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ABSTRACT 
 
This thesis aims to better understand the long-term recovery processes after a catastrophe 
linked to a natural hazard, and the adaptation strategies implemented to reduce the risk of 
disaster and to “build-back-better”. The study focuses on the sustainability of the recovery 
process. It underlines the complexity of managing short-term and long-term socio-
economic needs without creating new forms of vulnerability and without affecting the 
resilience of the society. 
The research focuses on the case of Montserrat, a small Caribbean island severely affected 
by a prolonged volcanic eruption from 1995 to 2010. Due to the destruction of its capital 
city, Plymouth, and most of its critical infrastructure, the island experienced mass 
emigration during the crisis. Demand for labour during the physical recovery and a need to 
re-establish a sustainable level of population has led to large-scale immigration from 
neighbouring Caribbean countries. Immigrants accounted for only 5-10% of the population 
in 1990 but now compose about half of the population. 
The research adopted an ethnographic approach, employing semi-structured and informal 
interviews, observation and focus-group discussion. It involved three seasons of fieldwork 
between 2014 and 2017.  
The changes induced by the demographic transformation of the country during an unstable 
period highlight a number of challenges and dilemmas for the long-term development of 
the island. Twenty years after the first eruption, physical and demographic recovery are 
seen as the main priorities, to the detriment of disaster risk reduction plans and immigration 
management. The research highlights how the will to restore stability conceived in terms 
of pre-disaster normalcy and cultural identity has tended to prevent the creation of bridging 
social cohesion in the newly diverse society, contributing to the marginalisation of 
immigrants and hence creating vulnerabilities to disaster. 
Although reconstruction has reduced the remaining population’s physical exposure to 
natural hazards, these efforts are constrained by a lack of resources and of time, and fail to 
consider post-disaster change in terms of social vulnerability to disaster. Moreover, 
memory of the previous disasters, familiarity with the volcanic hazards and the reliance on 
monitoring are mobilised to create a sense of safety, preventing the implementation of 
efficient risk communication and preparedness measures. The thesis argues that the will to 
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recover stability and promote economic, physical and demographic recovery encourages 
the creation of a collective imaginary where the risk of natural hazards, especially of 
volcanic hazards, is largely minimised. It claims that this prevents the country from 
adopting adaptive strategies based on learning, experience and memory. 
The thesis makes a case for adopting a comprehensive view of post-disaster recovery, one 
that takes into consideration the interactions between different dimensions of the process, 
and the social system in which the redevelopment occurs and that existed before the 
disaster.  
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CHAPTER ONE 
INTRODUCTION 
 
“Where there is a ruin, there is hope for a treasure”, Rumi  
 
1.1. Setting the scene: Recovery process, and post-disaster challenges 
Disastrous events and emergency response have received a lot of attention from 
researchers. However, it is well known that the impacts of disaster can last long after the 
aid flow has dried up, whether they concern the physical environment, the economy of a 
country or the psychological well-being of the affected people. This long-term period, 
despite being critical for the redevelopment of the affected place, is largely neglected both 
by practitioners and researchers (Rubin, 2009).  
Recovery is mainly discussed in terms of emergency and relief and the long-term 
implications are rarely considered. The decisions made during the post-disaster period are 
themselves, on the one hand, influenced by the disaster, in different extents dependent upon 
the context; while on the other hand, they highly determine the recovery trajectory of the 
affected communities. Research on disaster has recently started to focus more on the post-
disaster recovery following decades of focusing mainly on reducing vulnerability. 
Research now recognizes the importance of this time as opportune for learning from past 
events in order to create a resilient society (Becker & Reusser, 2016; Jordan & Javernick-
Will, 2012; Lindell, 2013; Oliver-Smith, 1990; Sword-Daniels, Twigg, & Loughlin, 2014). 
The Hyogo Framework for Action for 2005-2015 has institutionalized this in the principle 
of “build-back-better” (Becker & Reusser, 2016). This clearly distinguishes the recovery 
process from the idea of a “return to normal”, to the conditions existing before the disaster, 
and emphasizes the need for change and improvement, in order to reduce the drivers of 
vulnerability to natural hazards. Hence, it recognizes the need to include preparedness 
measures within the recovery period, instead of considering them as separate stages of the 
disaster cycle.  
Despite the ideal of building-back-better and learning from the past experience, the 
post-disaster recovery process remains very challenging to understand and to implement in 
a sustainable way. Defining when the relief period gives way to the long-term recovery 
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period, and when this one is finally achieved would require specific and measurable 
indicators. So far, attempts to determine them have failed due to the complexity of the 
process. Although studies often focus on physical rebuilding in order to examine and 
measure the recovery process, the latter is much more complex and multi-dimensional 
(Alesch, Arendt, & Holly, 2009; Johnson & Hayashi, 2012; Medd et al., 2015; Olshansky, 
Hopkins, & Johnson, 2012; Rubin, 2009; Smith & Wenger, 2007). For example, recovery 
encompasses psychological, social, demographic or environmental recovery. Each of these 
run at their own pace and interact with each other, impeding or encouraging them. Hence 
there are several recovery processes during the post-disaster period. We therefore need to 
understand each of these specific processes and their interactions in order to implement 
sustainable practices, reduce vulnerability and build resilience. 
The question of normality is very significant in the process of recovery. Although 
the common attempt of policy-makers and affected people is to recreate the resources they 
lost during the disaster and the familiar environment they were familiar with, the relevance 
of such an approach is now largely criticized among academics working in the field 
(Birkmann et al., 2010; Khasalamwa, 2009). Indeed, the occurrence of the disaster is clear 
evidence that the affected society was vulnerable in several aspects. Reinstating a pre-
disaster status-quo would correspond as reproducing the conditions for vulnerability 
(Handmer & Dovers, 1996; Klein, Nicholls, & Thomalla, 2003; Pelling & Dearing, 2008). 
Hence a sustainable recovery involves addressing and reducing the vulnerabilities that led 
to the initial disaster. This corresponds to the desire to move forward and create a resilient 
society. Resilience is increasingly considered as a major dimension of post-disaster 
recovery that could define the sustainability of the process (Manyena, 2006). However, the 
concept, although now widely used both among academics and practitioners working in 
the field of disaster risk reduction, remains unclear and subject to very different 
interpretations, making it difficult to operationalize. It is understood in this thesis as the 
“the intrinsic capacity of a system, community or society predisposed to a shock or stress 
to adapt and survive by changing its non-essential attributes and rebuilding itself” 
(Manyena, 2006, p. 443).  It therefore supposes that affected communities have strong 
adaptive capacities and can learn from the previous event. The thesis is based on the idea 
that there are learnings taking place at different levels in the recovery processes, 
implemented through policy and practices, that contribute to determine how adaptive or 
maladaptive the society’s transformation is, and hence the sustainability of the change 
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implemented (Djalante, Holley, Thomalla, & Carnegie, 2013; Lebel, Grothmann, & 
Siebenhüner, 2010; Pelling, 2011; Tosey, Visser, & Saunders, 2012; Wilkinson, 2013).   
Learning from a disaster and building-back better presents a central challenge for 
the recovery process because it aims to improve the measures for disaster risk reduction 
(DRR). While disasters were formerly considered as an “act of God” or “act of Nature”, 
which required only technical measures in order to mitigate the risk, it is now recognized 
that disasters are not natural, but result from the combined factors that produce or 
exacerbate vulnerability (Hewitt, 1983; O’Keefe, Westgate, & Wisner, 1976; Wisner, 
Blaikie, Cannon, & Davis, 2004). Disasters arise from social and political processes that 
prevent the most marginalized people from adjusting to and coping with natural hazards. 
Reducing the risk of disaster during the post-disaster recovery process implies therefore 
reducing the vulnerabilities which existed before the disaster and those emerging during 
and after the disaster (Djalante et al., 2013; Klinke & Renn, 2012; Manyena, 2006; Wisner 
et al., 2004). In turn, this involves raising people’s awareness of the risk of disaster (Mercer, 
Kelman, Taranis, & Suchet-Pearson, 2010; Renn, 2004; Wachinger & Renn, 2010)  and 
improving risk preparedness. Although there has been much research on the best 
approaches to increase preparedness and reduce the risk of disaster, there are relatively few 
studies of the challenges of implementing measures for DRR in a post-disaster period, a 
period of transition marked by multiple disruptions of the society.  
The post-disaster period therefore is complex and multi-dimensional. It consists of 
several recovery processes, including economic, physical, psychological or social, each 
going at different pace and interacting with each other. Recovery processes build on pre-
existing social structures, culture and values, in order to create a more resilient and a 
sustainable future. It can in turn reproduce existing social inequalities or create new factors 
of vulnerability to disaster. Analysis of the recovery processes is embedded in the discourse 
of vulnerability reduction and resilience building. Facing these complexities, Alesch (2005, 
p.494) highlights: “If the history of purposeful human intervention in complex systems 
should teach us anything, it should teach us that any intervention ought to be premised on 
a sound understanding of the system we are attempting to affect. Intervention based on an 
absence of understanding, no matter how well-intentioned, will have unexpected and 
unpredictable consequences. We are beginning to get good longitudinal information on 
what happens to communities and those people in them, but we do not have a theory of 
post-event recovery on which to base advice or to inform policy makers”. In my thesis, I 
do not propose a fully worked out theory of post-disaster but aim to better understand the 
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process. Three aspects of particular significance are further explored within this thesis in 
order to better understand the challenges of the post-disaster recovery processes:  
(1) reducing the risk of future disaster during the post-disaster period, as part of the 
learning process,  
(2) adapting to post-disaster change, focusing here on demographic change and 
immigration, and  
(3) strengthening social cohesion as a precondition for sustainable development.  
 
Research on risk and DRR includes, in particular, work on risk mitigation, for 
instance the technical measures implemented for lessening or limiting the adverse impacts 
of natural hazards. It also includes work on prevention and preparedness measures to 
effectively anticipate, respond to, and recover from hazardous events. Research on 
preparedness has focused in particular on risk perception (Haynes, Barclay, & Pidgeon, 
2008b; Renn, 1990, 2004; Slovic, 1987; Wachinger, Renn, Begg, & Kuhlicke, 2013), risk 
communication (Alaszewski, 2005; Bier, 2001; Breakwell, 2000; Haynes, Barclay, & 
Pidgeon, 2008a; Okada & Matsuda, 2005) and on trust between stakeholders (Alaszewski, 
2005; Carothers, Moritz, & Zarger, 2014; Haynes et al., 2008a, 2008b; Siegrist & 
Cvetkovich, 2000; Wachinger et al., 2013). Indeed, research on DRR increasingly 
demonstrates the importance of social context in the adoption of DRR strategies, in 
particular the role of culture (Mercer et al., 2012). This emphasizes the importance of local 
knowledge and the need of considering culture as part of the measures of preparedness, 
along with scientific knowledge (Cadag & Gaillard, 2011; Harris, 2012; Mercer, Kelman, 
Suchet-Pearson, & Lloyd, 2009; Mercer et al., 2010; Wisner, 2009). The formation of local 
knowledge is intimately linked to the experience and memory of past events, and 
contributes to shape the way risks are perceived. Risk perception is not merely individual 
but draws on collective imaginaries of the affected society and its associated risks, which 
in turns is shaped by active processes of forgetting and remembering some events, or 
aspects of those events (Connerton, 2009, 2010; Gruev-Vintila & Rouquette, 2007; 
McEwen, Garde-Hansen, Holmes, Jones, & Krause, 2017; Muzaini, 2015). Memory and 
risk perception therefore play a critical role in the post-disaster recovery, a period that can 
be marked by trauma or important psychological disruptions. It may highly influence the 
preparedness to future disaster and hence affects the strategies of recovery.  
Moreover, it is widely acknowledged that social capital plays an important role for 
reducing the risk of disaster (Aldrich, 2011; Aldrich & Meyer, 2014; Chamlee-Wright & 
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Storr, 2011; Mukherji, 2014). It supports amongst other things relations of trust that are 
essential for risk communication, access to information for building knowledge and 
accurate risk perception, or even access to a supportive social network (Aldrich, 2011, 
2012; Nakagawa & Shaw, 2004). Despite the evidences, practitioners and academics 
largely neglect the role played by social capital during the post-disaster recovery process. 
Aldrich (2011, p.595) argues that social capital is “the strongest and most robust predicator 
of population recovery after catastrophe”. Nakagawa & Shaw (2004, p.5) also explain that, 
“the community with social capital records the highest satisfaction rate for the new town 
planning and has the speediest recovery rate”. More specifically, social cohesion is largely 
underestimated by practitioners despite the multiple examples where it has clearly been a 
major factor of recovery (Aldrich & Meyer, 2014; Chamlee-Wright, 2009; Chamlee-
Wright & Storr, 2011; Leroy et al., 2016). However, a disaster is often a driver of 
demographic change that can significantly disrupt social networks and social cohesion long 
after the event itself.  
Natural hazards frequently trigger population movements out of and into the 
affected area. An increasing number of studies explore emigration movements following a 
disaster, viewing them as a coping or an adaptation strategy. This is particularly discussed 
in the context of climate change, for instance as a consequence of sea-level rise affecting 
some coastal areas. However, very little research has explored immigration movements 
into places affected by a disaster, although it is a relatively common phenomenon. Existing 
studies are essentially limited to the case of the New Orleans after Hurricane Katrina, where 
immigrants came mainly to rebuild and take job opportunities. By providing support for 
the recovery process, immigration not only contributes to changing the demography and 
the socio-economic context of a place, it also creates new challenges in terms of 
vulnerability to disaster. Indeed, it is now widely recognized that when their specific needs 
are not addressed, immigrants can be disproportionally vulnerable during and after disaster 
(Guadagno, 2015; Guadagno, Fuhrer, & Twigg, 2017). It is therefore essential to 
understand the role and the challenges faced by immigrants during the post-disaster period 
in order to promote a sustainable recovery and prevent their further marginalization. 
Assessing the post-disaster recovery process of a society includes assessing its capacity to 
adapt to demographic change and to include immigrants in the process.  
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1.2. Aims of the research 
While many studies have focused on understanding the cascading impacts of a 
disaster, in this thesis I aim to understand the forces that shape the trajectory of the recovery 
in post-disaster period in order to better understand the challenges, obstacles and resources 
for making a society resilient and leading a sustainable development. I aim to better 
understand how post-disaster recovery is conducted in a context of demographic change 
and uncertainty. I do not intend to establish measurable criteria but rather to identify the 
factors that support or obstruct change toward that goal. For that, I aim to examine the 
recovery processes in terms of the risk of and vulnerability to disaster, analysing how the 
recovery process contributes to developing adaptive capacities or, on the contrary, to 
developing conditions of vulnerability.  
To understand the complexities of the recovery processes, I focused this research 
on the case study of Montserrat, a small British Overseas Territory located in the 
Caribbean. The country was affected by fifteen years of volcanic eruptions between 1995 
and 2010, starting only six years after Hurricane Hugo had destroyed about 90% of the 
infrastructure. Since 1997, the southern two-thirds of the country has been totally evacuated 
and remains an exclusion zone. The capital city, Plymouth, and most of the major 
infrastructure were destroyed by pyroclastic flows and lahars. In 1998, three years after the 
beginning of the crisis, 75% of the population of about 10,300 emigrated to the UK or to 
neighbouring Caribbean countries. The rest of the population, reduced at its lowest point 
to only 2,400 inhabitants, had to relocate to the underdeveloped North of the country. From 
2002, the population started to increase again and reached about 4,500. Since then, it has 
stabilized between 4,000 and 5,000. This growth is largely due to intense immigration from 
poorer Caribbean countries, mainly Guyana, Jamaica and the Dominican Republic. That 
led to a major social and cultural change as the immigrants now constitute about half of the 
total population, while in 1990 they represented only 5-10% of the population.  
Since 2010 the level of volcanic activity has been low and no eruptions have been 
recorded. However, the risk is still present. Moreover, the island is prone to several other 
natural hazards, including the hurricanes that occur in the Caribbean almost every year at 
different levels of intensity. Therefore the recovery process occurs in the context of 
continuing high levels of uncertainty and of major socio-economic and cultural change.  
In this context, the specific objectives of this research are to: 
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 Understand the motives and the visions that shape post-disaster development 
measures, 
 Examine the interactions between the different dimensions of recovery, in particular 
how physical rebuilding interacts with the social, economic, cultural and political 
recovery, including multi-scale interactions, 
 Determine how the society adapts during the post-disaster period to additional 
change, in particular demographic change and immigration 
 Evaluate the extent to which post-disaster development strategies have contributed 
to enhancing adaptive capacities or to creating conditions that increase vulnerability 
to disaster 
 Examine how social cohesion is considered during the recovery process and how that 
affects the trajectory of the recovery 
 Examine how the experience of past disaster shapes the vision of the future and 
consequently the measures for DRR and risk communication. 
 
1.3. Structure of the thesis 
Following this introduction, Chapter Two provides a review of the research 
literature on disaster and post-disaster recovery, and outlines the analytical framework of 
this study. It presents a review of literature on disaster, vulnerability and recovery notably, 
and points out the main challenges in this understanding. Derived from this review, the 
analytical framework provides the basis for data analysis and discussion in the following 
chapters, and traces their links with the existing literature.  
Chapter Three presents the research methods used for the study. The research is 
based on a combination of qualitative data collection methods, including interviews, 
observation and focus group discussion for data collection, and qualitative data analysis 
based on a coding-based approach. The chapter also provides a reflection on the appropriate 
ethical stance of the work, the anticipated and unanticipated challenges faced during the 
study, both during the fieldwork and during the analysis, and their practical implications 
for this study.  
Chapter Four is an introduction to the case study, Montserrat. It introduces the 
major hazards the country is prone to and an historical timeline of its major disasters. It 
also presents the socio-economic setting of the country and their recent evolution. The 
chapter focuses particularly on the recent demographic change, and details who are the 
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recent immigrants, and their socio-economic conditions. It provides the context of the post-
disaster change and enables to further analyse the challenges of this period and of the 
decisions to take for redeveloping the Island.  
Chapters Five, Six and Seven present the data analysis and develop the research 
questions presented earlier. The three chapters examine the sustainability of the recovery 
process from the perspective of vulnerability to disaster. Chapter Five is a comparison of 
the development of four neighbourhoods. It explores, both at the scale of the 
neighbourhoods and at the national scale, how the rebuilding and the development 
initiatives, formal and informal, enable to build social cohesion and a better consideration 
of the risk of disaster. It analyses how the principles of building-back-better are 
implemented, the obstacles and the factors that support it.   
Chapter Six focuses on the role of immigration in the recovery processes. After 
providing an analysis of the role of the immigrants as actors in the process, it discusses 
how the recovery process has responded to the demographic, cultural and social change 
linked to immigration. It provides a qualitative vulnerability assessment and analyses how 
the strategies of development marginalize the newcomers and create conditions likely to 
increase their vulnerability to disasters.  
Chapter Seven explores more directly the questions of disaster risk reduction. It 
provides an analysis of how the recovery process takes into consideration the risk of 
disaster. It examines how past experience, memory of disaster and the collective imaginary 
shapes the way risk is communicated and DRR measures are implemented. The chapter 
provides an analysis of the evolution of risk perception during the post-disaster period and 
its impact on the way risk is communicated.  
A synthesis and conclusions to the research are provided in Chapter 8. The main 
findings and their relevance for other contexts, other than Montserrat and other than those 
exposed to volcanic hazards, are discussed. Finally, it highlights the important implications 
for practitioners and for future research on post-disaster recovery. 
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CHAPTER TWO
UNDERSTANDING THE PROCESSES OF RECOVERY: 
THE ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK
Disasters have been largely studied in  academic research,  from social  to physical
sciences.  This  interest  generated  diverse and evolving perspectives  over  time and across
different  disciplines.  This  thesis  attempts  to  look at  the complexities  of  the post-disaster
recovery processes, and so requires a complete understanding of the existing literature and
current analytical framework. 
This chapter explores the literature on disaster and post-disaster recovery. It starts
with a setting of the philosophical paradigm that has led the reflection and the data analysis.
It then examines the evolution of the academic understanding of disaster, with a greater focus
on the process of creation of disaster and of vulnerability. It then explores the post-disaster
recovery  process,  including  its  role  as  an  opportunity  for  learning  and  change,  and  the
concept of resilience. It also presents some of the major challenges for measuring recovery
and  for  implementing  a  sustainable  recovery  process,  in  particular  the  issues  of  risk
perception, risk communication and development of social capital.  
2.1. Philosophical paradigm
Attempting to analyse and understand how society works and designing a research
project  to  this  end  cannot  be  done  without  first  identifying  the  researcher’s worldview.
Everybody  has  a  different  approach  to  the  world  based  on  specific  ontological  and
epistemological assumptions (Guba & Lincoln, 1994). Hay (2002, p.6) argues that “ontology
relates to the nature of the social and political world, epistemology to what we can know
about it and methodology to how we might go about acquiring that knowledge”. In other
words ontology asks the question “is there a ‘real’ world ‘out there’ that is independent of our
knowledge of it?”  (Marsh & Furlong, 2002, p.18). It is important to distinguish two major
positions. The first, foundationalism, underlines that a real world exists independently of our
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knowledge  and  constitutes  the  foundations  of  life.  The  second,  called  constructivism,
underlines that there is no “real” world, as the world is socially constructed and variable
depending on time, place and culture. 
Epistemology  addresses  the  theory  of  knowledge,  its  nature  and  justification.  It
reflects the “view of what we can know about the world and how we can know it” (Marsh &
Furlong, 2002, p.19). The first type of view above argues that objectivity is possible, and that
it is for the researcher possible to know about the world without interfering on it. The second
view argues that objectivity is impossible and that our view and knowledge of the world is a
social construction of reality (Marsh & Furlong, 2002). The ontological and epistemological
positions of the researcher have major methodological implications and contribute to shaping
the conduct of the study and design of the methodology. According to  Marsh & Furlong
(2002, p.17), “[epistemology and ontology] shape the approach to theory and the methods”,
as they are deeply grounded in the researcher’s beliefs about the world.  It is  difficult  to
ignore them, even though they do not appear explicitly throughout the research. Marsh &
Furlong (2002, p.17) write that, “they are like a skin, not a sweater: they cannot be put on or
taken off whenever the researcher sees fit”. It is essential to address these two considerations
to choose the best methodological design. 
Different paradigms, in other words comprehensive belief systems, worldviews and
frameworks, lie on a spectrum from positivism to relativism.
Positivism corresponds to the standard view of science. It entails the idea that the
world exists independently of the observer, and that there is a constant relationship between
events and variables. It considers that facts can be observed or experienced and that there are
no invisible entities influencing the processes or facts observed. The observation of facts is
totally independent from values and not influenced by them (Robson, 2013). Positivist social
scientists consider that reality can be observed, measured and analysed by the same way as
natural sciences traditionally do. In other words, positivists use theory to generate hypotheses
that they then test through direct observation, implying that the latter is objective. The data
collected  are  eventually  used  to  generate  rigorous  models,  general  laws  and  causal
relationships  about  social  phenomena.  Positivist  research  generally  uses  quantitative
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methods,  which  it  considers  objective,  generalizable  and  replicable,  and  looks  for  an
explanation of behaviour rather than the meaning of it. 
This approach has been highly criticized by relativists and others in social research.
They argue that the same event can be seen differently depending on worldview and past
experiences.  In its  extreme form, relativism argues that  there is  no reality separate  from
human consciousness (Robson, 2013), and hence no one true reality, as the world is socially
constructed. This is an anti-foundationalist ontological position. Relativists argue that it is
not possible to be objective and value-free while conducting observation, contrary to what
positivists claim. This paradigm states that there are no strict and defined criteria to judge
and analyse reality. Instead it claims that reality should be interpreted from the point of view
of those observing that reality. It rejects the possibility of objectivity and argues that the
researcher is a participant and “always presents a specific version of social reality, rather than
one that  can be regarded as specific”  (Bryman,  2004, p.29).  Unlike positivists,  who use
natural  science  methods,  relativists  usually  mobilize  qualitative  research  methods  to
understand social behaviour, rather than explaining it and focusing on its meaning. 
Constructivists,  heirs  of  the  relativist  school  of  thought,  consider  that  reality  is
socially  constructed  and therefore  multiple  realities  coexist  together, and the  task of  the
researcher is to identify and understand them. Interviews and observation are adequate tools
for understanding this multiplicity. 
These polarized paradigms are often criticized, as they are problematic for qualitative
research. While positivism ignores the role of interpreting the findings in regards to values
and context, relativism is criticized for making it hard to produce legitimate and credible
research, since there can be different interpretations of the same event, and for preventing
arrival at an accepted conclusion (Andrews, 2012; Hammersley & Atkinson, 2007; Robson,
2013)
More nuanced approaches are now adopted in social research. On one side of the
spectrum, post-positivism is still  committed to objectivity but recognizes that knowledge,
values and background can influence what is observed. It considers that although there is
only one reality, it cannot be perfectly known. Among relativists, many recognize that there
can be some underlying realities (Robson, 2013). 
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Realism and pragmatism permit the conduct of social research without adopting a
pure positivist or relativist approach. Realism considers that research is value-laden, enabling
the  integration of  both  subjective and objective approaches  to  understand social  objects,
depending on what fits the subject matter best. It explains the explored phenomenon in terms
both of mechanisms in place that produce an action, and in specific contexts, mechanisms
already in place impeding a change or particular outcome. Its objective is to describe the true
story of a phenomenon, or of what the world is like (Cherryholmes, 1992). 
Pragmatism shares a number of assumptions with realism and critical realism. It is
also opposed to positivism (Cherryholmes, 1992; Robson, 2013). Contrary to many research
traditions, pragmatism does not focus on antecedent phenomena and past experience. Dewey,
a pragmatist, wrote in 1931 that pragmatism “does not insist upon antecedent phenomena but
upon consequent phenomena; not upon the precedents but upon the possibilities of action.
And this change in point of view is almost revolutionary in its consequences […]. When we
take the point of view of a pragmatism we see that general ideas have a very different role to
play than that of reporting and registering past experiences. They are the bases for organizing
future observations and experiences” (1931 in Cherryholmes, 1992, p.13).
Cherryholmes (ibid, p.13) explains that, “pragmatic choices about what to research
and how to go about it are conditioned by where we want to go in the broadest of senses”. He
argues that the data collected and their interpretation are largely embedded in the researcher’s
values, political and social preferences. Pragmatists are generally more sceptical than realists
about the possibility of telling the true story of the world, doubting that we can know that our
interpretation of the world corresponds to reality. Research is driven by the problem in hand
and designed depending on the specific goal of the research question; this is more important
than the paradigm or the methods (Cherryholmes, 1992). 
Given the nature of this research on the long-term consequences of current decisions
and actions, the aim of building change, and the worldview of the researcher, this research is
largely based on a pragmatic epistemology which determines understanding of the issues
tackled in the study and the methods adopted to conduct the research. 
2.2. Conceptual framework
Page | 13
2.2.1. What are disasters?
The  study of  disaster  is  nothing  new, with  the  earliest  studies  dating  from 1920
(Oliver-Smith, 1999). However, since then several conceptual views and foci have emerged
from competing  paradigms,  schools  of  thought  and research  traditions  (Chipangura,  Van
Niekerk, & Van Der Waldt, 2016; Oliver-Smith, 1999). It has evolved from a very positivist
approach, essentially based in the natural sciences, to a social constructivist approach. Such a
shift  not  only  affects  the  understanding  and  conceptualization  of  disasters  but  also  the
policies and decisions made to reduce the risks. Until now, no consensus has been reached on
the  definition  of  the  term  “disaster”,  and  regular  debates  emerge  among  scholars  to
understand “what a disaster is”.
In the efforts  to define what a  disaster is,  different paradigms from positivism to
social constructivism have influenced its understanding. From the 1940s to 1970s, studies of
disaster  essentially  adopted  an  objectivist,  or  positivist,  perspective.  This  view,  largely
shaped  by  the  natural  sciences,  such  as  geology, seismology  and  meteorology, strongly
emphasizes the importance of natural hazards in explaining the occurrence of a catastrophic
event.  Ontologically,  the  real  is  characterized  by  the  risk  itself  and  can  be  measured
objectively, especially in terms of the probability of loss (Chipangura et al., 2016). Research
has mainly centred on understanding the physical aspects of risk, in other words natural
hazards. From this perspective, disasters are mainly characterized as acts of Nature, detached
from social  issues  (Chipangura et  al.,  2016).  This understanding of disaster  is  called the
“hazard paradigm”, and was spearheaded by Gilbert F. White (1945) and two of his students,
Burton and Kates  (1964). Burton and Kates (ibid, p.413) define natural hazards as “those
elements in the physical environment, harmful to man and caused by forces extraneous to
him”, focusing on “the violent forces of nature”: this is the environmental determinist view.
Disasters  are  explained  by  geophysical  processes,  defined  as  “rare  and  extreme  natural
phenomena  greatly  exceeding  human  expectation  in  terms  of  [their]  magnitude  and
frequency” (Chapman, 1994 in  Gaillard, 2015, p.22). They are also justified by a lack of
human rationality and lack of modernity and development. In the hazard paradigm, nature is
thus considered the main triggering factor while the social dimension of disaster is largely
neglected. Nature is presented as an element that should be controlled and fought against.
The  literature  and  media  using  the  hazard  paradigm  overflow  with  adjectives  such  as,
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“extraordinary”, “uncontrollable”, “unpredictable” and “unexpected” (Gaillard, 2010, p.221).
Until  the  1970s,  therefore,  measures  for  reducing  risks  of  disaster  were  very
technocratic, focusing on controlling nature and mitigating hazards. They mainly focused on
anticipating the occurrence and severity of the hazard and measuring the short-term impacts,
the  short-term  mechanisms,  and  technical  means.  The  declaration  of  the  1990s  as  the
International  Decade  for  Natural  Disaster  Reduction  by  the  United  Nations  General
Assembly stressed the importance of quantitative analysis and objective measurements for
generalizable findings that are independent of the specific social context in which they are
measured (Chipangura et al., 2016). Infrastructure for prediction and early warning alerts, as
well as technocratic measures, are seen as a fundamental ways to reduce the risk of disaster. 
In the 1970s this paradigm started to be strongly criticized by both practitioners and
scholars working in the field of disasters, in part because the effects of disasters had not
decreased  despite  the  application  of  improved  technical  measures.  Following  the  well-
established  tradition  of  deconstructive  critique  (Escobar,  1995) in  geography  and  the
development  of  political  ecology, numerous scholars  questioned the objectivist  paradigm
used  to  explain  disasters  and  hazards.  The  “naturalness”  of  disaster  was  questioned
(O’Keefe,  Westgate,  & Wisner, 1976) and its  “exceptionalism”  (Hewitt,  1983) criticized.
Disasters  are  considered  the  result  of  social  and  political  constructs  which  cannot  be
distinguished from daily life (Bankoff, Frerks, & Hilhorst, 2004; Wisner, Blaikie, Cannon, &
Davis, 2004). Rather than being a “state”, they are considered the result of a dynamic process
leading to a collapsing situation that occurs when society or groups of individuals no longer
adjusts to its environment (Wisner, 1998). Collins (2009) argues that disasters are intimately
linked  with  insufficient  development  and  insufficient  adaptive  capacities.  Oliver-Smith
(1999, p.20) defines disasters as “totalizing events” as they bring to light the interaction
between  environmental,  cultural,  political  and  technological  processes  and  events.  This
approach  claims  that  the  principal  cause  of  risks  and  disasters  is  not  natural  hazards
themselves, but the social conditions they interact with (Alexander, 2000). Calling disasters
“natural”  is  nonsensical  as  it  denies  the  social  dimension  of  the  concept  and  society’s
capacity to reduce or eliminate the risk of disaster by acting not on the natural hazard itself,
but on its vulnerability. The concept of vulnerability is fundamental to understanding and
addressing risk (Hewitt, 2007; Kelman, 2003; Wisner et al., 2004). Wisner et al. (2004, p.11)
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describe vulnerability as “the characteristics of a person or group and their situation that
influence their  capacity to anticipate,  cope with,  resist  and recover from the impact of a
natural hazard”. Scholars that support this view argue that a better understanding of disasters
sees them as non-routine social problems (Chipangura et al., 2016), rather than exceptional
events disconnected from society. 
The  evolution  of  understanding  disaster  has  strong  implications  for  measures  to
reduce  the  risk  of  disaster.  However,  while  the  importance  of  considering  the  social
dimension of disaster has been established in academic literature, there is still a major gap in
the implementation of policies for risk reduction between theory and practices. Policies are
still predominantly governed by an objectivist approach (Chipangura et al., 2016) where the
natural hazard is the main focus for DRR. Chipangura et al. (2016) note that further research
is needed to explore why governments remain reluctant to adopt a constructivist perspective
in  their  implementation  of  DRR policy. Cannon  (1994) argues  that  the hazard paradigm
allows avoidance of questioning the social and economic issues in the region concerned. This
thesis contributes some early answers to this fundamental question in the context of post-
disaster recovery and the rebuilding of the “new normal”. 
2.2.2. Vulnerability to natural hazards
2.2.2.1. Social dimension of disaster
A major component of the risk of disaster is vulnerability. Despite about two decades
of research on the concept, the definition of the word “vulnerability” is not straightforward.
The  World  Development  Report  2000/2001  (World  Bank,  2001,  p.139) states  that
“vulnerability measures resilience against a shock - the likelihood that a shock will result in a
decline  of  well-being”.  Wisner  et  al.  (2004,  p.11)  define  it  more  precisely  as,  “the
characteristics  of  a  person  or  group  and  their  situation  that  influence  their  capacity  to
anticipate, cope with, resist and recover from the impact of a natural hazard”. 
 Like the concept of recovery, vulnerability encompasses several dimensions and can
be understood in different ways. A question commonly asked is, “vulnerability to whom and
to  what?”.  A person can  be  vulnerable  to  one  specific  hazard  at  a  specific  moment  but
resilient to another type of hazard. While the scope of vulnerability often tends to be reduced
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to the exposure of people to hazards or to their level of poverty (Wisner et al., 2004), it is
essential  to  recognize  that  it  is  a  more  complex  concept  with  a  large  set  of  indicators.
Moreover Wisner et al. (2004) remind us that “vulnerability” is a predictive and hypothetical
term. It can only be proved when an event occurs by analysing its impact on individuals and
society.  
To  understand  the  link  between  the  socio-political-economic  context  and  actual
disasters, vulnerability can be interpreted through the concept of livelihoods, defined as “the
command an individual, family or other social group has over an income and/or bundles or
resources that can be used or exchanged to satisfy its needs. This may involve information,
cultural knowledge, social networks and legal rights as well as tools, lands or other physical
resources” (Wisner et al., 2004, p.11). 
Livelihoods may be categorized into five types of capitals that are used daily to face various
hazards:
○ human capital (skills, knowledge, health);
○ social capital (networks, groups, institutions);
○ physical capital (infrastructure, technology, equipment);
○ financial capital (savings, credits);
○ natural capital (natural resources) (Wisner et al., 2004)
The  sustainable  livelihood  approach  closely  corresponds  to  the  Access  model
developed by Wisner et al. (2004). It explores how an individual or community manages the
five  types  of  capital  to  construct  their  livelihood  system,  with  some  types  of  capital
sometimes compensating for the lack of others.  The system becomes unsustainable when
there is too much dependency on one specific type of capital with no possibility of adapting
or compensating in situations of stress. 
As discussed later, what determines the level of vulnerability of an individual or a
group is not only the availability of livelihoods and capitals but the level of access to them.
This approach argues that vulnerability is directly anchored in daily life. The reasons for
disasters must be found in everyday life rather than in exceptional situations, as Wisner et al.
(2004) demonstrates in Figure 2.1, which explains the processes leading to hazards from an
initial situation of vulnerability. 
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In this diagram Wisner et al. highlight the different spatial and temporal, local and
international, and past and present scales. Vulnerability is considered not only a present state
but  also a  process  rooted  in  history. The first  step in  the progression of  vulnerability  is
identifying  its  root  causes  on  the  global  level,  including  in  the  social  and  economic
structures,  the  history  and  culture,  and  global  and  local  ideologies;  in  other  words,  the
context from which society is built and its functioning according to its norms and values.
This is also called the “production system” (Klee, 1980; Parry and Carter, 1987 in Wisner,
1993). According to  Watts & Bohle (1993), it  is the political economic environment that
makes individuals more or less vulnerable by organizing a particular system of power. Other
authors explain the vulnerability of groups of people by the type of social organization and
thus the power relationships between stakeholders  (Lewis, 1987; Peter Timmerman, 1981;
Pelanda, 1981 in Wisner, 1993). Timmerman (1981) argues for instance that some forms of
societies  are  more prone  to  collapse because  of  the way they are structured.  These  root
causes directly impact on the dynamic pressures of vulnerability at an intermediate level,
namely the societal  deficiencies such as lack of government  measures  for DRR, lack of
research,  or a deficit  in dialogue between the population and the decision-makers. These
pressures affect the safety of livelihoods. Watts and Bohle (1993) illustrate this, arguing that
the structural causes of the food insecurity in Africa are the failure of policies and economic
transition,  instead  of  food shortage.  O’Keefe,  Westgate,  & Wisner  (1976) argue that  the
increasing vulnerability of the less-affluent countries is caused by how power and resources
are  shared  in  society,  often  to  the  benefit  of  a  minority.  These  dynamic  pressures  also
correspond to social, political, economic and environmental processes which make it difficult
for  society  to  function.  For  instance,  strong  population  growth  following  increasing
deforestation may make access to resources difficult. 
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Figure 2.1: The progression of vulnerability (Wisner et al., 2004)
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The last step takes place on the scale of the people affected by lack of access to the
resources that sustain their livelihoods. The importance of livelihood assets is based not just
on their availability but more on the access to them and thus on the possibility of satisfying
primary needs such as for food, accommodation or washing facilities A hospital  may be
available, but if health care is too expensive it is not accessible to everybody. Lack of access
to resources is the main factor leading to vulnerability by marginalizing people, as Figure 2.2
shows below. Daily lack of access to resources may persist because of individual constraints,
patronage politics or the uneven distribution of resources  (Watts & Bohle, 1993). Bosher
(2005)  explains  that  the  lack  of  access  to  public  services  (in  the  form  of  savings,
employment, the health service, for instance), to political networks (in the form of lack of
representation of some social groups due to tradition, corruption or nepotism), and to social
networks contributes to vulnerability. This leads to social and structural constraints and to
economic  and  political  factors  that  reduce  access  to  resources  and  thus  increase  the
vulnerability of marginalized groups (Blaikie & Brookfield, 1987; Watts & Bohle, 1993). 
This process is summarized as a “triangle of vulnerability” in Figure 2.2  (Wisner,
Gaillard,  &  Kelman,  2011).  It  illustrates  how  poor  access  to  resources  can  lead  to
marginalization. Vulnerability reflects the power relationships of people in society. 
Not only the access to resources is vital for decreasing vulnerability, but livelihood
also have to be sustainable. According to Chambers & Conway (1991, p.6), “a livelihood is
sustainable which can cope with and recover from stress and shocks, maintain or enhance its
capabilities  and  assets,  and  provide  sustainable  livelihood  opportunities  for  the  next
generation; and which contributes net benefits to other livelihoods at the local and global
levels and in the short and long terms”. Sustainable livelihoods are particularly important in
preventing  the  vicious  circle  of  vulnerability:  vulnerable  people  are  more  affected  by
disaster, which destroys their livelihoods, making them more vulnerable to further hazards. 
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Figure 2.2: Triangle of vulnerability (Wisner et al., 2011)
2.2.2.2. Marginalization: immigrants in disasters
The question of  access to  resources  is  essential  to  understanding vulnerability. In
extreme cases it is often characterized by the marginalization of individuals or groups. Social
inequalities may limit the livelihood options of some groups, both leading them to expose
themselves to hazardous environments and reducing their ability to cope with environmental
change  (Chambers,  1995;  Collins,  2010;  Susman,  O’Keefe,  &  Wisner,  1983).
Marginalization  is  often  associated  with  minorities  and  less-powerful  groups,  but  varies
considerably depending on the specific context. 
One  commonly-marginalized  group  is  migrants.  Although  migration  is  a  key
component of the globalized world,  migrants have been identified as often marginalized,
socially excluded, and especially vulnerable to natural hazards (Guadagno, Fuhrer, & Twigg,
2017).  While  the  situation  of  immigrants  in  disasters  remains  relatively  unexplored,  an
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increasing  number  of  studies  highlights  immigrants’  particular  vulnerability  to  natural
hazards and the necessity for including them more in the process of preparing for disaster, at
the time of a disaster  and in response and recovery measures  (Collins,  2017;  Donner &
Rodriguez,  2008;  Freeman,  2014;  Guadagno,  2015;  Guadagno  et  al.,  2017;  IOM,  2007;
MICIC, 2016; Pauver, Twigg, & Sagramola, 2016; Tompkins, Hurlston, & Poortinga, 2009a).
The majority  of  studies  exploring  the  specific  vulnerability  of  immigrants  looks at  their
livelihood resources, which are often more limited than those of the rest of the population.
The  question  of  language  is  often  mentioned  as  a  major  challenge  to  efficient  risk
communication  among  immigrant  communities  (Arlikatti,  Taibah,  &  Andrew,  2014).
Tompkins, Hurlston, & Poortinga (2009a), citing the case of the Cayman Islands, argue that
immigrants are less likely to engage in the preparedness process than the national population
is, due to their lack of local knowledge of hazards, their limited financial capacity and their
specific social network. A few studies highlight how many immigrants face specific issues
due to the very condition of migrants, such as a limited social network, reliance on other
sources of communication,  lack of trust  in authorities,  unsafe legal status,  which remain
neglected,  especially  at  the  time  of  a  disaster  (Blazer  & Murphy, 2008;  Duncan,  2013;
Guadagno et al., 2017; IOM, 2007). The post-disaster period also highlights the differences
between immigrants and natives’ needs and responses: immigrants often have less access to
assistance than natives, for instance  (Blazer & Murphy, 2008; Duncan, 2013; IOM, 2007),
and when a disaster happens immigrants are often left behind by local authorities and forced
to leave the host  country with strong implications for  the whole of their  lives  (Duncan,
2013).  Those  who  choose  or  are  constrained  to  stay  face  a  challenging  period  where
resources become limited and prioritized and minorities’ requirements and need for inclusion
are neglected by governments  (Blazer & Murphy, 2008; Duncan, 2013; Guadagno et  al.,
2017; Pauver et al., 2016). 
Research is increasingly showing the importance of efforts to include immigrants in
societies  preparing  for  hazards  or  recovering  from a  disaster  (Blazer  &  Murphy, 2008;
Duncan, 2013; Freeman, 2014; Guadagno, 2015; Guadagno et al., 2017; Kammerbauer &
Wamsler, 2017; MICIC, 2016; Pauver et  al.,  2016). However in practice,  integration and
social cohesion are rarely a priority for decision-makers and practitioners, and the needs of
immigrants are often overlooked or even exploited (Blazer & Murphy, 2008; Duncan, 2013).
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Most  of  the  existing  studies  linking  immigrants  and  disaster  focus  either, on  the
condition of immigrants already in the country at the time of the disaster or during the time
of preparation for disaster (Duncan, 2013; Guadagno et al., 2017; MICIC, 2016), or on the
displaced communities following a disaster (Ambrosetti & Petrillo, 2016; Curtis, Fussell, &
DeWaard,  2013;  Fussell  &  Lowe,  2014;  Ghimire,  Ferreira,  &  Dorfman,  2015;  Gray,
Frankenberg,  Gillespie,  Sumantri,  & Thomas,  2014;  King et  al.,  2014;  McDowell  & De
Haan, 1997). There is very little research on the situation of immigrants arriving in a place
already affected by disaster, in a period of recovery but also of preparedness. The existing
research on the topic are mainly limited to the demographic recovery of the New Orleans
after  Hurricane Katrina  (Fussell,  2015;  Fussell,  Curtis,  & DeWaard,  2014).  My research
takes a complementary perspective by looking at immigrants coming into an affected and
unstable area. Although they are not directly affected by the disaster, they become actors in
the recovery process, and the instability of the post-disaster period affect their integration and
their  preparedness for disaster. The process of moving to a new place abroad or another
region often leads to difficulties accessing resources, information, and services, for instance
(Collins, 2017; Duncan, 2013; Guadagno et al., 2017). While their status is often neglected
by governments,  the  condition  of  migrants  is  becoming  a  growing  concern  for  scholars
working on vulnerability to natural hazards, in terms of both preparedness for hazards and
recovery. 
2.2.3. Post-disaster recovery
The aftermath of a disaster is a very challenging time for affected communities and
places. Medd et al. (2015, p.320) argue that the disaster itself is not the hardest part to deal
with for the affected population: “it is the recovery process […] that seems to have the most
impact  on  people  and  exacerbates,  or  even  produces,  vulnerabilities”.  Paradoxically  the
recovery period is the least understood phase of disaster management for both scholars and
practitioners (Berke, Kartez, & Wenger, 1993; Chang, 2010; Davis, 2007; Olshansky, 2005;
Rubin, 2009; Rubin, Saperstein, & Barbee, 1985). The first studies were conducted about
four decades ago  (Haas, Kates, & Bowden, 1977), and since then little progress has been
made. Rubin (2009) deplores how there is not enough research to respond to current needs
regarding long-term recovery. Lack of adequate knowledge and post-disaster recovery theory
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is  impeding capacity  to  give advice and to  inform policymakers  (Lawther, 2016;  Rubin,
2009). Davis (2006) argues that it is the complexity and diversity of factors of success in the
recovery process that explains why this phase is so often neglected by policymakers until
they have to deal with it. 
In recent years there has been an increase in research focusing on disaster recovery
and progressive agreement on the definition of the recovery process. Quarantelli (1999, p.2)
defines the objective of the recovery process as “bringing the post-disaster situation to some
level of acceptability [which] may or may not be the same as the pre impact level”.  He
emphasizes the frequent impossibility of returning to the situation that existed prior to the
disaster. Disasters alter the functioning of the community and require adaptation to the, “new
normal” (Lawther, 2016; Norris, Stevens, Pfefferbaum, Wyche, & Pfefferbaum, 2008). The
1st  International  Conference  on  Urban  Disaster  Reduction,  held  in  Kobe  in  2005  and
focusing largely on the development of a theory of disaster recovery, officially recognized
that  returning  to  the  previous  status  quo  after  a  disaster  is  neither  always  possible  nor
desirable (Johnson & Hayashi, 2012). An accepted definition of recovery summarizes it as,
“the  process  of  restoring,  rebuilding,  and  reshaping  the  physical,  social  economic,  and
natural environment through pre-event planning and post-event actions” (Smith and Wenger,
2006 in Rubin, 2009, p.2). Sword-Daniels, Twigg, & Loughlin (2014, p.1) add to this, “[the]
improvement, where appropriate, of facilities, livelihoods and living conditions of disaster-
affected communities, including efforts to decrease disaster risk factors”.
The  process  of  recovery  encompasses  two  major  objectives:  “restoration  of  pre-
disaster  functions”  (Lindell,  2013, p.812) and improvement of the system to prevent  the
occurrence of another disaster or the likelihood of facing a similar disaster again. The idea of
improvement is now widely accepted (Jordan & Javernick-Will, 2013; Lindell, 2013; Oliver-
Smith, 1990; Sword-Daniels et al., 2014) and is often illustrated with the “build back better”
concept, institutionalized in the Hyogo Framework for Action in 2005  (Becker & Reusser,
2016). The post-disaster period offers an opportunity to tackle previous vulnerabilities and
triggers a transition from a pre-disaster society that was vulnerable and maladapted to natural
hazards to an improved society (Becker & Reusser, 2016).
Different characteristics of the recovery process have been identified and are now
broadly accepted. Firstly, it is not a linear process. Rubin et al. (1985, p.154) explain that
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“long-term recovery begins  at  different  times in  different  places  for  different  activities”.
Haas,  Kates,  & Bowden (1977) first  characterized  the recovery  period as  a  sequence of
distinct  stages,  including  the  emergency  period,  lasting  for  some  days  or  weeks;  the
restoration period, lasting for a few months; the replacement period of up to two years, and
finally  commemorative,  betterment,  and  developmental  reconstruction,  lasting  up  to  ten
years.  The  recovery  process  which  is  assimilated  within  reconstruction,  is  described  as
“ordered,  knowable,  and predictable”  (Haas et  al.,  1977, p.  xxvi).  These sequences have
since  been critiqued,  and other  studies  have  shown the  non-linearity  of  the  process,  the
overlapping of the sequences and the multiplicity of the dimensions of the recovery process,
each processing at its own pace (Berke et al., 1993; Lindell, 2013; Rubin, 2009; Tierney &
Oliver-Smith, 2012; Wisner et al., 2004). Moreover the post-disaster phase faces a unique
temporality, conceptualized by Olshansky, Hopkins, & Johnson (2012), which they refer to
as time compression. It is caused by several factors which are often explored in the literature
on recovery, including pressure to restore normalcy, mismatch between the flow of resources
and the pace of demands, tension between the need for quick action and the need for quality,
and the necessity of taking quick decisions while the necessary knowledge- and information-
gathering and planning require time. It also characterizes the differences in rates of recovery
across institutions and urban settings  (Alesch, Arendt, & Holly, 2009; Johnson & Hayashi,
2012; Olshansky et al., 2012; Rubin et al., 1985; Smith & Wenger, 2007).
The non-linearity of the process also means that it is difficult to clearly identify a
beginning and an end to the recovery phase (Medd et al., 2015). Rubin (2009, p.2) does not
give a specific beginning point, explaining that the recovery period is distinguished from the
emergency  when  the  first  responders  (for  instance  fire  and  police  officials)  are  back  to
normal  activity  and  local  public  officials  become the  main  actors  dealing  with  “debris,
infrastructure, economic development, and housing”. People try to get back to normal and
“business  as  usual”,  beginning  to  make  trade-offs  between  old  and  new  methods.
Paradoxically,  Johnson  &  Hayashi  (2012) use  the  same  business-as-usual  indicator  to
characterize  the  end  of  the  recovery  period,  highlighting  the  difficulty  of  distinguishing
between the different post-disaster phases. In the same way, the end of the recovery phase is
difficult to identify due to the lack of clear indicators. Most definitions remains vague and
quite subjective. As explained, it is now agreed that the end of the recovery process does not
mean a return to  the status  quo ex ante,  which is  often not  possible,  and that  the same
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weakness and factors of vulnerability may be reproduced, highlighting failure to reach the
objective of betterment. Quantitative indicators, such as the population recovery (DeWaard,
Curtis,  &  Fussell,  2015;  Fussell  et  al.,  2014) are  often  used  to  measure  the  level  of
achievement of recovery, but frequently fail to take into consideration the holistic dimension
of this process and the interaction between its different dimensions. 
A second major characteristic of the recovery period is that it is multidimensional,
involving not only one process but several. While a majority of studies focus on its physical
aspects, and especially on reconstruction (Aldrich, 2012; Blong, 2003; Lindell, 2013; Oliver-
Smith, 1990; Tierney & Oliver-Smith, 2012), the process also encompasses environmental,
social, economic and institutional dimensions among others. So far efforts to understand the
recovery  process  and to  develop a  theoretical  framework for  it  have  generally  failed  to
contextualize  recovery  in  its  broader  context  (Tierney  &  Oliver-Smith,  2012) or  to
understand the interactions between different aspects of recovery. Some recent studies have
attempted to show the strong interactions between the different aspects of recovery (Hayashi,
2007;  Johnson & Hayashi,  2012).  Tierney and Oliver-Smith  (2012,  p.124),  for  instance,
explain that, “social recovery is […] inextricably linked to the recovery of structures and
infrastructure elements,  ecosystems, organizations and institutions,  economic activity, and
culture, making recovery a truly holistic process”. There is a growing claim that the holistic
or integrative approach is especially effective for assessing the process of recovery (Hayashi,
2007;  Hettige  &  Haigh,  2016;  Lawther,  2016;  Wisner  et  al.,  2004) and  clarifying  the
interactions between the different sectors and scales of recovery. The distinction between
social recovery and physical rebuilding is becoming sharper together with better recognition
of the holistic dimension of recovery (Natural Hazards Center, 2001). 
A major challenge of recovery processes, as part of human-environment system, is
the difficulty to take into consideration the cross-scales and multilevel dynamics of social-
ecological systems (Cash et al., 2006; Djalante, Holley, & Thomalla, 2011; Gibson, Ostrom,
& Ahn, 2000; Termeer, Dewulf,  & Lieshout,  2010).  Research has well  demonstrated the
importance  of  recognizing  these  interactions  for  improving  policies  and  sustainable
development  (Allen, Angeler, Garmestani, Gunderson, & Holling, 2014; Cash et al., 2006;
Djalante et al., 2011; Termeer et al., 2010). It links in this sense to the panarchy framework
(Allen et al., 2014; Gotts, 2007; Gunderson, 2010). The idea is that all system “exist and
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functions at multiple scales of space, time and social organization, and the interactions across
scales  are  fundamentally  important  in  determining  the  dynamics  of  the  system  at  any
particular focal scale” (Resilience Alliance, n.d.). Although panarchy framework will not be
used directly to conduct this research, it underlines the complexity of interactions between
scales. 
Cash  et  al.  (2006,  p.2) define  scale  as  the  “spatial,  temporal,  quantitative,  or
analytical dimensions used to measure and study any phenomenon”. Although spatial, and
more recently, temporal scales are the most studied,  Cash et al.  (2006) argue that policy
studies  should  also  consider  jurisdictional,  institutional,  management,  network  and
knowledge scales. Human-environment systems present substantial interactions, both within
a scale, namely “cross-level” interactions, and between different scales, namely “cross-scale”
interactions, for instance between spatial and temporal scales. Cash et al. (2006) argue that
the resilience and sustainability of a system can be jeopardized by particular combinations of
cross-scale and cross-level interactions. In the same way, Djalante et al. (2011, p.1) explain
that a system of governance is adaptive (an essential characteristic of resilience) if it shares
the  following  principles,  “polycentric  and  multi-layered  institutions,  participation  and
collaboration,  self-organization  and  network,  and  learning  and  innovation”.  However,
governance and development strategies often fail to deal with scale issues. Termeer et al.
(2010) identify how different types of governance, in other words, monocentric, multilevel
and adaptive governance, handle this issue. According to Cash et al. (2006), a scale challenge
can arise when there is: 
- Ignorance of the cross-scale dynamics. That can lead to local actions or/and short-
term solutions that become large-scale or/and long-term problems,
- mismatch between scales, in the case of trans-boundary phenomena or conflicts
between the scale of analysis for scientific knowledge and the relevant scale for
policy-making for instance,
- plurality of interactions but, “incorrect assumptions that there is a single, correct,
or best characterization of the scale and level challenge that applies to the system
as a whole or for all actors” (Cash et al., 2006, p.4). 
I  explore  through  this  research  the  cross-scale  and  cross-level  interactions  during  the
recovery process and how the strategies of development deal with these issues. 
Page | 27
2.2.3.1. Recovery: a window of opportunity for change
A disaster may induce change in a system that was obviously weak as it was unable
to cope with the natural hazard. Recent studies have emphasized the recovery period as an
opportunity to make society more resilient, less vulnerable and more capable in the face of
natural  hazards  (Becker  & Reusser, 2016;  Birkmann et  al.,  2010).  The build-back-better
concept, which encompasses more than just physical rebuilding, implies that during the post-
disaster period the affected society transitions from a “pre-disaster state of vulnerability to an
improved post-disaster state of vulnerability” (Becker & Reusser, 2016, p.75). Birkmann et
al.  (2010, p. 638) emphasize that “major disasters have the potential to change dominant
ways of thinking and acting” and may offer more opportunities for developing adaptation
capacity and learning lessons from the past. For Becker and Reusser (2016, p.76), “extreme
events like disasters not only spark transition, but also accelerate them”. In terms of a risk-
governance system, Wilkinson (2015) shows that disasters create space for existing systems
to be questioned and rethought. Dyer (2009) characterises the post-disaster change with two
extremes, namely Punctuated Entropy or Phoenix Effect (Dyer, 2009). Punctuated Entropy is
“a permanent decline in the adaptive flexibility of a human ecosystem” and is marked by
repeated  disaster  events  due  to  the  lack  of  effective  responses.  It  corresponds  to  a
maladaptive system (Field et al., 2012, p.314). The other extreme of the spectrum, namely
Phoenix  Effect,  corresponds  to  a  “sustainable  improvement  in  the  social  and  economic
resilience of a community or organization arising from the strategic investment of capital
resources after a disaster event” (Dyer, 2009, p.313). It illustrates the capacity of a society to
learn  and  adapt  from  the  past  in  order  to  be  more  resilient  and  limit  the  factors  of
vulnerability.
The  recovery  period  is  particularly  challenging in  the  sense  that  it  combines  the
impacts  of  the  disaster  and  implementation  of  changes  for  the  future.  It  is  a  period  of
transition, with looking back to the past and forward to the future. In the analysis of the
process of recovery it is necessary to distinguish impacts from changes. While both terms are
often used without distinction, most research on recovery looks at the impacts of disaster and
how society deals with them, that is  through the restoration of pre-disaster facilities and
capital  (Birkmann  et  al.,  2010).  Few studies  focus  on  the  formal  and  informal  changes
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implemented to build the future or on lessons learned from the disaster. The impacts of a
disaster are the result of the disaster and of pre-disaster vulnerability, and are dependent on
the type and severity of the hazard,  the exposure of the community and susceptibility to
disaster. Change, on the other hand, is an active process. Change is not necessarily planned
and can be spontaneous in response to an event, or reflective. It can be triggered by the
impacts of the disaster, and can lead to secondary impacts. Changes that are implemented can
be very diverse: formal or informal, slow or rapid, predictable or not, linear or not. They can
also affect a system on different temporal and spatial scales. While some changes affect only
a few individuals, others may have an international impact (Birkmann et al., 2010). In Figure
2.3, Birkmann et al.  (2010) illustrate the difference between the impacts and the changes
induced  by  a  natural  hazard  and  how, in  adapting  to  natural  hazards,  change  can  take
different shapes from a change in livelihood patterns to changed legislation. 
The type of change implemented is crucial in determining the “new normal” and the
new pathway of development, and for supporting the improvement of the system to reduce
the risk of disaster. Gawronski & Olson (2013) qualify change as a “critical juncture”, as it
triggers new trajectories for development,  action, policy and institutional regime. Critical
junctures are defined by Mahoney (2002 in  Gawronski & Olson, 2013, p.134) as “choice
points  when a particular  option is  adopted from among two or  more  alternatives.  These
junctures are “critical” because once an option is  chosen, it  becomes progressively more
difficult to return to the initial point when multiple alternatives were still available”. Facing
the diverse opportunities of the post-disaster period, the choices being made by the different
stakeholders are critical. Such choices can either allow sustainable development and system
resilience, taking lessons from the disaster  (Birkmann et al., 2010; Folke, 2006), or trigger
additional negative impacts. According to Capoccia and Kelemen (2007, in Gawronski and
Olson,  2013,  p.134),  they  have  “the  potential  to  trigger  a  path-dependent  process  that
constrains future choices”. It is essential to consider the priorities being set and their impacts
on long-term development when analysing the recovery processes. 
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Figure 2.3: Differentiating impacts and change led by a natural hazard or a disaster (Birkmann et al., 2010)
The build-back-better concept has been adopted by the Sendai Framework of Action
(UNISDR, 2015). Wisner (2017) summarizes the main recommendations under six major
themes:  government,  the economy, ecology, human settlements,  safety nets  and essential
services,  and  vulnerable  groups.  The  role  of  the  government  should  be  to  implement
adequate  national  laws,  regulations,  codes  and  institutions,  and  uniform  risk  and
vulnerability assessment procedures. The economy should contribute to recovery through its
provision  for  economic  measures  such  as  insurance  and  other  risk-sharing  funding  for
essential  infrastructure  and  business  resilience,  and  the  implementation  of  plans  for  the
recovery of lost or interrupted livelihoods. In terms of ecology, there should be a focus on the
conservation  of  the  natural  ecosystem and  the  restoration  of  degraded  land.  Concerning
human settlements there should be efforts to protect those existing and the anticipation of
hosting an influx of population displaced from somewhere else. There should be also some
adjustment of land use and building codes to the new necessities. In terms of safety nets and
essential services, major attention should be paid to health care, food security, nutrition and
housing. Finally, the recovery period should pay particular attention to groups which have
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been identified as vulnerable. 
A few studies have shown how complex and challenging the process of building back
better is. Wisner (2017) shows that it is complicated by various generally pre-existing factors
such as conflict, weak governance, and dependence on external donors. It is essential to view
the  recovery and build-back-better  processes  from a  wider  perspective,  not  disconnected
from reality by the disaster. Rather than looking at the disaster as the “narrow starting point
for a [building-back-better] strategy”  (Wisner, 2017, p.8), it is essential to look at the root
causes of vulnerability to disasters and processes of risk accumulation (Wisner, 2017; Wisner
et al., 2004) from a holistic viewpoint  (Hayashi, 2007; Hettige & Haigh, 2016; Johnson &
Hayashi, 2012; Lawther, 2016; Tierney & Oliver-Smith, 2012; Wisner et al., 2004).
2.2.3.2. Resilience and adaptation
The term “resilience” has become a buzzword in the field of disaster studies over the
past ten years in the vocabulary of both practitioners and scholars, as attention to recovery
has grown and since the adoption of the Hyogo Declaration (Aldrich, 2012; Manyena, 2006).
Not  clear  enough  to  be  raised  as  a  concept  or  paradigm,  it  complements  however  the
concepts of vulnerability and risk (Manyena, 2006). Before being adopted by social sciences,
and particularly by disaster studies, the term was mainly used in the hard sciences, especially
physics,  mathematics  and  ecology,  and  the  disciplines  of  psychology  and  psychiatry
(Manyena, 2006; Norris et al.,  2008; Quenault,  2014). Etymologically, it  comes from the
Latin  resilio,  which means “to jump back”  (Manyena, 2006). The term is now used in a
variety  of  disciplines  and  encompasses  multiple  definitions.  It  is  particularly  used  for
analysis the prosperity and sustainability of social-ecological systems, considering that there
are complex system facing rapid transformations (Folke et al., 2002). In the field of disaster
studies  it  has  gradually  acquired  greater  importance.  It  affects  how  risk  and  disaster
management are viewed, and is gradually replacing the concept of vulnerability  (Quenault,
2014). It is however still subject to important debate and is evolving from a static perspective
to  a  more  multi-dimensional  and  dynamic  vision  (Manyena,  2006;  Norris  et  al.,  2008;
Quenault, 2014). The multiplicity of the term’s uses and definitions makes it unclear and
often controversial, and it is impractical for supporting planning and policymaking  (Klein,
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Nicholls, & Thomalla, 2003). 
One of the main lack of clarity around the notion of resilience is  whether it  is a
process leading to a desired outcome or the desired outcome of the recovery period itself
(Klein et al., 2003). While the earliest studies are more outcome-oriented, describing disaster
resilience as a capacity or quality, it  has gradually come to be viewed more as a process
(Manyena, 2006). It should be noted that while the earliest studies tend to see resilience from
a reactive perspective as a process to reach an outcome (Manyena, 2006; McEntire, Fuller,
Johnston, & Weber, 2002), it is now mainly considered a deliberate process to reach a desired
outcome, stressing the role of society in the disaster. Disaster resilience is henceforth often
viewed as a system attribute (Klein et al., 2003) or “a quality, characteristic or result that is
generated or developed by the processes that foster or promote it” (Manyena, 2006, p.438).
As Djalante and Thonalls (2011 in Djalante, Holley, Thomalla, & Carnegie, 2013) note, the
concept of resilience should be understood both as an outcome, and as a process which is
conscious  and  anticipated  (Manyena,  2006).  Defining  the  resilience  of  social-ecological
systems, Folke et al. (2002, p.438) emphasize three aspects : “(i) the magnitude of shock that
the system can absorb and remain within a given state; (ii) the degree to which the system is
capable of self-organization; and (iii) the degree to which the system can build capacity for
learning and adaptation.”
The  distinction  between  reactive  and  proactive  disaster  resilience  is  of  major
importance,  as it  shapes  disaster  policy (Manyena,  2006;  Dovers  and Handmer (1992 in
Klein,  Nicholls,  &  Thomalla,  2003).  Proactive  resilience  underlines  the  capacity  for
anticipation  and  learning  (Dovers  and  Handmer,  1992,  in  Klein,  Nicholls,  &  Thomalla,
2003), distancing itself from traditional DRR methods  (Manyena, 2006) which are mainly
technocratic and hazard-centred. Reactive resilience “approaches the future by strengthening
the status quo and making the present system resistant to change” (Dovers and Handmer,
1992, in Klein, Nicholls, & Thomalla, 2003, p.39). Proactive resilience, as it is increasingly
viewed in current  research,  is  closely linked to  the concept of adaptive capacity. Pelling
(2003 in  Klein, Nicholls, & Thomalla, 2003, p.40) qualifies resilience as the “product of a
degree of planned preparation undertaken in the light of potential hazards”, highlighting the
ideas of anticipation, learning and adaptation. 
The notion of resilience as a proactive process is closely linked to the concept of
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adaptation, emphasizing the dynamic effect and the notion of the intended outcome. The
concept  is  largely  used  in  the  literature  on  climate  change  (Bassett  & Fogelman,  2013;
Pelling, 2011; Shaw et al., 2010), but the call for increased adaptiveness in DRR literature
and policies is much more recent and essentially theoretical  (Djalante et al., 2013). Recent
literature points out the need to encourage adaptiveness in DRR through pertinent decision-
making in dynamic environments through a learning process, and flexible and resilient risk-
governing institutions  (Djalante  et  al.,  2013;  Klinke & Renn, 2012).  Norris  et  al.  (2008,
p.131) make the link between these notions very clear by defining resilience as “a process
linking a set of adaptive capacities to a positive trajectory of functioning and adaptation after
a disturbance”.  Adaptive capacity corresponds to the resources implemented to reach the
adaptation  outcome.  The latter  refers  to  the  “ability  of  a  unit  to  transform its  structure,
functioning or organization in response to actual or expected level of risk, hazards and/or
vulnerability thresholds”  (Wilkinson, 2013, p.22).  Norris, Stevens, Pfefferbaum, Wyche, &
Pfefferbaum (2008) suggest  that  resilience is  generated  by a  set  of  “networked adaptive
capacities”, which enables taking into consideration both the resources themselves and their
attributes such as robustness,  redundancy and rapidity. In a review of  the literature they
summarize  these  resources  as  four  primary  sets:  economic  development,  social  capital,
information and communication, and community competence, emphasizing the need for a
holistic approach to adaptation and making a system resilient.  Research on recovery and
resilience generally focuses on some of these resources to analyse post-disaster development
strategies as well as disaster-preparedness measures. An important aspect of adaptation is
that it is generated strategically, emphasizing the role of humans and society in creating a
resilient community, and more generally in leading the post-disaster process (Djalante et al.,
2013). 
Referring to the ecological perspective on resilience, Gunderson (2010) emphasizes
the need to build adaptive capacity through anticipation and learning. The idea of learning is
taken  further  by  Pelling  (2011,  p.87),  who  defines  social  learning  as  “the  capacity  and
processes through which new values, ideas and practices are disseminated, popularized and
become dominant in society or a sub-set such as an organization or local community”. It
aims  to  lead  to  “new  knowledge,  shared  understanding,  trust  and,  ultimately,  collective
action”  (Lebel et al., 2010, p.334).  Pelling (2011), however, points out that if the learning
process  is  not  engaged  with  correctly,  adaptation  and  adaptive  action  can  preserve  the
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political and cultural roots of human vulnerability and prevent sustainable development. The
process  of  learning  is  particularly  important  during  the  post-disaster  period  in  order  to
stimulate  critical  reflection  and  hence  enables  the  implementation  of  appropriate
transformation of the system, from a disturbed one to a resilient one (Djalante et al., 2013). 
The learning process  is  quite  complex as  it  can  take  place  at  different  levels,  at
different scales and among different groups of stakeholders (Lebel et al., 2010; Pelling, 2011;
Tosey, Visser, & Saunders,  2012).  The degree to which learning is  implemented through
policy and in practice determines the level of a society’s transformation (Wilkinson, 2013).
Argyris and Schön (1996 in  Pelling, 2011) identified three levels of learning: first, double
and  triple  loop  learning.  Single-loop  learning  corresponds  to  the  implementation  of
incremental improvements, “whenever an error is detected and corrected without questioning
or altering the underlying values of the system” (Argyris, 1999 in Tosey, Visser, & Saunders,
2012, p.292). Double-loop learning emphasizes that assumptions are revisited to improve a
situation,  “when mismatches are corrected by first  examining and altering the governing
variables and then the actions” (Argyris, 1999 in  Tosey, Visser, & Saunders, 2012, p.292).
Finally,  a  further  level  of  organizational  learning,  called  triple-loop  learning,  aims  to
emphasize “fundamental changes within management or governance processes” (Djalante et
al., 2013, p.2118) and transformation of “underlying values and worldviews” (Lebel et al.,
2010, p.334). However, this third type of learning faces lack of consensus among scholars in
terms of conceptualization and measurement. It makes empirical research difficult (Tosey et
al.,  2012).  Wilkinson  (2013) adapted  to  the  concept  of  learning  look  to  volcanic  risk
management  (Figure  2.4).  A first  level  of  learning after  eruption  is  the  improvement  of
communication  systems and shelter  management.  Double-loop learning corresponds to  a
longer views of risk, with displacement of infrastructures to safer locations. Finally triple-
loop learning means that  development  models  are  re-evaluated depending on the risk of
disaster. It includes relocation of permanent infrastructures and economic opportunities in
safer  location,  and  further  engagement  and  participation  of  all  concerned  stakeholders,
including affected communities. 
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Figure 2.4: Learning loops and their application to volcanic risk management (Wilkinson, 2013)
Furthermore, scholars distinguish different forms of learning contributing to building
adaptiveness  (Figure  2.5).  That  refers  to  cognitive,  normative  or  relational  learning.
Cognitive  learning  refers  to  factual  knowledge.  Normative  learning  includes  changes  in
norms,  beliefs  and  values  system,  and  relational  learning  includes  building  trust  and
understanding each other worldviews (Lebel et al., 2010; Munaretto & Huitema, 2012; Shaw
et al., 2010). The latter two types, namely normative and relational learning correspond to
social  learning,  while  cognitive learning may take place at  the individual  or group level
(Shaw  et  al.,  2010).  Munaretto  &  Huitema  (2012) argue  that  relational  and  normative
learning are harder to achieve and much rarer than cognitive learning. They argue that it is
mainly due to low levels of collaboration between agents of change, limited possibilities for
stakeholders’ participation  and  greater  stability  of  the  governmental  system.  They  argue
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further that some forms of learning are restricted to certain practices only and that values and
beliefs hardly evolve.  They argue that to support change and make this social-ecological
system more adaptive, it is important to improve relational learning at all societal levels, by
increasing participation and interactions between stakeholders. 
Figure 2.5: Social learning processes among different groups and their role to build adaptiveness in several
different ways (Lebel et al., 2010)
A  major  ambiguity  in  the  notion  of  disaster  resilience  is  its  strong  link  with
vulnerability to disasters. While Timmerman (Timmerman, 1981; see also Klein et al., 2003)
was one of the first to associate vulnerability and resilience with climate change in the 1980s,
the differentiation between the two is still in debate. Manyena (2006) argues that two major
views  have  emerged  which  depend  on  the  definition  given  to  vulnerability.  The  first
approach  views  resilience  as  the  reverse  of  vulnerability.  It  implies  that  resilience  is  a
positive system property that risk management should reach (Quenault, 2014). However, this
approach is highly criticized for its circular reasoning: lack of resilience leads to a vulnerable
system, and the vulnerability of a system leads to lack of resilience. The second approach
understands resilience as a component of vulnerability: in this case, reactive resilience and
adaptive  capacities,  also  understood  as  proactive  resilience,  characterize  vulnerability
(Adger, 2006; Manyena, 2006; Quenault, 2014). This approach considers vulnerability more
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static than resilience, vulnerability corresponding to the inherent characteristics of a system
and resilience to the dynamic evolution and adaptive capacity of that system (Adger, Brooks,
Bentham,  &  Agnew, 2004;  Pelling,  2011;  Quenault,  2014).  This  approach  implies  that
resilience and vulnerability are two separate concepts with several overlaps (Manyena, 2006;
Quenault, 2014). It supports the idea that reducing vulnerability does not necessarily imply
an  increase  in  resilience,  and  holds  that  a  system  can  be  simultaneously  resilient  and
vulnerable (Quenault, 2014; Vale & Campanella, 2005).
Although the notion of resilience needs clarification to make it more meaningful and
useful for DRR measures (Klein et al., 2003; Quenault, 2014), it emphasizes the importance
of  sustainability  and  adaptation.  Manyena  (2006)  argues  that  it  allows  focusing  beyond
vulnerability reduction. Quenault (2014) claims that the notion of resilience changes the risk
management approach, especially in complex and uncertain contexts where the traditional
approach to reducing vulnerability and mitigating risk have proved insufficient. It takes a
more  positive  attitude  toward DRR and recovery, incorporating the  notion of  well-being
(through an emphasis on existing capacities and local knowledge) and focusing on people’s
strengths rather than only on their vulnerability and the objectives of coping with, reacting to
and surviving disaster (Manyena, 2006; Norris et al., 2008; Quenault, 2014). 
2.2.3.3. The difficulty of measuring recovery
Although it is clear that post-disaster recovery is closely related to the notions of
resilience, sustainability and adaptation, all of these concepts are challenging to implement
and difficult to measure and assess. The difficulties in measuring recovery are similar to the
those in assessing the sustainability of a development strategy (Ekins, Dresner, & Dahlstrom,
2008; Holling, 2001). For the Natural Hazards Center (2001, p.29), “a “good” recovery is a
holistic recovery [which includes] principles of sustainability in every decision”.  Recovery
and sustainability are strongly linked and presuppose the importance of reducing the risk of
disaster and vulnerability to future natural hazards. 
Sustainable development has been defined as “development that meets the needs of
the present without compromising the ability of future generations to meet their own needs”
(World  Commission  on  Environment  and  Development,  1987,  p.41).  However,  the
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evaluation of the objectives of a development projects and its results is problematic, as some
elements are neither quantifiable nor comparable and cannot be assessed using common units
of measure  (Ekins et  al.,  2008). The same difficulty arises when assessing the long-term
sustainability of a recovery program. So far, while attempts have been made to find relevant
indicators  (Jordan & Javernick-Will,  2013) there is still  a gap in the research in terms of
defining standardized and quantifiable measures for recovery activities and progress, and of
evaluating the long-term impacts of development strategies and the costs and benefits of
delays in recovery  (Johnson & Hayashi, 2012).  McMichael, Butler, & Folke (2003) claim
that there is a need for an interdisciplinary collaboration on understanding and achieving
sustainability  while  understanding  its  complexity  and  dynamic  evolution.  So  far  many
policymakers,  institutions  and  studies  have  focused  on  specific  aspects  and  measurable
indicators  of  recovery  from an objective  perspective  (Chipangura  et  al.,  2016) to  assess
sustainability  –  for  instance  rebuilding  or  economic  growth  –  without  considering  the
interactions between the different aspects (McMichael et al., 2003). 
2.2.4. Implementation of sustainable recovery
2.2.4.1. The challenge in implementation
The process of recovery is complex. While research is increasing understanding of
recovery,  implementation  of  post-disaster  redevelopment  strategies  by  policymakers
continues to be an issue. By definition, a disaster means that the level of preparedness for
hazards  was  insufficient.  Lack  of  preparedness  and  anticipation  of  the  risk  of  disaster
includes  lack  of  anticipation  of  post-disaster  recovery,  and  this  latter  phase  of  disaster
management  requires  a  high  level  of  coordination  and  planning  (Davis,  2007).  Apathy
toward DRR measures is not unusual, especially when natural hazards occur infrequently
(Berke et  al.,  1993).  The theoretical and accepted goals of the recovery process, namely
restoration and betterment, are challenging to implement at the local level (Olshansky, 2005).
Indeed demand on government officials is very high during the post-disaster period and a
multitude of difficulties impede the good implementation of recovery policies (Davis, 2007).
The structure of the decision-making, with the government too centralized for instance, can
prevent the flexibility and adaptability required for recovering. It was the case in Indonesia
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after  the  1992  tsunami  (Davis,  2007).  Other  challenge  include  time  pressures  and  the
prioritization of short-term needs to the detriment of sustainability (Davis, 2007; Olshansky
et al.,  2012),  and lack of resources or of the population’s participation.  Practitioners and
researchers often fail to take into consideration the multiple dimensions of the process and
their interactions, viewing its different aspects independently of one to another. Recovery is
often reduced to the physical  dimension with a  special  focus  on reconstruction  (Lindell,
2013; Oliver-Smith, 1990; Tierney & Oliver-Smith, 2012). The challenges of implementing
local recovery are several and have still not been clearly identified, and researchers are still
struggling to provide indicators and frameworks that are useful to policymakers. 
The changes being implemented and the choices being made reflect the vision(s) of
the population and policy-makers of the future development but also the existing constraints.
There is  frequently conflict  between willingness  to  restore  the  past  as  it  was  before the
disaster, development that addresses future needs, and a vision of what should become the
affected  place  (Rubin,  2009).  Moreover, post-disaster  development  is  distinguished from
development in normal times by time compression (Olshansky et al., 2012). 
Olshansky et al. (2012) argue that in the post-disaster period the interactions between
the different dimensions of recovery processes differ from what they are in non-crisis time.
Development activities are compressed in time and space. There is a dramatic increase in the
intensity of activity compared to normal times in the haste to recreate the capital destroyed or
affected  by  the  disaster.  Different  sectors  and  organizations  may  not  have  the  same
adjustment capacity, some recovering much faster than others. Bureaucracies, for instance,
are  often  less  able  to  recover  quickly  than  private  sector  organizations  because  of  their
incompressible  ways  of  functioning.  Due  to  the  urgency  of  the  situation  redevelopment
processes  are  often  accelerated  without  allowing  time  for  deliberation  and  long-term
thinking. Unsustainable practices may be accepted if they allow rapid economic development
(Davis, 2006). Time compression is an important determinant of not only the choices being
made in the post-disaster period and the trajectory of development, but also the issues faced
during the recovery period (Olshansky et al., 2012). 
Time compression and limited capital are the major limits to the implementation of
sustainable post-disaster recovery. This study explores development strategies in Montserrat
following the volcanic disaster, and how they determine the sustainability of recovery. 
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2.2.4.2. Major factors of sustainable recovery: risk perception and disaster 
risk preparedness
As discussed, the recovery period offers opportunities to better prepare society and
individuals for the occurrence of natural hazards and reduce the risk of disaster. Disaster
preparedness implies a focus on not only the risk of disaster itself but more generally on
well-being and sustainable development. There is no one model of disaster preparedness: it
must be adapted to each specific context depending on need. I focus here on two specific
aspects  of  disaster  risk  preparedness:  the  improvement  of  risk  perception,  of  risk
communication and the development of social capital. 
○ Risk perception
Determining and implementing measures for DRR and risk communication cannot be
done without an adequate understanding of risk perception,  as there are often disparities
among the views of scientists, decision-makers and the public regarding the level of concern
about certain risks and an acceptable balance between risks and benefits (Renn, 1990; Slovic,
1987). It has been observed that scientific evidence on the risk of disaster and the expected
number of losses and fatalities has had little influence the level of concern and preparedness
adopted  by  the  public  (Renn,  1990),  who  rely  on  their  own  perceptions  of  risk  when
implementing preparedness measures. 
“Risk perception” refers to people’s intuitive mechanisms for collecting, selecting,
assimilating,  and interpreting information about uncertain impacts of events,  activities or
technologies  (Renn,  1990;  Wachinger,  Renn,  Begg,  &  Kuhlicke,  2013).  It  does  not
necessarily follow a logical rationale. For instance, Renn (1990) argues that risks with a low
probability but potentially strong consequences are perceived as more threatening than those
which are more probable but would have low and medium consequences. Wachinger et al.’s
(2013) literature  review demonstrates  that  the  likelihood  of  a  disaster  and  its  perceived
magnitude are of little importance in determining people’s risk perception. Risk perception is
influenced by a variety of factors that Renn (1990) calls the circumstances of risk. Wachinger
et  al.  (2013)  divide  these  factors  into  four  categories:  (i)  risk  factors,  (ii)  informational
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factors,  (iii)  personal factors and (iv) context  factors.  Renn  (1990, p.2) argues that “risk
perception  denotes  a  variety  of  concepts  and  mechanisms  to  process  probabilistic
information  depending  on  the  risk  context  and  the  individual”,  and  that  the  collective
understanding of risks and the actions taken to reduce it is multi-dimensional and cannot be
reduced to probabilities.  Depending on people’s beliefs,  the type of risk and the context
where it happens, the mechanisms at stake can be attenuated or amplified differently.
Wachinger, Renn, Begg,  & Kuhlicke (2013) find from a literature review on risk
perception that two main factors affect the way people perceive risk: personal experience of a
natural hazard, and the level of trust in institutions in charge of disaster management. Various
studies demonstrate that direct experience can have a positive effect on risk perception by
encouraging precautionary  behaviour. However  in  some cases  it  has  the  opposite  effect.
Individuals who have not suffered damage personally are more likely to develop a false sense
of security and to overestimate their capacity to cope. They may also perceive that there is a
hazard cycle, and that since they have faced the hazard once they are protected for a certain
amount of time (Wachinger et al., 2013). Although people can have experienced a disaster,
their perception of it varies depending on the efforts for either remembering certain aspects
of  it  or  to  actively  forgetting  them.  That  depends  on  how the  risk  of  future  disaster  is
perceived and how previous disaster has been managed (Connerton, 2010; McEwen, Garde-
Hansen, Holmes, Jones, & Krause, 2017; Muzaini, 2015). The memory of the disaster and
hence risk perception are therefore very variable and shaped by various societal needs, such
as the need of psychologically recovering. This question is explored further in Chapter 7.
Indirect  experience  through  the  media  and  education  also  affects  risk  perception.  For
instance, media reports of a natural hazard can play a significant role in recalling personal
experience and raising risk awareness which has faded over time (Wachinger et al., 2013). 
It  is essential  to understand each of the factors influencing risk perception and to
adjust the DRR measures taken in response to them. Several studies reveal that accurate risk
perception  does  not  necessarily  lead  to  more  personal  preparedness  and  risk  mitigation
behaviour. Haynes, Barclay, & Pidgeon (2008, p.260) argue that “it is now understood that
there is not necessarily a direct link between awareness, perceived risk and desired (by risk
managers) preparation or behavioural responses”. Understanding this risk perception paradox
is  essential  to  adjusting  risk  governance  and  increasing  willingness  to  prepare  for  risk
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individually and collectively (Wachinger et al., 2013).
The literature finds three main reasons for the lack of personal DRR action despite an
accurate  risk perception.  Wachinger, Renn, Begg,  & Kuhlicke (2013) categorize these as
reasons linked to experience and motivation, reasons linked to trust and responsibility, and
reasons linked to personal ability (Figure 2.6). 
Figure 2.6: Visualization of the “hazard to action-chain” (Wachinger et al., 2013)
The first reason refers to the risk-benefit balance. People choose to accept the risk,
even if they understand it very well, because they perceive that exposing themselves to a
natural hazard brings more benefits than negative impacts. They have to prioritize: securing
the daily livelihood and coping with short-term socio-economic risk appears more significant
than addressing the risk of natural hazards. Risk perception is therefore strongly determined
by the risk-benefit balance. The risk is less accepted and judged greater when the exposure is
seen  as  unfair  and without  counter-benefits  (Frewer, Howard,  & Shepherd,  1998;  Renn,
1990; Siegrist & Cvetkovich, 2000). This balance is very important in determining “how safe
is safe enough” (Fischhoff, Slovic, Lichtenstein, Read, & Combs, 1978, p.178). Beliefs and
connotations  associated  with  the  causes  of  risk  also  contribute  to  determining  the
acceptability, or not, of the risk and how seriously it is perceived. The risks that contain
negative connotations are perceived as more threatening and unacceptable, to avoid cognitive
dissonance, than risks that are associated with positive image (Renn, 1990). For instance, a
person who associate nuclear power with war or ecosystem destruction is more likely to fear
the risk of nuclear explosion than a person who associate it  with technological progress.
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Moreover the uncertainty surrounding the occurrence of natural hazards can have a strong
influence on how the risk-benefit balance is assessed. 
The second reason for the risk paradox is related to trust. While risks appear complex
and uncertain,  Renn (1990) argues that the credibility of the institutions in charge of risk
management  can compensate  for the lack of individual  control  of risk and contribute to
making  collective  risk  acceptable.  Siegrist  &  Cvetkovich  (2000) found  that  people
particularly  rely  on  social  trust  in  the  managing  authorities  when  they  have  limited
knowledge about a hazard, but that the level of trust in the authorities has less influence on
risk perception when people are more knowledgeable. As knowledge about hazards and risks
is difficult to acquire for some parts of the population for diverse reasons, social trust is an
important  factor  in  the  implementation  of  disaster-risk  reduction  measures  (Siegrist  &
Cvetkovich, 2000). The main function of trust is that it reduces the complexity and anxiety
that people experience when facing a risk that they do not know or feel they have little
control  over  (Siegrist  &  Cvetkovich,  2000;  Wachinger  et  al.,  2013).  However,  trust  in
authorities and structural protection may also have a contrasting effect,  providing a false
sense  of  safety  and reducing  residents’ sense  of  responsibility  for  protecting  themselves
(Wachinger et al., 2013). 
The  final  possible  reason  exposed  by  Wachinger  et  al.  (2013)  is  confusion  or
ignorance about the appropriate action to take and lack of capacity and resources to prepare
for natural hazards. It is essential to not only provide information about risks but also to
transfer and share knowledge among all parts of society, namely policymakers, scientists and
the population if the implementation of adapted measures is to be possible. It is primordial to
consider  physical,  economic  and social  capacity  to  take  action.  Although  people  can  be
motivated to take action, they may face barriers such as lack of time, money or social support
(Grothmann & Reusswig, 2006; Wachinger et al., 2013). 
In  context  of  recovery post-disaster, risk perception is  directly  linked both to  the
recent experience of the event and to the vision of development for the future. The personal
memories of an event not only characterize the past of an individual or of a community, it
also help them reflecting upon themselves and what they are and want to be (Connerton,
2009). It illustrates the shape of the recovery process by highlighting what dimensions of
recovery are privileged over others and thereby what the adaptation capacity of the affected
Page | 43
population is.  The fact of denying some risks, choosing to ignore them or forgetting their
intensity despite of the previous experience strongly reveals what the society decides to be
and  how the  past  events  shape  the  process  of  recovery. The  memory  of  the  disaster  is
therefore as important than the fact of forgetting some events in the way people perceive
risks and thereby prepare to them (Connerton, 2009). The case of Montserrat illustrates the
difficulties to implement actions of preparedness and more generally to communicate about
risks. Risk perception gradually evolves with the recovery process and the emergence of new
needs and desires. It  is  framed by the different objectives of development,  including the
willingness to move forward after the disaster both psychologically and economically. 
○ Risk communication
Studies have demonstrated that the way risk of disaster is perceived influences the
way risk is communicated and hence the type of measures for DRR implemented (Haynes et
al.,  2008a).  Risk  communication  plays  a  major  role  in  disaster  preparedness.  It  aims  to
transfer knowledge and raise awareness about risks and practices to adopt to reduce people’s
vulnerability to natural hazards  (Okada & Matsuda, 2005). However, there is still  debate
concerning  the  most  effective  way  to  communicate  (Bier,  2001;  Haynes  et  al.,  2008a;
Mayhorn & McLaughlin, 2014). Changing behaviours is a complex process and requires,
amongst other things, effective communication techniques,  adjusted to the audiences,  the
objective and the type of social relationships. Communication involves different actors and is
strongly dependent on their different characteristics. The message, methods and process of
risk communication strongly depend on the specific objectives and the context in which they
are applied (Bier, 2001; Breakwell, 2000). Most studies now agree that the same message can
be interpreted and implemented in different ways, even in the same community (Bier, 2001;
Haynes et  al.,  2008a; Mayhorn & McLaughlin, 2014). Therefore it  is vital to deliver the
information  in  a  style  that  is  familiar  and  understandable  by  the  audience  (Bier,  2001).
Alaszewski (2005) notes that individuals are not “passive recipients” of information: they
actively decide to consider some aspects of it and ignore some others. Effectiveness in risk
communication is  strongly dependent on the social  context,  including the specific  needs,
beliefs, values and level of trust people give to the informants (Alaszewski, 2005; Carothers,
Moritz, & Zarger, 2014; Haynes et al., 2008a; Haynes, Barclay, & Pidgeon, 2008b). Trust, in
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both the provider of the information and the process and context of delivery, plays a major
role in the way that information is received and interpreted  (Alaszewski, 2005; Breakwell,
2000; Haynes et al., 2008a). The post-disaster context can be very challenging for DRR, as
the power relationship between authorities and individuals may have been strongly affected,
and with it, trust.
The  issue  of  trust  in  experts  and  authorities  involves  the  relationship  between
different stakeholders and the transfer of knowledge between them. While the technocratic
and hazard-centred approaches favour scientific or ‘expert’ knowledge in reducing risk of
disaster  (Jessica  Mercer,  Kelman,  Suchet-Pearson,  &  Lloyd,  2009),  since  the  1970s  a
growing body of literature has highlighted the importance of promoting local knowledge. 
Local knowledge is defined as a “body of knowledge existing within or acquired by
local  people  over  a  period  of  time  through  accumulation  of  experience,  society-natural
relationships,  community  practices  and  institutions,  and  by  passing  it  down  through
generations” (Mercer, Kelman, Taranis, & Suchet-Pearson, 2010, p.158). Expert knowledge
refers in particular, but not exclusively, to scientific knowledge. It is generally the outcome
of tried and tested methods and tools developed outside the community, and is often seen as
global knowledge, while indigenous knowledge is qualified as local knowledge (Mercer et
al.,  2009). Scientific or ‘expert’ knowledge is usually the one provided by scholars, local
authorities and NGOs, verbally or in writing (Cadag & Gaillard, 2011; CADRI, 2011; Mercer
et al., 2009, 2010). 
Although this dualistic approach, that is local vs expert knowledge, is criticized for
not  taking  into  consideration  the  processes  of  co-production  of  knowledge  and  the
hybridization  of  local  knowledge  under  various  influences (Audefroy  & Sánchez,  2017;
Haughton, Bankoff, & Coulthard, 2015; Wisner, 2009), it highlights the differences between
different  stakeholders’  knowledge  and  understanding  of  risk,  underlining  the  challenge
inherent  in  communicating risk between different  stakeholders  (Cadag & Gaillard,  2011;
Mercer et al.,  2009, 2010). Knowledge is embedded in specific and “multiple systems of
practice, beliefs, values and power across all scales”  (Briggs, 2013; Carothers et al., 2014,
p.1). The traditional top-down approach to DRR often fails to integrate scientific knowledge
into this system of values and practices imbedded in local knowledge, and rather attempts to
impose a different knowledge system (Chilisa, 2017; Mercer et al., 2012). 
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It is now well recognized that the integration of both types of knowledge is essential
to a better understanding of the context, the forms of vulnerability, and capacity drivers. For
instance, local knowledge is recognized as being very valuable for understanding historical
hazard  events,  while  scientific  knowledge  may  help  with  dealing  with  unpredictable  or
exceptional events  (Mercer, Kelman, Lloyd, & Suchet-Pearson, 2008).  Recognition of the
importance  of  integrating  different  sources  of  knowledge  about  hazards  and  risks  has
gradually  led  a  growing  number  of  scholars  to  value  participatory  approaches  to  risk
communication  and  risk  preparedness.  Gaillard  &  Mercer  (2012) suggest  that  DRR,
including risk communication, should be more integrative, composed of bottom-up and top-
down  action.  It  should  involve  a  large  range  of  stakeholders  including  communities,
policymakers,  disaster  managers  and scientists,  and should  integrate  different  sources  of
knowledge. This becomes even more important as the risk of disaster evolves due to various
factors  such  as  demographic  or  environmental  change.  For  this  reason  participatory
approaches are particularly valued. They encompass a large range of tools and aim to build
trust between stakeholders, and can be adapted to each context to best respond to the specific
needs  (Cadag & Gaillard, 2011; Gaillard & Cadag, 2013; Gaillard et al., 2013; Gaillard &
Mercer, 2012). 
This research explores how the knowledge of different stakeholders concerned with
disaster risks is emphasized and taken into consideration in communicating about risks and
adapting DRR methods. Chapter 7 and the following discussion explore how, in the post-
disaster period, the evolution of risk perception influences the way risk is communicated, and
vice-versa. I also analyse how risk communication strategies affect the sustainable recovery
processes. 
○ Development of social capital
One of the strategies for reducing the risk of disaster is developing people’s capacity
to face hazards. Capacity is defined as the “abilities, skills, understandings, attitudes, values,
relationships,  behaviours,  motivations,  resources  and  conditions  that  enable  individuals,
organizations, networks/sectors and broader social systems to carry out functions and achieve
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their development objectives over time” (Bolger, 2000, p.2). Capacity development for DRR
especially  includes  the  development  of  community  social  capital,  which  enables
communities  to  access  resources  for  coping  with  natural  hazards  such  as  information,
psychological and financial support, social networks to rely to (Aldrich & Meyer, 2014). The
role of social capital in disaster preparedness and especially post-disaster recovery is largely
under examined (Aldrich, 2012; Nakagawa & Shaw, 2004). Aldrich (2011, p.595) argues that
social  capital  is  “the  strongest  and  most  robust  predicator  of  population  recovery  after
catastrophe”. 
There is an important debate about what social capital is due to major epistemological
differences between three main authors, Bourdieu, Coleman and Putnam  (Pelling & High,
2005). Bourdieu (1984) understands it as part of social stratification and as a conscious way
to maintain social division. Coleman (1990) analyses it rather as a unintentional outcome of
social  processes and interaction.  In this  research,  I use the third approach, developed by
Putnam, who defines social capital as “features of social life – networks, norms and trust –
that  enable  participants  to  act  together  more  effectively  to  pursue  shared  objectives”
(Putnam, 1995 in Pelling & High, 2005, p.310). This approach, more positive, enables better
to understand the role played by social capital in the recovery process. 
Social capital is often distinguished into bridging and bonding social capital (Putnam,
2000). Bonding social capital corresponds to social ties that link people together with others
who  are  primarily  like  them along  some  key  dimension  (for  instance  community, race,
religion).  Bridging social  capital  corresponds to  social  ties  that  link people together  and
which cross social divides or between social groups  (Scott & Carrington, 2011). Although
this distinction between these two types presents some limits and may simplify the reality
(Leonard,  2004; Macnab,  Thomas, & Grosvenor, n.d.),  it  is  essential  since both of them
contribute differently to adaptation (Pelling & High, 2005), development and social cohesion
(Macnab et al., n.d.). Putnam (2000, p.23) argues that bridging social capital is inclusive and
enables “linkage to external assets [and] information diffusion”. Bonding social network “is
good for undergirding specific reciprocity and mobilizing solidarity” (Putnam, 2000, p.23). It
reinforces conformity and solidarity but can be, as a consequence, exclusive to the others,
those who do not share this conformity  (Macnab et al., n.d.). In addition of bridging and
bonding social capital, a third type is often presented: linking capital. It refers to ties with
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people  with  access  to  power  (Tompkins  et  al.,  2009a).  It  induces  a  more  hierarchical
dimension. However in numerous cases it can largely overlap bridging network, making it
difficult to use in the context of this research. 
Social networks are a major component of social capital. In the literature, the terms
“social network” and “social capital” are often inverted, making unclear their differences. I
understand here social networks as “a set of socially relevant nodes connected by one or
more  relations”  (Scott  & Carrington,  2011,  p.11) where  nodes  are  specific  actors,  either
individuals or organization. As part of the social capital, the notions of bonding and bridging
are also relevant to characterize social network. 
Several studies demonstrated that different forms of social network are used during
throughout the different stage of the disaster (Islam & Walkerden, 2014). Aldrich & Meyer
(2015) demonstrate that bonding network is used to support household during the whole
recovery  process.  It  is  the  most  persistent  support.  Bridging  network  on the  contrary  is
mainly used as a response during the relief period and early stages of the recovery period.
Linking network can play a longer term role but is often unequally distributed  (Islam &
Walkerden, 2014). 
However the concept of social capital can oversimplify the reality of the recovery
process if it does not take into consideration the quality of the interaction within and between
communities. It is therefore essential to examine the level of social cohesion throughout the
development  process.  Like  social  capital  in  general,  it  has  been  largely  neglected  by
practitioners in disaster planning and post-disaster recovery (Aldrich & Meyer, 2014) despite
evidence of its importance for building a sustainable development (Aldrich, 2011; Aldrich &
Meyer, 2014; Chamlee-Wright, 2009; Chamlee-Wright & Storr, 2011; Leroy et al., 2016).
The definition of social cohesion remains unclear (Kearns & Forrest, 2000; Wang, Zhang, &
Wu,  2016).  Forrest  and  Kearns  argue  that  social  cohesion  involves  several  domains,
including:
- common values and civic culture;
- social order and social control;
- social solidarity and reductions in wealth disparities;
- social network and social capital;
- place attachment and identity (Forrest & Kearns, 2001).
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For the purpose of this research, I understand social cohesion as a sense of trust
between members of society (Cagney, Sterrett, Benz, & Tompson, 2016) and the capacity to
hang together and adopt a common project  (Kearns & Forrest, 2000). The measurement of
social  cohesion  raises  many  questions  for  practitioners  and  researchers,  however.  The
concept indeed is  particularly challenging to operationalize and make tangible for use in
DRR or urban planning (Forrest & Kearns, 2001). Despite the lack of specific indicators to
measure it, this research seeks to identify the factors which promote or obstruct the building
of  social  cohesion  during  the  post-disaster  period.  Indeed,  a  disaster  may  provide  an
opportunity for building social cohesion. Rozdilsky  (2003, p.15) notes that the creation of
entire new towns or settlements following the evacuation of an area play a major role in
creating social cohesion. He says “the new towns will be the site on which actions of social
cohesiveness or actions of social conflict take place”. Building social cohesion is of major
importance when a society has been highly disrupted and faces large demographic change. 
Past research has shown that social cohesion is a fundamental factor in economic and
social  development and in recovering after  a  disaster  (Calo-Blanco,  Kovarik,  Mengel,  &
Romero, 2017).  The literature demonstrates that it  contributes to several aspects of local
development.  It  is  a  factor  in  participation  and  engagement  in  collective  activities,  and
prevents  engaging  in  activities  with  negative  outcomes  for  the  community  and  local
development  (Calo-Blanco et al., 2017). In terms of reducing the risk of disaster, it is now
widely accepted that disasters are socially constructed and determined by everyday social
interactions  and  social  structures  (Wisner  et  al.,  2004),  and  therefore  enhancing  social
cohesion may be a way to reduce vulnerability to disasters. Past research has also underlined
the  major  role  of  social  cohesion  in  preparing  for  natural  hazards.  Some  studies  give
evidence that mutual trust and feelings of dependence contribute to awareness of disaster
management measures and stimulate volunteering in preparations for disaster (Hausman et
al., 2007 in  Aldrich & Meyer, 2015). Social cohesion programmes also aim to strengthen
bonds between communities and prevent tension, one of the root causes of disasters (MICIC,
2016; UNDP, 2013) and a risk following the strong perturbation of society such as a disaster
can cause (Stephan, Norf, & Fekete, 2017). 
Several  studies  have  demonstrated  the  strong role  of  social  cohesion  at  different
stages  of  the  disaster  recovery  process.  During  the  emergency response,  social  cohesion
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seems to support self-organization and mutual assistance  (Tierney & Oliver-Smith, 2012).
Scholars  have  highlighted  the  role  of  social  cohesion  in  the  recovery  of  different  New
Orleans neighbourhoods after Hurricane Katrina. The tightly-knit Village de l’Est, inhabited
by the cohesive Vietnamese community, was able to recover more quickly and efficiently
than some less-damaged and richer city neighbourhoods (Aldrich & Meyer, 2015; Chamlee-
Wright, 2009; Chamlee-Wright & Storr, 2011; Leroy et al., 2016). Nakagawa & Shaw (2004)
reach similar conclusions on communities recovering from earthquakes in Kobe, Japan and
Gujarat, India. They show that social capital and leadership are the most effective drivers of
collective action and recovery. Cagney, Sterrett, Benz, & Tompson (2016) demonstrate that
neighbourhoods with high social  cohesion are more likely to  believe that  they are well-
prepared for hazards and that they will be able to recover quickly. The authors argue that as
perceptions shape action, social cohesion provides the basis for people’s involvement in the
recovery of their neighbourhood. 
Importantly social cohesion can also jeopardize sustainable recovery when it involves
mainly bonding social network and too few bridging network. In that case, social cohesion is
primarily within a community instead of being between communities. It can therefore lead to
exclusion and hence marginalization of the less powerful communities  (Aldrich & Meyer,
2014; Beumer, 2010). Aldrich & Meyer (2015) explain that social cohesion can be obtained
by the  imposition  of  wills  and values  of  a  community  to  a  minority, marginalizing  and
dominating de facto the minorities. To facilitate social cohesion between communities and
hence sustainable recovery, bridging social capital plays a major role by enabling greater
integration  (Cheong,  Edwards,  Goulbourne,  &  Solomos,  2007;  Djalante  et  al.,  2011;
Hawkins & Maurer, 2010, 2011; Leonard, 2004; Macnab et al., n.d.). Although it is primarily
bonding social capital that is deployed as a response to disaster, as shown earlier, bridging
social  network  enables  better  the  development  of  social  cohesion,  a  major  factor  of
sustainable recovery in a diverse society. 
Several  studies  suggest  prioritizing  investment  in  social  infrastructure  during  the
recovery period to better prepare for other hazards (Cagney et al., 2016; Islam & Walkerden,
2014; Lawther, 2016; Nakagawa & Shaw, 2004).  Forrest & Kearns (2001, p.2138), among
others scholars, emphasize the importance of developing neighbourhood social capital as a
way of developing “self-help and mutuality” and hence addressing deprivation and social
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exclusion.  They  recommend  developing  local  policies  on  specific  domains,  namely
empowerment,  participation,  associational  activity  and  common  purpose,  supporting
networks  and  reciprocity,  collective  norms  and  values,  trust,  and  safety  and  belonging.
Chapter 5 explores  how the development of new neighbourhoods in  the recovery period
enables,  or  not,  the  development  of  a  bridging  social  capital.  It  analyzes  the  potential
difficulties and obstacles in the development of social cohesion in the changing society of
Montserrat, and their broader, long-term impacts. Chapter 6 explores how rapid demographic
change challenges the recovery process by requiring additional adaptation to build social
cohesion. 
2.3. Summary
I presented in this chapter how the understanding of disaster has evolved over-time. I
base my thesis on the view that disasters are the results of social and political environments
that drives to the incapacity of individuals or groups to anticipate, cope or recover from the
impacts of natural hazards, in other words that make them vulnerable to disaster (Wisner et
al., 2004). This view on disasters enhances the issue of marginalization, as major factor of
vulnerability. Marginalization corresponds to a relatively lower access to major livelihoods,
hence exacerbating the difficulties to cope with natural hazards. This question takes a major
importance in my thesis as I explore the post-disaster recovery process.
Despite significant progress in defining recovery, existing models presented in this
chapter fail to reflect the complexity of the process. That prevents to understand the extent of
challenges associated with this period,  in particular the interactions between the different
dimensions of recovery, and its long-term implications. In order to address this, this thesis
draws on complementary concepts, namely vulnerability, resilience, changes and adaptation.
Those place the post-disaster recovery process in a wider context and enable to understand
its  long-term  dynamics  and  complexity,  highlighting  how  the  interactions  between  the
different dimensions of the recovery processes can affect its sustainability and can hence
prevent reducing the risk of disaster. 
The literature on post-disaster recovery stresses its importance for learning from the
event,  introducing change and hence build-back-better. It  therefore matters  to  reduce the
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drivers of vulnerability and hence to prevent the marginalization of certain groups during this
process. A special attention is given to immigrants given that their conditions makes them
marginalized  in  the  hosting  community.  In  this  thesis,  I  will  examine  how  immigrants
support the recovery process of a place largely affected by a series of volcanic eruptions and
meanwhile what the impacts of the recovery process on the immigrant communities, and
consequently, on the whole  society, are.  For  that,  the literature  on social  capital  is  very
useful. I will examine how the recovery processes use and build social capital over time.
Acknowledging  the  importance  of  social  cohesion  for  a  sustainable  recovery,  as
demonstrated by the literature, I will examine the role played by bonding and bridging social
capital throughout the process. 
The existing literature on recovery emphasizes the challenge of implementing actions
for sustainable development, and for measuring the progress made. In this thesis, I will argue
that a major element for measuring this progress is based on the learning capacity from past
disasters and hence on the increase capacity to prepare to future risks. It includes measures of
risk  communication  and  of  awareness  raising.  Memory  of  the  past  disaster  is  a  major
mechanism  for  building  risk  perception  and  hence  determining  the  risk  preparedness
measures to implement.  I  will  examine how memory challenges the recovery process by
influencing  the  objectives  for  post-disaster  recovery, and  hence  the  sustainability  of  the
process. 
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CHAPTER THREE  
RESEARCH METHODOLOGY  
 
 
Through this research, I have questionned the post-disaster recovery processes and the 
strategies of redevelopment. After determining the analytical framework, I address here the 
methodological design of the research in the light of the specific needs of the study, the context 
and the practical challenges. As a real-world issue, disasters are typically addressed through 
problem-driven research. Such approaches start by identifying a particular phenomenon, 
thanks to a large literature review. The research design was chosen in order to analyse in detail 
the causalities and processes at work to explain the problem and anticipate the future 
consequences, in keeping with the pragmatic approach adopted in this research.  
As explained in Chapter Two, adopting a pragmatist approach means that the choice 
of method is not guided by a specific paradigm on what makes good science. Instead it is 
guided by the necessities of the context, the researcher’s values, political and social 
preferences. Therefore, I defined a set of methods depending on the research objectives, the 
specificities of the fieldwork, my positionality as a researcher (see section 3.4.2.), the 
sensitivity of the topics addressed through the research, and more generally by my 
epistemological commitments. These include in particular the will to involve the participants 
in the research process, and the respect of ethical matters. Adopting a pragmatic approach has 
resulted in a trial and error approach based on mixed-methods (largely qualitative) with 
gradual adjustments during the research process. 
Considering the sensitivity of some of the major elements of this study, the methods 
are largely shaped according to ethical principles. In this chapter, I first analyse the major 
ethical concerns, before examining and justifying the research methodology in more detail. I 
explain the choice of the case study and the management of the three fieldwork seasons, with 
the use of interviews, focus group discussions and observations. I then outline the process of 
data analysis before finally giving an overview of the project through a reflexive exercise.  
 
Page | 55  
 
3.1. A qualitative research project for a complex study  
3.1.1.  Qualitative study 
In the previous chapter, I explained why my research topic required an approach that 
was able to explore the different coexisting realities and perceptions. To understand the 
recovery process after a volcanic eruption and the induced spatial changes, it seemed necessary 
to adopt a broad perspective that takes into consideration the different systems at stake. 
Qualitative methods were adopted for this project as a way to capture all the realities  
associated with the studied question. Due to the multi-dimensional nature and subtle 
interactions between the different dimensions of post-disaster recovery, it would have been 
difficult to isolate specific topics for a quantitative survey. Thus a qualitative approach was 
taken to this study. Qualitative approaches are particularly valuable here as it is important not 
only to understand many diverging factors but also to be able to understand how differing 
questions are being perceived and understood by participants. I therefore used a set of 
ethnographic methods, described in more details below, considering the high complexity of 
the post-disaster recovery process and the lack of significant research on the topic and on the 
specific case study explored in this research. Ethnographic methods help to identify 
unexpected issues and to explory the differences in perceptions, knowledge and behaviour 
among the population (Bryman, 2004; Patton, 1999; Spoon, 2014). 
A qualitative study results from a systematic research design. Berkowitz (1997, p.34) 
characterizes qualitative analysis as “a loop-like pattern of multiple rounds of revisiting the 
data as additional questions emerge, new connections are unearthed, and more complex 
formulations develop along with a deepening understanding of the material. Qualitative 
analysis is fundamentally an iterative set of processes”. Rather than being a step-by-step 
process, it corresponds to an iterative process with constant re-clarification of the research 
question, research methods and collected data. The objective of this constant questioning is to 
adopt a reflexive approach and to adapt the focus and the objectives to the emerging insights.  
The iterative process goes through three categories of reflexive questions to provide 
specific reference points to conduct the data analysis process. The first question, “what are the 
data telling me?” allows me to clarify the theoretical and conceptual framework through which 
we analyse the data. The second question, “What do I want to know?”, allows me to regularly 
rethink the research objectives in the light of the conceptual framework. The third question, 
“What is the dialectical relationship between what the data are telling me and what I want to 
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know?”, is used to refine insights and identify the gaps in understanding. The same process is 
reproduced several times in order to refine the focus of the research. This permanent going 
back and forth takes place during the definition of the research question but also during the 
selection, the collection and the analysis of the information and data.  
 
3.1.2. The importance of ethical considerations 
The sensitivity of the topics addressed in this research made it necessary to pay close 
attention to ethics during the whole process, including data collection, data analysis and the 
transmission of findings.  
Conducting social science research can affect the research participants and their 
relations in positive and negative ways, that were unintended initially. The analysis of the post-
disaster recovery processes tackles a multitude of very sensitive topics. This period 
corresponds to a period of quick transition and leads  to major and sometimes difficult changes 
in the personal lives of the inhabitants of Montserrat. This included displacement, social and 
demographic change linked to migration, and considerable uncertainty concerning the future. 
It is vital to be aware that addressing, analysing and then communicating about these topics 
may raise strong disagreement and tension among the society. This possible tension requires 
constantly adapting the research methods depending on the emerging necessities and 
observations. Being constantly reflexive as a researcher (and as a human) facilitates an 
improved ethical stance, particularly in choices around frameworking, methodology and 
reporting of results. It is important to balance high quality research with being sensitive to 
those I am studying.   
 
Different measures were adopted to respect ethical necessities. Before conducting the 
fieldwork, an ethic clearance form was submitted to the General Research Ethics Committee 
of the University of East Anglia, and accepted. Critical choices in seeking ethical approval and 
subsequent reflexive choices are summarised here:  
(i) Interview authorisation. I was not to ask the participants of the research to sign an 
authorisation form before each interview as it would have affected the flow of the 
discussion and made the interviews much more formal, therefore adversely 
affecting the quality of the interviews. However, each time that I recorded an 
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interview, I orally asked permission from the person. A few times I was planning 
to record but as the discussion started very rapidly and in a very passionate way, I 
did not get the opportunity to ask and therefore decided not to record in order not 
to interrupt the discussion. I never asked for authorization or informed the people 
when I  conducted observation for several reasons, mainly practical. Living in 
Montserrat during the whole fieldwork, I was continuously observing my 
environment. I did not hide the purpose of my presence in Montserrat, letting 
people know that I was doing research when they asked me. However, it was 
impossible to inform people systematically. This was also so that I would not 
intervene in what I was observing, or as little as possible, and therefore prevent 
biases in the observations.  
 
(ii) Focus-group discussion: location and privacy. Dealing with sensitive topics also 
required regularly adapting the methods used for data collection. For instance, it 
appeared quite rapidly that interviewing  immigrants in a face-to-face situation and 
without knowing them more personally was not efficient as it was very difficult to 
get meaningful answers. It was therefore necessary to create a trusting environment 
in order to give voice to these marginalized groups (Marra & McCullagh, 2018; 
Winke, 2017). It had to be an environment that corresponded to the wishes and 
requirements of the participants. For instance, I decided to conduct focus group 
discussions (FGDs) as I estimated that it would be more efficient than face-to-face 
interviews, but I had to adapt the organization of each FGD to each group. While 
the group of Montserratians had no objection to do this in a public place as long as 
it was easily accessible to all, the non-nationals wanted to do it in a private place 
where they could talk without being heard. The organization of each FGD was 
therefore very individualized to respect ethics and requirements of confidentiality 
at the expense of a systematic method and possibilities of comparisons.  
 
(iii) Anonymity. The question of anonymity is crucial, especially as the research tackles 
sensitive issues. As explained previously, I decided to anonymise the interviewees 
by specifying only their job or their role in the society, rather than mentioning their 
names. In some cases however, due to the small size of the Island, people remain 
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very recognizable even if they are identified them only by their job or status. Hence, 
despite the lack of scientific accuracy, I decided sometimes to remain vague about 
their identification in order to prevent them being recognized. Indeed, the small 
size of the population and the transitional period that Montserrat is experiencing 
encourages intense and emotional reactions. A quote may therefore have very 
important consequences and raise national debates if it is related to a sensitive or 
personal matter.  
 
(iv) Approach to reporting findings locally. Considering the small size of the country 
and the challenging period it is dealing with, it rapidly appeared important to share 
the findings to both policy-makers and the population. While social research aims 
to “add to the stock of knowledge about the social world” (Bryman, 2004, p.5), I 
feel that this study has a role to play at the local level in a more practical way. Many 
participants showed a strong interest in my research and asked me to provide 
recommendations or to communicate the main findings. I therefore decided to 
organize some presentations and discussions with the different stakeholders 
involved in the recovery process. Two were organized at the end of the third 
fieldwork, one that was open to  the public, and one that was addressed more 
specifically to the policy-makers and the agencies in charge of different sectors of 
development, including schools, Red Cross, Disaster Management Coordination 
Agencies. The two presentations were separated assuming that it would facilitate 
discussion and avoid some groups of people feeling uncomfortable talking in front 
of policy-makers. Both meetings led to interesting discussions and encouraged 
reflections, but the attendance was quite limited. Therefore another presentation 
was organized with the support of the Governor’s office in September 2017, with 
the objective of having a wider attendance. The presentation was recorded, 
broadcasted on the national radio and on Facebook live for those who could not 
attend it physically. Another presentation was organized in London in June 2017 
and addressed to the community of Montserratians living in the UK. Organizing 
these presentations raised several ethical issues and questions about what should 
be presented and how, as a number of issues raised were sensitive ones. To address 
these, I worked  beforehand with three people, a Montserratian living in Montserrat, 
Page | 59  
 
a Montserratian living in the UK and a Jamaican living in Montserrat, to adjust the 
presentations. The objective was to be able to present my main findings and 
generate discussion without being insensitive, and hence preventing emotional 
rejection and blockage reactions. It was also necessary to specify my role as a 
researcher and to mention my research autonomy with respect to the British 
government. Contrary to what was required by some of the participants, I did not 
give recommendations but rather large guidelines derived from my findings. Indeed 
from an ethical point of view, I believe that the researcher can inform thanks to 
their expertise. They are not mandated to say what should or should not be done 
and he has to leave the people concerned in charge of deciding.  
 
Being clear about the specific objectives of the research, the complexity of the situation 
and the ethical necessities allowed me to design the research accordingly. It has in particular 
determined the choice of conducting research based on a specific case study, and the use of 
interviews, focus group discussion and observation as the main methods for data collection.  
 
3.2. Designing the research 
3.2.1. Case study research 
The structure of the research is organized around the use of a specific case study in 
order to understand complex issues, especially how disaster, post-disaster recovery and 
associated processes are socially constructed in a particular context. According to Hartley 
(2004 in Kohlbacher, 2006, p.6), a case study research corresponds to "a detailed investigation, 
often with data collected over a period of time, of phenomena, within their context” in order 
"to provide an analysis of the context and processes which illuminate the theoretical issues 
being studied". It corresponds to an intensive research approach, which aims to focus on a 
particular instance, within its specific context, its history, in order to get a great amount of 
details and to understand its evolution and its specificities (Swamborn, 2010). In this instance, 
focusing on a specific case study appears as a broad, multidisciplinary and comprehensive 
manner to understand disasters and their recovery process (Burton, 2010). The case study is 
used through an iterative process, which allows the researcher to gradually clarify the research 
questions as the different processes and their interaction become better understood. For the 
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understanding of the general process of recovery, the use of case studies allows us to adopt a 
comprehensive perspective and to test the validity of previous research, mostly focusing on 
specific aspects of the process of post-disaster recovery.  
 
The use of case studies is now commonly used in social sciences and is associated with 
a systematic and rigorous research design. It presents a large number of advantages, especially 
in the case where little is already known and where there are few or no quantitative data. It is 
also often used as a complementary method of quantitative research in order to validate 
hypothesis and/or to determine and orient the trajectory of the research according to the actual 
observed issues. According to Yin (2003a in Kohlbacher, 2006, p.5), “the case study method 
allows investigators to retain the holistic and meaningful characteristics of real-life events”. A 
major concern about case studies is the difficulty to provide scientific generalization. However 
Yin (2003a, in Kohlbacher, 2006, p.6) argues that "case studies […] are generalizable to 
theoretical propositions and not to populations or universes. In this sense, the case study […] 
does not represent a 'sample', and in doing a case study, your goal will be to generalize theories 
(analytical generalization) and not to enumerate frequencies (statistical generalization)". The 
use of the case study does not therefore aim to make general truth but rather to test theories in 
particular context for, eventually, reinforcing and creating new theories. The use of case 
studies is thus well adapted to test hypothesis and to bring more insight to a theoretical 
question.  
 
The selection of the case study depends on various criteria, specific to each research 
project and depending both on scientific and practical purposes. Due to the relatively low 
number of places significantly affected by volcanic eruptions in the last 10-20 years, the choice 
has been limited to a few number of possible cases. Moreover, practical matters have largely 
contributed to the selection, such as the language spoken, the cost of  access and the level of 
safety. It was therefore decided to conduct the research based on the case of Montserrat, a 
Caribbean island. The general context of this country and its interest for the research are 
outlined in more details in the Chapter Four.  
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3.2.2. Three seasons of fieldwork 
Considering the lack of scientific valid grey literature and previous social research 
conducted in Montserrat which could have informed my research, it was decided that three 
fieldwork seasons in Montserrat needed to be conducted. This enabled a deeper immersion in 
the society, necessary to tackle sensitive questions in a less aggressive way, and to better 
understand the different perspectives.  
Exploratory fieldwork was conducted in March and April 2015 in St Vincent and the 
Grenadines and in Montserrat. It aimed to settle the basis of the research, both in practical 
terms and in terms of research focus. The second fieldwork, conducted from January to May 
2016, was dedicated to the main data collection, completed the following year during the third 
fieldwork between January and March 2017. The latter was also the opportunity to disseminate 
the main findings of the research through various meetings with communities, decision-makers 
and disaster managers.  
 
The first fieldwork, conducted after six months of literature review, aimed essentially 
to settle the basis of the research, namely 1/ determine the methodology to be used for the data 
collection mainly according to the specificities of the context, 2/ determine the location of the 
case study, and 3/ clarify the research questions. This fieldwork was composed of three weeks 
in St Vincent and the Grenadines, followed by five weeks in Montserrat. In both countries, 
semi-structured interviews were conducted with key stakeholders in charge of disaster 
management and planning for socio-economic development following the volcanic crisis. 
Informal discussions and observation also played a large role. The initial objective was to 
conduct a comparative study between the two islands, which were both strongly affected by 
volcanic eruptions, the last one being in 1979 in St Vincent, and between 1995 and 2010 in 
Montserrat. However, this first fieldwork led to the decision to conduct a study on the unique 
case of Montserrat. The major differences of context, included the time-scale of the disasters 
and the extent of the population affected,revealed that a comparison would be inadequate or 
would require a deeper understanding of each context to be relevant. Practical considerations, 
such as the limited time available for fieldwork in each place and the high cost of conducting 
research in two places, also contributed to the focus on a single case study. It was therefore 
decided to focus on the case of Montserrat. Indeed the first series of interviews revealed that 
the socio-economic development of Montserrat was still largely influenced by the volcanic 
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disaster, more explicitly than in St Vincent, where the volcanic eruption occurred longer ago.  
The exploratory fieldwork in Montserrat also enabled me to clarify the research focus, 
by reorienting it slightly according to the specificities of the context and making it more 
relevant to the local considerations. Informal discussions and semi-structured interviews 
revealed the importance of demographic changes in the recovery process of Montserrat. The 
importance of immigration, in a positive and negative way, was almost systematically and very 
spontaneously mentioned during the discussions with a range of actors. Although I did not 
anticipate to tackle this topic when designing my research, it appeared to be an important one 
during the recovery process. I therefore decided to focus more on the role of demographic 
changes, especially immigration, in the process of recovery. Moreover a quick literature 
review highlighted that there was a major gap in research concerning the impact of 
demographic change on post-disaster recovery (see Chapter 2), despite being a universal and 
critical issue. The fieldwork also revealed that the risk of eruption was less determining in the  
in the recovery process than what was initially expected. While I expected it to be a major 
concern considering that the last eruption had occurred less than five years ago at the time of 
the fieldwork, interviews contradicted that hypothesis. It appeared very clearly that talking 
about the risk of future eruption triggered annoyance or even anger. On the contrary, people 
happily discussed the past eruptions. Therefore it was decided to adapt the methodology for 
addressing questions about the role of the risk of disaster in the recovery process in a less direct 
way and to explore the reasons for such negative reactions when it comes to risks in the future.   
Most of the data collection was conducted during the second fieldwork, between 
January and May 2016. I specified the research questions thanks to the initial findings 
following the exploratory fieldwork, seven months earlier, and thanks to an extensive literature 
review. I used a similar methodology as for the exploratory fieldwork. However, instead of 
getting a general overview of the local context, the second fieldwork directly aimed to explore 
and test the hypothesis determined during the previous months of work. The methodology 
followed during these five months was therefore designed specifically to respond to these 
objectives.  
 
Mixed qualitative methods were used to conduct the data collection, including semi-
structured and informal interviews (see Appendix), observation and focus group discussions. 
I gradually adapted the methods during the fieldwork with the emergence of some difficulties, 
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related to the high sensitivity of some topics and the difficulty to meet people especially from 
immigrant communities. That includes a more indirect way to address risk perception and the 
necessity to build trust and provide a very safe and anonymous environment to address the 
questions of social cohesion and discrimination. For that, I needed preliminary work to identify 
adequate gatekeepers, people who had a good knowledge of the community, who were trusted 
by its members and who were able to introduce me to the rest of the community. The selection 
of gatekeepers for starting the data collection was very important in this research due to the 
sensitivity of the topic tackled. Gatekeepers helped to gain credibility and to build trust with 
the participants, two conditions for conducting qualitative research (Petts, 2007; Reeves, 
2010). The interviewees and the sample groups for conducting the research were composed 
of:   
○ The main communities including: 
○ the three main immigrant communities, namely Jamaican, Guyanese 
and Dominican (DR),  
○ The native-community, namely Montserratians 
○ Authorities/ Policy-makers including members of the GoM, of the British 
government and DfID 
○ Disaster managers and monitoring, including staff of the Red Cross, of the 
Montserrat Volcano Observatory and of the Disaster Management 
Coordination Agency 
○ Workers in the social sector, including school teachers, social services, church 
representatives, psychologist, medical doctor 
 
During the third field season, conducted between January and March 2017, I completed 
data collection. Before that, I had conducted a first session of data analysis, which aimed to 
tackle the contradictions and the grey areas, and therefore allowed me to tackle more specific 
questions rather than looking at the general context. I used the same methods as during the 
previous fieldwork for data collection. In addition to completing the data collection, I aimed 
to communicate some of the initial findings of the research to the residents of Montserrat, 
including people from different communities, to policy-makers, social workers (including 
teachers, counsellor, social services), and agencies in charge of disaster management and 
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hazard monitoring. For that purpose, two meetings were successively organized during the last 
week of February 2017. An additional presentation wasconducted later with the support of the 
Governor’s office at the Government’s Residence in September 2017.  
 
Figure 3.1 below illustrates the main steps of the research.  
 
Figure 3.1: Data collection process and main objectives 
 
3.3. Research methods 
3.3.1.  Building trust and conducting interviews  
 As explained previously, the sensitivity of the topics addressed during the research 
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required spending time working on building trust with the participants, including national and 
immigrant communities.  I therefore first identified and met some key people identified as gate 
keepers within the larger communities. These people had to be trusted by the community and 
to have a good knowledge of it. They were generally identified as gatekeepers because of their 
social positions, generally as a person of reference or influence. By snowballing, I was then 
referred to other people who the gatekeeper thought would accept to talk to me.  
To build trust and to have access to more personal information, I also spent time 
participating in the life of the community and let people get to know me more personally, not 
just as a researcher. They were then more inclined to talk freely to me and to develop their 
answers. It was perceived more as a mutual exchange, where I was also informing them about 
aspects of my life, than purely a data collection exercise. To meet the Dominican (DR) 
community for instance, a gate keeper invited me to join a service at the Dominican (DR) 
Church where he could introduce me to a part of the community and therefore make further 
meetings easier. However, it did not enable me to meet the rest of the community, less involved 
at the Church. It was more difficult to find a way to access them as they tended to mix less 
with the rest of the society. The main place where I could have met and started to discuss with 
them in an informal way would have been the bars where they often gather. This was much 
more difficult for me for various reasons. My level of Spanish is not high enough to conduct 
a spontaneous discussion in a noisy and agitated environment such as a bar. Moreover, as a 
young foreign woman, I felt very uncomfortable going to bars, alone, as it is mainly a 
masculine place. This prevented me from building a closer relationship with this community. 
I therefore had less access to this group of people and had to find an alternative way to collect 
data. Instead I could collect some information and get an overview of the situation of this 
community by talking to intermediate people such as teachers, medical doctors or Red Cross 
staff.  
It was also difficult to get access to the Guyanese and Jamaican communities as they  
are not such cohesive communities. They mix more with the rest of the society than the 
Dominicans (DR) generally do. Even though they face some specific issues relating to their 
origin, there are no specific places or events where I could meet them. The role of the gate 
keeper was therefore primarily to access people by snowballing. In several cases, I met 
members of the Guyanese and Jamaican communities in a very informal way, which was not 
anticipated. I was able to get data through informal and spontaneous discussions. 
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A large number of interviews (see Appendice) were conducted in  quite an informal 
and spontaneous way, often in bars or when people approached me by themselves, often out 
of curiosity. Such situations were ideal to talk with people in a friendly and informal 
atmosphere. Although I could not anticipated these discussions, regular work on my data and 
on the topics I wanted to tackle helped me to better anticipate these spontaneous discussions 
and therefore to make them evolve from a short and superficial discussion, generally often 
focused on me as an outsider, to a deeperdiscussion on people’s experiences and perceptions. 
In a few cases, it led to a more formal interview later on. Informal discussions and spontaneous 
semi-structured interviews were much more improvised than the formal and planned structured 
and semi-structured interviews. Objectives and questions to ask were not pre-defined. I had to 
constantly adjusted to follow the flow of the discussion and the interests of the person. When 
some of the research topics were not addressed spontaneously and if they seemed relevant 
during the discussion, I tried to bring them up in a natural way, which did not affect the flow 
of thoughts of the interviewee. I could not take notes during these spontaneous discussions, 
nor record them. However I tried most of the time to take notes as soon as possible, in the most 
complete way by remembering the discussion chronologically and thematically.  
 
Apart from these informal interviews, which were conducted essentially with 
community members, the interviews with the authorities, disaster managers or key people of 
the social sectors were more organized and anticipated. Each interview was prepared in 
advance with a list of topics to tackle, specific to each interviewee depending on their field of 
expertise. The interviews were recorded only when I knew the interviewees would feel 
comfortable enough with this, and after asking for their agreement. In several cases, especially 
when sensitive topics were going to be addressed, I decided not to ask to record as I felt it may 
have made the person uncomfortable. In such cases, I took only brief notes of the key points 
during the interview and I tried as much as possible to complete the notes after the interview. 
It was necessary to constantly adapt the interview process and design. For instance, the 
politicians, more used to such exercises, were often expecting a succession of clear and well-
focused questions and were giving quick and pre-thought answers. It was therefore more 
difficult to reach their actual opinion, to raise a deeper reflection and to go beyond the 
politically correct. Apart from them, most of the interviewees seemed to feel more comfortable 
with a less structured interview, more akin to a normal discussion. The difficulty in this case 
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was to keep the discussion focused on topics relevant to my research without over-forcing the 
direction.  
In total, 130 interviews were conducted during the three fieldworks and distributed as 
following (Table 3.1):  
 
 
Institutions/groups 
Total 
number 
of 
interviews 
Formal 
interviews 
(number) 
Informal 
interviews 
(number) 
Wo- 
men 
Men 
Age 
range 
(estima-
tion) 
1 Government officers (British 
and Montserratian government) 
21 21  9 12 30-60 
2 Risk management/ monitoring 
institutions (DMCA, MVO, 
Red Cross) 
10 10  5 5 30-60 
3 Social/Health/Educational 
institutions (like social 
services, schools, churches) 
16 16  12 4 30-65 
4 Business people 5 5  2 3 25-55 
5 Montserratians 20 8 12 7 13 20-75 
6 Guyanese 14 8 6 8 6 15-65 
7 Jamaicans 14 6 8 6 8 20-65 
8 Dominicans (DR) 12 7 5 5 7 45-70 
9 Other nationalities 18 3 15 4 14 30-60 
 Total 130 84 46 58 72  
Table 3.1: Interviews conducted between 2014 and 2018 in Montserrat  -                                                         
(The members of risk management, social/health institutions and business people (categories 2, 3, 4) were both 
Montserratians and non-Montserratians. Their nationality was not specifically asked for the interview as these 
individuals were interviewed because of their particular task and job. The interviewees in categories 5, 6, 7, 8, 
9 were specifically chosen because of the national group they identify with) 
 
3.3.2. Focus-Group Discussions (FGDs) 
Towards the end of the second fieldwork, four focus-group discussions, lasting 
between two and three hours, were also conducted with members of three main communities, 
namely Montserratian, Guyanese and Jamaican communities. FGDs can be in-depth semi-
structured or unstructured interviews conducted as a group (Bryman, 2004). They are 
commonly used in order to comprehend complex behaviours and processes (Carey & Smith, 
1994). Two FGDs were conducted with Montserratians, the second one having been organized 
on the request of the participants themselves. One was organized with a group of Jamaicans, 
and one with a group of Guyanese. One was planned with the Dominicans (DR) as well but it 
could not be organized for practical purposes. Indeed it was too difficult to gather enough 
people at the same time as they were often very busy with family and working life.  
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Organizing FGDs with each major community, separated from each other, has various 
objectives: (i) to compare the expectations for the future of Montserrat depending on the 
characteristics of each group, (ii) to assess the level of unity or cohesion in each community, 
(iii) to point out the major difficulties or factors of vulnerability in each community and to 
understand their causes according to the concerned people. Separating the groups depending 
on the country of origin of the participants was necessary to allow the comparison, but also to 
prevent discomfort and shyness due to the existing racism within society. FGDs are a quick 
way to reach a group of people from the same community, between 5 and 12 people depending 
on the groups and to complete the individual interviews. In some contexts, the group dynamics 
enable the raising of new ideas and stimulate the discussion by decreasing inhibition caused 
by a one-to-one interview, especially when it concerns sensitive issues such as integration, 
discriminations and expectations for the future (Bryman, 2004; Carey & Smith, 1994; 
Kitzinger, 1994; Munday, 2006). Through the discussions, participants could validate, 
complete and extend the experiences, memories and one another’s ideas. It allowed me to have 
a better understanding of the data collected during previous interviews and to validate or 
question them. The group discussion also facilitates a kind of cascading effect (Tracy, 2013) 
where topics and thoughts can flow from one to another. Moreover, the FGD allows the 
observation of the form of interactions between participants and therefore plays the role of a 
mini-interactions laboratory (Tracy, 2013). It was particularly useful to understand the level 
of integration and cohesion of the immigrant communities in Montserrat, as well as the type 
of community-feeling within each group. Indeed, while the interviews and the previous 
observation highlighted the strong cohesion within the Dominican (DR) community, the 
situation was less clear for the Jamaican and Guyanese communities. FGDs therefore highlight 
how these two groups felt separated from the Montserratians and felt like outsiders even after 
one or two decades of residency on the Island.  
 
The organization of the FGDs raised the issue of confidentiality and anonymity at 
various degrees depending on the communities. It was not presented as an issue by the 
Montserratians, who accepted meeting  in public and opened places, that is a bar-restaurant 
easily accessible to all. They then did not show any difficulty about talking loudly in public, 
even when they were addressing sensitive matters. The non-nationals, however, asked for the 
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meeting to be organised in a private and closed place where nobody could hear them and hence 
know what they were talking about. They asked me several times to confirm that it was safe 
for them to talk and that nobody would know about what they said. I therefore decided to take 
only notes during the discussions and to not record anything. For the same reason, only the 
group of Montserratians was photographied during the meeting (Figure 3.2).  
 
 
Figure 3.2: FGD with the Montserratian group (on the left) (David Bates, 2016) and note-taking by a 
participant during the activity (on the right) 
 
For all groups, it was also necessary to invite the participants through an intermediary, 
a person of trust and influence in the community. While for the Montserratians it was mainly 
to convince the participants of the interest of the activity, for the non-nationals it was more a 
matter of trust, anonymity and safety. Unfortunately, I did not find such a gate keeper for the 
Guyanese community, as those who could have done it refused, arguing it was not a good idea 
to organize such an activity. Therefore I had to make contact with the Guyanese that I met 
previously either during one-to-one interviews or informally in the street to convince them to 
come. A first attempt failed when only two people showed up out of ten that had confirmed 
they would come. The second attempt, one week later, was more successful, with four adults, 
including one male and a teenager, present. Considering the difficulty in organization, it was 
not possible to be selective in terms of gender, time of residence in Montserrat or socio-
economic background. The organization of the FGD with the Jamaicans was easier as an 
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influential person helped me and contacted several people, paying attention to have a mixed 
group. Six people attended, including two women and people from different socio-economic 
backgrounds. Similarly, the Montserratian participants were contacted by an influential 
person, which allowed me to have a very diverse group of twelve people during the first 
meeting, and seven came back the second time.  
 
The four FGDs were conducted quite differently each time, especially depending on 
the way they were organized. The downside of having an intermediary person to organize the 
FGD with the Jamaicans especially was that it made the discussion too formal and prevented 
the participants from being as disinhibited as they were in the other groups. The discussion 
actually started to become freer and more engaged after the official end when four of the 
participants and I were heading back home in the car of one of the participants. The more 
informal and relaxed atmosphere in the car encouraged people to pursue the discussion more 
freely.  For all the FGDs, large A3 sheets of papers were offered to the participants so they 
could take notes of the major key points. The objective was to help the participants to keep 
focus, to go further on each point and provide a tangible outcome to the discussion. I let the 
participants decide who would write down the ideas. This process worked very well with the 
group of Montserratians as they were more familiar with this way of doing things. A teacher 
spontaneously took the initiative to note the ideas and it seemed helpful to encourage the 
participants to clarify and discuss each point as much as possible. In the Jamaican group, noting 
the ideas was a useful way to focus the discussion as well and to tackle different subjects. As 
the participants naturally tended to discuss the negative aspects of their experience in 
Montserrat and the problem encountered, they could visualize on paper that they were not 
looking at any of the positive. Once they became aware of this, by themselves, they started to 
discuss the positive aspects, their own assets or what had helped them in their lives on the 
island. The use of paper, however, seemed less natural for them and the notes were much 
briefer, irregular, than with the Montserratian group. Finally, the group of Guyanese did not 
use the paper at all. As with the two previous groups, as a facilitator, I did not force the 
participants to use it but just quickly suggested it. Unlike the two other groups who positively 
responded to the suggestion, the group of Guyanese hardly paid attention to it. Regarding the 
fact that the discussion was very emotional, the paper would have certainly been too 
constraining for them. It required me to ask regular questions to avoid the discussion going too 
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off topic, things that I almost did not have to do with the two other groups.  
The four FGDs, especially the two with the Montserratians and the one with the 
Guyanese group, seemed to have a kind of therapeutic effect. At the end of the first FGD with 
the Montserratians, the participants asked of their own accord to organize a similar activity 
every week. They explained that they generally did not take the time to talk about the societal 
issues of Montserrat although they felt very concerned and felt they had to discuss them to 
improve the social situation of the country. The Guyanese participants expressed gratitude to 
me for having organized this opportunity to discuss. Among this last group, the therapeutic 
effect was particularly visible through the evolution of the activity. Although the participants 
tended to be shy at the beginning, rapidly when they became more confident, the discussion 
became much more active and frank. Their attitude and way of speaking made their actual 
feelings and emotions gradually more and more explicit. I had to end the discussion myself 
after more than two hours because it was starting to get very late and one of the participants 
had to go to work. The participants eventually thanked me for the organization of the FGD. 
Among the Jamaican groups, such therapeutic effect was not really visible. That may be due 
to the participants themselves, perhaps being less in need to express themselves or less 
confident speaking freely; or due to the more formal format of the FGD itself. The therapeutic 
effect is important to enable deeper discussion, in a more ethical way as the research benefits 
the participants themselves (Kitzinger, 1994; Munday, 2006).  
 
While only brief notes were taken during the meetings, I had to spend several hours 
after each meeting to transcribe the main elements of the discussion, with as many details as 
possible. However, due to this late process and some unavoidable biases in the reinterpretation, 
some information may have been forgotten or slightly modified. Unless I mentioned it in the 
notes taken during the FGDs, it was difficult to remember who said what. Therefore the notes 
transcribe mainly the major ideas and the atmosphere of the discussion, the interactions 
between people and the evolution of the process as the discussion went on.  
A major bias of the FGDs concerns the important group effect, especially when the 
discussion addresses sensitive topics. This may lead to potential exaggerations and lack of 
objectivity from the participants. The interaction as a group can lead to psychosocial factors 
affecting the eventual quality of the data (Carey & Smith, 1994). It has been found that those 
who have a different perception tend to repress and conform to the rest of the group (Asch, 
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1951 in Carey & Smith, 1994). Such effect perhaps happened during the FGDs conducted with 
the Montserratian group as there was a larger number of participants. In the other groups, the 
participants did not seem to hesitate to intervene and mark their disagreement.  
 
3.3.3. Ethnographic observation 
A large part of the fieldwork involved ethnographic observation, conducted in 
everyday life as I was living in Montserrat. Ethnographic observations were used during each 
fieldwork, for collecting data, and as a way to confirm the data collected through the other 
methods and to raise new questions. It enables the understanding of a process in its natural 
settings and therefore the nature of the interactions between different aspects of the 
phenomenon and their mutual influence. It also completes interviews and FGDs by enabling 
the comparison between what people say and what they do in actual life. Interviews for their 
part may help the understanding of observed processes in the light of specific explanations or 
additional elements given by the participants.   
 Ethnographic observation can be either structured, involving systematic observation 
using a specific list of pre-determined variables, or be unstructured, in other words done in a 
more open manner without pre-determined variables or goals. In both cases, it involves 
expended note taking during the time on the field. For this study, observation was conducted 
in an unstructured way during all acts of daily life on the field. Notes were taken regularly as 
soon as something was noticed. This involved direct notes or notes taken afterwards. It 
included notes of observation of events, attitudes and type of relationships. 
The small size of the island and of its population was favourable to ethnographic 
observation, allowing me to take part rapidly in a large range of activities and therefore be able 
to observe and analyze. The question of access is essential to be able to conduct observation 
and determine what will be observed and how. Bryman (2004) distinguished overt and covert 
observation, covert being the fact of not disclosing the fact of being a researcher. Considering 
the small size of the population, it would not have been possible to hide this while conducting 
also interviews and focus group discussion. However while I did not hide my role, I also did 
not systematically reveal it. For instance a lot of observations were conducted in public places 
with a large number of people. While some may have been aware of the nature of my presence 
in Montserrat, most people may not have been fully aware of what I was doing. I also tended 
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to take notes after observing something and only rarely during the event itself and in front of 
people, keeping hidden the fact that I was observing. This was essentially in order not to make 
people uncomfortable and to perpetuate good relationships with people.   
To be able to conduct extensive observation, I quickly tried to get involved in different 
activities. I became a volunteer at the Red Cross, taking part in regular meetings and activities 
conducted with the communities. Thanks to the help of the residents of Montserrat, I got 
involved in various social activities, such as various church services, barbecues, anniversaries 
and festivals. This raises some ethical questions however, as taking notes and observing 
confuse the roles of researcher and friend for many people, as I could not always make it clear 
that I was observing. Living on the field of my research meant that every single event in my 
daily life could become subject to reflection and observation. A friend once asked me whether 
I was analysing what he was saying after I explained to him the nature of the job of a researcher. 
He seemed to feel very uncomfortable with that. Therefore I decided not make it obvious, 
especially by not taking notes in the presence of other people, and by not asking authorization. 
Instead I made sure to keep the anonymity of people in order not to jeopardize them.  
Observation, especially when conducted in an unstructured way, largely depends on 
the informants and the key people met, as well as on the researcher himself. For instance, 
among the Dominican (DR) community, as explained earlier, it was easier to meet the people 
attending Church thanks to an initial introduction by the community pastor. It was therefore 
not representative of the actual population. Proportionally, the Dominicans (DR) who did not 
go to Church weekly were more numerous than those involved at Church. My presence and 
who I am, or who I was perceived to be, also played an important role in my capacity to take 
part in different activities and hence to observe. I explained this later in my reflexive account, 
in part 4.2. 
Moreover, observations include significant observer bias as the same event may be 
interpreted in very different ways depending on the observer, his culture, language, or 
objectives. Moreover, it may be difficult to assess what is worth being noted and analysed 
more carefully. For instance, an event can become noticeable and meaningful only if it is 
repeated and if this happens at particular moments or places. Therefore it may be possible to 
miss it if not enough time is spent in the field to be able to notice the repetition. A risk often 
highlighted by research is going native as a result of prolonged immersion, in other words, 
losing the ability to analyse events and social situations with social scientific lenses (Bryman, 
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2004). It is therefore necessary to keep the necessary distance, even while immersing yourself. 
Being in contact with different groups of people and therefore different perspectives has helped 
me to keep an analytical perspective. Daily or weekly synthesis of the latest observations and 
reflexions have also helped to keep a critical perspective and avoid going native (Delamont & 
Atkinson, 1995; Rossing & Scott, 2016).  Overall, it is necessary to consider observations as 
a complement to other methods and to analyse and reinterpret them in the light of additional 
findings.  
 
3.3.4. Data analysis 
A total of 130 formal and informal interviews, four focus group discussions and several 
notebooks of observations generated a large amount of qualitative data. Unlike with the 
quantitative data, there were no straightforward and well-established rules for qualitative data 
analysis. I therefore decided to use a qualitative data analysis on a coding-based approach, 
similar to the approach used for grounded theory (Charmaz, 2015)  
Coding qualitative data is a major step for conducting qualitative data. During and after 
the end of the second fieldwork, all interviews and notes were first transcribed into the 
qualitative analysis program NVivo, in order to enable a systematic identification of common 
themes and concepts. The process of coding constantly evolved throughout the analysis, 
corresponding overall to the three stages defined by Charmaz (2006) as the initial coding, the 
focused coding and the theoretical coding.  
The first stage splits the data in a very detailed way and hence enables a first overview 
of the collected information. It is essentially a descriptive stage, used to name words and 
segments of data. I used very descriptive codes, such as “Guyanese”, “child”, “reason for 
immigration”, “work”. Sentences or parts of the interviews generally corresponded to several 
codes at the same time.  A second, more focused stage, enabled the re-exploration of the most 
common codes and to categorize them into bigger groups, namely actors, local 
development/recovery, migration, relationship inter-communities, resources, risks/hazards, 
research methods. Each of these groups contains sub-categories with more specific codes 
explaining the data. For instance, within the category risks/hazards, we can find sub-codes 
such as DRR, exclusion zone, exposure, natural hazards, uncertainty, volcano impacts, 
vulnerability. Some of these groups are themselves divided into other sub-groups. I have also 
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sometimes added some comments in the properties of the nodes to specify what they include 
exactly since the name used was simple and quite generic.  
This categorization fluctuated throughout the analysis. Most of it was conducted 
between the second season of fieldwork in 2016, dedicated mostly to the first data collection, 
and the third season of fieldwork in 2017. The stage of analysis enabled the identification of 
the types of data missing and that needed to be collected during the third season of fieldwork. 
Finally, the last stage of coding corresponds to the theoretical coding, as a way to make sense 
of the data and to bring theoretical coherence. It includes some codes such as social cohesion, 
lack of awareness, or risk perception.  
During the whole process of coding, the elaboration of analytical memos supported the 
analysis by assessing the potential connections between the multiple categories and their 
properties (Saldaña, 2016). Moreover, some reports and documents other than the interview 
transcripts were coded in the same way to make the analysis easier. This was not possible for 
all the grey literature however as it would have taken too much time. All the documents, 
interviews and notes were also classified in different types of sources or “cases”. The 
interviews for instance were divided into five cases, namely DRR agency, “expat”, immigrants 
(with sub-groups specifying the nationality), Montserratians, policy-makers.  The elaboration 
of summaries, reports and analysis was facilitated by the use of the functions of query on 
NVivo and the combination of different codes depending on the topics explored.  
 
3.4. Verification of the results 
3.4.1. Reliability and validity of results 
Part of the ethical consideration during a research project is to ensure the 
trustworthiness of the results. Qualitative data has been highly criticized for a long time as it 
was not perceived as valid as quantitative data. In the 1950s-1960s, quantitative research was 
prioritized over qualitative research. According to Charmaz (2015, p.403) “quantitative 
researchers often viewed the inability of their qualitative colleagues to generate verifiable facts 
and replicable studies as evidence of lack of rigor”. Guba & Lincoln (1994) insist therefore on 
the need to establish four points: 
● the credibility of the research, that is the confidence in the “truth” of the findings,  
● the transferability, or in other words the degree to which the results can be generalized 
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to a more universal population, 
● The dependability. Contrary to the assumption of replicability tied to the traditional 
view of reliability of data, dependability emphasizes the need to take into 
consideration the specificities and the continuous change of the context where the 
study is conducted, 
● The confirmability, that is the degree to which the results could be confirmed by 
others studies.  
 
Lincoln & Guba (1985, p.213) present the credibility “in the eyes of the information 
sources” of the research as a major trustworthiness criterion. It was especially tested through 
the four presentations organized in Montserrat and London to the different stakeholders 
contributing to the post-disaster recovery of Montserrat. Each presentation was the opportunity 
to get approval, correction, disagreements and specifications. Considering the sensitivity of 
some topics tackled during the presentations, it was expected to at least observe reactions, if 
not verbal opposition, in the case of a disagreement. It was also important to have a diversified 
range of participants to prevent biases. Moreover, the time spent in the field, a total of nine 
months, gave the opportunity to discuss, informally or formally during an interview, with a 
large number of stakeholders, and hence has allowed me to regularly specify, correct and 
complete the previous assumptions. For that it was important to gather a representative sample 
of the population, with people from different communities and different sectors of the society, 
to confront the experiences and opinions, while confronting the information with other sources. 
Triangulation of data was particularly important as few statistical data exist on the country 
concerning the topic tackled by the research. Understanding the actual state of the post-disaster 
situation is essentially based on what people say and think, and is therefore very subject to 
opinion and prejudices. In addition to the triangulation of sources, triangulation has been 
conducted by combining research methods. Observation has completed interviews and vice-
versa, enabling the clarification of potential misunderstandings. Governmental reports and 
statistical data have also enabled the cross-checking of the qualitative data.  
The analysis of the data also can affect the credibility of the research. Denzin (1978) 
and Patton (1999) therefore recommend an analyst triangulation and theory triangulation in 
order to avoid bias of interpretations. The use of multiple framework of analysis and the 
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understanding of the data in the light of previous research has enabled the confrontation of 
different interpretations.  
 
The transferability and the dependability of the results are recurrent questions when 
research is conducted through a specific case study. It matters therefore to identify what 
findings are specific to the particular case of Montserrat and what can be generalized. This is 
why a complete understanding of the post-disaster recovery and of the different interactions 
and influences has been necessary. The small size of Montserrat and of its population enables 
easier identification of which factors are at stake and influence specific phenomena, and 
therefore what is particular to Montserrat and what is a more general process. By analysing 
the case study in the light of more general theories and previous work done in other places, it 
becomes possible to theorize the study and draw conclusions from the specific case of 
Montserrat. Chapter 8 comes back in more details on the question of the relevance of this 
specific case for a broader understanding of the recovery processes. 
 
Finally the confirmability of the study is ensured by using a research design, explained 
and justified by the specific needs of the study and of the context. Discussion with other 
researchers and comparison with previous studies enables the verification of the reliability of 
the methods. Conducting the reflexivity effort presented below is essential to raise awareness 
and inform about the potential biases in conducting research and what can influence the 
process and outcomes of the study. By being aware of the pitfalls, it has been possible to 
combine methods for triangulating data accordingly. It is important to consider these pitfalls 
if the study is to be reproducible. The methods have then to be adapted to the characteristics 
of the researcher. The work of data collection has been considered as achieved when the new 
interviews and observations stopped bringing new information or contradicting the initial 
conclusions, but seemed instead to confirm the outcomes of the study. However, it may be 
possible for a researcher very different from me, for instance an older black male researcher, 
to reach the same findings faster or using another combination of methods as he would face 
different challenges than the ones I faced as a young white female. This is what the reflexivity 
effort aims to highlight.  
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3.4.2. Reflexive account 
It is essential to realize that the researcher cannot be neutral while he/she is conducting 
the study. The researcher, as an individual with his own background, experiences, standpoint, 
knowledge and assumptions, collects, interprets the data and constructs the knowledge in a 
specific way (Bishop & Shepherd, 2011; Bryman, 2004; Charmaz, 2015; Engward & Davis, 
2015). It is therefore necessary to find strategies to step back from our own perceptions and 
prejudices. For this, as a researcher I have to understand what is susceptible to bias my analysis. 
Moreover, the researcher can affect the environment he/she is studying in several ways, by 
taking part in it. In order to understand how the researcher may have influenced the type of 
data, the researcher is committed to reflexivity. This means to identify, pay attention and 
document the role the researcher may have played during the different stages of the research. 
However, it is clear that a number of factors that may have influenced the interviews and 
observations can escape our awareness. We can also overestimate the role of our personality 
in the proceeding of an interview for instance. Indeed, we are not necessarily aware of 
everything that shapes our identity and participants’ thoughts (Bishop & Shepherd, 2011). It 
is also impossible to establish an exhaustive list of all the factors at play, considering the fact 
that they may also be very different from one interview to another and at the different stages 
of the fieldwork and the data analysis.  
 
 Bishop and Shepherd (2011) recommend using narrative reconstruction in reflexivity 
to ensure honest and ethical research and to better understand the data collected and analysed. 
It is not possible to write here a reflexive account for each stage of the data collection and of 
the data analysis. However, it is possible to identify a number of factors that may have 
influenced my research to some degree. 
 While conducting my fieldwork on an Island of only 5,000 people, mainly black 
people, my presence in Montserrat could not be ignored. Being a young white woman 
immediately contributed to putting me in some specific categories. My role as a researcher 
became more widely known only later, although I was regularly confused with either a British 
volunteer working with youth groups or an ocean conservation group, or with Jehovah 
witnesses. This may have strongly, at least among certain parts of the population, influenced 
the way I was perceived and the type of attitude I was supposed to have. In both cases, it may 
have affected my credibility when interviewing certain people, especially people working in 
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the government. The fact that I was dressed in shorts and tee-shirts, in a pretty relaxed way, 
may have also contributed to a certain lack of credibility. Indeed traditionally in Montserrat 
titles and high levels of education are perceived as quite prestigious and are often associated 
with an adequate dress code and attitude, which I do not naturally have and could not adopt 
due to the hot temperature and the need to move a lot by foot in the sun. It was therefore 
difficult to make my research credible and to show the impacts it could have for Montserrat. 
It may have affected what people told me during the interviews, either making them less 
suspicious and perhaps more frank, or either by preventing them from going into more detail. 
To counterbalance this, I made sure not to use the word “student” when introducing myself 
but rather to say that I was a researcher. I tried during each interview to assess how the 
perception people had of me was altering the way the discussion was flowing and to adapt the 
way I was behaving or asking questions. The lack of credibility became less of an issue as 
people got to know me and my work, especially after half of the second fieldwork. Several 
participations on a national radio program helped make me better known. Indeed, the fact of 
having been invited by the person in charge of the program, a well respected and influential 
woman on the island, enabled me, I think, to be more credible and to introduce my research as 
important for Montserrat.  
 
My skin colour, white, may also have played important role. Indeed I was often 
considered a British person, raising some suspicions regarding my links with the Department 
for International Development (DfID) and the British Government. I therefore had to make it 
very explicit that I had no link with the British government. My strong French accent could 
have helped to counterbalance my skin colour and hence decrease the level of suspicion that 
some may have had. However, it happened twice that I was reminded of the responsibility of 
the UK and France for slavery during interviews which were not focused on this topic. In these 
cases, it is clear that my origin and my skin colour contributed to categorize me as part of the 
“enemy”, which made it difficult to build trust with the interviewees. However, despite making 
me feel uncomfortable, it is difficult to assess how the fact of seeing me as an adversary had 
an effect on the interview and whether it also affected other interviews where the topic was 
not mentioned as explicitly.  
My gender associated to my age (mid-20s at the time of the interviews) on also clearly 
affected my relations with people, the type of relationships I was able to build and therefore 
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the groups I had access to for interview or observation. The relationship between women and 
men being much more sexualized in Montserrat, the ambiguity of relationships with men  
many times made it difficult to conduct interviews without putting myself in an uncomfortable 
situation. For instance, although I could perhaps had access to the Dominican (DR) community 
by going to the bars where they tend to gather during their free time, I did not feel safe, or at 
least comfortable, to do it as a young woman. It also made it difficult to maintain a trusting 
relationship with some men from each community as our intentions clearly differed. At the 
same time, my gender also made the relations with many females in the 20s-30s difficult. 
Building trust with them was often difficult and cold. I interpreted this as due to a relation of 
competition. Therefore, my contacts with women were much more formal and interviews had 
to be planned in advance. It was more difficult to conduct informal and repeated conversations 
with them than with men and to meet them in a friendlier place to discuss freely.  
With the Dominican (DR) community, being a woman may have been an advantage. 
After a first meeting at their Church, where I was introduced by the Dominican (DR) pastor, I 
could quickly meet a few Dominican (DR) women again, directly at their house. Each time, 
the meetings were very friendly, rapidly looking more like a meeting with a friend than an 
interview. The type of relationship enabled me to meet these women several times and to 
access more private information, especially on some sensitive topics such as sex work and 
relations with employers. The fact of being a young woman, a non native-English speaker like 
them and speaking a bit of Spanish, enabled me to create an informal and friendly relationship 
that I would certainly not have been able to have if I had been a man or an older woman with 
a more formal look. However, this raises some ethical questions. Although it had been made 
clear that I was a researcher and meeting them initially for research purposes, I often felt that 
they forgot about that, or did not really understand the purpose of my work in Montserrat, and 
were rather talking to me in full confidence like a friend. Using what they told me as data and 
using our meetings essentially for collecting information, while they were seeing it as a 
meeting between friends appeared to me several times to be a breach of trust. I never took 
notes or recorded during these meetings in order to maintain a friendly and free atmosphere, 
but this also contributed to making them forget what I was there for. Once the relationship had 
settled in a very friendly and trusting way, it would have been rude and indelicate to remind 
them that I was actually there for research purposes. However, I made sure to keep all the 
information they gave me anonymous, especially as some information was very personal and 
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intimate.   
While it may have been an asset with the Dominican (DR) community in the sense that 
it made me more equal to the people, the fact that I am not a native-English speaker made more 
difficult not onlysome of the interactions with the participants but also the data analysis. The 
exploratory fieldwork in 2015 in St Vincent and in Montserrat was the hardest as my 
pronunciation of English was not always clear enough and understanding the Caribbean accent 
was often challenging. While I could understand most of what people were saying, I could not 
necessarily assess the importance of the use of specific words and the specific meanings behind 
these choices. When the interviews where not recorded, it was difficult to remember exactly 
how quotations had been phrased. Moreover, it is clear that my questions, or at least some 
specific words, were not directly understood, especially during the first fieldwork. It 
sometimes forced me to reformulate the questions in a more direct way which may have led to 
specific answers despite this being exactly what I was trying to prevent. When it obviously 
happened and I was able to notice it immediately, I generally tried to check whether what had 
been said was confirmed by the rest of the interview or if it was clearly influenced by the way 
my question was either asked or understood and in contradiction with the rest of the interview. 
The difficulties in phrasing my questions and understanding the shades of meaning of the 
answers was exacerbated during the interviews of the Dominican (DR) community, where 
most people were speaking only in Spanish. Indeed while I was able to understand pretty 
easily, I had more difficulties speaking fluently and therefore in conducting an actual 
discussion. Therefore I encouraged them to speak and I picked up on some specific words to 
mark my interest rather than ask unclear questions which could have been easily 
misinterpreted. While it may have prevented me from exploring more deeply into some topics, 
the language issue may have allowed more agency to the interviewees to go in the directions 
which mattered most for them and to compensate for the potential biases I could have had.  
 
Besides the role played by my appearance and my way of speaking, the way I 
conducted data collection and data analysis may have been influenced by my own sensitivity 
and assumptions.  I am highly sensitive towards questions of discrimination, marginalization 
and segregation which may have been perceived during the interviews and in the way I 
interpreted the data, even though I have tried to be as neutral as possible. To compensate for 
my own subjectivity, I have focused a lot on trying to better understand the views and 
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perceptions of those who clearly did not share the same political and social views as me. I had 
to adjust my way of collecting and analysing data (Blee, 1998). I have forced myself to focus 
even more on the views I was not spontaneously sharing in order to better understand them 
and what motivated them. I also paid great attention to the way I was speaking with those with 
whom I clearly disagreed in order that my own sensitivity and opinions did not become explicit 
and hinder the interviews. I anticipated hearing some racist views and therefore I was mentally 
prepared to answer in a non-emotional way. However, the same sensitivity and the fact that I 
have a personal experience of being a foreigner where I lived  helped me to become more 
familiar with the immigrant communities in Montserrat and perhaps to ask more sensitive or 
relevant questions.  
Overall, the sensitivity of the subjects tackled forced me to be very careful about the 
way I addressed them and the way I introduced myself. I was initially introducing myself as 
working on the volcanic risk and noticed that it led to some negative reactions. Several people 
openly expressed boredom and irritation toward researchers interviewing them for many years 
always about the volcanic crisis. It was therefore necessary to find a way to make clear that I 
did not want to annoy them anymore with questions that they had been asked several times. 
However, making clear that I was working on the risks of natural hazards on the future in 
Montserrat did not make the discussion easier as it is clearly a subject that most people do not 
want to discuss or think about. During the first fieldwork and the beginning of the second one, 
a lack of sensitivity about these issues affected the interviews by raising irritation. I therefore 
had to adapt my way of speaking and gradually avoided speaking directly and first of all about 
the volcano. I had to find very indirect ways to tackle the topic and only if I felt talking about 
it would not affect the interview and cause the person to closeup. In such circumstances, it was 
very necessary to distinguish myself from the British government as the management of 
volcanic risk by the UK was often criticized. However, observing and analysing the type of 
reactions that people had when I asked naively about the volcano was very valuable in 
understanding how people deal with risks of disaster.  
I demonstrated carelessness on a specific occasion, when I published an article online 
on the blog of the Migrants in Countries in Crisis, at the organization’s request, on the 13th 
October 2017 (see Monteil, 2017). The article transcribed the story of a Jamaican woman, who 
migrated to Montserrat after the beginning of the volcanic eruption and contributed actively to 
the recovery process by working with the Red Cross. The blog post was mainly addressed to 
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an international public, not specifically to the Montserratians, in order to show the experiences 
of immigrants in a country recovering from a crisis, for the International Day of disaster risk 
reduction. It was published after I had finished all my fieldwork, while I was back in England. 
The publication faced some strong disapproval from several Montserratians who argued that 
the article was harmful and negative for their country. They also argued that it was not 
representative of the reality since it presented the story and point of view of only one person. 
A large part of the disapproval was also linked to the person presented in the article and 
reflected very personal issues. Some criticisms were related to my credibility of writing about 
Montserrat as an outsider. The reactions were sometimes very violent and emotional, for 
instance aggressive emails and discussions on social media and public meeting against the 
woman presented in the article. It also received some very positive reactions, especially from 
immigrants, albeit much more discreetly. Although the reactions confirmed some of the points 
addressed by the article and in my thesis, they also emphasized the necessity to be very careful 
in the way of presenting my research. This article could have affected the rapport of trust built 
up with at least a part of the Montserratian community. On the contrary, it could have also 
contributed to building trust with a part of the immigrants who could recognize themselves in 
the article. Because my fieldwork was already finished at the time of the publication, it did not 
affect my research. It will probably not affect other scientific research as it was seen as a very 
personal issue. However, it could have aggravated some tensions between immigrants and 
Montserratians if the subject had been talked about in the main media. It was decided not to 
talk about the article on the radio, as is often the case, in order to let the reactions calm down 
and prevent more long-term negative impacts.  
 
3.5. Conclusion 
The aim of this chapter was to present and justify the methodology used during the 
study. It presents the use of interviews, focus-group discussions and ethnographic observation, 
through three field seasons, for collecting data on the recovery processes following a volcanic 
eruption, using the country of Montserrat as a case study. It particularly highlights the ethical 
needs that have shaped the data collection process. Indeed this research tackles several very 
sensitive topics, such as the risk of volcanic hazard in a crucial period of development and the 
issues linked to social cohesion and management of immigration. It was therefore necessary 
to constantly adapt the methods to address these topics without raising tensions and making 
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people closeup. Finally, a reflexive effort enabled me to understand the challenges that 
emerged especially during the data collection process but also for the reinterpretation of the 
data. It contribute to justifying the methodological choices throughout the research project. A 
more detailed presentation of the case study, Montserrat, in the next chapter, will also 
contribute to the set up of the context of this study.  
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CHAPTER 4  
PRESENTATION OF MONTSERRAT 
 
 
The research was conducted in Montserrat, a British Overseas Territory located in the 
Caribbean (Figure 4.1). The Island was affected by a series of natural hazards, including the 
hurricane Hugo in 1989 and fifteen years of eruption between 1995 and 2010. I outline here 
some major aspects of the context to understand better how changes are arising and what 
justified the decisions made for post-disaster recovery.  
First of all I introduce the physical characteristics of Montserrat and point out the main 
natural hazards it is exposed to. I briefly present the two most recent disasters that have 
occurred in Montserrat, namely the hurricane Hugo in 1989 and the volcanic eruption from 
1995 to 2010. I will then introduce the political, economic and social context of Montserrat, 
and for each sector, the major evolutions in the last 20 years. I finally show the evolution of 
the migration patterns in Montserrat and the socio-economic conditions of the immigrants.  
 
Figure 4.1: Map of the Lesser Antilles, West Indies and location of Montserrat (adapted from Hicks & Few, 
2015) 
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4.1. Physical context of Montserrat 
The Island of Montserrat is located in the Leeward Islands in the eastern Caribbean. It 
covers an area of 102km², approximately 16kms long by 11kms wide. It is a volcanic island, 
geologically young, formed less than 50 million years ago, resulting from the subduction of 
the Atlantic plate plunging under the Caribbean plate. The mountainous island is composed of 
primary and reworked volcanic deposits. The island is composed of three main mountain 
massifs, which are related to three volcanic centres: the Soufrière Hills in the south, which also 
corresponds to the currently active volcano, the Centre Hills and the Silver Hills in the north. 
The Silver Hills were active between 2.6 and 1.2 million years ago, while the Centre Hills, 
more recent, were active between 950 and 550 thousand years ago. They are now extinct, 
eroded and covered by highly dense vegetation.  
In terms of vegetation, about 71% of the island is secondary forest, including rain and 
moist forest, dry woodlands and cactus scrub (Possekel, 1999). There are major differences of 
vegetation between the different areas of the Island. Forest areas are mostly located on the 
Centre Hills, Soufrière Hills and on the western part of the islands, around Garibaldi Hill. The 
north of the island, including Silver Hills and the north-west coast, is much dryer, dominated 
by scrubs and dry vegetation woodland.  
The distribution of the population is largely determined by the relief and type of 
vegetation all over the country. Moreover, the volcanic activity and the destruction of almost 
two-thirds of the island by lahars in the southern part has forced the population to limit its 
occupation to the drier north of the country only (Figure 4.2).  
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Figure 4.2: map of Montserrat showing the distribution of the population and the volcanic hazard zones 
(Wilkinson, 2013) 
 
4.1.1.  An island highly exposed to natural hazards 
The location and geophysical context of Montserrat make it highly prone to a large range 
of hazards, including volcanic hazards, hurricanes, tsunamis, tropical storms, landslides, 
flooding and droughts mainly. Although a dependency of the UK, Montserrat is classified as 
a Small Island Developing State (SIDS) as it has limited resources and is very vulnerable to 
environmental hazards. A series of climatic and geological events have been a constraint for 
the development of the Island and its efforts for economic independence and autonomy (Clay 
et al., 1999; Mitchell, 2006; Possekel, 1999; Smith Warner International, 2003; Wilson, 2010). 
The table summarizes the main hazards and disasters that have been recorded in Montserrat in 
the last centuries.  
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Type of hazard Date Extend of damages and casualties 
Hurricane 1667  
Flood 24/12/1672 Marginal damage 
Earthquake 1672 Marginal damage 
Hurricane 1737 Severe damage due to associated flooding 
Hurricane 1740 Harvest destroyed 
Hurricane 1744 Harvest destroyed 
Hurricane 1766 
Many deaths and injuries, hundreds of housing 
damage and half of Plymouth destroyed 
Flood 1767 
Some deaths, bridges and street damage and 
some houses flooded 
Hurricane 1772 Harvest and houses destroyed 
Hurricane 1792 Minor damage to the harvest 
Hurricane 16/09/1816 Harvest completely destroyed 
Earthquake 08/02/1843 
6 deaths with complete devastation of all 
infrastructures 
Hurricane  07/08/1899 
100 deaths, 1.000 people injured, 9.000 people 
homeless, severe devastation all over the island 
Hurricane 28/08/1924 
36 deaths, many injuries, 5.000 people homeless. 
Damage to houses, infrastructures and harvest 
estimated at £100,000 
Hurricane 12/09/1928 
42 deaths, 100 injuries, 1,000 people homeless. 
Severe damage on houses and infrastructures, 
estimated at more than £150,000, especially in 
Plymouth. 600 houses totally destroyed  
Hurricane  1933 Minor damage 
Hurricane 1966 Minor damage 
Earthquake 16/03/1985 6.6 on Richter scale, damage to houses 
Hurricane 17/09/1989 
10 deaths, extensive damage to infrastructures 
and houses (90% damage) (Markham & Fergus, 
1989; NEMA, 1989; Possekel, 1999) 
Volcanic eruptions 1995-cont 
Extensive damage and complete destruction of 
Plymouth. 19 deaths (Hicks & Few, 2015; 
Meade, 2006; Pattullo, 2000; Possekel, 1999; 
Sword-Daniels et al., 2014; Sword-Daniels, 
Twigg, Rossetto, & Johnston, 2016) 
Hurricane  09/2017 Minor damage 
Table 4.1: Timeline of the main hazards and disasters recorded in Montserrat from 1667 to 2017 (adapted from 
Possekel, 1999) 
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4.1.1.1. Montserrat, exposed to several volcanic hazards 
After more than 300 years of dormancy, the Soufrière Hills volcano first erupted on 
the 18th July 1995. Series of eruptions the occurred between 1995 and 2010. In 2017, the 
volcano was still considered active but there has been no magmatic extrusion since 2010 
(Stinton et al., 2016). The Soufrière Hills volcano is a typical strato-volcano of subduction 
zone, erupting highly viscous crystal-rich andesitic magma. This high viscosity magma has the 
capacity to erupt both passively as a lava dome and also to generate overpressures significant 
enough to generate explosions. Typically, as the magma reaches the surface, it creates a dome. 
Pyroclastic density currents are generated either when this dome collapses or during explosive 
eruption. Such flows are composed of fragments of magma, including ash and pumice. They 
move at high speed, between 100 and 700km/h, following valleys typically. In Montserrat, 
they have been recorded at temperatures ranging from 130 to 650ºC (Calder et al., 1999). 
Several pyroclastic flows were recorded in Montserrat between 1995 and 2010. In 1999, some 
flows were recorded to have travelled up to 6kms (Calder et al., 1999). On the 26 December 
1997, a pyroclastic flow produced by the collapse of the dome and of the south-western flank 
of the volcano, devastated 10km², with its accompanying surge, (Calder et al., 1999). This was 
limited to the southern part of the Island (Figure 4.3), now identified as zone V and potentially 
C of the Hazard Level System (MVO, DMCA, & GoM, 2011) (Figure 4.2). 
 
Figure 4.3: Map of Montserrat showing: submarine and subaerial (based on NASA satellite photography) 
pyroclastic flow distribution and debris avalanche Deposit 1 (Karstens et al., 2013) 
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These also produced ash falls between 1995 and 2010. They were produced mainly 
during the phases of dome building and collapse, and during the explosions themselves. They 
are also generated by pyroclastic flows  (Horwell & Baxter, 2006). Ash is made of fine 
particles of volcanic rock, less than 4millimetres in diameter and is produced during phreatic 
eruptions, pyroclastic flows and explosions. Respirable ashes are particles of less than 10 
microns in diameter (SAC, 2013). Some studies showed their toxicity for human health, with 
a significant risk of developing chronic and acute diseases for the most exposed populations, 
in particular children and outdoor workers (Horwell & Baxter, 2006). The map below (Figure 
4.4) shows the thickness of ash deposited on different parts of the island during the eruption 
cumulated between 1995 and 1999 (Searl, Nicholl, & Baxter, 2002).  In the western part of the 
country, up to 15cms of ash were 
deposited (Searl et al., 2002; 
Wilson, 2010). The prevailing 
winds generally force ash to fall 
to the west and north-west of the 
volcano.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4.4: Map of Montserrat showing 
the thickness of ash deposited over the 
island between 1995 and 1999 (Searl et 
al., 2002) 
 
In addition to pyroclastic flows and ash falls, lahars constitute a major hazard in 
Montserrat. The Indonesian term “lahar” describes flows composed of a mixture of loose 
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volcanic debris and water (Barclay, Alexander, & Susnik, 2007). They can therefore occur for 
months to years after an eruption as long as volcanic debris remains when heavy rainfalls 
occur. They encompass a range of sediment-laden flow, highly concentrated flows and dilute 
stream flows. They can be very hazardous and can destabilize or destroy infrastructures, or 
even bury them. In Montserrat, they are solely the consequence of rainfalls on loose volcanic 
material deposited in the Belham catchment and ash over the island. The main lahars occur in 
the Belham River Valley, in the western part of the volcano and continue to pose a significant 
hazard even if the volcanic activity has remained quiet since 2010 (Figure 4.5). By burying the 
Belham River Valley, the lahars make the crossing more complicated between the safe zone 
in the north of the valley and the south, for a long time a “Daytime Entry Zone” only. It can 
be hazardous for those who regularly need to cross it, including farmers, workers, the residents 
of Garibaldi Hill in the 
south of Zone B and 
tourists (Barclay et al, 
2007). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4.5: Location of the 
rain gauges in the Belham 
Valley in Montserrat (Barclay 
et al., 2007) 
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4.1.1.2.  Climatic hazards 
Like the other Leeward Islands, Montserrat is exposed to the Trade Winds, which flow 
mainly from the east to south-east, creating a predominant wind direction. Intense storms may 
generate storm surge and then severe flooding of coastal areas. The north-western part of 
Montserrat is the most vulnerable to those winds. Yellow Hole, to  the north-east of Montserrat, 
Isles Bay to the west and to a lesser extent Little Bay and Carr’s Bay, to the north-west, are 
particularly vulnerable to storm surges (Smith Warner International, 2003). In addition to these 
events, hurricanes often affect the island sometimes with very serious damage. In the recorded 
history, 41 hurricanes have been noted, with eighteen “great storms” that caused major damage 
and deaths. In 1899, the whole island was devastated, with about a hundred people killed, 1000 
people injured and 9000 people homeless. The last major hurricane, Hugo, occurred in 1989. 
It was one of the strongest hurricanes that occurred in the Caribbean during the 20th century. 
90% of houses were destroyed, eleven people killed, 40 injured and more than 3,000 were left 
homeless. Later, several hurricanes, like Luis and Marilyn in August and September 1995, 
occurred while the volcano was erupting. They did not cause major damage however, except 
for the destruction of the tents erected for the evacuated Montserratians (Possekel, 1999).  
 
Other climatic hazards besides hurricanes are less well documented but regularly affect 
the island, inducing minor damage but creating regular costs. Some of them, like hurricanes, 
flooding and drought, are directly linked to extreme weather events and therefore susceptible 
to increase with climate change (Caribbean Development Bank, 2012;  Food and Agriculture 
Organization of the United Nations, 2016). A change in rainfall seasonality is expected as a 
consequence of climate change (Caribbean Development Bank, 2012). Heavy rainfalls can 
lead to various risks of disaster, including flooding and landslides. Inland flooding occurs 
mainly in the flat areas, especially the coastal reclamations or natural ponds, in times of heavy 
rain. They may be enhanced by natural or artificial drains such as natural embankments or 
roads (Smith Warner International, 2003). The risk remains limited, however, due to the 
mountainous topography of the Island. Landslides correspond to gravitational movements of 
rocks or soil down slopes. They are either natural, mostly generated by heavy rain, or as a 
consequence of deforestation or construction of roads in particular. Even though Montserrat is 
very prone to landslides due to its physical characteristics, no major damage due to landslides 
was recorded (Smith Warner International, 2003). However, the increasing number of 
Page | 94 
 
constructions on steep slopes due to the limited availability of land reinforces the risk of 
damage due to landslides. Parts of the population also express a concern for the vulnerability 
of the inhabitants living on such slopes, especially when they are immigrants, and therefore do 
not necessarily have the adequate knowledge and awareness of the risk of landslide.  
Extreme weather events can also be responsible for the generation of droughts in the 
Caribbean, and hence dramatically affect agriculture. Climate change is a major concern for 
the whole Caribbean region. The IPCC in its Fourth Assessment Report projects that there is 
a 90% chance that temperatures will increase up to 2 to 2.5ºC in the Caribbean region and a 
decrease of annual precipitation of 5 to 15%, particularly marked during the dry season from 
June to August (Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations, 2016). Recent 
major droughts have been recorded in the Caribbean, especially in years with El Nino events, 
in 1957, 1968, 1976-77, 1986-1987, 1991, 1994, 1997-1998, and 2009-2010 (Food and 
Agriculture Organization of the United Nations, 2016). In 2015, Montserrat also reported 
having suffered from an important drought. Although the availability of drinkable water is not 
seen as a concern for Montserrat, droughts may strongly affect agriculture either in Montserrat 
itself or in the neighbouring Islands that are in charge of providing food to Montserrat. 
 
4.1.1.3. Geological hazards  
The location of the Caribbean region on a subduction zone also leads to risk of 
geological hazards. The whole Caribbean region recorded frequent earthquakes during the last 
century, with events during the 1890s, 1930s and 1960s. Most events were minor and did not 
cause any damage. However, in 1843 in Montserrat, six deaths and much damage was recorded 
and in 1985, some houses were damaged by a 6.6 earthquake. Most of the recorded earthquakes 
have been assimilated to failed eruptions (Smith Warner International, 2003; Wilson, 2010).  
Even if there were no major tsunamis recorded in Montserrat, it has been assessed that 
the risk is also present (GoM, 2011b). Tsunamis are generally due to tectonic displacements, 
landslides or underwater explosions. Montserrat experienced two minor tsunamis, in 1867 and 
in 1997. The latter was due to the collapse of a flank of a volcano, during the so called “Boxing 
Day collapse”, but did not cause major damage. However, the risk remains limited as only few 
infrastructures and dwellings are located on coastal areas. After the relocation of the population 
into the north of the Island, only Little Bay is assessed as exposed to the risk of tsunami (GoM, 
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2011b).  
 
4.1.2. Recent history of disasters in Montserrat 
In recent history, two major disasters have affected the development of Montserrat in 
the long-term. Hurricane Hugo hit the island on the 16th September 1989 and caused major 
damage, with 98% of houses affected, including 20% completely destroyed. The main 
infrastructures were also impaired and eleven people were killed. A few years later, while the 
island was recovering and rebuilding, the Soufriere Hill Volcano erupted after about three 
hundred years of dormancy. A scientific report dated in 1987 warned that the volcano was still 
active. It says, “Soufriere Hills Volcano, although only moderately active in the geological 
past, poses a considerable potential threat to the inhabitants of southern Montserrat. With no 
previous experience to rely on, the Montserrat government authorities need to have a full 
assessment of possible hazards from the next eruption” (Wadge & Isaacs, 1988, p.545). 
However, this report was largely ignored by the policy-makers and all major infrastructures 
were rebuilt in the south of the country, the most exposed area.  The volcano became active in 
1995 and has gone through five major phases in its activity between 1995 and 2010, leading 
to the need of re-assessing the risk constantly.  
It has caused major damage in the very long-term. Large-scale evacuations from the 
inhabited areas surrounding the volcano were processed. The capital city, Plymouth, and the 
whole of the south and east were permanently evacuated in April 1996 after several short-term 
evacuations. One year after, on the 25 June 1997, the exclusion zone was extended and the 
village of Cork Hill was permanently evacuated. On the same day, 19 people were killed by 
pyroclastic flows while they were working in the exclusion zone. Salem, located in the north 
of Belham Valley, was also evacuated in August and September 1997 as the volcanic activity 
was consistently high. The photos below show what Plymouth was like before its total 
destruction by pyroclastic flows in 1997 and now (Figure 4.6). 
The most productive arable lands in the eastern and southern part of the island have 
been covered by ashes and pyroclastic flows and most of the major infrastructures, including 
the airport, have been destroyed. The majority of the population and most of the infrastructures 
have been permanently relocated into the north part of the country, safer but more rural and 
under-developed. By early 1998, almost 75% of the total population had emigrated mainly to 
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the UK or other Caribbean islands. The economy has been massively affected, with a 44% 
decline in the real GDP between 1994 and 1997 (Pattullo, 2000; Possekel, 1999; Searl et al., 
2002; Sword-Daniels et al., 2014). The British Government now supports the economy by 
providing about 60% of the national budget through the Department for International 
Development (DfID), and more than £350 million between 1995 and 2012 (Sword-Daniels et 
al., 2014). 
From 1999, the rules regarding the exclusion zone were relaxed, enabling a day-time 
entry into the Western part of the Island, including Isles Bay, Fox’s Bay, Cork Hill and 
Richmond Hill. Since 2011, the area is open any time, under some conditions related to 
volcanic activity (Figure 4.7). Although some residents, in particular expatriates, have 
reoccupied villas on Isles Bay and Garibaldi Hills, utilities have not been restored there and 
banks and insurance still do not cover the residents.  
 
Figure 4.6: Aerial photos of Plymouth before and after its destruction. Above: Plymouth in 1997, before its 
destruction by pyroclastic flows (Barry Lewis in Schuessler, 2016). Below: in 2017 (Charlotte Monteil, 2016) 
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Figure 4.7: Maps of Montserrat showing major revisions of the Volcanic Hazard Map over time. Map (ii) is one 
of several revised maps showing the microzonation of Montserrat into seven hazard zones (A-G) in 1997, with 
access depending on the hazard level. Access to some of these zones, particularly A and B, depended on the alert. 
Map (iii) shows the three broad zones which replaced microzonation. Map (iv) was implemented in August 2008 
in response to the new hazard level system established by the MVO. All maps have been redrawn from the original 
Montserrat Volcano Observatory maps (Hicks & Few, 2015). 
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The timeline and overall impacts of these two disasters have largely been discussed in  
literature (Possekel, 1999; Rozdilsky, 2001; Sword-Daniels et al., 2014). The objective of this 
study is to go further in the analysis of the direct impacts of the disaster, in order to analyse 
and understand the decisions made for long-term post-disaster recovery and the implications 
for sustainable development and resilience.   
 
4.1.3. Stakeholders of risk management 
Different actors are in charge of disaster management in Montserrat. The Disaster 
Management Coordination Agency (DMCA) is a major Government agency in charge of 
organising preparedness, emergency planning and response, contingency and recovery after 
disasters. It is also in charge of establishing a comprehensive disaster management plan and of 
ensuring that all departments and actors of DRR carry out the tasks they are assigned. It 
coordinates the different actions during all stages of the disaster management and hence works 
closely with the different government bodies, with the Premier, the Governor and the Deputy 
Governor. It also cooperates with the Red Cross. At the local level, disaster committees are 
organized to represent the population of each neighbourhood and village and transfer the 
information from the population to the DMCA and vice-versa. The Royal Montserrat Defense 
Force, the Montserrat Fire Service and the Royal Montserrat Police Service are in charge of 
the Emergency Response.  
The DMCA is supported by the Caribbean Disaster Emergency Management Agency 
(CDEMA), a regional intergovernmental agency for disaster management in the CARICOM. 
The agency, initially established in 1991, had focused essentially on emergency response and 
relief. It has now expanded its tasks to include a more comprehensive disaster management, 
including preparedness, hazards mitigation, and vulnerability assessment. It provides 
assistance to its member countries after major hazards and disasters.  
 The Montserrat branch of the British Red Cross Society also plays an important role in 
disaster management by supporting local projects of preparedness, capacity development and 
vulnerability reduction. Although its activities are more diversified, it has a special focus on 
disaster risk reduction. It employs a small team dedicated to DRR activities. It is supported by 
a disaster committee composed mainly of volunteers. Some play a role of mediator by 
representing specific areas of the country and communicating about the specific needs of these 
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zones. Volunteers are consigned to different tasks including vulnerability assessment, 
emergency response and relief to disaster.  
In terms of monitoring volcanic hazards, the Montserrat Volcano Observatory plays 
the major role. It is a statutory body of the Government of Montserrat and managed, under 
contract, by the Seismic Research Unit of the University of the West Indies. It is in charge of 
scientific advice and works closely with the Government to decide on the preparedness 
measures which should be adopted in case of volcanic hazards and on the control of the 
exclusion zones. In addition to the permanent staff, the Scientific Advisory Committee, 
composed of a team of international scientists, reports every six months on the evolution of 
the volcano. It informs the government about the volcanic activity and provides educational 
outreach programs to the students and residents of Montserrat.  
 
Hurricane Hugo in 1986 and the volcanic crisis since 1995 have induced a lot of social 
and political changes in the country. The recovery process following the disasters is not only 
linked to the physical impacts of these two events but also to the socio-economic and political 
situation of Montserrat.  
 
4.2. Political context of Montserrat 
The political context of Montserrat is relatively atypical as a consequence of being one 
of the five British Overseas Territories. Formerly a Crown Colony, it became self-governing 
in 1967 after receiving the status of a dependent territory with a double system of governance. 
The British Monarch is the Head of State of Montserrat according to the constitution of 1898, 
and is locally represented by the Governor. The status of British Overseas Territory induces 
the “self-determination for the territories”, “mutual obligations and responsibilities”, “freedom 
for territories to run their own affaires to the greatest degree possible”, and “Britain’s firm 
commitment to promote economic development in the Territories and to help them in 
emergencies” (Skinner, 2002, p.303). In addition, the British government has the obligation of 
promoting self-government in its dependency, as it signed the UN Charter (United Nations, 
1980, pp.37-38 in Skinner, 2002).  
The local government is democratically elected and organized on the Westminster 
Parliamentary model. It is autonomous regarding the regular decision-making and planning, 
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related to social and economic policy. It comprises a Legislative Council, the highest 
legislative body of the country, composed of nine members elected for five years, and an 
executive council. The latter is presided over by the Governor, the Chief Minister, himself 
designed by the Governor, three ministers, two ex-officio members, seven elected members 
and two nominated members. It receives budget support from the UK to conduct its policies 
(Wilkinson, 2015) and take charge of inner affairs including internal security and defence.  
The Governor is in charge of external affairs, defence and inner security, judiciary, 
administration of the public sector and control of offshore financial sector (Possekel, 1999). 
The central government is also in charge of the emergency management functions if it is 
beyond the capacities of the local government. In pre and post-disaster period, most decisions 
and actions are expected to be taken by the local government. The UK has also a strong 
influence on the law in Montserrat, closely linked to British Common Law. The status of 
British Overseas Territory makes Montserrat strongly influenced and dependent on British 
decisions and political context. Major political and economic change in the UK therefore may 
have major impacts on Montserrat. Brexit, for instance, is expected to limit the source of 
funding and the economic opportunities of the Caribbean region (Humphrey, 2016).  
 
Montserrat is also strongly linked to the other Caribbean countries through its 
membership of the Organisation of the Eastern Caribbean States (OECS) and the Caribbean 
Economic Community (CARICOM). It joined the OECS as a founding member in 1981. The 
OECS is an international inter-governmental organization, which comprises ten members 
including Antigua and Barbuda, St. Kitts and Nevis, Montserrat, Anguilla, the British Virgin 
Islands, Dominica, St. Lucia, St. Vincent and the Grenadines and Grenada and Martinique. It 
aims to create economic partnerships and exchanges, to protect human and legal rights and to 
support good governance among the independent and non-independent countries in the eastern 
Caribbean. It recognizes the challenges of the SIDS to face the rapidly changing international 
economic environment, and aims to support them through a joint or coordinated effort both in 
terms of economic and social advancement. For instance, a building code has been developed 
by the OECS, with the support of the UNDP, in order to support its member countries to 
respond and adapt to the natural hazards (GoM, 2015). The Eastern Caribbean Central Bank 
is a major institution of the OECS, that helps to regulate and control the EC$, the common 
currency of its full member states (Possekel, 1999).  
Page | 101  
 
The country has been a member of the CARICOM since the 1st May 1974. It enables 
functional cooperation between its members, with a focus on four main aspects, namely the 
economic integration, foreign policy coordination, human and social development, and 
security. Part of the actions of the CARICOM are, for instance, the creation of a single market 
and economy between its members to support their economic growth and development. It also 
facilitates the migration between the citizens of its States members. For instance, it is not 
necessary to get a work permit when migrating to another CARICOM member for 
employment. Citizens of CARICOM countries are also allowed to vote after 3 years of 
residency in Montserrat. Montserrat also benefits from other sources of funding, including the 
European Union, the Pan American Health Organization and the UNDP.  
 
The political context of Montserrat at the time of this research was marked by two main 
parties, namely the People’s Democratic Movement, led by Donaldson Romeo, the current 
Prime Minister, and the Movement for Change and Prosperity, led until 2016 by Reuben 
Meade. The Alliance of Independent Candidates also participated in the elections of 2014. The 
political context of Montserrat is characteristic of the micro-States by generating a close 
proximity between the politicians and the population. The role played by individuals is often 
of greater importance in the votes for elections than the political orientations of the different 
parties. The close family and friendship ties strongly shape the formation of opinion and the 
result of elections. In 2016-2017, the government started to face important public 
disapprobation because of the perceived lack of progress in the country and the perceived 
growing dependency of Montserrat on British decisions. The instability of the Government 
was marked, for instance, by the firing from the Government of Minister Claude Hogan in 
September 2017 by the Premier.  
 
4.3. Economic context of Montserrat 
The economy of Montserrat has slowly expanded over the last century. While during 
the 20th century, the economy was dominated by the agricultural sector, especially cotton 
production, it has shifted from the 1960s to a service-oriented economy, based mainly on 
tourism, light industry and construction. This transformation contributed to a noticeable 
economic growth during the 1970s and 1980s (Berleant-Schiller & Pulsipher, 1986; Possekel, 
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1999). In 1981, British budgetary aid ended and development aid became limited to capital 
projects and technical assistance. The country showed a good level of development in the 
1980s and a vibrant economy. In 1989, GDP per capita was US$ 4,000, and standards of health, 
education and housing were relatively high compared to the rest of the Caribbean (Clay et al., 
1999).  
 
However, the economy, demography and social context were highly disturbed by a 
series of natural hazards, especially the hurricane Hugo in 1989 and the volcanic eruption 
between 1995 and 2010. The economy recovered rapidly after the hurricane Hugo, thanks to 
the support of Great Britain, with an average yearly growth of 4.8% in (Sword-Daniels et al., 
2014) and 5.26% in 1995 (Greenaway, 2003). However, the economy considerably suffered 
following the volcanic eruption. Between 1994 and 1997, the real GDP dropped by 44% 
(Sword-Daniels et al., 2014) (Figure 4.8). Most of the island’s physical infrastructures and 
facilities, namely administrative, commercial and industrial, were affected by the eruption. In 
June 1997, the airport was closed then destroyed by pyroclastic flows. A new airport was built 
in the Safe zone, in the northern part of the island, in 2005. A new calm water harbour was 
built in Little Bay and a new capital city is still in project in that same area (Riley, 2009). In 
addition, most of the most arable lands, located in the south and east of the island, were 
destroyed, affecting considerably the agricultural production. While the Island exported food 
before 1995, it is now largely dependent on imports from neighbouring Caribbean countries. 
It may therefore be strongly affected by any decrease in the production abroad.  
 
Figure 4.8: Evolution of the real GDP growth rate of Montserrat from 1978 to 2018 (source: Eastern Caribbean 
Central Bank, 2017) 
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The real estate market collapsed while the insurance industry could not cope and let 
businesses and landowners cope by themselves. The economy became increasingly dependent 
on government spending, on private investments (Cassell-Sealy, 2003) and on British aids 
(Greenaway, 2003). The public sector now largely dominates the economy, being the main 
employer of the country. The situation is similar to what is observed in many small economies 
and generally in the Caribbean countries (The Economist Intelligence Unit, 2015). It remains 
very challenging to reinforce the private sector despite this being a major objective of the 
Sustainable Development Plan 2008-2020 (GoM, 2010). In the early stage of the post-disaster 
periods, the construction sector largely contributed to the economic revival of the national 
GDP (Figure 4.9), in addition to the private sector, due to the need to rapidly rebuild 
infrastructures and housing for the displaced people.  
 
Figure 4.9: Evolution of the Gross Domestic Product and part of the construction sector in the GDP of 
Montserrat (current price) (source: Eastern Caribbean Central Bank, 2017)) 
   
Several major economic projects have started to be developed in the south of the 
country, within the exclusion zone, since the volcanic activity has slowed down. Since 2012, 
DfID funds the development of geothermal wells, which aim to be finished by 2020. While 
now the Island relies on high-speed gas powered generators, geothermal energy production 
should enable Montserrat to considerably reduce the cost of electricity and to provide a safe 
and sustainable energy. Sand mining is also a growing economic activity since the volcanic 
activity has decreased, although it has never represented 2.7% of the GDP (Eastern Caribbean 
Central Bank, 2017). It employs a variable number of employees, up to about fifty. Tourism 
has also developed in the south as there is a great demand to see the destroyed capital city. The 
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access for tourists has started to be more open since 2015 when tourists gained access to the 
exclusion zone. It is, however, still very controlled, with strict rules to respect in order to enter 
the area. Tourism plays an important role in the national economy. Unlike many other 
Caribbean countries which have opted for mass tourism, Montserrat largely focused on “villa 
tourism” and small-scale day tours. It has been strongly affected by the volcanic crisis. Whilst 
in 1995, tourism contributed to 30% of the GDP, it corresponded only to 10% in 2001 
(Greenaway, 2003). The part of the activity of hotels and restaurants in the national GDP has 
largely deteriorated because of the volcanic crisis, dropping from 12.8% in 1995 to 2.8% in 
1996. Since then, it has increased only by 1% in twenty years (Eastern Caribbean Central Bank, 
2017) (Figure 4.10). Some projects are expected to be developed in order to increase tourism 
inside the exclusion zone, but also all over the island. Tourism indeed is a major focus for the 
economic development of the country.  
 
Figure 4.10: Part of the activity of hotels and restaurants in the national GDP (Eastern Caribbean Central Bank, 
2017) 
 
At the beginning of the 2000s, the development of the island was criticized for not 
being sustainable (Cassell-Sealy, 2003; Greenaway, 2003). The major investments were 
subjects of long debates and were sometimes criticized for not being appropriate for long-term 
development (Riley, 2009).  In 2003, it was claimed that the economy was on the path to 
collapse as the decisions taken were not sustainable (Cassell-Sealy, 2003). The development 
plans face a number of challenges that hinder their sustainability. Agriculture is not well 
developed and the country strongly depends on fruit and vegetable imports for daily life. The 
development also faces a lack of major utilities such as transport infrastructures, ports or 
hospitals, as most have been destroyed by the volcanic eruption. The small population, even 
lower since 1997, also constrains the development plans (Greenaway, 2003), as we see more 
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in detail in Chapter Six. Finally, the limited financial resources of Montserrat and its strong 
dependency on external donors and on the United Kingdom contributes to external decision-
making, not always appropriate for local development. Most plans were mainly focused on 
economic growth and not on human interests (Cassell-Sealy, 2003). However, the high 
uncertainty concerning the volcanic activity has restricted private investments and has led to a 
lack of long-term meaningful investments in the first year of the crisis (Greenaway, 2003; 
Young, 2004). Since 2010, the situation has seemed to evolve slowly with a larger number of 
major economic projects and an increased consideration of social issues.  
 
4.4. Social context of Montserrat 
4.4.1. Brief overview of the social situation 
The last twenty years have strongly affected the social context and the demographic 
structure of Montserrat. The size of the population considerably dropped after 1997, because 
of the forced displacement of a large part of the population. Over most of the recorded history 
of the Island, the population was stable around 10.000-12.000 people, with a peak of 14,000 
during the post-war period in 1946. The population dropped to 2,726 people in 1997 according 
to the mid-year estimations of the Department of Statistic in Montserrat. The population then 
rapidly grew from 1998 to 2002 to reach about 4,500 inhabitants in 2002. Since then, the 
population has stabilized around 5,000 inhabitants, mainly thanks to a large immigration that 
constitutes now about half of the total population (Figure 4.11).  
The structure of the population was largely affected by the volcanic crisis, with the 
departure after 1997 of 75% of the total population. The population of all age groups declined 
but not in the same way (Figure 4.12). After the beginning of the volcanic eruption in 1995, 
the main change corresponded to the decline of the population under the age of 15 and the 
increased part of the population in the working age groups, be 25-44 and 45-65 years old. The 
youngest sector of the population, under 15, declined from being more than a quarter of the 
total population to less than 20%. Their number increased again in 2008 but seems to remain 
unstable. The increase in the number of children is certainly related to a stabilization of the 
population and to an increasing number of immigrants bringing their children. However, we 
can wonder if the drop in the youth sector over the total population in 2011 reveals the 
instability of the population and especially of the immigrant population. 
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Figure 4.11: Evolution of the population of Montserrat between 1881 and 2011 (according to the data provided 
by the Department of Statistics of the GoM in 2016) 
 
The low proportion of 15-24 years olds corresponds mainly to the important “brain-drain” on 
the island and the need to leave the country to find jobs or pursue studies. It seems to have 
become more important since the beginning of the volcanic crisis as the proportion of this age 
group dropped from 17% in 1991 to 10-11% after 2001. The proportion of elderly people has 
slightly changed since 1991, decreasing from 2001 to 2008 because of the increase in the 
number of under 15 year olds. This remains high compared to the other Caribbean countries 
(Halcrow Group Limited, 2012a). 
 
With the volcanic crisis and the emigration of 70-75% of the population, the sex ratio 
has strongly evolved during the last years. While the Island has had traditionally a larger 
proportion of females due to male emigration, the trend changed during the crisis. In 2001, the 
number of males became greater than the number of females. This was directly linked to a 
larger number of women emigrating with their children to enable them to pursue their studies 
during the volcanic crisis, and the larger immigration of single male immigrants initially 
coming to participate in the reconstruction (Pattullo, 2000). From 2006, the census shows that 
the balance between males and females in the 25-44 age bracket had started to become equal. 
This may be due either to the increased immigration of adult women or/and to the emigration 
of young adult men (GoM, 2012; Halcrow Group Limited, 2012a). As shown in the graphic 
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below (Figure 4.13), the sex ratio of the 50-69 years olds remained unbalanced in 2011 with a 
majority of males (GoM, 2012).  
 
 
Figure 4.12: Evolution of the age structure of the population in Montserrat (Halcrow Group Limited, 2012a)  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4.13: Age distribution 
for males and females in 
Montserrat in 2011 (GoM, 
2012) 
 
 
Despite a fragile economy, Montserrat has relatively high standards of living compared 
to neighbouring islands and the majority of developing countries. Health, educational and 
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housing sectors have remained at a high level even though they were strongly affected by the 
volcanic eruption of 1995 (Clay et al., 1999; Halcrow Group Limited, 2012a; Possekel, 1999; 
Rozdilsky, 2011). Thanks to remittances, loans and support from the United Kingdom and 
CARICOM, Montserratians have maintained a relatively high material lifestyle in comparison 
to the rest of CARICOM members. In 2006 the GDP per capita was 50% higher than the 
Eastern Caribbean Central Bank average and was the 3rd highest among the eight members. 
The level of crime remains constant and relatively low. Domestic violence constitutes the most 
serious offence (Halcrow Group Limited, 2012a). 
The Survey of living conditions carried out in 2012 (Halcrow Group Limited, 2012a, 
p.81) mentioned that one of the major social changes in the last decade was the migrant issues. 
The report mentioned new issues compared to 2000 with an increasing “sense of disquiet 
amongst many Montserratians about the potential loss of jobs to non-nationals”. It also 
mentions that immigrant often report a sense of injustice compared to Montserratian nationals. 
They perceive an unequal access mainly to health services and social welfare services, and 
difficulties for obtaining work permits. Other new social issues concerned access to health 
care, often very costly especially for low income families who were not eligible for social 
welfare services.  
A major social change concerns the loss of labour and skilled workers, in all sectors, 
due to the widespread emigration, that is about 75% of the population, in the first years of the 
volcanic crisis. This largely affected the functioning of the Territory. The head teacher of a 
school explained that during the first years, it was necessary to adjust with no buildings and 
less staff. A nurse from the public hospital explained a similar thing. Although no accurate 
data exist on the exact loss of skills, it is often said that a lot of the highly qualified and most 
experienced people were also constrained to leave. The island was therefore forced to resort 
to immigrants to enable its good functioning, by replacing the emigrants for essential jobs and 
adjusting to the new needs. The displacement of the whole population to the north of the Island 
which was underdeveloped until then, and the destruction of all major utilities and 
infrastructures indeed created a great demand for labour for construction (see Chapter Six). 
The major need for workers during the post-disaster period therefore made immigration 
become a central part of the recovery process.  
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4.4.2. Immigration in Montserrat during the post-disaster period 
4.4.2.1. Evolution of the structure of the population during the post-disaster 
period 
The multiple evacuations from the south and east of the island to the undeveloped 
north, the uncertainty of the situation and the lack of accommodation in the safe north led to a 
massive emigration to the United Kingdom and neighbouring Caribbean countries. Women 
left the island in greater numbers than men, generally in order to accompany their children and 
enable the latter to pursue their education. Most people from the last evacuated villages also 
had no choice but to leave Montserrat as the shelters were already too crowded. From 10,324 
people in 19951, the population of Montserrat dropped to 2,726 people in 19981. In the face of 
this rapid and massive decline, the government took the decision to open the borders of 
Montserrat and attract immigrants, removing the need of visas and allowing anyone to work 
in Montserrat. In 2002, the population had almost doubled compared to 1998, reaching about 
4,563 people, half of them being recent immigrants. Up to 2017, the population stabilized 
between 4,000 and 5,000 people2. In 2017, it was estimated that 50% of the population was 
immigrant while it was only 19% in 1991. That was two years after the hurricane Hugo, while 
there was a first increase in immigration due to the reconstruction activity (50% of the 
immigrants in 1991 had arrived less than 3 years before). In 1980, estimations differed 
depending on the sources between 5% of the total population (Possekel, 1999) and 13% 
(Halcrow Group Limited, 2012a). Such massive change in the ratio has had multiple 
consequences on the society with especially questions on the distribution of power and socio-
cultural impacts on Montserrat.  
4.4.2.2.  Who are the immigrants? 
 Origin of the immigrants 
At the time of the study in 2017, it is estimated that the immigrants living in Montserrat 
mainly come from Guyana and Jamaica and to a lesser extent from the Dominican Republic 
and Haiti. The origin of the immigrants changed massively between the pre-disaster and post-
                                                          
1 The figure is a mid-year population estimate and was provided by the Department of Statistics of GoM in 
2016 
2 Data provided by the Department of Statistics of GoM in 2016 
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disaster periods. While Guyanese immigrants had already started to immigrate massively to 
the island at the beginning of the 1990s after the hurricane Hugo which destroyed 90% of the 
infrastructures (Possekel, 1999), the number of Jamaicans strongly increased after 1995, 
reaching and perhaps soon outreaching the number of Guyanese whose population is now more 
stable. The immigration of Dominicans (DR) is also a post-disaster phenomenon. Many of 
them actually lived in Antigua before and decided to move to Montserrat gradually after 1995. 
While there is no census, the data collected during the interviews done for this study 
allow to estimate that the population in 2016 was composed of: 
 About 1,000-1,500 Guyanese, being about 5-60% of the immigrants,  
 900-1,000 Jamaicans (a population certainly bigger in 2017 according to the 
estimations), that is about 20-30% of the immigrants, 
 200-250 Dominicans (DR), or about 10% of the immigrants, 
 members of OECS countries, that is less than 10% of the immigrants. 
In 2001, 40% of immigrants were from Guyana, 15% from Dominica and Antigua, 14% from 
the UK and the US and 10% from Jamaica.  
Before the volcanic crisis, these countries counted to less than 20% of the countries of 
origin of the immigrants. According to the director of the labour office, most immigrants in 
1980 came from the OECS countries, especially Antigua, St Kitts and Nevis, Dominica and St 
Vincent and the Grenadines. During the FDGs with the Guyanese, the participants explained 
that there were Guyanese living in Montserrat since the 1960s when people started to migrate 
out of Guyana, but it became a really popular destination after the hurricane Hugo due to the 
needs for labour for reconstruction. According the Physical Planning Unit (1995b in Possekel, 
1999), only four Guyanese were enumerated before 1980. Their number increased strongly 
during the period of 1980-1989, up to 78, and almost tripled in 1990 after the hurricane Hugo, 
going up to 210 immigrants. Today they are more than 1,000 (Figure 4.14).  
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Figure 4.14: Evolution of the immigrant population by country of origin and year of immigration before the 
volcanic crisis (Physical Planning Unit, 1995b in Possekel, 1999) 
Since the main factor of immigration is economic, being to find a job, and familial, to 
reunite families, it is possible to have an estimation of the evolution of the arrival of new 
immigrants thanks to the applications for work permits. The following graph shows that while 
the Guyanese accounted for more than 50% of the applications for work permits between 2001 
and 2006, their ratio has decreased to less than 25% now. This does not mean that there are 
less Guyanese but rather that the presence of Guyanese is more ancient and more stable. On 
the contrary, the application of Jamaicans for work permits has increased from about 20% to 
more than 50% of the total of applications. The part of Dominican applications has also 
outreached the part of Guyanese applications, increasing from about 10% of the demands 
between 2001 and 2006, to about 25% in 2014 (Figure 4.15). 
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Figure 4.15: Origin of immigrants in Montserrat (in %) applying for work permits between 2001 and 2014 
(according to the data provided by the Department of Statistics of the GoM in 2016 and Halcrow Group Limited, 
2012a) 
An important characteristic of the immigration in Montserrat is the rapid turn-over of 
the immigrant people. This is confirmed by the stagnating size of the population since 2002 
despite the increase in immigration. The fact that the demands for work permits have increased 
among the Dominican (DR) population may also be justified by a rapid turn-over, confirmed 
by the Dominican themselves. According to the interviews conducted for this study, the turn-
over of the immigrants is frequently the subject of complaints among Montserratians as it 
prevents the total population from increasing and reaching the official objective of 10,000 
inhabitants. Some people argue that certainly 10,000 people came, but not as many stayed.  
 Socio-economic characteristics of the immigrants 
The census of 1991 and 2001 shows an important change in the age distribution of 
immigrants, with an important shift in the proportion of the under 15s. Their proportion 
increased from 17% to 29% while the proportion of the over 65 year olds decreased from 9% 
to 1%. It shows a progressive establishment of families bringing their children with them 
(Halcrow Group Limited, 2012a). The age distribution below (Figure 4.16) shows that in 2001, 
the immigrants were mainly young adults, more males than females on average, between 20 
and 39 years old, with young children. It is noticeable that more than half of the very young 
children, between 0 and 4 and more than 75% of the 20-24 year olds were immigrants. It shows 
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that immigration concerns mainly young people moving for job opportunity and bringing their 
children with them. In 2012, about 30% of the households were headed by immigrants 
(Halcrow Group Limited, 2012a). My observation during my fieldwork between 2015 and 
2017 also goes in that direction. There are many men alone on the Island, working in the 
construction sector especially, but immigrants with families and young children are very 
frequent. The 2008/09 Survey of Living Conditions also shows that the majority of new 
arrivals were children under 15. In 2015 and 2016, the school teachers affirmed that the number 
of Dominican (DR) students rapidly increased, leading to more diverse classes. The need for 
teaching Spanish was increasingly felt as the classes became more bilingual.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4.16: Age structure 
of the population by 
nationality (in green: 
national males; in blue: 
immigrant males; in red: 
national females; in 
yellow: immigrant 
females) (Halcrow Group 
Limited, 2012a) 
However, the lack of data and more recent census by nationality does not allow us to 
know whether the immigrant population is aging and therefore to know whether it has settled 
for life or just for a few years. It is also probable that as they age and stay longer on the island, 
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the immigrants become naturalized and are therefore not counted anymore as immigrants. In 
terms of gender, it is noticeable that the number of adult females was inferior to the number of 
males of the same age. This is mainly justified by the mainly female emigration during the 
crisis, creating an unbalanced population. As the graph shows, the composition of the 
population changed after the beginning of the volcanic crisis (Figure 4.12). Indeed traditionally 
the island had a surplus of women due to the male emigration, mainly for work opportunities 
abroad. However, mainly due to the lack of accommodation and schools, the emigration 
pattern has changed since 1995, leading to a population composed mostly of men. A 
Montserratian woman explained why she had left the island with her mother:  
“Because we were living with the volcano for about two and half years but it 
was because school went pretty bad because of the volcano, a lot of people were 
living randomly so I could go to school and teachers weren’t there because they 
had left with their family so eventually that was what convinced my mother for 
us to leave. Things went better eventually but she didn’t want to take a chance 
because we didn’t know what would happen with school so that’s why we left.  
And I cried, I cried, and she said oh you can stay with your father but I went.” 
(Interview in January 2016)  
A consequence of this has been to look for female immigrants to compensate the 
imbalance, since many married or unmarried men had remained alone. Although the 
information was difficult to verify formally due to the lack of data and the sensitivity of the 
topic, it was commonly explained by Montserratians and Dominicans (DR) that the 
immigration of Dominicans started while some Montserratians were bringing on the island 
Dominican female sex workers, initially working in Antigua. The transfer of women was 
visible and well-known for several years until it started to appear as a problem. It has continued 
but in a more hidden way. The settlement of these women allowed a more traditional 
immigration to start, with the arrival of Dominican males and children.  
 
4.4.2.3.  Main factors of immigration and long-term residence 
 Traditionally the research on migration distinguishes different types of migration, 
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characterized mainly by push and pull factors (Asad, 2014). The decision to move is often a 
combination of both negative factors in the place of origin that encourage the migrants to leave, 
and some attractive factors in the place of reception. However, several studies have 
demonstrated the complexity to analyse the migration according to such specific criteria. There 
is now a consensus that the process of migration is often over-rationalized, based on economic 
interest. The family context also plays a major role, despite not always being economically 
positive (Asad, 2014; McDowell & De Haan, 1997). Hunter (2005, p.279) argues that the 
decision to migrate is rather “shaped by the ways in which these values/goals interact with 
individual and household characteristics, societal and cultural norms, personal traits, and 
variation in opportunity structures between areas”.  
In Montserrat, two main types of immigrants can be distinguished: the highly skilled 
immigrants coming because of some specific skills and competencies, and the others. The 
majority of immigrants have a low educational background. The census of 2001 reveals that 
23% of the immigrants had attained at the most Primary level, and 45% secondary level 
(Thomas-Hope, 2009). The majority of work-permits delivered between 2010 and 2014 were 
also for low-skilled jobs according to the department of statistics.  
 Low qualified and qualified immigrants 
The interviews and focus group discussions conducted with the three main immigrant 
communities in Montserrat suggested that the decisions to move to the island were often 
resulting from a combination of factors. Among the non-qualified or low-qualified immigrants, 
three main attractive factors were identified: job opportunities, an easier access to British 
overseas citizenship and therefore a greater flexibility in terms of jobs and movement, and 
family reunification. In addition to this, push factors exist in the countries of origin. High levels 
of crime in the country of origin, too severe competition in accessing jobs and qualifications, 
lack of job opportunities were commonly mentioned during the interviews conducted for this 
study to justify either why people decided to move out or why people did not want to go back 
to their country. Among the very qualified immigrants, or those with specific and unique skills 
in Montserrat, the decision to move to the Territory is generally more based on job 
opportunities, while the decision to stay or not depends on more diverse, and often less 
economically rational factors. The quietness and peacefulness of Montserrat play a 
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contradictory role, attractive or repelling depending on people. Personal life is also often 
presented as a factor of decision to stay or leave the Island.  
According to the interviews, except among the highly qualified immigrants, the 
decision to move to Montserrat was generally triggered by a family member already on the 
island for some years, word of mouth playing a major role to attract people. The stories told 
by the immigrants during this study are all very similar: a brother/cousin/husband had 
encouraged them to come and they themselves had encouraged some other people to move. 
For instance, a Guyanese civil servant explained during an informal discussion in 2016 that 
while he had a stable job in Antigua for more than two years, his sister encouraged him to 
immigrate to Montserrat, arguing that there were a lot of job opportunities “after the volcano”. 
She had been living in Montserrat since the beginning of the 1990s as her husband came for 
rebuilding the island after the hurricane Hugo. During the FGD organized with the Guyanese 
community, the participants explained that Montserrat had become a popular destination after 
the hurricane Hugo because of the need for labour for reconstructing the damaged 
infrastructure and dwellings. It had been the starting point for calling friends and relatives. The 
group of Jamaicans confirmed this process during their FGD. They all explained that while 
they came for employment, they all had a friend or relative on the island to encourage them to 
come. They said that it was the main reason for moving to Montserrat.  
Moreover, several young immigrants, in their 20s, explained during informal and 
structured interviews that they did not choose by themselves to immigrate but that they had 
followed their parents and finished their school in Montserrat. They either came at the same 
time as their parents or a few months or years after. The government, now aware of this, tries 
to facilitate family reunification especially when young children are involved, according to a 
government senior officer. 
In addition to having family members or friends encourage them to come, several 
immigrants explained during interviews and FGDs that they were looking for a better life. 
They were expecting better in Montserrat than in their own country because of what they had 
heard. Indeed a Jamaican man explained that whatever the level of disappointment or the issues 
they faced on the island, they continued to say to their family and friends back in their home 
country that “all is good in Montserrat”. However, the experience was often described in a 
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much more nuanced way. A Guyanese said that like everybody else, he had come to Montserrat 
12 years before thinking that the grass was always greener abroad but “there was grass but it 
dries up after one and a half years”. Some Guyanese participating in the FGD explained that 
they were also disappointed and had rapidly discovered that life was in many aspects better in 
Guyana. But despite this, they affirmed that they would continue to encourage Guyanese to 
come and try a new life in Montserrat, arguing that some succeed well and that life in 
Montserrat also has some advantages. Most of them ended up finally “earning good money 
and children doing very well at school”. There is therefore a perpetuation of the myth of a 
better life in Montserrat, disseminated through families and friends.  
The needs for jobs and for earning greater incomes are central for many of them. 
Among the Dominican (DR) community, it seems that it is mainly the people belonging to the 
poorest families who come in. A Dominican woman argued during an interview in 2016 that 
the others had higher education and did not need to leave their country. Similar arguments 
were given among the Guyanese community. It seems that a majority of immigrants are 
originally from the countryside of Guyana, where they benefited from fewer job opportunities. 
The participants of the FGD explained that Guyana was a nice country but the problems are 
political and there is a high crime rate. One of them said “Guyana done, boy” and all other 
participants agreed and explained that since the election of 1992, there had been no hope in 
their country and still lots of fighting there, compelling them to go and see abroad. For them, 
the free access to education was also underlined as an argument: the education system has 
become very expensive, although free in the past. It encourages the poorest household to go 
and educate their children abroad, where it is free, like in Montserrat, or at least cheaper than 
in Guyana. Jamaicans often raised the issue of high competition in their country, arguing that 
only those who were highly educated or belonged to the richest families could find a satisfying 
job. For others, moving abroad seemed to be a better option. Eventually, although the job 
opportunities have decreased compared to the beginning of the volcanic crisis and the period 
of massive rebuilding, immigrants generally argued that there will always be some jobs that 
the Montserratians do not want to do and that the money currency is still stronger in Montserrat 
than in their own country. Therefore there will always be new immigrants coming to try to 
have a better life. 
The decision to stay longer is depending on very diverse factors. The quality of jobs or 
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the level of incomes does not necessarily always come into consideration. Among the 
Dominican (DR) community especially, several women I interviewed explained that they had 
a better job back in their country, a more stable situation and that their certificates were 
recognized. While most of them are domestic workers now, one said with pride she had been 
a fire fighter in the Dominican Republic. Another said that she was a secretary and would like 
to be able to do the same thing again. But because of their poor level in English, they had very 
few job options in Montserrat outside the domestic sector. However, both of them said that 
they did not want to leave because they could not adjust anymore to the violence and the 
agitation in their own country. A Guyanese explained that a lot of Guyanese were attracted 
partly by the low crime rate, because they wanted a break with violence. The peacefulness of 
Montserrat was therefore often put forward as an important factor of decision to stay on the 
Island, or on the contrary a repelling factor, especially for the youth. A leader of the Dominican 
community explained the paradox between the lack of job opportunities in Montserrat for the 
Dominicans and their desire to immigrate anyway:  
Interviewer (I): “Regarding the other [Dominican] people, what is their main 
occupation? What are they here for? 
Community Leader (CL): Yes, the main one is construction. And also some are 
keeping house, they clean the houses also.  
I: Ok, so people come for that? 
CL: Well the majority of them, they come and they get what they can find here. 
Then, we have one Spanish girl who works in the Bank of Montserrat. And 
then… the possibilities are not much… for the people from Santo Domingo, you 
know because…  
I: But why did they leave Dominican Republic? 
CL: Well… let me tell you. The reality… Santo Domingo is a big place you 
know, nice place and… it’s a beautiful place… but the problem is the mentality 
of people, the majority of people, they think they can get a better job elsewhere. 
And then, except that, the major problem we have in Santo Domingo is crime, 
you know, crime. Too much killing and rebelling. And that, you have people 
who are, shooting everywhere. And some people want to come out from that 
situation“ 
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During the FGD with the Jamaicans, all the participants under 30s expressed their 
willingness to leave Montserrat, arguing that they felt bored here. The feeling of boredom is 
observable at all levels of the society, in all communities. For many, it is pointed out as a major 
reason to leave the island as soon as possible, when they have found a better opportunity 
somewhere else.  
For some others, it was the sense of achievement that was motivating them to stay. A 
Guyanese woman participating in the FGD explained that they had all made important 
sacrifices to come and therefore they were not going to leave again, even though they were 
facing a lot of difficulties. During the FGD, the participants often repeated “we are achievers”, 
highlighting the fact that they had an objective, getting a better life, and that they were going 
to do everything to reach that objective. For instance, a Guyanese teacher explained that she 
had come to Montserrat as a default choice as she wanted to leave her country and go to the 
US but could not get the visa. She told how her first months on the island had been hard and 
how she had been crying almost every day. I asked her why she had not decided to go back, to 
which she answered that it would have been weird to leave so quickly, she “did not see it 
possible to go back” so she had stayed and had eventually got used to it. Similar stories were 
told in all communities. A Guyanese man explained that the quietness of Montserrat was a big 
issue for him but because he could earn more money by staying in Montserrat than if he had 
stayed in Guyana. He had decided to stay and he “accepted [his] situation”. He had been on 
the island for 14 years. But his own brother had decided to leave and go to the UK because he 
was not achieving well and therefore could not face all the problems he encountered on the 
island. The lack of achievement and of opportunity seems therefore to be an important factor 
for leaving the island and according to some Montserrat is used as a stepping zone to the UK. 
 
The possibility of getting British Overseas citizenship was often presented by 
Montserratian people and decision-makers as the main factor of immigration. This topic seems 
quite controversial and is presented in two different ways depending on whether it is discussed 
by Montserratians or immigrants. The former tend to think that the main reason for 
immigrating to Montserrat is that it is a stepping zone for moving to the UK, and therefore that 
the immigrants do not intend to stay on the island. A minister summarizes the issue by saying 
“So you know that they come specifically for the opportunity to move to the UK. 
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Here becomes like a gateway to get to the UK.” 
The same idea is repeated at all levels of the society. Among the immigrants, the discourse is 
a bit different. Naturalization is generally presented as an opportunity that people try to take if 
they do not achieve their life well enough in Montserrat. However, it is not mentioned as an 
initial factor for migrating to Montserrat. Immigrants explained during interviews and FGDs 
that the opportunities were limited in Montserrat and therefore those who do not success well 
enough leave the island as soon as they get a better opportunity in the UK. A Dominican 
woman argued that she would ask the naturalization for her son only in order to allow him to 
go and study in England. She does not does not want to leave Montserrat. Several immigrants 
also highlighted that they could have asked to be naturalized but never did because they never 
felt the need. The possibility to be naturalized is never presented as the main factor of 
immigration in Montserrat, but rather as an opportunity if they stay long enough and feel the 
need to move on. During the FGD with the Jamaicans, the topic was not tackled spontaneously 
while discussing the reasons of immigrating. When I finally asked a question about it, the 
participants explained that the procedure to get the British Overseas Territories passport was 
too long (eight years) and too complicated (several criteria have to be filled). Hence, according 
the participants, lots of people do not have the patience to stay that long or do not have the 
resources to go through the process. Several immigrants of different nationalities indeed 
explain that even though they are on the island for more than 8 years, they still do not have 
enough financial resources to apply.  
The extent of the role of potential access to BOT citizenship on the level of immigration 
and turn-over remains unclear because of the lack of data. It seems that the extension of length 
of time of residency in Montserrat necessary to get citizenship (from three, to five and then 
eight years now) may have contribute to decrease the turn-over but the lack of data prevents 
us to know if it has contributed to reduce the level of immigration or not.  
 
 Highly qualified immigrants 
The factors of immigration of the highly qualified immigrants or those with special 
skills are different than those of low-skilled immigrant. Highly skilled immigrants correspond 
to a lower proportion of immigrants in Montserrat, but they are now more demanded for the 
Page | 121  
 
development of the island. Their decision to move to Montserrat is mainly determined by 
choice of a professional career instead of the search for a better life. It is triggered by a specific 
job opportunity rather than by familial and friends networks. Among all the immigrants that I 
met during my fieldwork, the consultants and highly educated workers were the only ones who 
came initially without knowing anyone on the island. For instance a consultant from Trinidad 
working in the health sector explained in January 2016 during an interview: 
“It is an opportunity […] I was trained in England but I’ve never practiced, in 
management. So when I saw that opportunity, I knew it’s a British Overseas 
Territory, I thought it was best to come here because I was trained in UK. So 
I’ve never worked before in the UK system. [Trinidad is] a Republic so the 
system is… somewhat British but not totally British. [...] and when the post was 
advertised, they said that I will work with the NHS, National Health Service, 
which was at the time contracted to support Montserrat redevelopment health 
sector, so that’s why I wanted that experience. But I was employed in Trinidad 
and everything was nice.”  
The job opportunities that bring them in Montserrat are often linked to the 
redevelopment of the island post-disaster and to compensate the lack of skilled people resulting 
from brain-drain and evacuation during the volcanic crisis. The same Trinidadian man 
explained:  
“I came because it is an opportunity to work in a resource constraint in post-
disaster for redevelopment. That’s a good experience, right? So that’s why I am 
here.” 
The same situation concerns teachers, nurses and various other trades.   
As they do not have any specific attraction in Montserrat despite the opportunities for 
career development, highly skilled immigrants are also more flexible, and hence more 
demanding in terms of life and work conditions. They also can leave Montserrat more easily 
and easily make another life somewhere else. Some of them explained during interviews that 
if they want to progress in their career, they need to move again. The British DfID 
representative summarized the reasons for immigration of the highly skilled people in a public 
letter to inform his departure from Montserrat in 2017:  
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“I am very pleased to have been offered this opportunity by DFID [to move to 
another job]. I have thoroughly enjoyed working and living in Montserrat and 
the experience I have gained over the last three years.” 
A Montserratian policy-maker explained: 
“You will find that those who're coming at that higher level does not necessarily 
stay, they come for short-term period. Very little of them, maybe 0.5%, 0.05% 
stay. “ 
A few of them decided to settle for longer period as they have built a family and enjoy their 
life in Montserrat. A Jamaican teacher explained during an interview in 2016 that initially she 
came for one year, taking an unpaid leave in her country, in order to have a new experience 
abroad. She was still on the island eight years after as she has finally made her life in 
Montserrat. However those cases are less frequent. Turn-over remains source of complaints 
from both policy-makers and citizens who feel that it impedes the development of the island.  
 
4.5. Conclusion 
The small Caribbean BOT of Montserrat has strongly been affected by two major 
natural hazards, namely Hurricane Hugo in 1986 and a succession of volcanic eruptions since 
1995. Since 2010, the volcanic activity is low but the situation remains uncertain. The volcanic 
crisis has led to major change among the society, including in particular the displacement of 
the whole population to the underdeveloped north of Montserrat, the emigration of 75% of the 
total population and a rapid and large immigration since then. The demographic structure of 
the Island therefore has largely changed, with about 50% of the 5,000 inhabitants, being 
immigrants, against only 5 to 10% before the disaster (Possekel, 1999). 
In the next chapters, I will analyse how the long-term recovery processes in Montserrat 
following the volcanic crisis, and explore how the BOT adjusts to the local constraints and 
resources in order to become resilient.    
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CHAPTER FIVE  
DEVELOPMENT OF THE NORTH OF MONTSERRAT:  
DIFFERENT FORMS OF RECOVERY TO DEAL WITH SHORT AND LONG-
TERM POST-DISASTER RECOVERY 
 
 
The successive eruptions of the Soufrière Hills and the pyroclastic flows that 
accompanied them forced the displacement of about 75% of the population from the southern 
part of Montserrat (the most populated area) to the north, which was undeveloped at that time. 
On the 21st August 1995, known as ‘Ash Monday’, the first large phreatic eruption led for the 
first time to three weeks of evacuation of 5000 people living in Plymouth and the south of the 
island. The third evacuation on 3 April 1996 was the last and final one. Between 1997 and 
1999, the delimitation of the exclusion zone evolved several times, sometimes including and 
excluding the central part of Montserrat in the unsafe zone (Possekel, 1999). Today, in 2017, 
about two-thirds of the island is still in the unsafe zone (see Chapter Four). The redevelopment 
of the island is therefore concentrated in the northern part of Montserrat, considered as safe 
but highly underdeveloped in 1996.  
The redistribution of infrastructure and the population in the northern part of the Island 
is a major determinant of the trajectory of post-disaster recovery in the sense that it can 
facilitate the development of capacity to cope with disasters or create conditions of 
vulnerability. The latter process therefore is strongly determined both by the type of hazard 
occurring and the need to relocation or not. 
Some studies demonstrate that relocation leads to prolonged economic and emotional 
losses, affecting all sources of capital. Studies exploring the impacts of a mandatory relocation 
of communities after the eruption of the Mount Tungurahua in 1999 in Ecuador showed that 
the relocation led to an economic and political crisis, due in particular to the lack of livelihood 
alternatives in the place of relocation (Lane, Tobin, & Whiteford, 2003; Whiteford & Tobin, 
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2009; Whiteford, Tobin, Laspina, & Yepes, 2002). Using the Cascade of Effects model, 
Whiteford & Tobin (2009) show that the relocation affected in particular, (i) the social capital 
of the communities, with the disruption of social relations and networks, and hence community 
cohesion; (ii) the health of the communities, with a greater sedentary lifestyle, less access to 
agricultural products and instead a greater access to processed foods (Whiteford & Tobin, 
2009); (iii) the financial capacities of the evacuated communities, as livelihood opportunities 
were extremely limited in the place of relocation and inflation high; and (iv) the political 
stability as the evacuees were fighting for access to livelihoods and government attention 
(Lane et al., 2003). Ambrosetti & Petrillo (2016, p.87) make similar observations concerning 
the relocation of the communities affected by the earthquake in L’Aquila (Italy) in 2009. They 
summarize,  
“Most of the [relocation] sites are located in remote neighborhoods with poor or 
insufficient access to transit and other essential services. This displacement has strongly 
affected the daily life of people that used to live in the city center and they are now facing the 
true risk of social isolation and economic marginalization. This social fragmentation, has been 
exacerbated both by the slowness of the resettlement patterns, and by the perceived lack of 
reconstruction and re-development progress”.  
Relocation and building of new neighborhoods for resettlement corresponds to an 
additional disruption of the state of normality and of the Montserratian milieu, which is “the 
relatively stable configuration of action and meaning in which the individual maintains a 
distinctive degree of familiarity, competence, and normalcy based on the continuity and 
consistency of personal disposition” (Rozdilsky, 2003, p.14). One of the key issues of the 
recovery process and of the rebuilding of new towns is to create a new sense of normality and 
stability.  
I argue here that forced displacement has not only contributed to the loss of some 
critical resources, such as crops and major infrastructure, but also that the way the 
redevelopment is conducted largely influences the short-term and long-term trajectories of 
recovery, at the scale of the neighborhoods and consequently at the scale of the Island. It 
creates the conditions for the creation of a “new normal” in the post-disaster period and for 
specific social dynamics, including new social networks and types of connectivity and a new 
hierarchical structure. The new neighborhoods built are the place where actions of social 
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cohesiveness or social conflict take place (Rozdilsky, 2003). It is also part of the “window of 
opportunity” created by the disaster, to learn from the disaster experience, implement structural 
change, build-back-better, and hence reduce the risk of disaster (Becker & Reusser, 2016). 
The relocation of the population and the rebuilding in the north of the island has been 
developed in different ways depending on the neighborhoods. Some were totally nonexistent 
and have rapidly been developed, funded by the British Government, the GoM or external 
donors, including CARICOM and the Caribbean Development Bank. Other were existing and 
have gradually evolved due to private initiatives and as a consequence of the demographic 
change. Observation and interviews demonstrate that the way the new settlements have been 
initially developed affects how they are considered by the residents of Montserrat almost 20 
years later. The Physical Development Plan for North Montserrat (GoM, 2012b) underlines 
eight major elements essential for forming the, “foundations of successful communities and 
sustainable socio-economic development”, namely:  
1. The need of a mix of land use, comprising residential, commercial, retail and 
recreational areas; 
2. The presence of community facilities, with venues and facilities for recreation, 
learning, socialization, recommending the creation of community centers; 
3. The preservation of a healthy and safe population, particularly through development of 
recreational places; 
4. The possibility of easy movement and access, including a good road network, safe 
pedestrian access and access to bus transport; 
5. Good access to agriculture and back yard gardening as it is an important source of 
livelihood but also part of the cultural heritage of Montserrat; 
6. A good environment management and preservation of the livelihoods; 
7. The possibility to celebrate the cultural heritage of Montserrat; 
8. The reduction of risk of disaster (GoM, 2012b). 
 
Two main criteria, namely the need to create social cohesion and to decrease the level of 
vulnerability to natural hazards, are highlighted among these eight elements. The same criteria 
are highlighted by the residents and policy-makers when they examine the development of the 
different neighborhoods.  
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In this chapter, I compare the development or redevelopment of four different 
neighborhoods and explore how they enable: 
 Social cohesion through (re)building of communities, 
 Incorporation of the principles of DRR and “building back better”. 
I first examine how social cohesion is developed through the rebuilding of the northern part of 
the Island. I look at its specific role in the recovery process and how the different strategies of 
development allow it to be strengthened or not. In the second part, I examine how the concept 
of “building back better” is implemented in these four neighborhoods and hence how 
sustainable the recovery process is. I demonstrate here how the very initial stage of rebuilding 
determines the long-term recovery of the neighborhoods and, as a consequence, of the whole 
territory. I attempt to identify the factors that prevent or enable sustainable recovery and 
adaptive development.   
I examine the development during and after the volcanic crisis of four major 
neighborhoods (Figure 5.1 and 5.2):  
 Davy Hill was a new development built in 1997 to relocate in an emergency the 
population displaced from the south and temporarily living in shelters or tents. This 
development was financed mainly by the British Government.  
 Lookout was built soon after for the same purpose, also with external funding, 
including funding from CARICOM and the British Government, but with more 
planning.  
 Cudjoe Head, underdeveloped before 1995, has rapidly grown through private 
initiatives.  
 Salem, an old village located at the border of the evacuated zone, existed long 
before 1995 and has gradually been transformed following the emigration of the 
original population and the arrival of new immigrants. In this research, it includes 
the neighborhoods of Friths, Flemmings, Happy Hill, Hope, Salem East and West. 
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Figure 5.1: Administrative map of Montserrat, showing the density of population and the main amenities. The 
four studied sites are encircled in red (adapted from (GoM, 2011) 
Page | 129  
 
The table below summarizes the differences between the neighborhoods (Table 5.1):  
Village Davy Hill Lookout Cudjoe Head Salem 
Year of creation 1997 1997 
Some houses 
existing before 
1995. Developed 
essentially after 
1996. 
Existing prior to 
1995, evacuated 
several times 
between 1995 and 
1998. 
Re-inhabited since 
1998 
Funding External funds External funds 
Private and 
governmental 
support 
Private 
Population in 
1990 
(estimation) 
0 0 
A few households 
(no data available) 
Between 300 and 
400 
Population in 
20011 
765 474 112 668 
Population in 
20111 
738 670 137 521 
Part of 
immigrant 
population in 
20111 
25% 10% 28% 41% 
Local amenities 
and services 
Small numbers of 
commercial 
services 
(supermarkets and 
bars), one 
community centre, 
churches. Lack of 
recreational 
facilities 
Lack of recreation 
space and 
community 
facilities 
Presence of 
businesses, 
churches, school 
and care home 
created  
Small concentration 
of shops and bars. 
No recreational and 
community 
facilities. One small 
private school. 
Small concentration 
of shops and bars. 
Some recreational 
facilities. Police 
station. 
Access 
Network of narrow 
and steep roads 
Good network of 
roads but isolated 
from the rest of the 
island. 
Good access on the 
main roads, and 
some side roads 
very steep and in 
poor state of repair 
Road network in 
poor state of repair 
and limited access 
to some side areas 
Type of land use 
High and medium 
density of 
population. Highest 
concentration of 
government owned 
social housing (11 
family units) 
Mainly owned by 
the government, 
with limited 
privately owned 
areas. Relatively 
high density of 
population 
Majority of lands 
privately owned, 
highly fragmented 
Majority of lands 
privately owned 
and subdivided into 
smaller lots. 
21 government 
owned social 
housing 
Table 5.1: Main characteristics of four of the villages created, developed or redeveloped after 1995, namely 
Davy Hill, Lookout, Cudjoe Head and Salem 
                                                          
1 Data provided by the Department of Statistics in 2016 
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Figure 5.2: Aerial photographs of (A) Davy Hill, (B) Lookout, (C) Cudjoe Head, (D) Salem (source: Google Earth, 2018) 
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 I chose to compare these four neighborhoods because of the major differences both in 
their modes of development and in their current demographic, physical and social situations. 
Lookout and Davy Hill are interesting to examine because both of them have emerged as a 
direct consequence of the population displacement and destruction of the south of the island. 
As Rozdilsky (2003) demonstrated, the creation of new towns indeed plays a major role in the 
first years of recovery process. However, the development of Montserrat is not based only on 
new settlement, but also on the redevelopment of villages that pre-existed before the volcanic 
crisis. That is why I analyze the impacts of the redevelopment Cudjoe Head and Salem; two 
villages that have been less subject to strategic and planned development after 1995. At the 
time of the study, the four places present a very diverse identity and very diverse socio-
economic and physical issues. The contrast between these four villages highlights some 
processes of development and their impact on long-term recovery. 
For the purposes of this study, I conducted semi-structured interviews with the residents 
of the four villages, social workers and policy-makers. I also interviewed formally and 
informally people living outside these villages in order to assess the external perception of 
these places. By living in Montserrat, in particular six months in Cudjoe Head and five months 
in Lookout, I could conduct extensive observation.  
The different patterns of development of these four neighborhoods highlight different 
obstacles to social cohesion at the local and national scale that can affect the whole process of 
recovery, over the long-term, by maintaining or increasing social fragmentation. These four 
forms of development allow us to understand how the principle of ‘build back better’ is 
implemented and what may interfere with it. I demonstrate how the experience of disaster 
encourages physical preparedness while rebuilding but also how other priorities affect that 
ideal. While rebuilding from scratch could facilitate the construction of more resistant 
infrastructure, several factors, such as needs that are more urgent, limited resources, and low 
level of risk awareness, can interfere. I also analyze how different speeds of social and physical 
recovery interfere with each other in each village and affect the overall development or 
redevelopment both of the villages themselves but also of the whole territory.  
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5.1.  How different forms of physical development induce different levels of social 
cohesion 
The volcanic disaster did not only manifest itself in terms of destruction of the 
infrastructure. It also strongly contributed to the disaggregation of the social relations. The 
displacement to the north and the emigration of 75% of the total population has led to the 
separation of families and communities and has jeopardized social networks and social 
cohesion. The rapid and relatively massive immigration has also largely contributed to social 
transformation. Twenty years after the beginning of the crisis, the rebuilding of the north of 
the island and the creation of new neighborhoods seems to have generated new types of 
connectivity between and within the different communities (Halcrow Group Limited, 2012b). 
As seen in chapter 2, social cohesion plays a major role for reducing vulnerability to natural 
hazards and support different stages of recovery, by maintaining or building trust in the 
different stakeholders, preventing conflicts and encouraging participation to the community 
life (Cheong, Edwards, Goulbourne, & Solomos, 2007; Djalante, Holley, & Thomalla, 2011; 
Forrest & Kearns, 2001; Guadagno, Fuhrer, & Twigg, 2017). The variable degree of social 
cohesion in the different neighborhoods therefore has major implications on their recovery. 
However as we have seen previously, there are different kinds of connections, between and 
within communities, and all do not necessarily bring social cohesion in the whole society 
(Cheong et al., 2007; Macnab, Thomas, & Grosvenor, n.d.). It is therefore essential to analyze 
how the social capital, in particular social networks, are shaped and used within the 
communities and neighborhoods.  
The rebuilding process may be the opportunity to provide the necessary infrastructure 
essential to develop networks, facilitate social cohesion and to shift from a disaggregated 
society to one with higher bridging network (Cheong et al., 2007; Macnab et al., n.d.). As a 
period of opportunity for change, the recovery period may be seen as an opportunity to enhance 
capacities and rebuild by avoiding past mistakes and improve societal functionality, from a 
multi-scale and holistic point of view (Natural Hazards Center, 2001). The way that 
neighborhoods are rebuilt is therefore critical to determine the development strategies and the 
type of connectivity between and within communities. Montserratians and social workers 
report major changes in the relationship between people following the volcanic crisis. During 
an interview in 2017, a social worker explained that the sense of community had been lost due 
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to the displacement to the north and the separation of families, and could be reestablished again 
but only thanks to major efforts. She referred here particularly to the bonding network within 
the Montserratian community. She added that before there were representatives of the different 
villages, while now there are only leaders for the whole island, contributing therefore to the 
loss of sense of community at local scale and the loss of identification to a specific 
neighborhood. A man living in Montserrat for about 40 years explained to me during an 
informal discussion in January 2017 that the new communities are artificial ones and have not 
been able to reproduce the solidarity existing before 1995. He illustrated that by the example 
of the new need for childcare while before people used to look after each other. Now there is 
a new need of organizing specific structures to compensate for the lack of solidarity.  
I analyze here how the new settlements and the efforts for rebuilding cope with the 
multiple demographic and cultural change in order to recreate a sense of community and social 
cohesion, necessary for a sustainable recovery. I examine the differences of success and social 
cohesion between the different neighborhoods and I inspect the main obstacles or the main 
strategies (or lack of strategies) which have contributed to such differences.  
Three main factors obstructing the creation of social cohesion and bridging social 
network emerge from the comparison of the four villages, namely: 
 the lack of appropriate infrastructure; 
 the social mix and stereotypes associated with some groups; 
 the lack of identification with the new neighborhoods by the displaced 
population.  
 
5.1.1. Davy Hill: new development during an emergency 
The development of Davy Hill reflects a typical way of recovering where the 
emergency takes over planning for the long-term. Post-disaster recovery creates a tension 
between the need for rapid reconstruction and rapid decisions, and the necessity to take time 
to think through decisions and gather resources for a sustainable development project 
(Olshansky, Hopkins, & Johnson, 2012; Rubin, Saperstein, & Barbee, 1985).  The 
neighborhood of Davy Hill was the first to be built after the evacuations of the southern part 
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of the Island. It aimed to provide a rapid, but temporary, solution to accommodate the displaced 
people, as the life in shelters and under tents was raising tensions and discomfort as the 
situation prolonged itself. In her account of the first five years of the volcanic crisis, the 
journalist Polly Pattullo explains that in 1997, being two years after the first eruption, “the 
building program was extremely needed” in order both to encourage emigrants to come back 
but also “to cope with the needs of those who had remained on the island”. Therefore in July 
1997, the UK government allocated £6.5 million to build 250 houses, and 50 prefabricated 
two-bedroom houses were quickly made ready by the following November. They were 
provided primarily for the people who had been in shelters longest. However, despite 
providing a rapid answer to the need for rehousing, it has been rapidly criticized, especially 
for not respecting the local standards and the Caribbean housing-style. Gradually other social, 
sanitary and economic issues have emerged.  
The 2012-2022 Physical Development Plan (GoM, 2012b) mentions the lack of 
recreational facilities in Davy Hill and the need to deal with the high unemployment in the 
neighborhood. Indeed it was estimated that unemployment was around 60% in 2012 and that 
many households were in the low income bracket (GoM, 2012b). The neighborhood is also 
perceived by some of being a “ghetto” because of a perceived higher level of petty crimes. In 
their report on living conditions of Montserrat in 2009, Halcrow Group Limited  (2012a) stated 
that, “Davy Hill and parts of Salem were mentioned by some respondents as being prone to 
disorderliness and some crime”. The fact that it is a “ghetto” is denied by the inhabitants and 
community action group of Davy Hill. They argue that the multiple petty crimes that were 
perpetrated in the neighborhood were the act of outsiders, in particular drug dealers who used 
to meet in the neighborhood for a short period of time. Whoever are responsible, it illustrates 
nonetheless the image emerging from the structure and the life in Davy Hill.  
The appearance of the neighborhood, often qualified as poor looking, and the lack of 
recreational infrastructure affect not only its image at the national scale, but also the capacity 
of people to create social cohesion. Being a neighborhood mixing different communities, 
namely displaced Montserratians and a growing number of immigrants, especially Dominicans 
(DR), there is naturally no strong connection between the inhabitants. During an informal talk 
in February 2017, an old Montserratian woman told me that she moved to Davy Hill after the 
evacuation of Plymouth, where her former house was located. In trying to understand where 
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her new house was located, I ask her if it is in the down part of the main road. She strongly 
reacted by saying that those were not houses for her, implying a spatial segregation by social 
class or ethnic group. It is indeed on the main road that the first houses for resettlement have 
been built and where social issues are arising the most. A leader of the community action group 
explained that because there is no social area, people do not get much opportunity to socialize. 
She said: 
“It’s rather a ‘good afternoon’, ‘good bye’ area when people go from work to 
home.” (Informal discussion in February 2017) 
There is a perception that Davy Hill is a neighborhood with a higher level of petty crimes, a 
fact that is refuted by the community action group and some inhabitants of the area. They argue 
that the tensions and fights which have been more common at some period were not linked to 
the inhabitants but were rather the fact of external people involved in some drug trafficking. 
The major disruptions have decreased now according to the inhabitants and social workers.  
Moreover, although the children of Davy Hill are all supposed to go to Lookout school, 
the Dominican (DR) children tend to rather go to another school where most of them were 
initially before the move to Davy Hill with their family. While there was no comment about 
that, it may contribute to divide the children between those newly arrived and those from more 
‘established’ families, acknowledging that school is an important place for socialization and 
integration. It contributes however to reinforce the bonding social capital within the 
Dominican (DR) community, which tends to share more activities all together and share spaces 
for socialization within the community, especially bars and church. Overall, at the scale of the 
neighborhood, the level of social cohesion and sense of community remains low as the 
bridging and bonding social networks have not been developed, except in some extent within 
the Dominican (DR) community.   
Gradually, some informal and formal measures are implemented in Davy Hill by 
different actors, including the government, the Red Cross and the inhabitants, as the need for 
tackling social issues becomes more acute. A community centre, part of the Physical 
Development Plan of 2012-2022, has been built in 2017 (Figure 5.3). It was designed to be a 
multi-purpose centre, for recreational and training activities. In an article of the Montserrat 
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Reporter, the national newspaper, officials insisted on the role of the centre for socialization 
and for “bringing people together” (Roach, 2017).  
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5.3: Opening 
ceremony of the Davy 
Hill Community 
Centre on March 26, 
2017 (Roach, 2017) 
 
Additionally, the Red Cross has conducted different projects to improve the image of the 
area, its safety and sanitation. The government also plans to improve the housing and gradually 
replace the temporary houses raised for resettling the displaced people. The community action 
group, established with the creation of Davy Hill but actually only active since 2012, also aims 
to stimulate social activities and to advocate as a big group for the development of the 
neighborhood. The efforts for social recovery in Davy Hill are therefore belated compared to 
the efforts for physical recovery. While they can be sufficient to compensate the initial gaps, 
they reveal the incapacity of the society and policy-makers to benefit fully of the “window of 
opportunity” offered by a disaster, because of the compression of time, or the emergency 
response to specific needs. Moreover, the lack of consideration of the long-term needs and 
more specifically of the social issues, can be detrimental in the long-term, even after some 
measures are taken. The negative image of Davy Hill persists even after the tensions and illegal 
activities have stopped. Moreover the temporary housing proves to be difficult to replace as 
they are already built. Several prefabricated houses are still in place 20 years after having been 
built. While the government encourages people to fix their houses or to build stronger ones, it 
is more difficult to retrofit existing ones than to create from scratch because of the additional 
costs and the lower emergency of the situation. Interestingly the risk of a difficult transition 
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from temporary to permanent infrastructure was already a problem mentioned at the beginning 
of the crisis as it could lead to a lower quality of life (Rozdilsky, 2003), and hence to various 
drivers of vulnerability to natural hazards. Fifteen years after Rozdilsky’s observation, the 
problem seems indeed to now be rooted and to impede the sustainability of the recovery 
process. As Gawronski & Olson (2013) explain, the first stages of development are a “critical 
juncture”, where the choices made becomes a determinant for the future and difficult to correct.  
 
5.1.2. Lookout: new development during an emergency, with anticipation of the 
long-term needs 
The development of Lookout can be compared with the development of Davy Hill, as 
it was also created as a new neighborhood to relocate displaced people. Lookout has been 
subject of longer reflection and more long-term planning, and faces today a very different 
situation than Davy Hill, despite having been built under the same conditions. Built also in 
order to relocate those who were staying in shelters, it is described by some Montserratians as 
a “social experiment”. While the construction company was the same than for Davy Hill, local 
architects, contractors and suppliers were involved in the decision-making process in order to 
better adapt the housing to local standards and regulations (Pattullo, 2000). The willingness to 
adopt a more planned way of building led to multiple delays during the construction process 
due to the difficulties of the local contractors to complete on time, and therefore there were 
lots of complaints. However in the long-term less social and physical issues have emerged 
from the development of Lookout and overall the neighborhood is seen to be more successful 
than Davy Hill. Lookout has been thought to [re]create a sense of community and to be more 
multi-functional, with the integration of several small supermarkets at different levels of the 
neighborhood, of a primary school (Figure 5.4), a nursery, a care home and a church. It is 
hence not only a place of residence but also a place where people commute to go to school, 
work or church.  
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Figure 5.4: Lookout Primary 
School, built with the 
neighbourhood (Charlotte 
Monteil, 2017) 
Unlike the development of Davy Hill, the development of Lookout has taken more into 
consideration of the different dimensions of recovery, including physical, social and economic 
recovery. The fact that it is not only a residential area encourages ‘village life’ within the area 
by providing a diversity of services and activities. It enables the neighborhood to build a 
specific identity in Montserrat and to actively contribute to the development of the Island. 
Lookout is not only a place where people have their house, it is also a place where children go 
to school, even if they do not live there, and where many people have their church. Importantly, 
more attention has been given to the appearance of the neighborhood and to the appearance of 
the houses. It benefits therefore from a better image, being attractive for a number of 
households thanks to its structure, to the way it looks and to its identity. Fewer social issues 
are reported in Lookout than in Davy Hill twenty years after its creation. Some issues, like a 
few temporary houses which need to be rebuilt and a lack of recreational activities, are 
mentioned but do not seem as critical as in Davy Hill. Most constraints for further development 
of Lookout are due to a lack of available lands and to the topography, but are not directly 
linked to the initial development plans.  
Noticeably, Lookout is one of the neighborhoods with the highest Montserratian 
population, comprising about 90% of its residents (GoM, 2012a, 2012b). That appears as a 
factor likely to facilitate the creation of bonding social network as it gathers a more 
homogeneous population. The low number of immigrants is due especially to the fact that most 
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houses were initially provided to the displaced Montserratians and only a few plots are 
available for autonomous construction by non-displaced households due to limited space. It 
makes therefore the access to land more difficult for immigrants who often have less stable 
incomes and less capacity to own their own lands.  
The development of these two new neighborhoods, Davy Hill and Lookout, and their 
differences at the time of the study brings to light the long-term impacts of two different 
strategies of rapid building. While the building of Lookout has been done in order to anticipate 
some long-term needs, the development of Davy Hill is primarily associated with the physical 
rebuilding, and tends to ignore the more comprehensive nature of the process, mainly as a 
symptom of time compression (Olshansky et al, 2012). The immediate emergency to relocate 
people living in harsh conditions prevented the anticipation of the long-term needs of the 
neighborhood. Apart from the need for accommodation, the multiple consequences of 
displacing and relocating people was ignored and therefore does the possible emergence of 
socio-economic issues was unanticipated, unlike the development of Lookout. However, only 
fifteen years later, social issues are a concern both at the scale of the Davy Hill and at the 
national scale. While Lookout benefits from a rather positive image, Davy Hill faces more 
critiques concerning various socio-economic issues.  
Importantly, the way these two villages have been developed has implications also at the 
national scale, notably the distribution of the population at the national scale and the reputation 
of the residents and their integration nationally. The fact that both neighborhoods were initially 
set up for displaced people and that Lookout did not allow for much extension determines the 
spatial distribution of the population by nationality and level of wealth in Montserrat. It 
automatically makes the access to residence in Lookout more difficult for the immigrants and 
tends to prevent the creation of bridging social networks. On the contrary, Davy Hill, because 
of housing being on average cheaper than the rest of the Island, tends to attract some of the 
immigrant population, while several Montserratians express reluctance to the idea to settle 
there. The rapid development of Lookout and Davy Hill, their reputation and their current 
situation therefore affects the relationship between communities at the national scale. It seems 
to gradually lead to favorable conditions for spatial segregation depending on the country of 
origin, and hence to potentially unfavorable conditions for developing bridging social network 
and hence social cohesion between communities at the national scale.  
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5.1.3. Cudjoe Head: a spontaneous development based on private initiatives 
The development of Cudjoe Head is similar to the development of several other 
villages of Montserrat built on private lands, such as St John’s and St Peters. It does not depend 
on formal governmental plans. Instead the construction is more spontaneous, gradually led by 
the house owners. While a few houses were existing prior to 1995, most have been built later 
when displaced people could get some lands in the area. Interviews reveal that there were 
different scenarios. A woman who was living in the now exclusion zone explained that she 
moved on to land belonging to a relative, who let her build a house on it. Some instead bought 
land after their displacement in the north and after one or several movements from a temporary 
settlement to another. Another woman explained that she could obtain land at cheaper price 
because she knew the owner and made an agreement with him. The GoM then provided some 
financial support to rebuild homes for the displaced people. The amount of support depended 
on the size of the household in order to adapt the size of the house. This system of support has 
allowed more flexibility on the general structure of the neighborhood than in Davy Hill or 
Lookout even if it is subject to some criticism. The development of the neighborhood therefore 
has been more progressive than in Davy Hill and Lookout and is still in process. It depends 
mainly on the acquisition of land and on private initiatives rather than on the decisions of 
external donors and national plans. However, a number of houses are rented while the 
landowners live abroad. The Physical Development Plan for North of Montserrat 2012-2022 
(GoM, 2012b, p.126) presents the fragmentation of lands and their access as a major issue for 
further development. It says, “the unwillingness of many land owners to sell property to buyers 
who are not family and friends is placing a major strain on the developable land. Often, people 
wish to hold land for future use rather than develop it so that it can contribute to the housing 
and buildings stock”. Private initiatives therefore determine the pace and the form of 
development of the area with little possibility of coordination or intervention by the 
government.  
Moreover, although the center of Cudjoe Head, alongside the main road, is dedicated 
to commercial area and a few places of socialization (including bars and small take-away food 
outlets), there is no recreational place nearby. The area remains very residential and 
observation reveals that most of the social life happens outside, considerably limiting the 
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opportunity for exchanges within the village and potentially the level of social cohesion and 
development of a sense of place.  
The private and spontaneous development of Cudjoe Head also has implications at the 
national scale, in the same way than Lookout and Davy Hill. The conditions of access to land 
strongly determines the nationality and social class of the population living in Cudjoe Head. It 
is facilitated for the Montserratians, displaced or not. Indeed they are more likely to have 
members of their close social network, including family and friends, owning land in the area 
and willing to either give them or sell them at low cost some lands to build a house. As a 
consequence, only 28% of the inhabitants are immigrants according to the data provided by 
the Department of Statistics in 2016. The statistics however, do not specify whether they are 
owners or tenants. The form of development of Cudjoe Head following 1995 therefore also 
affects the distribution of the population at the scale of the island and hence the form of relation 
between national and immigrant communities. Similarly as Lookout and Davy Hill, the 
development of Cudjoe Head tends to prevent bridging social network as little is done to 
encourage exchange and socialization between communities.  
 
5.1.4. Salem: development of an existing settlement affected by major 
demographic change 
Salem represents a fourth form of development, or redevelopment, following 1995. 
Unlike Lookout and Davy Hill, it existed long before 1995. Although Cudjoe Head only 
accounted for a few houses, Salem was already a major village on the island. It highly evolved 
after having been evacuated several times between 1996 and 1998 (GoM, 2012b; Pattullo, 
2000). The structure of the village and some of the facilities existing today are inherited from 
the pre-volcanic crisis period, giving a paradoxical image to the village. It is often considered 
as one of the few remnants of the “real” Montserrat and it is the object of a lot of pride from 
the “Salemites”, a name identifying the people who grew up in Salem before 1995. It is used 
every year as a main hub for major festivities like St Patrick’s festival (Figure 5.5). The village 
has been chosen to host these events due to its physical features that enables the 
accommodation of a large number of people, and due to its identity as the most ancient village 
of Montserrat out of devastated area. However, the village has also faced some major changes 
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and does not always benefit from a positive image. According to Physical Planning Unit & 
GoM (2012) and Montserratian interviewees, Salem was a major commercial center on the 
island but has now lost much of this activity. Although the center of Salem still has a 
concentration of a number of shops, bars and restaurants, several amenities, like a school and 
some churches, have closed down (Figure 5.6). 
          
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5.5: St Patrick's Festival in the streets of Salem 
(Charlotte Monteil, 2016) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5.6: an abandoned 
restaurant in Salem 
(Charlotte Monteil, 2017) 
Although Salem existed before the first eruption, its identity and image at the national 
scale seems to have strongly change since then. Its location plays a major role. Its proximity 
with the volcano and the devastated area appears as a factor of fear for a number of 
Montserratians and for those who left the village during the volcanic crisis. A disaster manager 
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at the Red Cross explained in January 2017 during a semi-structured interview, that the 
situation in Salem still looks “volatile and uncertain” because of the risk of ash falls. The high 
level of uncertainty tends to discourage investments and maintenance of the area, including 
roads and public facilities, by fear of wasted money in case of another eruption. During an 
interview, a physical planner explained in February 2017: 
“[Montserratians] think it is too close from the volcano so they don't want to 
go. […] The government provides some incentives to rehabilitate some houses 
there but they don’t want to invest in roads or things like that. They don’t have 
much interest in that area.”  
Moreover because of the repeated evacuations, many houses lay empty, either available to rent 
or abandoned. That contributes to decrease the value of the land and housing in Salem. Its 
relative remoteness from the new main core of the Island, Brades, considered as the 
commercial capital, also contributes now to decrease its attractiveness. It has therefore now 
become one of the cheapest areas of Montserrat. 
The rapid evolution of Salem and the decrease of its value have led to a demographic 
transformation, composed of a poorer population, mainly immigrant communities looking for 
cheaper place to stay and to gather. Consequently, Salem has become the first place of 
settlement in Montserrat of the poorest immigrants and of those who do not intend to settle 
down in Montserrat for long. Among the Dominican (DR) community, the willingness to stay 
gathered in a local area has contributed to raise numbers of the community living in Salem. To 
justify where the Dominican (DR) choose to live, a Dominican (DR) man argued in January 
2016 during an interview: 
“In Salem, we have a lot of Spanish because where we live… that is the Spanish 
culture, the Spanish culture they like to live closer. So the majority of them live 
in Salem and then we have some there and there, we have a few of them. But 
they live in about you know, in the area. They do not live far, you know. Like 
let’s say here, in Davy Hill, we have a group of them. That is our culture, try to 
live in the same area at least.”  
Page | 144 
 
The Department of Statistics indicates that 41% of its residents in 2016 are immigrants, which 
places it as the village with the most immigrants, if we exclude the particular situation of the 
areas mainly occupied by the “expatriate” community, being the European and North 
American immigrants, in Olveston, Old Towne and Isles Bay. In Hope, one of the 
neighborhoods of Salem, a Montserratian resident who was living there before 1995 revealed 
that only three households have remained after the multiple evacuations. All other residents, 
about 60 households, have left Montserrat. The houses of the neighborhood are therefore only 
composed of newcomers.  
The rapid demographic change in Salem due to the decrease of the cost of housing 
contributes even more to reduce the value of the area, creating a spiral of decline. It gradually 
leads to a negative transformation of the socio-economic characteristics and identity of the 
area of Salem. It seems to self-maintain a negative image of the village. Indeed, a number of 
Montserratians explain that the large presence of immigrants, among the poorest ones, is seen 
as quite negative and encourage them not to settle there. For instance, a Canadian woman 
looking to buy a house explained that she had been discouraged by Montserratians who were 
describing the village as “the little Dominican Republic”, as the “Spanish neighborhood”. 
Salem is regularly qualified as a “ghetto” and suffers from the same negative stereotypes 
affecting the immigrants.  
While the village has dramatically changed, in particular demographically and socially 
post 1995, some efforts have been made to preserve its past identity. The St Patrick’s festival, 
major annual event for the island, in addition of a number of national events, parades and 
celebrations are conducted in the center of Salem. That contributes to improve the social life 
of the village and to give a positive image to it by making Salem being the active place of 
Montserrat during some weeks or days. 
However, despite hosting these important events for the Island and the presence of 
several bars, social cohesion between communities seems to remain relatively poor within 
Salem. A lot of people going to the bars are actually not living in Salem. For a number of 
immigrants, national events like St Patrick’s Festival or local events like Salem’s day are 
considered as “too Montserratian” for them to be able to fully take part to them. Similarly to 
what is found in Davy Hill, several bars in Salem are owned and used by the Dominican (DR) 
community, constituting important places of socialization for this community but not allowing 
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strong exchanges with the non-Spanish-speaking people. Moreover several immigrant 
inhabitants, living in below average socio-economic conditions, explained during informal 
discussions that they cannot afford to go socializing much. A Dominican (DR) woman living 
there argued that she had to combine several jobs to earn her life and send money to her family 
back in Dominican Republic, and therefore does not have time or money to go out. During a 
personal conversation, another Dominican (DR) explained that because she used to help her 
neighbor, an old and sick Montserratian man, she was subject of gossip as people thought she 
was may be a prostitute. She explained that these kind of remarks discouraged some 
Dominicans (DR) to mix with the other communities. During a meeting organized by the Red 
Cross in Hope, a neighborhood of Salem, the participants regretted that none of the 
Montserratian inhabitants had turned up to the meeting, an issue commonly reported by the 
Red Cross during community activities. According to a staff of the Red Cross, that reflects the 
type of relationships in the neighborhoods and the differences of behavior between the 
different communities.  
Although the old structure of Salem allows it to maintain a more village ‘feel’ than the 
newer settlements, the movements of the population to and from Salem have strongly affected 
the type of connectivity between communities. The social issues affecting immigrant 
communities and the high diversity of communities living in Salem challenge the development 
of social cohesion and bridging social network. On the contrary, more is done to reinforce 
bonding networks within the Montserratian community. That tends to exclude the immigrants 
that do not share the same identity. It prevents the development of a bridging social network 
and hence social cohesion between communities.  
Unlike the other settlements presented previously, the development of Salem and the 
relations between people within the neighborhood are not mainly dependent on the strategies 
of development post-disaster but rather the consequence of successive changes during and 
after the disaster and lack of measures to counterbalance these changes.  
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5.1.5. Recovery processes, different paces, different scales.  
The post-disaster recovery process takes place at different spatial scales, namely 
individual, community, village and national scale, at different temporal scales, and under 
different dimensions, such as physical, economic or social (Cash et al., 2006; Djalante et al., 
2011; Gibson, Ostrom, & Ahn, 2000). The analysis of the growth, or evolution, of four villages 
in the post-disaster period, namely Davy Hill, Lookout, Cudjoe Head and Salem, highlights 
some major constraints towards leading a sustainable recovery process. It also illustrates the 
factors that affect the pace and trajectory of recovery in different places, and ultimately at the 
national scale.  
 
5.1.5.1. Recovery constrained by the availability of resources and the pre-
disaster system 
While the post-disaster period is often presented as a “window of opportunity” to build-
back-better and to take into consideration the lessons of the disaster, there are also a variety of 
challenges associated with this stage. The development of these four areas of Montserrat 
highlights how some major constraints prevent the creation of social cohesion between 
communities at the local and national scale, and thereby the sustainability of the recovery 
process. It also highlights that post-disaster recovery is not independent from the pre-disaster 
period.  The dynamics already in place, such as the relationships between and within 
communities or the political situation of the territory, and the resources remaining available 
following the disaster strongly determine the shape and pathway of the post-disaster recovery.  
The history and political condition of Montserrat, as a British Overseas Territory, a 
Small Island Developing State and a land of slavery in the past, affect in multiple ways the 
strategies of recovery of Montserrat and of its different neighborhoods. As explained 
previously, Davy Hill and Lookout have been developed due to support from external funding, 
and a lack of resources internally. Although rapid external support has enabled physical 
rebuilding, frequent complaints from residents have concerned the fact that the new 
settlements were not culturally adapted to the practices and habits in Montserrat (GoM, 2012b; 
Pattullo, 2000). The strong situation of dependency of Montserrat therefore contributes to 
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determine the type of recovery process, notably the strong focus on the physical dimension of 
recovery and the relative negligence of its social aspects.  
In the same vein, the traditional system of land division, in place for several generations 
and resulting essentially from its slavery history, also determines the recovery pathway. As we 
have seen previously, it constrains the growth of Lookout from private investments and limits 
the access to land in Cudjoe Head. The history and traditions of Montserrat, with large families 
and frequent emigration of some of their members, makes it difficult to sell land or use it for 
rapid investment, as land cannot be sold without the agreement of all members of the family. 
That affects, by repercussion, the distribution of the population at the national scale, with areas 
comprising less than 10% of immigrants and some with almost half of their residents being 
immigrants, altering hence the possibilities of building social cohesion in a diversifying 
society.  
That not only demonstrates the high interactions between different dimensions of the 
recovery process, but also that it is part of a long-term process, very connected to the pre-
disaster situation.  
 
5.1.5.2. Different paces and processes of recovery for different neighborhoods.  
The analysis of the four neighborhoods highlights that the pace of recovery can differ 
highly from one place to another. It therefore prevents an examination of the post-disaster 
recovery at a specific time as an outcome, and requires instead to analyze the whole process. 
In each village analyzed previously, one notes the emergence of various needs and socio-
economic or physical conditions.  
By comparing the situation of Davy Hill with Lookout or Cudjoe Head, one notices 
that it suffers from a relatively negative reputation. At the time of the study, it faces the adverse 
effects of unplanned and rapid development. However, this observation, by the inhabitants 
themselves, the social services and the Red Cross, leads to various initiatives at the local scale 
to counterbalance the situation. That includes for instance the construction of a community 
center, various works for an aesthetic improvement of the area, and since 2018 the increasing 
mobilization of the community action group. In the long-term, these efforts may therefore 
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improve the social situation of the neighborhood and favor social cohesion between 
communities. In Davy Hill, we observe therefore a succession of reactions potentially 
counterbalancing the cascading effects of the disaster and the lack of long-term planning.  
A very different process is observed in Cudjoe Head and Salem, where the post-disaster 
development or redevelopment has been much more spontaneous. Although on the one hand, 
it appears to be smoother form of development; less artificial and culturally more adequate, 
there was no formal planning and multi-scale coordination of the needs and plans. This type 
of redevelopment tends to respond mainly to the short-term individual’s needs, especially 
physical and economic recovery at individual levels, depending on various constraints such as 
the availability of lands and their cost, and the time-compression (Olshansky et al., 2012). It 
makes coordination and consideration of the rapid demographic, economic and social change 
more difficult and fails to take into consideration the needs for long-term at national scale, 
including social recovery and inter-communities relationships.  
Only Lookout benefited from the “window of opportunity” opened by the disaster as 
investments were rapidly made in order specifically to tackle the different dimensions of the 
recovery altogether, including building social cohesion, creating a sense of community, 
relocating people and rebuilding major infrastructures mainly. Although there is still place for 
improvement in terms of social cohesion between the inhabitants for instance, it demonstrates 
a faster pace of recovery at the local scale. That is essentially due to rapid investments, a more 
comprehensive approach of what recovery is, and a possibility of more coordination and 
planning as almost the whole neighborhood was built from the same funding and at the same 
time. It remains to see how this form of development affects the recovery process of the whole 
Island as it has so far contributed to a segregation of the population depending on whether they 
are Montserratian or not.  
 The development of the four neighborhoods therefore points out conflicts of spatial 
and time scales in the recovery process. It demonstrates how the physical aspect of the recovery 
takes priority over its social and human dimensions. The lack of coordination linked to the 
pressure for rapid solutions during the post-disaster period and due to the lack of resources can 
create favorable conditions to a downward spiral instead of an adaptive cycle (Bunce, Mee, 
Rodwell, & Gibb, 2009) which would enable resilience and reduction of the vulnerability to 
disaster. The development of each neighborhood demonstrates a willingness to reinforce 
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bonding social network among the Montserratian community especially instead of a bridging 
social network between the different groups. It demonstrates the willingness to “return to 
normal” and recreate the identity and the connectivity that existed in Montserrat before the 
crisis, while the society was more homogenous. That way, the recovery process of Montserrat 
fails to adapt to the new characteristics of the society and hence to build proactive resilience, 
characterized essentially by the adaptive capacities of a society (Djalante et al., 2011; Djalante, 
Holley, Thomalla, & Carnegie, 2013; Klein, Nicholls, & Thomalla, 2003; Manyena, 2006). 
The consequences of the development of bonding social network within the Montserratian 
community, being the majority community, may affect the sustainability of the development 
as the society becomes more diverse. Diverse studies have indeed shown the major importance 
of bridging social network for long-term recovery (Hawkins & Maurer, 2010, 2011) in order 
to support neighborhood and community revitalization. It has also been shown that strong 
internal bonds can compromise social cohesion, by excluding minority communities (Cheong 
et al., 2007; Leonard, 2004; Macnab et al., n.d.), contributing to marginalize them and hence 
to create conditions of vulnerability to disaster.  In consequent, the development of Lookout, 
mainly based on the creation of a strong bonding social capital may compromise the 
opportunity to bridge the networks and build social cohesion.  
  
5.2. Building-back-better: how that principle is implemented in the north of 
Montserrat 
While rebuilding in new areas theoretically offers the possibility to create a strong 
social environment, with favorable conditions for social cohesion, sense of place and building 
of a new identity, it is also creates the opportunity to “build-back-better”, referring here to the 
reduction of physical vulnerability. This idea has become important in the concept of recovery, 
highlighting the need of learning from the past and not reproducing the factors of vulnerability 
that could lead to disaster. It is what differentiates the concept of recovering with the idea of a 
return to normal or to pre-disaster conditions (Johnson & Hayashi, 2012).  
In terms of rebuilding, the idea of build-back-better emphasizes the need to create 
stronger and less vulnerable infrastructure and neighborhoods. It has been institutionalized for 
the first time under the 2007-2013 Hyogo Framework for Action which underlines the 
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“responsibility to protect” (Becker & Reusser, 2016, p.82) and the “need for quality in the 
recovery efforts” (Khasalamwa, 2009, p.73). UNISDR defines the principle of Build Back 
Better as “the use of the recovery, rehabilitation and reconstruction phases after a disaster to 
increase the resilience of nations and communities through integrating disaster risk reduction 
measures into the restoration of physical infrastructure and societal systems, and into the 
revitalization of livelihoods, economies, and the environment” (United Nations General 
Assembly, 2016 in UNISDR, 2015, p.6). It comes with a holistic understanding of the process 
of recovery, where response, mitigation, preparedness and sustainable development are 
inseparable (UNISDR, 2007, 2015).  
 
5.2.1. Moving to the north and build-back-better 
In Montserrat, the displacement of the population to an underdeveloped area, with very 
little existing infrastructure, in addition of two recent experiences of disasters, namely 
hurricane Hugo in 1989 and the volcanic eruptions from 1995, appear as favorable conditions 
for applying the principle of build back better. Through the development of the four 
neighborhoods presented earlier, Cudjoe Head, Lookout, Davy Hill and Salem, I examine how 
the idea of “building-back-better” is implemented and its main obstacles. The redevelopment 
and recovery process in Montserrat must not only take into consideration the risk of volcanic 
hazards but also the other hazards that the island is prone to, like hurricane, landslides, flood, 
earthquake and tsunami to name only the major ones. The redevelopment of Montserrat also 
shows how some hazards, like droughts, earthquake or tsunami, are more neglected than 
others. It can be because of a lower risk of damage or of occurrence of the hazards. However 
several other factors are at play, such as the perception of the risk and the differential level of 
awareness for different risks, the trauma from the previous hazard, the conflict with other 
priorities and the lack of resources to deal with them all.  
 
5.2.1.1. Displacement as a way to reduce the exposure to volcanic hazards 
The displacement of people to the north of the island, out of the exclusion zone, has 
consequently reduced the exposure of the population and dwellings to volcanic hazards. The 
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volcanic hazards map indicates that, with the exception of Salem, Isles Bay and Old Towne 
which are located in zone A and B, all other inhabited areas are no longer exposed to volcanic 
hazards (MVO, DMCA, & GoM, 2011). One exception to this is that the inhabited areas could 
still be affected by ash falls and acid rain, as they can both cover the whole Island if the wind 
direction redirects gas and ash plumes over to the north. This can affect crops, backyard 
gardens, and the infrastructure that is sensitive to acid rain. That requires some adjustments, 
such as green houses for farmers (Halcrow Group Limited, 2012a, 2012b). Additionally, 
secondary lahars occasionally flow down the Belham Valley; a dry river channel that has to 
be crossed to reach Isles Bay and Garibaldi Hill, where there are a number of houses (Figure 
5.7). Although there is no direct risk to the population of these areas (if of course they are not 
in the valley itself) it can restrict access to the south of the valley.  
A policy-maker explained that moving to the north and implementing an exclusion 
zone was a strategy to mitigate the risk. She said: 
“We’re all in the north now, you know, we don't, we're not in the south, that's 
one of the way of managing, we manage […] if you can go in, if you can't, you know, 
all that kind of stuffs. […] any place that people can live and rent have been 
scientifically allocated that they can live there. There is very clear demarcation based 
on very scientific research and the experience of the last volcano about where it's safe 
to live and where it's not. And nobody can 
live legally in any unsafe zone. There is some 
activities carried on, some are in the unsafe 
zone, people go on and do that like in Cork 
hill car races and stuffs like that, but you 
cannot live, you are not allowed to live and 
it is monitored anyway, so you know... but 
has been scientifically designated a safe 
zone.”  (Interview in May 2016) 
 
Figure 5.7: Lahars formed in April 2016 in the Belham 
Valley that destroyed the road and cut the access to the 
southern side of the Valley (Charlotte Monteil) 
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 However, the area that is the most exposed to volcanic risks, known now as the 
exclusion zone, is still used for various economic activities for instance. Therefore several 
people and families remain at risk. The economy of Montserrat is therefore still partly 
dependent on volcanic hazards, including pyroclastic flows and lahars. I will explore more 
deeply evolution of the risk perception over the Island in the Chapter 7 in order to examine 
how it affects the recovery process of Montserrat.   
  
5.2.1.2. Rebuilding and taking into account the past experiences of disasters 
The risk of hurricane is of major concern in Montserrat. The Island had been strongly 
affected by hurricane Hugo in 1989, with 85% of dwellings either totally destroyed or seriously 
damaged (Berke & Wenger, 1991), only six years before the first eruption. As we will see in 
Chapter 7, the direct memory of hurricane Hugo and the opportunity to build back new houses 
has enabled to build stronger concrete houses and supposed to be hurricane-proof. Considering 
the lack of data and lack of building control, it is difficult to know the exact proportion of 
hurricane-proof building. However, according to the policy-makers and the inhabitants who 
have seen the evolution before and after the displacement to the north, the reconstruction in 
the north has been a good opportunity to build hurricane-proof houses and infrastructure. Most 
houses now have a flat roof and are made of concrete, contrary to before 1995. The OECS 
building code (GoM, 2015), used for Montserrat, pays particular attention to the risk of 
hurricane, before all other hazards. It refers to the previous hurricanes and mentions:  
“The reviews of damage by the recent hurricanes have shown the need to be specific 
about the design and installation of exterior doors and windows and other non-
structural items. The Code requires that such doors and windows be designed by 
experienced structural engineers or architects to resist hurricane winds in 
accordance with Section 12 of the Code”. 
Despite the fact that there is no obligation and no systematic control of its 
implementation, one observes a general compliance when building new houses to make sure 
that their houses are resistant to hurricanes. In September 2017, when hurricane Maria passed 
50 miles south of Montserrat, it was mainly the bars that lost their roofs or were damaged in 
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some other way (Figure 5.8), while all the houses withstood the impact fairly well, facing 
minor damages at the worse. Despite the lack of published and shared assessment of the 
physical vulnerability of housing, it is clearly observable that some areas are physically more 
vulnerable than others. Cudjoe Head, built by individuals but with governmental aid for buying 
the material, is essentially composed of concrete houses with flat roofs, generally resistant to 
the impacts of hurricanes. The development of Lookout has also paid attention to such 
consideration. On the contrary, Davy Hill, because it has been developed very rapidly and in 
a temporary way for coping only with the emergency, is composed of a larger number of 
‘fragile’ houses. In the same way, Salem, which does not benefit from good maintenance 
following the emigration of the majority of its inhabitants, is qualified as a zone of concern 
according to the Red Cross.  
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5.8: Bar-Restaurant 
destroyed by the Hurricane 
Maria in September 2017 
(Charlotte Monteil) 
In addition to building better in the areas built after the disaster, the displacement to 
the North has been the opportunity to build hurricane shelters and reuse the shelters initially 
set up during the volcanic crisis for the displaced people as a refuge in case of hurricane (Figure 
5.9). For instance, when he was supervising the construction of the Dominican (DR) Adventist 
Church in 2015-2016, the pastor insisted on the need to have a shelter for the Dominican (DR) 
community inside of the Church. During an interview in April 2015, he explained:   
“That’s why [talking about the risk of disaster] I tried my best to build a building 
who can be a good shelter for people. So that building we have right now is strong 
enough if anything happens so we can shelter the people in it. So we have downstairs 
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facilities, we have a bathroom, a kitchen and accommodation for people if anything 
happens. So Spanish people can be sheltered there. That’s okay, that’s for everybody, 
but especially for the Spanish because like I told you before, the language and the 
culture and somethings like that. So they can feel somebody is care for them.” 
In general, the risk of hurricane is better taken into consideration than in the past and 
compared to other natural hazards. It is also mentioned by all stakeholders. There is indeed a 
general agreement among policy-makers and DRR managers about the need of preparing for 
hurricanes.  
 
 
 
 
Figure 5.9: Church in 
Salem, also serving as 
hurricane shelter (blue 
logo above the door) 
(Charlotte Monteil, 
2016) 
 
The interviews with policy-makers and actors in charge of disaster risk reduction reveal 
the different factors that explain why the risk of hurricane is better taken into consideration 
than other hazards. That includes the regularity of the hurricane and their seasonality. They 
can occur every year, generally between June and September, and are therefore generally 
expected. The past experience of hurricane Hugo and the regular reminders in neighboring 
islands like the impacts of hurricane Erika in Dominica in 2015, Maria and Irma in 2017 in 
Barbados, St Martin, Puerto Rico, Dominica etc., also contribute largely to the awareness of 
the need to be well prepared. According to a disaster manager, the volcanic crisis and more 
recently the discovery of sinkholes in an uninhabited area have acted to remind people that 
natural hazards could happen suddenly, and have therefore encouraged the implementation of 
preparedness measures to hazards. A government officer highlighted that: 
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“The volcano has shown that an event can be sudden, that safety and quietness 
are not granted.” 
He shows that the volcanic eruption has emphasized the need to take the uncertain into 
consideration in the development plans, and that includes several type of natural hazards.  
It seems therefore that there is an evolution in mentality regarding the need to consider 
uncertain hazards, compared to the first few years following hurricane Hugo. At that time, 
Possekel (1999) conducted a study to analyze the recovery process of Montserrat after 
hurricane Hugo and during the beginning of the volcanic crisis, and she found out that despite 
of a better awareness of the risk of hurricane, there was a general perception that it could not 
happen at such intensity again. She writes that a hurricane was “perceived as a rare and extreme 
event that will not repeat itself for a long time”. The perception that it could not occur again 
prevented consideration of the risk in the reconstruction process. That corresponds to the belief 
that certain hazards occur as a cycle and not as random events (Wachinger & Renn, 2010; 
Wachinger, Renn, Begg, & Kuhlicke, 2013). It seems at contrary that the displacement to the 
North, the intensity of damage since 1995 and the threat on Montserrat linked to the volcanic 
eruptions have better raised awareness, at least in the short-term, about the need to anticipate 
and prepare for natural hazards. As we will see in chapter 7, several reminders are however 
necessary as time passes. 
 
5.2.2. Obstacles to build-back-better  
While the risk of hurricane seems better taken into consideration during the recovery 
process, it is not the case of all types of natural hazards. As shown earlier, the measures taken 
for reducing the risk of disaster linked to hurricane have increased because of a better 
awareness of the risk and because of its high frequency of occurrence. The other hazards being 
more uncertain in terms of timing and intensity, they are put in conflict with other priorities 
and are less taken into consideration. The development of the four neighborhoods illustrates 
some of the tensions and obstacles for sustainable development and disaster risk reduction. 
As said previously, the relocation in the north helps reducing the risk of disaster linked 
to volcanic hazards. However some neighborhoods, including Salem, are located in zones A 
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and B of the exclusion zone, which means that they are could be exposed to heavy ash fall in 
the event of another phase of eruption (MVO et al., 2011). Salem has been highly affected by 
ash falls several times between 1996 and 1998, with some fragile roofs collapsing under the 
weight. Between five and ten centimeters of ash fell on the village in 1995 (Searl, Nicholl, & 
Baxter, 2002). Although one can presuppose that the proximity of Salem with the volcano and 
the recent experience of ash falls could encourage households to be better prepared to volcanic 
hazards, the development of Salem since 1995 does not reflect a perception of high risk. It 
faces multiple conflicts of interests, where risk of disaster is not seen as a priority.  
 
5.2.2.1. Risk perception in zone A 
On the one hand, policy-makers and residents of Salem often argue that the area is safe. 
They justify this by highlighting the fact that the volcano is closely monitored by the MVO, 
by the fact that the village is out of zone V (the area totally excluded from occupation) and by 
the lack of volcanic activity since 2010.  
Moreover the low frequency of volcanic activity and the quietness since 2010 may 
appear to justify a decrease in concern. A disaster manager explained in January 2016:  
“[the volcano] doesn’t impact every day and that is the main reason [why we are 
not worried], but the impact is great, but the risk presently… […] before the 
volcano erupted in 1995, there was three measurements that were used, and all 
three went off. Now two, one is red and one is green, so there is a possibility that 
it might [erupt again] but presently there has no official word… so the risk 
associated with it remains low […] so you have a low priority [for preparing to 
volcanic hazards].” 
The inhabitants use similar arguments to justify the fact that they do not take any specific 
measures to prepare in case of eruption, even if they seem to be aware of their proximity with 
the volcano and of their higher exposure than the rest of Montserrat. A Dominican (DR) man 
living in Salem for several years explained in April 2015 during an interview: 
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“We have to accustom to live with that reality. So, I don’t think we need to worry 
too much about that. Because we live in here and we depend on that you know. We 
think that God is in control and whenever happens, everybody is in the same 
situation.” (Interview in April 2015) 
The development of Salem without greater consideration of the risk of ash falls than in the 
other areas of Montserrat illustrates the paradoxes in the risk perception and obstacles for 
“building-back-better”. I develop this further in the Chapter 7 in order to analyze the impacts 
it has on the recovery processes.   
 
5.2.2.2. Lack of investments and maintenance in a vulnerable area 
While the Physical Development Plan reports: “Where areas are at perceived risk from 
volcanic activity, such as Salem and its immediate vicinity, it is important to support social 
and economic development, making these areas vibrant and attractive places to live and to do 
business” (GoM, 2012b, p.78), Salem suffers from a clear lack of maintenance and 
investments. Currently, that is illustrated by the lack of infrastructures such as roads in good 
condition, lack of public lights, and lack of connection of several dwellings to water supply. 
The area faces also a relatively higher level of social problems, linked as shown previously, to 
a lack of consideration.  
 The lack of physical investments and maintenance of Salem has important 
consequences on the vulnerability of residents, mainly to volcanic hazards, but also to the other 
hazards that can affect the area, including earthquakes, hurricane and landslides. In 2015, by 
establishing a Vulnerability and Capacities Analysis, the Red Cross identifies a major problem 
of access to houses, due to the lack of roads and the bad conditions of those existing. Public 
buses are also not regular in that area and go there only if they are asked to do so, despite of 
the fact that it is an area where many residents do not own their private vehicle. A manager of 
the Red Cross underlined this during an interview in January 2016: 
“The population there, most of them work as [house] cleaners and construction 
workers, they don’t drive. [They are] non-nationals, Spanish, Haitians and 
Dominicans. So they didn’t drive and they used that passage [talking about a 
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narrow path] to go to and from work. Sometimes late at night, it was dark without 
light, the road was very bad. Surfaces were very very bad.” 
Through advocacy of Red Cross on behalf of inhabitants of a neighborhood of Salem, a road 
has been opened in 2016 to facilitate the evacuation of the population in case of emergency 
and to allow for safer daily commuting between work and home.  
A lack of maintenance of the abandoned houses has also been reported, leading to 
hygiene issues (Figure 5.10). It is closely linked to the rapid evacuation of the inhabitants 
during the volcanic crisis. Most house owners are now living abroad, and the tenants often do 
not have the financial capacities and the willingness to maintain the houses. Moreover, a small 
number of temporary shelters built for displaced people after the first evacuations were not 
planned to be maintained for about 20 years and are not considered as suitable in such an 
environmental context, despite remaining inhabited today (Figure 5.11). The lack of 
management and maintenance of Salem not only contributes to stigmatize its residents and 
prevent their integration at the national scale, as we have seen earlier, it also prevents their 
adequate physical preparedness to hazards.   
 
 
 
 
Figure 5.10: Abandoned 
house in Salem, causing 
sanitary problems 
(Charlotte Monteil, 
2016) 
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Figure 5.11: Social houses in Salem, built 
as temporary initially but that have 
become permanent. There is a plan to 
destroy them and move the tenants to 
stronger and more comfortable 
apartments in Davy Hill by 2020 
(Charlotte Monteil, 2016) 
While the objective of building-back-better and decreasing the vulnerability to disaster 
is clearly mentioned in the Sustainable Development Plan developed by the GoM (GoM, 2002, 
2010), these objectives are in tension with the post-disaster change and short-term needs. As 
shown previously, the demographic transformation of the territory has gradually led to a 
greater occupation of Salem by immigrant communities. It is estimated that in 2016, about half 
of the population of Salem was immigrants, making Salem the area with proportionally the 
least number of Montserratians. For this reason, Salem is often qualified as a less attractive 
village than Cudjoe Head or Lookout for instance. It is difficult to assess how the demographic 
change of the area and its gradual association with immigrant communities, that is to say 
people who are perceived to stay only for short-term, discourage investments.  
Despite of the high level vulnerability of the residents of Salem, the fact that they are 
immigrants and therefore, supposedly only passing by Montserrat for a few years, is expressed 
by the policy-makers as a limit for investment, especially for the maintenance of the road 
network and for public infrastructure. A common discourse is that investments for immigrant 
communities are lost investments for Montserrat, as immigrants are not expected to stay more 
than a few years. However, no statistical data is available to support this idea. Although it is 
true that a number of them rapidly leave Montserrat, in order either to go back to their place 
of origin or to go to the UK once they are naturalized British citizens, a large number of 
immigrants remain in Montserrat for long periods, up to almost two decades for some of them. 
There is a conflict here between the willingness to make valuable long-term investments, to 
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promote first the Montserratian population and to decrease the level of vulnerability to natural 
hazards of the residents of the Island.  
The lack of investment in Salem also reveals that despite the common discourses 
arguing that it is safe, policy-makers still fear the uncertainty related to the volcanic hazard. 
The proximity of the village with the volcano is often mentioned as a major factor for limiting 
investments. They are considered as too risky, being potentially useless if the volcano was to 
erupt again, and considering the disinterestedness of Montserratians for these lands. 
The Physical Development Plan highlighted in 2012 this issue: “A significant 
constraint is the reduced access to finance and insurance as banks and insurance companies 
provide very limited services at the expense of significant collateral in other locations north of 
Nantes River. Furthermore, the reluctance of GOM and DFID to fund infrastructure in this 
area is constraining development and discouraging people from investing in the area […] Road 
condition and capacity also hinder access to many local areas, particularly in Hope and 
Flemings [two neighborhoods of Salem (Editor’s note)]” (GoM, 2011, p.159). While financial 
resources are rather invested in areas perceived as safer, that contributes at the same time to 
maintain a low level of attractiveness to the area and a high level of vulnerability to natural 
hazards. 
The uncertainty and the demographic transformation of the area therefore tend to 
prevent investment in the area, while its occupation, increasing in the meantime the 
vulnerability of its inhabitants, already relatively more disadvantaged than the other 
communities.  
 
5.2.2.3. Emergency response: conflict between short and long-term needs 
The whole Island is prone to diverse natural hazards including hurricanes, earthquake 
and landslides (see Chapter Four). We have seen previously that the redevelopment of the 
north has been the opportunity to pay more attention to the housing in order to improve the 
resistance to hurricanes. However all neighborhoods and all houses do not benefit from the 
same consideration. Despite a relatively high level of awareness about hurricane risks, 
different priorities, for instance reducing the risk of disaster and providing a house for 
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everyone, compete with each other. In 1997 while rehousing the displaced people was urgent, 
about 50 pre-fabricated houses were built in Davy Hill and a few in other neighborhoods such 
Salem. Supposed to be temporary, these shelters did not aim to be hurricane-proof or 
earthquake-proof but just to respond to the emergency of rehousing. In a compressed-time, the 
rapidity of the response is often privileged over the quality of the response (Olshansky et al., 
2012). Twenty years after, a large number of these houses are still present in several areas.  
In Davy Hill, the temporary houses (Figure 5.12) are an important concern both for the 
residents and for the government, as explained by a leader of the Davy Hill Community Action 
Group. It is difficult to replace these houses as the financial capacities of the government are 
limited and other measures becomes more urgent. An officer of the housing department 
explains that although housing is a priority, rehabilitating the temporary shelters of Davy Hill 
is complicated as it requires sufficient funding and a transition period when people would have 
to be relocated in another house or apartments. That is made difficult by the general shortage 
of houses on the island. Inhabitants of Davy Hill explain that the government sold the houses 
for a low price to the people living there, transferring the responsibility of maintaining or 
replacing the house to the individuals. In 2013, the Premier Ruben Meade explained to the 
journalist of The Montserrat Reporter: 
“Government does not have the money to fix the houses, neither can we continue 
the maintenance cost, the maintenance costs are high, which is why we want to 
work with the people to provide for them the concessionary financing so they can 
do the necessary improvements.” 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5.12: Social and 
temporary houses in Davy Hill, 
built for the evacuated people 
and not hurricane or 
earthquake-proof (Charlotte 
Monteil, 2016) 
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A group of houses in Lookout face similar issues (Figure 5.13). In 2013, Donaldson 
Romeo - then leader of the opposition and now Premier - pointed out, “serious concerns on the 
state of the houses and their vulnerability to hurricane and earthquakes. These houses have 
long since proved to be quite unsuitable to climatic conditions” (Roach, 2013, 2014). While 
external donations were supporting the emergency needs during the disaster, the lack of long-
term planning and anticipation reveals to be a major issue as the additional expenses need to 
be done. The rapid answer to the need of rehousing people therefore hampers the capacity to 
build back better and to reduce the risk of disasters despite of the risk awareness. The case of 
Davy Hill also demonstrates the importance of the immediate response to disaster on the long-
term recovery, as it shapes and determines what will be done afterwards. It appears more 
difficult, possibly more costly, to upgrade the emergency investments than to make long-term 
investments immediately.  
 
 
 
 
Figure 5.13: Houses in Lookout, 
built for displaced people, and 
causing concerns related to their 
vulnerability to earthquake and 
hurricane (Roach, 2014) 
 
5.2.2.4. Lack of resources to adapt to rapid change 
Although the risk of hurricane is usually considered when rebuilding, other risks 
perceived as less probable, such as the risk of earthquake, are often not considered due to 
cultural habits, from a lack of resources and a lack of measures for adapting to the new context. 
In Lookout, Cudjoe Head and Davy Hill, all recently built, the risk of earthquake is 
neglected, both at the private and at the public level. For instance, the pre-fabricated houses, 
used for relocating people after the evacuation of the south and now used as social housing, do 
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not respect the basic rules of engineering to face earthquakes (Figure 5.13). At the private 
level, the same issue is noticed. One disaster manager said in January 2017 that: 
“People don’t apply the building code. They are not interested in it. They prefer 
to have a bigger house than a stronger one. Most of the houses don’t respect the 
building code at least for earthquake.” 
He took the example of a new building, used as a shop, in Cudjoe Head (Figure 5.14), that is 
built on a steep slope, on irregular and unstable pillars, similarly as several houses all over 
Montserrat. A large number of new houses are multi-story, with the top floor used first and no 
infills between the columns of the ground floor, making them very unstable in case of 
earthquake.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5.14: A new building in Cudjoe Head 
which is not earthquake-proof ( Charlotte 
Monteil, 2016) 
Different reasons are presented to explain the lack of consideration of this risk in 
rebuilding. They include cultural and practical reasons. Multi-story houses are an expression 
of wealth. But when the household does not have the financial capacity to build directly several 
floors, they prefer building first the first floor and fill the ground floor later, as it is considered 
easier and less expensive than building above the existing house. The consequence is that 
houses often remain on pillars, without infills between the columns, making them unstable and 
vulnerable to earthquakes. 
Moreover, the topography and the availability of land often limits the options of 
construction. The location of the new houses mainly depends on the lands that are made 
available by their owners. During the interviews, residents and policy-makers explain that the 
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lands sold are frequently the ones that the owners do not want because they are impractical. 
They are often located at the parcel boundaries, on steep slopes. It makes building more 
complicated and it requires more financial and technical capacities for building earthquake-
proof and landslide resistant dwellings on a slope. A lot of Montserratian households explain 
that because they invested a lot of money, if not all their money, in the house they built in the 
south before 1995 and they are still paying the mortgage for it, even though they do not have 
access to it, they cannot spend as much for the new one. The quality and the resistance to 
earthquake are therefore currently sacrificed. 
The likelihood of being prepared also differs depending on households and depending 
on their origin and previous experience of hazards, as we will see more in details in Chapter 
Seven. The rapid demographic change seems to affect the capacity to build back better. If those 
who have experienced previous hazards are overall more aware of the need for being well 
prepared, a large part of the population does not have similar experience and may not pay the 
same attention to preparedness while building their house. In the Cayman Islands, Tompkins, 
Hurlston, & Poortinga (2009a, 2009b) found that new migrants are the group most vulnerable 
to cyclones as they are the least likely to prepare, they tend to live in more exposed places and 
interact mostly with other immigrants with no previous experience of such hazard. The 
research, which focuses on the agency of individuals to prepare to tropical storms, discovered 
that the main factors preventing adaptive behavior were the place of residence, that is close or 
adjacent to the coast, the recent immigration and the fact of renting accommodation. On the 
contrary, previous experience of major storms, strong social network, residency status and the 
fact of having a child under the age of 15 in the home tends to encourage individuals to prepare. 
In Montserrat, informal discussions reveal differences of building methods depending on the 
origin of the households and their knowledge of the local hazards. In an informal conversation, 
a Montserratian woman highlighted the differences of practices between the communities. In 
September 2017, she said that  
“Montserratians pay attention to the lay of land and will do the preparation work 
necessary as part of their building practices while certain non-nationals are 
assumed to take less into consideration that risk when building their house due to 
their lower experience of landslides.” 
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She gave the example of a house built by a Guyanese household and damaged by 
landslides during heavy rain. The owners had to reinforce the front of the house and build 
a retaining wall following that. She explains that because they used to live in a flat area 
back in Guyana, they do not think of the risk of landslide when building their house in the 
steep slopes of Montserrat. Talking about Salem, exposed to several hazards, a disaster 
manager explained in 2017: 
“So you'll find a lot of persons living in Salem area, Guyanese, Jamaican, etc. 
They're living there because one, the cost of houses is maybe much lower, but 
they are more vulnerable, one because they have less money for preparedness 
and response, they have less exposed mind on preparedness and response but 
they are also... closer to the hazards as well. So they're exposed to more risks.” 
Unfortunately, the lack of a systematic survey on the nationality or origin of the house owners 
means we cannot confirm that houses built by immigrants are less adapted to landslides. Hence 
it prevents the adoption of awareness raising measures adjusted to the specific needs of each 
community. Despite the fact that decision-makers are aware that immigrants may be less 
prepared for the hazards that they have less experience of in their place of origin, there is no 
tangible measure to encourage them to build better.  
Most of the measures for raising awareness concern hurricane and volcanic hazards. 
Those targeting other types of hazards like landslide and floods are much more limited. A 
disaster manager said in January 2016: 
“Let me admit that, I don't think we've done properly or done enough. But we 
do preparedness activities. Unfortunately it is centered so much around 
hurricanes. We still do some information around volcano, so pamphlet... or the 
observatory... observatory [MVO] does a better job but they collaborate with 
us to do it.” 
In 2015, the building code was still at the state of draft and not compulsory. Now the building 
code is referred to in the Physical Planning Act and is a guideline that should be followed by 
persons building any structure in Montserrat.  A person must submit a plan to the Physical 
Planning Unit for approval before building any type of structure. After the plan is passed by 
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the unit and people start building, an inspector is expected to visit the building site during the 
construction of the building. However its application is criticized by disaster managers who 
affirm that houses are not controlled correctly. The respect of the building code was a major 
concern for the residents, right before the arrival of hurricane Maria in September 2017 as 
people were wondering whether their house was actually safe or not and whether they should 
trust their promotor or not. During the same month, hurricane Maria and the damages that have 
been observed in the neighboring islands, including the total destruction and evacuation of 
Barbados, have also raised questions about the quality of the building code, as it does not plan 
for winds as high as a hurricane of Category 5. One disaster manager argued in January 2016: 
“Some persons put up somethings and it’s not really under any code per see, but 
as for government, they look it at those. The architect and others persons are 
looking to make sure that their home are put up in that […]. But for personal 
homes, you know, there is no guarantee. Yes they’re supposed to put up certain 
things but you know… on occasion, a person can pass through, from the 
government, to make sure that things are followed but, the guarantee… how 
accurate is that… unless it is a government-funded project and government 
would make that then they would make sure that… for that capacities. But as for 
hurricane, is it earthquake proof? Because you are also prone to earthquake, 
so… and then down by Little Bay, it is prone to tsunamis.” 
 The type of building therefore essentially depends on the individual level of awareness 
for each type of disaster. The lack of effective incentive measures prevents to compensate the 
potential lower risk awareness among the new immigrants. The rapid demographic change and 
the lack of resources and adaptation measures compromise therefore the ability to build-back-
better and to take into consideration the hazards that are perceived as less probable. In Chapter 
7, I will analyze further the evolution of the risk perception and the reasons that explain the 
lack of adaptive measures, far more complex than just a lack of resources or a lack of 
awareness.   
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5.3. Conclusion: Recovery processes, as multi-time and scale processes.  
 If in theory the recovery process aims to build a resilient society and prevent the 
creation of factors of vulnerability to disaster, the post-disaster period spotlights a number of 
challenges to the learning process. The (re)development of the north of Montserrat during and 
after the crisis plays a major role in determining the trajectory of the recovery process and its 
sustainability. New town development presupposes a conscious policy development and 
strategical plan (Rozdilsky, 2003). Gawronski & Olson (2013) qualifies the change being made 
during this period as a “critical juncture” as they trigger specific trajectories for development. 
Once decisions are made, a trajectory is defined making more difficult to return to the stage of 
“window of opportunity” (Birkmann et al., 2010) where several different trajectories for 
learning and improving were still available.  
 The redevelopment of the four neighborhoods illustrates the complexity of the recovery 
process. The first difficulty results from the emergency of rebuilding to relocate the displaced 
population, qualified as “time-compression” of the decision-making for recovery (Olshansky 
et al., 2012). This period is marked by the necessity to decide and act quickly to respond to the 
emergency. However if the rebuilding can go fast, some other dimensions of the recovery 
process such as the regeneration of social capital and cultural identity takes more time. Yet the 
emergency of the situation and the limited resources have prevented the adoption of an 
approach that considers all the dimensions of the recovery process and their interactions, both 
in the short and long-term (McEntire, Fuller, Johnston, & Weber, 2002; Natural Hazards 
Center, 2001; Norris, Stevens, Pfefferbaum, Wyche, & Pfefferbaum, 2008). The physical and 
social differences between Lookout and Davy Hill, two neighborhoods developed in similar 
conditions but in different ways, highlight the long-term issues arising from a lack of early 
planning. While Lookout benefited from longer-term planning, the other neighborhoods 
studied here lacked a planned strategy for recovery, being rather the outcome of a succession 
of reactive decisions and changes. This contributes to make them more dependent on the 
financial, human and social resources becoming gradually available, or not, and to postpone 
the consideration of long-term issues such as social cohesion and disaster risk reduction. It 
refers to the notion of “reactive resilience”, that “approaches the future by strengthening the 
status quo and making the present system resistant to change” (Dovers and Handmer, 1992, in 
Klein, Nicholls, & Thomalla, 2003, p.39).  
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 The resistance to change is not only due to the emergency of the decision-making but 
also to a conscious decision linked to the influence of the representation of what Montserrat 
used to be. Among decision-makers and Montserratian citizens, there is a strong willingness 
to restore what is seen as the past identity of the Island. It generates efforts for bonding the 
social networks among Montserratians, highly disrupted during the crisis. In that sense, it 
corresponds to a vision where recovery is considered as the rehabilitation of the pre-disaster 
“normalcy”, or more exactly of the collective representation of what was the normalcy. The 
post-disaster change, including the demographic change and the new drivers of vulnerability 
to disaster, are not seen as part of the new identity of the Island, nor part of the characteristics 
to consider for adaptation. The role of social networks and social reorganization is often seen 
as a coping mechanism after a disaster instead as a major factor to build resilience on long-
term (Djalante et al., 2011). In the meantime the rebuilding is also seen mainly as a way to 
cope with the lack of infrastructure rather than a way to determine the recovery strategies 
(Rozdilsky, 2003). In Montserrat, it seems that the decisions made to determine further 
development are essentially reactive to cope to the destruction, and shaped on the collective 
representation of what the past was and aimed to create this ideal. Not only has it prevented 
proactive decision-making for recovery, it also appears to deliberately ignore the post-disaster 
change that does not fit this this past identity.  
 It demonstrates a gap between the recommendations of the recent research on recovery 
and the implementation of the post-disaster measures by policy-makers and affected people. 
Research has shown the importance of adopting pro-active measures taking into account the 
post-disaster change (Bassett & Fogelman, 2013; Djalante et al., 2013; Klein et al., 2003; 
Manyena, 2006; Norris, Stevens, Pfefferbaum, Wyche, & Pfefferbaum, 2008), and the 
importance of adopting a comprehensive approach that does not focus only on the physical 
reconstruction (Hayashi, 2007; Hettige & Haigh, 2016; Lawther, 2016; Tierney & Oliver-
Smith, 2012). Yet in Montserrat, the recovery management fails to understand the complexity 
of the interactions between spatial scales, in other words between the development of 
neighbourhood and the recovery process at the national scale, between different network 
levels, and between temporal scales, in the sense that it focuses mainly on short-term (Cash & 
Moser, 2000). 
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The reactive measures implemented in Montserrat threaten the sustainability of the 
recovery process and the resilience of the society. A system is considered resilient when it has 
the capacity to “self-organize, learn and adapt” (Djalante et al., 2011, p.3). Self-organization 
implies the “ability to maintain and recreate its identity and to buffer itself from outside 
impacts”, while the ability to learn and adapt corresponds to the ability “to achieve its 
management objectives better over time and adjust those control measures should the context 
change” (Djalante et al., 2011, p.3). Montserrat on the contrary expresses a resistance to the 
context change and a focus only on the recreation of its identity. I have demonstrated in this 
chapter that little is done to encourage bridging social networks, at the scale of the 
neighbourhood or at the national scale. That prevents the building of social cohesion between 
communities. Yet other research, particularly based on Putnam’s work, have emphasized the 
greater importance of bridging social networks on the long-term recovery rather than the 
bonding social network (Cheong et al., 2007; Djalante et al., 2011; Hawkins & Maurer, 2010, 
2011; Leonard, 2004; Macnab et al., n.d.). It enables better relationships, coordination of the 
activities and broader scope of actions. As bonding social networks among the Montserratian 
community tends to be exclusive (Macnab et al., n.d.) towards the non-Montserratian, it 
contributes to marginalize the latter, already in a vulnerable situation due to their immigrant 
status (Guadagno, 2015; Guadagno et al., 2017). The recovery pathway of Montserrat therefore 
tends to create new drivers of vulnerability, failing to learn from the past disaster and to build-
back-better.  
In Chapter Six, I will further explore the process of marginalization of the immigrant 
communities, in spite of their major role in the recovery process. In Chapter Seven, I will 
examine the role of the memory and collective representation in the risk management and risk 
communication strategies.  
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CHAPTER SIX 
IMMIGRATION AND RECOVERY: HOW DOES THE MANAGEMENT OF 
IMMIGRATION REFLECT THE RECOVERY PROCESS? 
 
The post-disaster period in Montserrat is marked by a significant demographic change 
with the rapid arrival of large numbers of immigrants following the departure of about 75% of 
the population after 1996. It is now estimated that immigrants constitute about half of the total 
population. Immigration has taken an essential role in determining the pathway of recovery in 
Montserrat. On the one hand, it plays a major role in supporting post-disaster needs. It has 
been important for supporting the economic, physical and demographic needs for recovering 
after the disaster, particularly in order to maintain the political self-determination of the Island. 
However, the lack of long-term planning and the instrumentalization of immigration has led 
to major unanticipated change in all sectors of the society. It has generated new conditions of 
vulnerability to disaster among the immigrant communities and led to reactions of rejection 
and exclusion of immigrants among the society.  
 
6.1. Immigration as a support for development and recovery 
The benefits of immigration for the development of hosting countries have largely been 
demonstrated in the literature (see Chapter Two). It plays a critical role in supporting economic 
development particularly (Clark et al., 2015; Friedberg & Hunt, 1995; Sanderson, 2013). 
However, there is a lack of research into the long-term impacts of immigration on living-
standards (Sanderson, 2013). There is also a lack of understanding of the short-term and long-
term impacts of immigration in a post-disaster context, in a condition of stress. This includes 
the impacts for the hosting country and for its recovery, and the impacts for the immigrants 
themselves.  
Page | 172 
 
Very soon after the departure of more than 70% of the population of Montserrat, the 
former government decided they had to resort to immigration to cope with the post-disaster 
needs for emergency (for instance rebuilding of critical infrastructure and dwelling)  and long-
term recovery (for instance replacing qualified workers, enabling the functioning of schools 
and hospitals). The first step to increase the size of the population was taken in 1998 when 
David Brandt, Chief Minister at that time, facilitated the immigration process in the country, 
by initially abolishing the need for work permit and facilitating the access to visa.  
That has had far-reaching implications in the process of recovery on Montserrat. As 
seen in the Chapter Two, the post-disaster period is a critical time, when important decisions 
are taken for future development. The management and perception of immigration reflects the 
progression of the recovery processes and the evolution of the perceived needs of the society 
for recovering. Immigration both shapes and is shaped by the recovery process and by the 
determined priorities. This chapter aims to explore the impacts of immigration in the recovery 
process and the role played by immigrants as agents of change during a critical time. It also 
brings to light the complexity of managing such rapid change while Montserrat was already 
dealing with continued uncertainty and extreme transformation. Immigration appears both as 
a tool for supporting the redevelopment of the island and as an additional impact of the disaster 
that the Island has to deal with. It demonstrates that the Government focuses especially on 
economic and political needs, without consideration of the cross-scale dynamics and 
interactions between the different dimensions of recovery. It highlights some of the barriers to 
sustainable recovery and some of the factors influencing the pace of the process.  
 
6.1.1. Immigration as a tool to maintain the political self-determination of 
Montserrat 
As a British Overseas Territory, the system of governance in Montserrat is very 
particular and strongly influenced by the colonial history of the island. A system of co-
governance is in place, comprising the local government, autonomous over day-to-day 
decision-making and over social and economic policy, and the British Government, which is 
in charge of decisions concerning internal security and defence, including emergency 
management. Between the 1960s, a period of decolonization of the Caribbean, and 1995, the 
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date of the first volcanic eruption, Montserrat benefited from a very high level of autonomy 
and was self-governing (Wilkinson, 2015). Hurricane Hugo in 1989 marked the first alteration 
in the decision-making autonomy of the Government of Montserrat due to its limited 
management capacities, its lack of planning and its strong dependence on foreign assistance 
(Berke & Wenger, 1991; Wilkinson, 2015). A state of emergency was declared and the control 
of the Island gradually shifted from the local government to the British government (Skinner, 
2006). The situation was made worse with the first volcanic eruption, as the capacities of the 
local government were totally exceeded. In the face of the extent of the disaster, the British 
Government drew up a plan for complete evacuation of the island should the situation become 
completely unmanageable. It was known as ‘Operation Exodus’ and was made public in May 
1998 after the evacuation of 75% of the population (Clay et al., 1999; Wilkinson, 2015).  
The tensions in the balance of decision-making power between the British and 
Montserratian governments are illustrated by the management of the Island and of its 
population. Former Chief Minister David Brandt explained during an interview: 
“Because of the volcanic crisis, several Montserratians left the island and 
went to several countries including the United Kingdom. The population 
decreased severely. And while I was Chief Minister, the British Government 
informed me that if the population went below 1500 that they were going to 
take everybody off the island and send them to England. […] And then, I 
disapproved. They said from an economic point of view that they would not 
want to support Montserrat if the population was reaching less than 1500.” 
Faced with the threat of the Island being closed if the population continued to decrease, 
Brandt turned to immigration as a strategy to counter that threat:  
“I went to a Heads of Government meeting at CARICOM [in 1998] and 
explained my situation to the other Prime Ministers in their own countries; 
they encouraged CARICOM nationals to come to Montserrat. It was 
necessary because a lot of the workers from Montserrat had left so we needed 
workers and they came. [CARICOM nationals] didn't have to have work 
permits, and when I told the British that I would like them to send their... their 
[own] people to do the counting of the [population of Montserrat after 
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immigration of CARICOM workers]. They went, their own people did the 
checking. The population was 2,500. So the British abandoned their idea [to 
close the Island], it could not be possible what they intended. And so, it is why 
that so many CARICOM nationals are in Montserrat. […] many times 
Montserratian call them foreigners but it is because of them why we are here.  
The Government of Montserrat (GoM) then changed its immigration policies in order to 
facilitate entry to the island, which rapidly began to increase the size of the population: in 1998 
the island lost 3,327 people; the following year 691 new people arrived.1 Although the UK 
Government was ultimately responsible for the life and safety of the residents of Montserrat 
(Clay et al., 1999), the GoM’s response to a decision considered to be “Too pro-British and 
too colonial” (Pattullo, 2000, p.113) ensured that it maintained control and the relative 
autonomy of Montserrat. Pattullo (ibid, p.111) explains that, “The Government of Montserrat 
had resisted British plans to offer help to Montserratians with, for example, free air fares to 
Britain. It was anxious to keep society together and perceived the British proposals as offering 
unequal choices”. 
Not only was the decision to call for immigration perceived to be a way to retain the 
GoM’s power to decide not only the future of the Island, rather than have it decided by the 
British government, but also the future of the identity and culture of Montserrat. David Brandt 
explained during an interview in March 2016 that ‘closing Montserrat’ would have destroyed 
the culture of Montserrat as people would have been dispersed over the UK and would have 
lost the connections between the members of the community. 
The same argument was given by Julian Romeo, one of the organizers of the Concerned 
Group of Citizens, a group leading the protests against the UK strategy: “We were concerned 
about the total evacuation and what would become of our country and our lives. What would 
happen to our culture?” (Pattullo, 2000, p.112). The fear of losing the island and its culture led 
to a resurgence of patriotism and activism to defend those who decided to remain, while a lot 
of those who left were seen as betrayers, and are still often viewed as such today. The current 
Premier, Donaldson Romeo, explained in an interview that he entered into politics during the 
crisis, while before 1995, “You could have paid me a lot; I wouldn’t talk politics”. He was an 
                                                                
1 according to the data provided by the Department of Statistics of the GoM in 2016 
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artist but became an activist “to defend the people in shelters” and out of concern for the 
cultural identity of Montserrat.  
The will to maintain the political self-determination of Montserrat persists, with the 
constant objective of increasing the size of the population in order ultimately to be self-
sufficient and not dependent upon the British Government. The Sustainable Development Plan 
for 2008-2020 (GoM, 2010) mentions for this purpose the need to increase the size of the 
population by encouraging immigration and retaining the people currently living on the island, 
in order to reach a sustainable population.  
 
6.1.2. Immigration as a support for physical and economic recovery  
Relying on immigration has rapidly become an economic necessity to keep the island 
viable. As mentioned by David Brandt, a population that was too small could have been 
prejudicial to Montserrat as the UK was threatening to cut its support. While the level of 
economic support from the UK Government was very low before the volcanic crisis, it 
accounted for 60% of national GDP after the crisis, becoming an essential resource that 
Montserrat had to assure in order to recover. Encouraging immigration therefore was initially 
aimed to assure the economic support of the UK in time of crisis (GoM, 2010, 2014). The 
second objective has been to provide labour in order to support the rebuilding of the North of 
the Island, to which the population has been displaced, and therefore initiate the recovery 
process (GoM, 2010). The regulations for employment have been adapted to attract 
CARICOM nationals without the obstacle of work permits or visas (Figure 6.1). 
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Figure 6.1: Regulations for employment in Montserrat in 1998, made to attract workers from CARICOM 
countries (CARICOM, 1998) 
With the destruction of over 70% of the buildings and over 60% of the island now 
considered as unsafe for habitation (Clay et al., 1999), the necessity of maintaining the 
Montserratian population on the island has required massive rebuilding in the North. Although 
this area was less exposed to volcanic hazards, it was also underdeveloped at that time. The 
need for labour therefore has rapidly become a priority to allow the functioning of the Island, 
including the functioning of governmental institutions, businesses, health centres. The 
contribution of the construction sector to the national GDP strongly increased after Hurricane 
Hugo in 1989, when 98% of the houses were damaged (Possekel, 1999), going from about 
10% of the GDP in 1988 to more than 30% in 1990. While the sector had contracted again to 
just 7% of the GDP some years after the hurricane and before the first eruption in 1995, it 
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expanded again when reconstruction activities started in 1997, two years after the beginning 
of the crisis, when it had become clear that the South could not be occupied anymore (Figure 
6.2). 
 
Figure 6.2: Evolution of the construction sector contribution to the GDP of Montserrat (current price - %) 
(Source: CSO, Montserrat and Eastern Caribbean Central Bank in Eastern Caribbean Central Bank (2017)   
  During a focus group discussion in April 2016 with the Guyanese community, the 
participants explained that it was the need for reconstruction, both after the Hurricane Hugo 
and the destruction of the South by the volcanic hazards, which have made Montserrat a 
popular destination for workers. The part of the construction sector in the economy however 
has gradually decreased while the main infrastructure has been built. Since 2006, construction 
represents between 6 and 10% of the GDP only, coming back to its initial level before the 
volcanic crisis and before the hurricane Hugo. The decrease of the reconstruction activity is 
also perceptible within the testimonies of the immigrants. While it was attractive in the past 
years, the construction sector is now considered as instable and frustrating, with lots of months 
of unemployment when the economic activity goes down. Immigrant men involved in this 
sector argue that they need to have an additional job or to move to another sector of activity in 
order to save money to send back to their family.  
However, the decrease of construction sector does not mean the island has physically 
recovered. A large number of infrastructure have not been achieved in 2017 and some critical 
amenities, such as hospital, some parts of schools and of governmental services were still 
located in temporary buildings in 2017. For instance, the current hospital, which had had a 
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proper building before 1995, is now relocated in what was a school before. It aimed to be 
moved into a permanent structure, but nothing has yet been decided. The development of a 
new capital city is also still at the state of project. Only few infrastructures have been built so 
far and additional funding and plans are required before pursuing its development. According 
the Ministry of Economic Development and Trade & GoM (2010), the decline of rebuilding 
activity from 2002 is mainly due to the limited private sector activity and the delays in the start 
of several public infrastructure projects. While funding was rapidly available for emergency 
projects such as the rebuilding of housings in the new settlements of Lookout and Davy Hill, 
longer-term projects are now required but take longer to be planned and implemented, hence 
slowing down the economic growth and therefore the needs for immigrants. The need of 
immigrants for the rebuilding of the North of island persists and may persist as long as major 
infrastructure are needed but it is mainly dependent on availability of private funding and on 
the development of the private sector. The end of the emergency period and hence the 
slowdown of the rebuilding process is observable through the decline of employment of 
immigrants in the rebuilding. It does not however signify the achievement of the physical 
recovery process but rather the shift on stages of recovery and the slower process of 
implementing long-term projects. Moreover, the difficulties to obtain funding and to make 
long-term decisions directly affects the demographic recovery of the Island by slowing down 
the recruitment process.      
By enabling the physical recovery of Montserrat, immigration also directly contributes 
to its economic redevelopment. The need for immigration is mainly justified by the need of 
growing the overall size of the population in order to increase the size of the market and hence 
to enable an economy of scale. An objective often repeated is that the Montserrat population 
should reach 10,000 again in order to have to vibrant economy. The former Chief Minister 
David Brandt explained in March 2016:  
“Except if you have population, the economy can't improve. […] there is a 
need [of increasing the population]. How is commerce? and commerce would 
be the engine of the economy, of the private sector. To have private sector you 
need to have population.”  
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There is a common understanding at all levels of the society that economic growth will 
stimulate demographic growth and vice-versa. A minister of the GoM summarized in May 
2016 the need of increasing the population growth: 
“As population growth is one of our objectives and recognizing the economy 
of scale when you have a bigger population and in terms of how you're able 
to move […] the economy forwards as a result.” 
A government official argued during an interview in January 2016 that by increasing the size 
of the population, it should make investors confident and therefore it should boost the 
economic recovery. He imagined a situation where the population would be higher and 
increasing:  
“Only factors of economic improvement are in place. It means I could maybe 
take a chance and come back in the country. The market is improving because 
we have 7,000 people now, imagine in 5 years we have 10,000 people. If I start 
a business now, in 5 years, I may have a bigger market.”  
While most stakeholders show that demographic growth is a mean for the achieving economic 
growth, he argued that the contrary is true also: 
“I think the population will keep growing with a lot of persons from outside. 
If conditions stabilized, and as I said, safety and security, volcano stabilizes, 
and the economic activity at least remains stable or is growing, so people can 
actually make a living and I think you would have actually more people 
coming.”  
There is indeed a close link between demographic, economic and physical recovery, among 
others, as they interact and determine one another. A poor economic recovery directly affects 
the necessary demographic growth of the Island. The population of Montserrat has stabilized 
around 5,000 people since 2002, simultaneously with the stabilization of the economic growth 
and the slowdown of the rebuilding of the North of the Island.  
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 Despite the necessity to increase the size of the population in order to relaunch the 
economy, the management of immigration has changed, becoming gradually more selective in 
terms of skills and competencies brought on the Island. A minister explained:  
“While you would want immigrants to come, you're also trying to be that not 
having the wrong type of persons coming who would be a burden on our social 
system, who would also be a burden in terms of our crime rate. […] So you 
still have to protect who you allow to come into your gates at that time and 
that when they come they're coming meaningfully contribute to the 
development of Montserrat.” (Interview in April 2016) 
A policy analyst also declared:  
“Who they want are skilled labour because you are on risk that being in 
situation where you have people who come and then government has to 
support them on some ways. And there isn’t enough money to support so.” 
(interview in January 2016) 
The discussions about low skilled workers are often very contradictory, with on the one hand 
the recognition that the immigrants do the jobs that the Montserratians do not want to do, in 
the construction and domestic sector mainly, and on the other hand, the fact that these 
immigrants may be a burden for the island and are not valuable. On the contrary, highly skilled 
immigrants are much more accepted as their skills are recognized as needed for the 
development of the island. The management of immigration has therefore evolved, with an 
increasing selectivity of the skills and competencies of the immigrants. Not only it is perceived 
that economic recovery is restrained by the considerable numbers of low skilled immigrants, 
but also it is perceived that the lack of skilled and competent people on the island explains the 
incapacity of Montserrat to develop new projects.  A DfID official said:  
“If the [skills] capacity is limited and we're asking more and more and more 
[development projects], then things slow down.” (interview in February 2016) 
A policy analyst explained: 
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“One of the issues […] in Montserrat is that, is having access to the necessary 
skills in order to deliver it and because it’s such a small country, it’s an acute 
problem.” (Interview in January 2016) 
For instance, according to a senior manager of the DMCA, efforts of preparedness to natural 
hazards remains insufficient during the post-disaster period because of the lack of qualified 
staff able to make accurate hazard maps, and lack of budget to pay them. During an interview 
in January 2016, he explained: 
“We don't have a hazard officer to prepare these specific maps etc. so there 
is nothing to feed from [for implementing preparedness measures]. But also, 
we don't have a preparedness specialist who goes to the communities to do 
that work.” 
As it concerns a position of responsibility, the lack of qualified staffs impedes the whole 
preparedness activity in addition. The labour commissioner explained that the government 
continues to face difficulties to fill these positions as not enough of the Montserratians who 
have remained on the Island have the necessary qualifications. All sectors of the society are 
facing the same issues. The Director of Education and the Principal of the Secondary School 
both explain that schools still suffer from the departure of a large number of Montserratian 
after the first eruption. It has therefore been necessary to resort to immigrants to fill these 
positions. The Secondary school now has a large diversity of teachers from Jamaica, Dominica, 
Guyana, St Vincent in particular at the secondary school. If this compensates for the lack of 
skilled professionals, it continues to be a challenge as it does not guarantee that these teachers 
stay for long period of time.  
The lack of skilled workers is closely linked to the lack of attractiveness of Montserrat, 
being a small Island with very limited resources. As seen before, the skilled immigrants, who 
benefit of a larger range of options as place where to work compared to unskilled people, tend 
to be more demanding in terms of working and living conditions, leaving otherwise the Island 
after short period of time when they get a better opportunity. Consultants working for DfID 
and highly skilled civil servants tend to stay only for a few years. Therefore, despite the fact 
that their skills are needed and demanded, the use of immigrants to fill skill gaps is highly 
criticized among the whole society. The cost of attracting skilled professionals and the rapid 
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succession of these experts are the object of lots of critiques, especially when it comes to assess 
the progress of development projects, perceived as very slow. A Trinidadian consultant 
explained during an interview in January 2016: 
“Another thing in the resistance I see is in the disparities in salaries. […] 
Because foreign consultants are paid international rates. And the locals 
[Montserratians] are paid the local salary. And there is a big gap. And that is 
expected. So a technical person will get 5,000$, and DfiD, funded by the DfID 
to do the same work he will get 20,000$. And that is actually parallel public 
services that you have, and that is [...] animosity and resistance from the 
public service.” 
A Montserratian senior official confirmed: 
“And you see a lot among, I guess if you were listening to the radio over the 
periods and the […] Technical Cooperation discussions. The persons that 
would come under that cooperation, […] they receive four or five times the 
salary a Montserratian would get. You'll find that you'll have a lot of 
resistance to that. And I think resistance is not about the skills of individuals 
or others, in some cases, some of the persons who have come in the past, have 
not demonstrated the competencies and the discipline. […] they need to be 
adjusted and need to be comparative. It is not so significant that someone who 
come in this program would been paid 5 times or 8 times what I knew but you 
still have to work a lot with them surely, your knowledge to help them to get 
better, so you get that kind of resistance.” (Interview in April 2016) 
Among the society, resorting to immigrants for filling the skills gaps is therefore highly 
criticized and rather seen as an excessive cost than as an investment for Montserrat. 
Immigration brings therefore strong paradoxes and conflicts of interest in the 
development of the Island. On the one hand, there is a recognition that there is a need for 
immigrants to increase the size of the population, boost the economy and fills the skill gaps or 
the jobs that Montserratians do not want to do. On the other hand, immigrants are perceived 
either as a burden for the economy and the social welfare system or as unfair competitors with 
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the Montserratians. There are therefore conflicts of priorities between the different dimensions 
of recovery and on the means to achieve each of them.  
 
6.2. Immigration as factor of unanticipated post-disaster change 
 The rapid increase in immigration has enabled some of the needs for economic, 
physical and demographic recovery to be met. However, at the same time, it has led to major 
socio-cultural and economic changes that were not anticipated and hence have not been 
managed in a timely way. It generates a new division and hierarchical distribution of the 
society depending on the origin and socio-economic conditions of the immigrants, leading to 
marginalization and conditions of vulnerability to disaster for some communities.  
 
6.2.1. The unanticipated impacts of immigration on the economic recovery 
6.2.1.1. A new economic division of the society 
Immigration has been seen since the beginning of the volcanic crisis as a tool to 
promote physical and economic recovery and enable Montserrat to keep its decision-making 
power and self-determination. In addition, immigration contributes to significant social change 
which have not been all anticipated throughout the recovery process. It has mainly led to a 
change in the distribution of the population in the society depending on the economic sector.  
 Although the post-disaster period is often a favourable period for entrepreneurs to 
mobilize their resources in order to rebuild and redevelop their lives and communities 
(Chamlee-Wright & Storr eds., 2010), in Montserrat the economic investments in private 
sector tend to be led mainly by immigrants. A number of studies have shown that immigrants 
are generally more willing to take risks than the native-born population especially in the 
professional sector (Mavletova & Witte, 2016). The decision of migrating is itself strongly tied 
up to a risk-taking behaviour considering the inevitable uncertainty when arriving and settling 
down in a new place. In Montserrat, such behaviour is observed in the sense that immigrants 
are said to be more proactive in their search of a source of incomes and more willing to get 
involved in an activity which is supposed to be less prestigious, less profitable and less stable 
than what the native-born people would generally accept. The labour commissioner affirms 
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that immigrants are more pro-active in their search of jobs, actively looking for a job and 
soliciting the potential employers, while the native-born would rather tend to wait to be called 
to be offered a new job. Montserratians are often blamed for having become used to be assisted 
due to the extended support of UK following their displacement, and therefore they would not 
be ready to make as much efforts, both in terms of work and sacrifice than the immigrants. For 
instance, a private employer explained that she prefers to employ immigrants as they are more 
dedicated to their work and more serious. An expat woman living in Montserrat explained in 
an email exchange in May 2017: 
“It is interesting how people can be quite schizophrenic. For example, my 
car has died so I had the misfortune to spend a day at a garage. Two things: 
I saw [rare] Montserratians bringing their cars to be fixed. The Spanish 
mechanic offered me a chair to sit down whilst I waited. For that alone I will 
go there again! So it seems that price and service will be key factors driving 
economic integration at least. […] Their biggest fear is that the immigrants 
might just be better at some things than them. Immigration (and trade) policy 
is needed to protect against fair and open competition (like for jobs 
resources) since in a fair and open competition they would lose. This is the 
only reason why the government is listening to the minimum wage argument 
- they know that the immigrants can compete on price (and take market 
share) and their businesses will lose if they do not put in place measures to 
prevent the immigrants from offering (better quality) services more 
cheaply.” 
A specific story often repeated relates to youths involved in a program for facilitating 
professional integration, where the Montserratians youths would have stopped work arguing 
that the sun was too strong, while immigrant youths would have continued. In the same way, 
a Montserratian woman explained that she offered work to several young Montserratian 
women who were unemployed as a cleaner in her house. All refused or did not answer, 
preferring to stay unemployed, while immigrant women did not hesitate to do the job, even for 
a lower salary than what she offered to Montserratians. Similar stories are regularly narrated 
by Montserratians and immigrants themselves to illustrate the difference of attitude between 
both groups.  
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The literature suggests that the difference in the willingness to take risks may be 
partially due to the difference between perceived risks and perceived benefits (Chamlee-
Wright & Storr eds., 2010; Mavletova & Witte, 2016). Interviews reveal indeed major 
differences between immigrants and Montserratians in their perception of risk and benefit of 
being involved in the private sector. In Montserrat, immigrants are generally less demanding 
in terms of living and working conditions and therefore more readily take the decision to 
become private entrepreneurs. Among Montserratians, the perceived risk is essentially that of 
losing their prestige in a society where white-collar employment is highly valued and where 
social hierarchy plays an important role. The perceived benefit, namely the potential financial 
income, is often not perceived as sufficient to warrant the effort. Several Montserratians affirm 
that they cannot accept salaries as low as immigrants accept because culturally and 
traditionally they cannot live the same way as some immigrants do, often several people in 
small, cheap houses. A Montserratian woman explained that immigrants team-up to reduce 
their expenses, for instance sharing their accommodation and food costs, and therefore can 
accept lower salaries. She says that Montserratians could in theory do the same, but they were 
not exposed to such a situation before and had always been accustomed to having large houses 
and their own rooms. According to her, Montserratians are not ready to adapt and reduce their 
living standards, especially considering that many of them have already lost a lot after their 
evacuation from the South of the Island. That explains why they are generally less likely than 
immigrants to be risk-takers.  
The immigrants are not in the same position as Montserratians as they benefit from less 
flexibility. As demonstrated earlier, one of the main reasons for immigrating is income. During 
a FGD in April 2016, a Guyanese says that they came to Montserrat to achieve a goal, namely 
working and earning money, and therefore they are ready to do everything necessary to reach 
that goal. For them, the benefits of getting involved in any jobs, whatever the sacrifices they 
have to make, are much more important than the risks. Even if the job is low-paid as it is often 
the case in the domestic and construction sector, the value of the East Caribbean Dollar used 
in Montserrat is much higher than the local money used in most of their native countries, and 
therefore, even a low salary allows to make significant remittances. Any source of income is 
welcomed whatever the prestige of the activity as it is specifically the purpose of the 
immigration. Even the poorer immigrants living in Montserrat tend to argue that despite of the 
multiple difficulties they face, they succeed better in that new country. A Dominican (DR) 
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woman for instance explained that even if she “only” can be a cleaner in Montserrat, while she 
was a secretary in Dominican Republic, she has now been able to finish building the house 
started about ten years before, thanks to the money she makes on the island and the extra 
financial support she gets from her employer. A self-employed Guyanese explained that it is 
worth sacrificing somethings to earn his income and that it will be only when he will have 
earned enough that he will go back to Guyana, where he considers that his real life should be. 
He expected to have reached his goal in about ten years while he has already spent fourteen 
years on the island. Moreover, having a job is a condition for living in Montserrat as it is 
required to have a work permit. Considering that the options are also more limited for the 
immigrants, with the public sector reserved in practice (even if not legal) to Montserratians, it 
is more beneficial for them to accept any job than to be too demanding and take the risk of 
being unemployed.  
The difference of attitude toward risk gradually leads to a segregation of society in 
terms of economic and professional activities. The various communities carry on different 
professions. Montserratians mainly look for employment in the governmental sector, more 
stable and secure, while the immigrant groups rather go into the private where the job 
opportunities are greater and more flexible. The most obvious example concerns the 
supermarkets. They are almost exclusively owned by the Indian community. On the other 
hand, bars tend to be owned by Dominicans (DR) or, especially, Guyanese. Various private 
businesses have also been set up either by immigrants or returnees Montserratians. 
Employment in the governmental sector, on the other hand, is essentially reserved for the 
Montserratians who have remained on the island. Despite the lack of legal provision stating 
that, it is generally admitted and hence, much more difficult for an immigrant or a returnee 
Montserratian to access a governmental job. The lack of quantitative data prevents however to 
know the actual ratio between Montserratians and immigrants owning private businesses. 
Not only such segregation of the activities contributes to divide the society in terms of 
access to employment and access to stability, but it also contributes to stigmatize the role 
played by the two groups for the development of the Island, and hence impede the creation of 
social cohesion between the different communities. Observation, informal discussions and the 
FGD conducted with the Jamaican and Guyanese groups reveal that immigrants often justify 
the discriminations they face by the fear of the Montserratians of not being able to face the 
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competition. A woman for instance says that Montserratians are often blamed for their 
complacency but many of them have been fighting for so many years for finding back a sort 
of stability, for cleaning the island repeatedly after each ash fall that they now want to rest and 
stop to think of the future. Montserratians are often considered as less dynamic, less willing to 
take risks and hence less active for the recovery of the Island. Indeed it is largely admitted in 
the society that the development of private sector is necessary for the recovery of the island, 
an idea which is also confirmed by the scientific literature (Chamlee-Wright, 2017; Storr, 
Haeffele-Balch, & Grube, 2015). A returnee Montserratian, entrepreneur, argued: 
“[Montserratians] want to be nationalist [but] nationalism is measured by 
the amount of efforts done for a country. Some Montserratians don’t do 
much for the country. They have the title but they don’t do the efforts which 
go with the title. So the non-nationals [immigrants] who do lots of efforts for 
Montserrat […], they deserve more the title of Montserratians.” (Interview 
in January 2017) 
The segregation of the professional activities also contributes to change the power 
relationships between communities. By being constrained to the private sector, immigrants 
play a significant role for the economic recovery and may gain a quite influential position as 
the private sector is determining for the strategies of development. It is its dynamism which 
can determine the evolution and the pace of the recovery process. Although the private sector 
is more unstable, it is essential for boosting the economy. Its reinforcement is part of the 
Sustainable Development Plan established by the GoM for the period 2008-2020 (GoM, 2010). 
That is a source of fear often mentioned as the Montserratians are generally willing to keep 
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the most influential position. The 
demographic change therefore affects not 
only the economic distribution of the 
population, but also the power 
relationships and the capacity of building 
social cohesion into the post-disaster 
society. For instance, an exchange on 
Facebook (Figure 6.3) reveals the fear of 
Montserratians to be marginalized in 
favour of immigrants, in particular at the 
most influential and qualified positions. It 
leads to a strong argumentation of 
segregating measures favouring 
Montserratians, despite the contradiction 
with the Constitution.  
 
 
 
 
Figure 6.3: Facebook exchange, dated of the 15 
February 2018, between Montserratians to protest 
against the nomination of an immigrant at a high-
level position 
 Mavletova & Witte (2016) suggest that the risk-taking behaviour in terms of 
investment and employment is contagious to the natives. We can question whether it would be 
the case in Montserrat. As argued, the difference of behaviours is also explained by a difference 
of access to some sectors of activity between the Montserratians and the immigrants, a 
difference of social network and a limited job offer outside the public sector. As long as these 
differences persist, the conditions do not seem sufficient for the Montserratians to engage more 
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in the private sector and take the risk of losing their stability. However, the governmental 
sector is gradually destabilized due to its lack of efficiency, widely blamed by the whole 
population, by the decreasing financial support from UK (suspected to decrease even more 
because of Brexit) and by the lack of wage rise despite of the increase of the cost of life. 
Informal discussions have shown that there is an important paradox between the fact that 
governmental sector is still very attractive but also strongly criticized. Two Montserratian 
private entrepreneurs explain that they decided to leave the public sector because they have 
found out that launching their own activity was more stimulating. The stability they benefited 
from was not enough compared to the disadvantages of working as civil servant. One argues 
that because the salary has not been increased since 2004 despite of a high increase of the cost 
of life, it is less advantageous to work with the government now. The economic recovery of 
Montserrat is therefore still strongly evolving following the disaster, in a non-linear way. There 
is however no evidence that the risk-taking behaviour of immigrants is yet contagious to the 
Montserratian. The Montserratians do not yet recognize the benefits of such attitude for the 
individuals as they perceive immigrants as poorer and struggling more. Although the fear of a 
change of balance of power between Montserratians and immigrants is widespread, at the 
moment it rather reinforces the requests from the Montserratians to be better protected and 
privileged instead of stimulating more risk-taking behaviour.  
 
6.2.1.2.  Immigrants: a cost for the society? 
 While the new division of the society and the economic competition between 
Montserratians and immigrants has raised during the post-disaster period, immigration is also 
criticized for the cost it is perceived to bring to Montserrat as the receiving country.  
 The contribution of immigrants on the Island is generally perceived by the 
Montserratian community as low or even inexistent. A common idea among the Montserratian 
community is that because immigrants are working in low-paid sectors, they pay a little only 
or no taxes and therefore do not contribute to the economy. The Dominican (DR) community 
is particularly concerned by this statement as they are the ones having on average the most 
low-paid jobs. An official of the tax department explained that taxes are collected only when 
the incomes are over EC$ 15,000. The lack of statistical data prevents knowing the average 
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salary of immigrants and depending on the different communities, however testimonies show 
that it is not uncommon for monthly incomes to not reach EC$ 15,000. A lot of work is also 
done without contract and may provide a very variable income depending on the negotiations 
with the employers, on the month and on the nature of the work. While that is valid both for 
Montserratians and immigrants, the second category is more concerned as they work more in 
the private sector, with monthly salary. Moreover, the fact of being an immigrant, non-English 
speaker particularly, is commonly reported as being an opportunity for mistreatment. A 
Dominican (DR) cleaner, speaking only very basic English, living without a partner and 
depending on a work permit to stay in Montserrat, reports that her employer did not pay her 
for about six months while she was continuing to do the work she had been employed for. She 
said she had talked to her employer several times but had to wait as she could not afford to 
lose this job.   
 The widely-held belief that immigrants do not pay taxes has added to the idea that a lot 
of money is circulating without being declared, and quite often is sent abroad, as remittances, 
without benefiting the local economy. There are no existing data on the amount of remittances 
and, by definition, the amount of non-declared income is also not known. It is therefore 
difficult to estimate the actual amounts of money which do not directly benefit the Island. 
Those complaints are strongly associated with the stigma attached to each community. For 
instance, the Dominican (DR) women are known and stigmatized among the other 
communities for sex work. While it is difficult to estimate how many women are concerned, 
and how different it is from the other communities, the fact that some women prostitute 
themselves or start a relationship with men in exchange for financial support sustains the idea 
that Dominican women receive much more money than what they declare. Informal 
discussions with women having such ongoing relationship with their older men or their own 
employer reveals that the financial support they receive is generally used to support their 
family, sometimes their own children who are still in Dominican Republic. A woman 
explained that thanks to her employer and the extra support he provided to her she could finish 
to build a house in her country of origin while the first year I met her, she was about to sell the 
lands as she could not pay the bills and was getting more and more in debt. 
 In addition to be perceived as having a limited contribution to the economy, 
immigration is commonly judged as costly for Montserrat, both by Montserratian citizens but 
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also by decision-makers of the GOM. The discourses on immigration are often contradictory, 
highlighting both the necessity of having immigrants for the development of the country but 
also the high cost of it. The access to free services, especially education and in some cases 
health care, and the cost required to adapt to the changes led by immigration are often assumed 
very important for the whole society. The arrival of communities who do not speak English 
and with children in need of an extra support, of communities on average facing more socio-
economic issues (see part 3.2.), forces gradual adaptation, including implementation of 
specific programs for integration (such as. English class for Spanish-speaking students, multi-
cultural celebrations at school, translation of administrative documents in Spanish and Haitian 
Creole). In the short-term these adaptations appear as an extra cost to the post-disaster existing 
cost. The economic advantages of immigration are less direct and seems therefore difficult to 
assess.   
  
6.2.2. Demographic change and social divisions 
 The rapid demographic change led by immigration adds to the direct impacts of the 
volcanic crisis. It contributes to changing the socio-economic structure of the society. The 
diversification of the population induces need of adaptation strategies to build up social 
cohesion and stability in a society affected by crisis. Interviews and observations report 
important differences in access to resources depending on the communities linked to the lack 
of management of immigration and the lack of measures for supporting the integration of 
immigrants. These contribute to extensive inequalities and marginalization of some groups. 
Ultimately, it can make these groups more vulnerable to disaster by hindering their capacities 
of preparedness and limiting their access to essential resources (Wisner, Blaikie, Cannon, & 
Davis, 2004). 
 Table 6.1 summarizes the main drivers of vulnerability depending on the social groups 
and visualizes the cumulative factors leading to vulnerability. It is based on the qualitative data 
collected from members of each social group and presents a collective picture of the situation 
for all of them at the time of the study. Although the differences between social groups are 
separated in distinct types of resources, all of these categories interact and influence each other. 
The matrix does not show an exhaustive list of differences, but instead highlights those that 
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could have the most impacts on long-term recovery. It draws a collective picture, and 
circumstances can therefore differ considerably at an individual level. The colours express the 
potential impacts of each aspect presented on the vulnerability of the communities to disaster. 
Dark green means that the group is not made vulnerable or marginalized by the factor presented 
in each row. Light green means that although the whole group is not made vulnerable by this 
factor, it varies more at the individual scale. Light red means that the factor presented in the 
row makes most members of that group more vulnerable to a disaster. Dark red means that the 
factor is a major issue for whole groups and makes its members more vulnerable to a disaster.
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 Vulnerability 
factor 
Montserratians Guyanese Jamaican Dominican (DR) 
F
in
a
n
ci
a
l 
re
so
u
rc
e
s 
Stability of 
incomes 
Facilitated access to governmental 
jobs that are more stable than the 
private sector 
Variable depending on the time 
spent in Montserrat, level of 
education… 
Variable depending on the time 
spent in Montserrat, level of 
education… 
 Mainly access to unstable and 
low-paid jobs (like domestic jobs, 
construction…) 
Level of incomes 
Variable depending on the job – 
tend to refuse more low-paid jobs 
Variable depending on the job – 
little flexibility due to the status of 
immigrant 
Variable depending on the job – 
little flexibility due to the status of 
immigrant 
Generally low-paid jobs, due 
mainly to the language barrier and 
the low level of education of the 
immigrants 
Access to loans 
 Do not express difficulties of 
access 
 Do not express difficulties of 
access 
 Express difficulties due to their 
status of immigrant and the stigma 
they face 
 Express difficulties due to their 
status of immigrant and the stigma 
they face 
 
S
o
ci
a
l 
re
so
u
rc
e
s Bonding social 
network 
Strong bonding network within the 
community, amplified by the 
familial linkages. Affected by the 
displacement of 75% of the 
population, but strong efforts for 
developing it 
Explain that there is no real 
community feeling. The Guyanese 
association is not very active 
Explain that there is no real 
community feeling. The Jamaican 
association is not very active 
 Strong bonding network within 
the community, amplified with the 
increase in size of the community, 
but affected by the turn-over of the 
Dominican (DR) population 
Bridging social 
network 
Low level of connections with 
other communities – efforts to 
develop the Montserratian bonding 
social network 
Low level of connections with 
other communities. Little 
representation at policy-level 
Low level of connections with 
other communities. Little 
representation at policy-level 
 Very weak connections with other 
communities. Little representation 
at policy-level 
 
u
m
a
n
 r
es
o
u
rc
e
s 
Language 
 Language considered as the 
“normal” English – the returnees 
Montserratian children who grew in 
England are however said to speak 
and write less well 
 
Common reflections regarding the 
accent and the colloquial 
language  
Common reflections regarding the 
accent and the colloquial language  
 Few people only speak English. 
The language is a major barrier 
for integration and employment 
Level of 
education 
The level of education is said to 
have decreased since 1995 as the 
most educated people have left the 
country. However the Island 
benefits from higher standards of 
education than other Caribbean 
countries 
Very variable. Certificates are not always recognized or are considered 
fake. Children immigrating during their school years are affected by the 
change of country and education system  
On average, lower level of 
education. Certificates are often 
not recognized. The language 
plays a barrier even for highly 
educated people. Children 
immigrating during their school 
years are affected by the change 
of country and education system 
 
Table 6.1: Assessment of the main drivers of vulnerability to disaster for each of the main social groups 
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Vulnerability 
factor Montserratians Guyanese Jamaican Dominican (DR) 
H
u
m
a
n
 r
es
o
u
rc
e
 
Cultural identity 
High level of pride in 
Montserratian culture and 
practices. Domination of the 
Montserratian culture over others 
Strong stigma related to the culture 
and practices (violence, 
robbery…). Lack of identification 
to the Montserratian culture 
Strong stigma related to a culture 
perceived as more violent than 
Montserratian culture. Lack of 
identification to the Montserratian 
culture 
 Strong stigma, especially against 
women who are often considered 
as sex workers, and against the 
culture and practices. Lack of 
identification to the Montserratian 
culture 
Memory of 
disaster and 
knowledge of 
natural hazards 
Most Montserratians have 
experience of major disasters (see 
Chapter 7)  
 
Little or no experience of 
hurricane and volcanic hazards 
Little or no experience of volcanic 
hazards 
Little or no experience of volcanic 
hazards 
 
P
h
ys
ic
a
l 
re
so
u
rc
e
s 
Access to home 
ownership 
Easier access to loans and hence to 
ownership. Many people still 
paying mortgages on properties in 
the exclusion zone, making them 
financially more vulnerable than 
before 
 Access to ownership made more 
difficult for foreigners, but several 
Guyanese have become home 
owners 
The difficulty of getting a loan 
from the bank forces most to rent 
and live sometimes in houses of 
poor condition 
The difficulty of getting a loan 
from the bank forces most to rent 
and live sometimes in houses of 
poor condition 
Exposure of 
housing to 
hazards 
Displacement to the North has 
created the opportunity to build 
hurricane-proof homes. Some 
households still live in temporary 
housing 
The new houses are generally 
hurricane-proof. There are not 
necessarily adapted to all local 
hazards because of a lack of 
knowledge 
They depend on maintenance by 
the owner 
Tend to live in the cheapest houses 
and areas, at the border of the 
exclusion zone, more exposed to 
ash falls. Houses often are not 
maintained by the owner and are in 
poor-condition 
Means of 
transportation 
Most households have their own 
vehicle 
 Variable depending on income  Variable depending on income 
 They tend to depend much more 
on public transportation, irregular.  
 
Table 6.1 (continued): Assessment of the main drivers of vulnerability to disaster for each of the main social groups. The table is an overall assessment based on 
qualitative data collected from each group. It aims to draw out the major differences between the situation of each group. It does not represent the situation of all 
individuals in the groups. It does not provide an exhaustive list of differences and characteristics but highlights those that seem most likely to affect the long-term post-
disaster recovery process and vulnerability to disaster. The table can serve as a tool for planners and decision-makers concerned with demographic change, with the 
marginalization of social groups, and with their consequences for the sustainability of the recovery process.  
Key: Dark green means that the group is not made vulnerable or marginalized by the factor presented in each row. Light green means that although the whole group is 
not made vulnerable by this factor, it varies more at the individual scale. Light red means that the factor presented in the row makes most members of that group more 
vulnerable to a disaster. Dark red means that the factor is a major issue for whole groups and makes its members more vulnerable to a disaster.  
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6.2.2.1. Linguistic diversification  
 The diversification of the society has induced in the meantime more linguistic 
heterogeneity than what Montserrat used to have before 1995. It concerns mainly the 
Dominican (DR) community, and more recently the Haitian community, who respectively 
speak Spanish and Haitian Creole. To a lesser extent, it also concerns the Guyanese and 
Jamaicans who do not talk the same colloquial English than the Montserratians and have a 
recognisable accent. A teacher of the secondary school highlighted during an interview in 
January 2016: 
“The other challenge now that the school faces now and that it didn’t face 
pre-volcano, it’s the influx of students with a second language, Spanish. So 
we now have to find a way to help them.” 
 One of the main impact of the language barrier is reflected in terms of inequalities of 
access to employment. While they often come to Montserrat without speaking English, the 
Dominicans (DR) and Haitians are confronted to limited opportunities of employment. They 
are essentially restrained to the domestic and construction sectors and have therefore limited 
ability of getting more integrated in the society. A Haitian man who speaks English explained:  
“My people when say to me to help them to get a job, you know… One thing 
that I consider, when they say, truly you could get the job but language 
barrier…” (Interview of January 2016) 
Because he is one of the few Haitian able to speak English, he has to translate for the rest of 
his community, a task which he finds exhausting and annoying. About his sister who does not 
speak English but works with English-speaking people, he said: 
“Almost every day [her chief] has to call me and tell me what to tell her. It’s 
very embarrassing, you see? First of all, what they’re supposed to do is learn 
the language first and then get themselves ready for work.” (Interview of 
January 2016) 
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 Beyond access to employment, the lack of capacity to communicate (in English) 
increases the mistreatments and relations of dependency, at work, at school and in daily life. 
Issues are reported in all sectors. At school, teachers report more cases of violence from the 
non-native English students and explain them by the academic difficulties and the frustration 
faced by these students. Social workers and residents report more cases of prostitution among 
the Spanish-speaking community. Social workers and Dominicans (DR) justify it by the 
inability to access other financial resources because of the language barrier. A Dominican (DR) 
leader commented: 
“You know, the language barrier is some problem. Sometimes they speak but 
they don’t understand English. And then when, if you go somewhere, it’s not 
easy to communicate because of the language. Plus… but that is in 
everywhere, not only in Montserrat. Everywhere when the people is non-
national, then some people, some people you try you know, let’s say, neglect 
them or abuse them, so you know, so sometimes… we have women here so 
they cannot find a job so easy and some men are… you know, take advantage 
from the situation, you know… you know what, you are woman so you know 
some… in that everyplace there are men using that situation to… you know..”. 
(Interview of January 2016)  
Ultimately, it contributes to stigmatize these women and increase their marginalization 
(Guadagno, Fuhrer, & Twigg, 2017).  
 The linguistic diversification requires therefore the implementation of adaptation 
strategies to support the integration of non-Montserratians in all sectors of the society, to 
enable the communication between different groups and hence to support the functioning of 
all institutions. So far, limited measures for adaptation are implemented at community level, 
but suffer from lack of financial and time capacities. It often comes from individual initiatives 
of those who can speak English in the non-English speaking communities. For instance, a 
bilingual Dominican (DR) woman took the initiative to voluntarily teach English to the 
members of her community, but alone and without financial support, she argues that her work 
is far from sufficient to address the language barrier.  
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 As the needs have not been anticipated at the beginning of the recovery period, the 
adaptations at the national and institutional levels are essentially reactive and dependent on the 
resources available at the moment. For instance, the social services do now use the help of a 
bilingual mediator to communicate with the Dominican (DR) community. A popular radio 
program is now conducted in Spanish and was used for communicating about the risk of 
hurricane in September 2017. Language gradually becomes a concern in several sectors of 
society but is still not being seen as a priority by the government. The rapidity of the 
demographic change and of the apparition of these new challenges in a post-disaster context 
makes difficult the implementation of measures of adaptation. In the education sector, the staff 
complains of the lack of coordination between sectors and lack of capacities to teach English 
to the non-native English speakers, to communicate with their families and more generally to 
adapt to the heterogeneity of languages. An official of the Minister of Education complained 
during an interview in March 2016 that  
“[schools alone] can’t do all changes” 
In terms of support of the immigrant children, he explained that it requires the participation of 
other agents of change, including the family. He also underlines the need of training teachers 
to teach English as Second language, to do more counselling in different languages as for now 
there is only support in English while Dominican students often present mental health issues. 
A psychiatrist for young students emphasizes the need for more psychological support for the 
Dominican students in order to address problems in the community in the longer-term. While 
the needs are now better known, their implementation is dependent on time, resources and 
coordination, all of which are lacking. 
 Because there are gradually more non-English speaking people, the diversification of 
languages and the lack of adaptation strategies affects both the non-English speakers but also 
the whole society, including schools. The management of the language diversification is 
directly linked to other socio-economic issues, such as the relative limited job opportunities 
for the non-English speakers or the stigmatization of the Dominican (DR) women.   
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6.2.2.2. Socio-economic vulnerability of immigrant communities 
If the language issue is the most obvious when talking about the difficulties of 
integration and social cohesion, it is intimately linked to socio-economic conditions of 
immigrant communities. It is not possible to list all the factors of vulnerability among the 
different communities and to know which one may eventually affect their capacities to cope 
with a natural hazard. However, it is possible to identify some major socio-economic factors 
of marginalization which affects the daily life and hence which could play a significant role in 
case of a disaster (Wisner et al., 2004).  The situation varies depending on the characteristic of 
each community, on their migratory process (when, how and where from?) and on the level of 
skills and qualification of each immigrant and communities. Those difficulties are clearly 
translated through the challenges faced by the children especially.  
The socio-economic situation differs from one community to another, partly due to the 
reasons that brought them into Montserrat, but also depending on the challenges they faced 
once on the island. The language is not the only issue justifying the further marginalization of 
the Dominican (DR) community. The socio-economic background of the immigrants also 
plays a critical role, especially among the low-skilled immigrants. Coming from poorer 
countries where rules in matter of education are not as strict as in Montserrat, a large number 
of low-skilled immigrants and their families do not have the same level of education than the 
Montserratians. A government official working in the Ministry of Education explained:  
“The challenges we have, some of the children they come from different social 
background, from... instances where a child may not have been attending 
school regularly. But as the result of Montserrat's law, that every child must 
be at school. In our context, once a child comes on island, they must be 
engaged in some education institution. So you may find that, a child who may 
be age 14 may, because of absences from school, from where they're coming 
from, from their own country, they may only have limited exposure to 
education. So they may be operated at the lower level of what is required for 
them within the school environment”. (Interview in March 2016) 
The language barrier can in addition perpetuate or even accentuate the socio-economic gap 
between the Dominicans (DR) and the other communities.  
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The migratory process itself may affect the educational background of the immigrant 
children, and therefore indirectly their level of integration or marginalization. Migration to 
Montserrat leads to separation and reconnection of families, students often having to interrupt 
their studies to follow their parents, sometimes too late to be able to pass the final exam or/and 
learn English and adapt to the Montserratian school system. Another commonly reported issue 
concerns children admitted to Montserrat without a legal guardian, at the charge of friends or 
relatives while their parents are abroad for a period of time. A government official of the 
Ministry of Education explained: 
“They may be their parents who have been travelling for work, and so now 
they have really settled, they are now bringing their child to spend that time 
with them, to get to redevelop that connection with their child, but the child 
may have grown up, let's say with the grandmother or another relative, so you 
find that when they come, they're not really familiar with their parents […] 
because their parents have been travelling for work, and so you have issues 
in socially, among some parents and, even to the point where this academic 
year, we have seen an increase in number of mental related behaviours 
coming out among children and most of them are migrant children.” 
(Interview of March 2016) 
Moreover a few cases of children being stateless following the migratory process have been 
reported. The same government official added: 
“There are situations where neither the mother nor the father are naturalized 
so the child cannot be considered as a Montserratian although he was born 
in Montserrat. So that child becomes stateless until such time where either the 
parents' country accepts them as being a national of their country or the child 
reaches the age where he can be registered as a Montserratian. So you have 
cases like those in Montserrat. And it is challenging for the non-nationals 
[immigrants] too because... When the child was born here, and your country 
of origin does not accept them as a national of their country, your child is 
stateless until such time and they do not get the benefit of Montserratian's 
child who is either Montserratian's who parents, by mother or father been 
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naturalized Montserratian or born Montserratian. Hum... so you have that 
challenge for non-nationals [immigrants] as well, whenever they want to 
travel, when it comes to health care, there is that difference between the two. 
Although they have access to it, they are treated differently in terms of how 
they would have to pay for that service. That's one of the challenges we have.” 
(Interview of March 2016) 
The education difficulties and psychological troubles of the immigrant youths is a concern 
expressed by a variety of stakeholders, including school staff, medical sectors, social services 
and policy-makers, as the challenges faced by immigrant children can be multiple. Moreover, 
the British government is particularly focused on childcare issues at the international scale and 
contributes to influence measures for better integration of immigrant children and for making 
it a priority. A senior government official argued: 
“The report that came out [from the British government] which ask you to 
support the non-English speaking children on island, they are migrants, their 
families, their parents have not naturalized in Montserrat but we're expected 
to provide a service that will provide support for these children because 
they're children regardless of what language they speak and so you find that 
Montserrat whose first language is English now has to make accommodation 
in his policies to allow for guidance counsellor who speak Spanish, other 
supports who speak Spanish as a result of these Spanish-speaking children, it 
also allows for changes in our policies in terms of how, what kind of support 
and care we give in domestic and child abuse situations for non-English 
speaking child so that's a real live example of how their policies are affected 
as a result of British and government support, direct support.” (Interview of 
April 2016) 
The senior official added:  
“You would question in the Montserrat context that even among our own 
English speaking [people], there are funds that we need to put in place and 
implement other policies that, you know we have to take a piece of that pie to 
give to our policy area for which is of interest.” (Interview of April 2016) 
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The issues faced by immigrant children are not considered as a main priority for the 
GoM, because of the fact that it does not concern directly the Montserratians and because it is 
seen as an additional cost for the Island. However, the financial and political dependency of 
Montserrat in the UK forces the GoM to gradually adopt adaptive measures addressed to the 
immigrants.  
The institutions related at various extents to the socio-economic issues faced by the 
immigrants presents different level of adaptive capacities and different objectives. The 
compression of time explained by Olshansky et al. (2012)  plays here a critical role. While the 
GoM is gradually forced to adapt, the British legislation concerning immigration and 
citizenship prevents to address the issue of stateless children. Because the legislation is not 
unique to Montserrat but concerns the whole United Kingdom and Overseas Territories, it is 
more complex to adapt to the specific and recent issues faced by Montserrat. In the same way, 
while individuals and specific organizations, like schools, are aware of the need of adaptation 
to the new issues, their capacity of adaptation is hindered by the decisions of the GOM.  
 
6.2.2.3.  Stigmatization and hierarchization of the society 
The socio-economic situation of each community, their background and cultural 
practices, and the context in which they migrated, that’s it a context of rapid change and fear, 
influence the way they are perceived and hence get integrated into society. The socio-cultural 
differences and their more or less recent arrival in Montserrat stresses stigmatisation of the 
immigrant and prevents inclusion and integration, fundamental principles for efficient disaster 
risk reduction (Gaillard & Navizet, 2012; Guadagno et al., 2017). Similarly to what has been 
observed in the rest of the Caribbean (Ferguson, 2003), Montserrat as a receiving society 
maintain strong prejudices against the immigrants. That refers to the question of social 
cohesion, addressed in Chapter Five.  
 
Social networks are developed in different ways depending among the communities 
and tend to be exclusive. Although the Jamaicans and Guyanese tend not to have a strong 
bonding network, Montserratians refer to them by their country of origin. The terms “the 
Jamaican”, “the Guyanese”, or “the Spanish” (referring to the Dominicans (DR)) are used in 
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daily life to identify a person or a group. Slights physical, clothing, attitude or language 
variations allow to distinguish a group from another and hence contribute the segregation 
depending on the origin. Among the main groups, the Dominicans (DR) correspond to the 
group who presents the most differences with the Montserratians. There are said to fit in less 
than the Jamaicans or Guyanese, essentially because of cultural, language and physical 
differences. A Montserratian man during an informal discussion in February 2016 explained 
that the: 
“Jamaicans fit more than the Spanish because they have the same ancestors 
from Africa and similar culture. For the Spanish it is more difficult to fit. At 
least physically, they are sometimes different, and their culture is different.” 
 Stigma and prejudicial comments are common both in daily life and in the context of 
work, strongly affecting the integration of immigrants. The stigmatization is mainly felt 
through daily discourses and is reported among all immigrant communities. Throughout my 
fieldwork and daily informal discussions, I very rapidly observed the racist comments against 
immigrants and distinction between Montserratians and immigrants. The simple fact of talking 
about something annoying on the island, for instance the harassment by men in the street, was 
often commented for being attributed to immigrant men, even though the question of 
nationality was not even mentioned previously. A Guyanese woman explained that just by 
listening at the radio or listening people to speak, it is possible to know that some 
Montserratians want the immigrants leaving the Island. A Guyanese during a FGD in April 
2016 summarized the situation by saying that here  
“Instead of shooting you with a gun, they shoot you with their mouth and 
that’s worse.” 
A woman living in Montserrat for 40 years, well known and respected, also explained during 
an interview in January 2016:  
“But yes, I am not from Montserrat. So it’s a small place and there is that 
tendency to feel threatened when somebody comes from outside. That hasn’t 
changed [since I arrived]. […] Well there is still that… people are welcoming, 
people are welcoming. But there is […] always going that element when you 
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have come from abroad. […] Well, it’s probably more pronounced now in the 
same time that there are more foreigners. Whenever they talk, I am at the top 
of it and I say, you remember me, and they so “oh, oh, not you, we are not 
talking about you” but yes… sure not you but you get this sentiments…” 
Other immigrants also argued that the level of discrimination increases with the demographic 
change on the island. 
In spite of multiple protests from immigrants and persistent frustration and anger, the 
question of discriminations and stigmatization remains largely silent within society. 
Immigrants often talk about it only if they feel safe and anonymously by fear of the possible 
consequences, and Montserratians often deny the existence of the problem, preventing 
therefore any discussion about the topic. In reaction to the feeling of rejection, immigrants 
themselves also commonly express their frustration and anger again the Montserratian 
community. Some forms of stigmatization mainly translate it, with the Montserratians often 
being characterized as pretentious, arrogant or lazy for instance. Critiques against 
Montserratians are related mainly to their attitude towards immigrants, highlighting the 
difficult relationships between communities and the lack of social cohesion.  
In 2017, after I published a blog article at the request of the International Organization 
for Migration on the experience of a Jamaican immigrant in Montserrat; Montserratians 
reacted very strongly and debated aggressively. For instance a written comment on social 
media in April 2016 was: 
“Our actions can speak for themselves. As a nation the Conscience thinks we 
have done an EXCEPTIONAL job in assimilating immigrants. No one can 
control Zenophobia [sic] in every individual. As a nation we above reproach. 
No violence towards non nationals, and access to services is not prohibited. 
Can improvements be made; Of Course. But in general we are way above 
average.” 
At the political level however, the issues faced by immigrants however seems to be 
increasingly highlighted within the political discourses, especially in campaign periods. In 
January 2017, during the by-elections campaign, most candidates addressed a message to the 
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immigrants, promoting the inclusion of all nationalities. A senior official of the British 
Government office explained:  
“We are beginning to recognize different groups here, but it does take a while 
and there is some resistance to it and then when you start to get segregation, 
social segregation, labour market segregation and languages segregation in 
a tiny place for a tiny population, I worry about that.” (Interview of May 
2016) 
In a debate between two policy-makers, one was arguing that uneven treatment between 
Montserratians and immigrants was normal and even essential to prevent the Montserratians 
to be disadvantaged in their own country. The opponent argued that such comment was not 
relevant anymore in Montserrat as more than half of the population is immigrant. He argued 
therefore that a discriminatory treatment toward such a large part of the population was 
therefore prejudicial to the whole society in the long-term, reminding also that a large part of 
the immigrant community had the right to vote and therefore could influence political 
decisions in the long term. This reflects a progressive understanding that the issue of 
stigmatization of the immigrants is crossing scales and also affects the Montserratian society. 
The rising proportion of immigrants compared to Montserratian people is therefore an 
important factor of change. Despite of the resistance of the population, it forces the decision-
makers to rethink their social policies and to take better into consideration the needs of the 
immigrants.  
 
6.2.3. Unanticipated impacts of immigration management on demographic 
recovery: turn-over and stabilization of the population size 
One of the first objectives of immigration was to increase the size of the population in 
order to extend the size of the market and keep the socio-economic life on the island viable 
after the emigration of 75% of the population. An objective often repeated by policy-makers 
would be to reach a population of 10,000 people but the number of inhabitants has remained 
at 4,000-5,000 inhabitants since 2002. Although this is in part linked to Montserratians going 
abroad to work or study and to the relatively low number of return from post-disaster diaspora, 
one of the main factors explaining the relative stabilization in population size is the turnover 
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of the immigrant population. While new immigrants regularly arrive, they do not necessarily 
settle long enough to allow an increase of the population. While some immigrants stay in 
Montserrat long enough to be naturalized and eventually move to the UK, many more move 
back to their country of origin after varying lengths of time in Montserrat. The lack of official 
data on migration makes it impossible to determine how long immigrants tend to stay on the 
island, their main reasons for leaving, their destination when they depart Montserrat, or the 
numbers taking different options.  
In addition to preventing population growth, the turnover generates a lot of stigma and 
a general bad perception of the immigrants. It contributes to prevent the implementation of 
measures for the integration of immigrants. Policy-makers often argue that it would cost too 
much to the Island to implement programs for the immigrants if they leave rapidly after and 
therefore do not allow Montserrat to see the benefit of these efforts. A senior official explained:  
“[We are] always having to importing skills for short period of time and then 
you lose that skills again. Even at that time when you would have someone 
from another country been trained, and then they're gone, they leave as well... 
individuals. So one of our greatest challenge has been the turn-over of the 
skills at that level as the result of the immigration policies that where in place 
at that time.” (Interview of April 2016) 
Within the institutions depending on immigrants to function, such as the secondary 
school or the hospital, the turnover also makes long-term planning challenging as the head 
teacher of a school explained during an interview in January 2016:  
“Well, we have frequent turn-over over of staff, teachers left, you have to 
recruit a new one and then they left. So you have that change over almost 
every year. […] For me the biggest concern is that… is retention. Whether 
they are going to continue the next year, so they are on contract so whether 
they are going to continue their contract or not. That is really the biggest issue 
I have with the staffs who are not from Montserrat.” 
The stabilization of the population results from the interactions between the different 
dimensions of the recovery process as well as the conflicts of priorities during such process, 
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that is to say supporting the integration of immigrants who will potentially leave Montserrat 
versus privileging the Montserratians who are assumed to stay in the Territory. A senior 
official from the GoM explained how measures for supporting the socio-economic needs of 
immigrants are perceived beneficial only for the immigrants and not for Montserrat, despite of 
their cost:  
“So although it may be something [promoting immigrants integration] that 
we want to do a little later down [the line], because [UK government is] trying 
to affect immigration policy where people live in Montserrat and become part 
of the population, you want to increase your population growth, you're now 
providing a service where it does not necessarily help you to increase the 
population growth on a one hand, because we can have a […] child come 
trained up in our system lately and so you can have an influx of these people 
who come for short period of time and then they get the opportunity where 
they would have to pay for this and they get it for free then leave.” (Interview 
of January 2016) 
Therefore policy-makers often suggest privileging the needs of Montserratians, like this 
government official who said during an interview in February 2017 that: 
“It is better to privilege the natives and try to keep your own people on the island.” 
instead of implementing measures of integration of the immigrants. Although it aims to 
encourage Montserratians to stay and hence to relaunch the demographic growth, it prevents 
efforts for social cohesion yet essential for long-term recovery (Cheong, Edwards, 
Goulbourne, & Solomos, 2007; Nakagawa & Shaw, 2004) 
 
This approach, which aims to support the demographic growth, is not supported by any 
evidence. There is no quantitative data available to know the patterns of emigration from 
Montserrat, the reasons and the country of destination. However, interviews and informal 
discussions reveal that only a part of immigrants consider Montserrat as a step before migrating 
to the UK. The lack of data prevents to know what part of immigrants is concerned. However, 
many immigrants explain that they do not intend to migrate again when they decide to move 
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to Montserrat. A Guyanese man explained that he decided to stay because he managed to 
develop his business, but his own brother and mother could not afford well enough their life 
in Montserrat, persisted to be in a very unstable situation, and therefore decided to try a new 
life in the UK. The Jamaicans participating in the FGD also express their willingness to leave 
the island as soon as they will get another job opportunity somewhere else as they do not feel 
good enough in Montserrat, suffering too much from the lack of job opportunities and from 
the verbal violence against them. The level of integration, linked to socio-economic condition 
and language, is often mentioned as a determining factor. Those who have decided to stay 
generally express that they have found a good balance in their life, often arguing that they “got 
accustomed” to the quiet life in Montserrat or like the safety and calm of the Island. From all 
the interviews, it appears that those who aim to leave Montserrat rapidly often do not feel good 
in the Island for various reasons, either because they financially cannot afford a lifestyle they 
enjoy or because the difficulties they face in terms of integration.  
 
There is therefore a contradiction between the arguments of the policy-makers for not 
supporting the integration of immigrants and the objective of raising the size of the population. 
It reflects a reactive approach where measures aiming to support the recovery process are taken 
step by step and depend on the resources available. Because it is perceived that the immigrant 
creates a competition for financial resources, the reaction is to preserve the latter for the 
Montserratians, without consideration of the long-term benefits and of the interactions between 
the different dimensions of the recovery, like demographic, social and economic recovery.  
 
 
6.3. Reactions to the changes induced by immigration and post-disaster management 
As mentioned earlier, mainly physical, economic and demographic recovery have been 
considered as priorities. The lack of management of social issues is often presented by policy-
makers as a consequence of the volcanic crisis and justified by the lack of financial and human 
resources, in addition of the lack of time available to take decisions. However, the multitude 
of unanticipated change led by the massive and rapid immigration in Montserrat during the 
post-disaster period gradually encourages the implementation of reactive measures. The 
management of immigration highlights several conflicts of interests and priorities which are 
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emphasized by the multitude of consideration to protect social rights and by the differences of 
approach between the British government and the GoM.  
 For instance, the implementation of a minimum legal wage is a recurrent question in 
Montserrat. While it is often presented as a way to prevent ill-treatments, poverty and social 
dumping of immigrants towards Montserratians, it could prevent the necessary increase of 
population. It is often argued that enabling the private sector to manage the salaries by 
themselves allow them to employ more people, and therefore eventually to attract more 
immigrants and hence to increase the size of the population. So far, there is no evidence that 
this strategy is efficient. On the contrary, informal discussions with some immigrants reveal 
that the hard working conditions were encouraging them to leave when they could get a better 
opportunity elsewhere.  
 
6.3.1. Evolution of the management of immigration 
6.3.1.1.  Immigrants as actors of change, and fear 
Immigrants are progressively gaining influence on policy-making, due to their number 
(about half of the population), to the right of vote which parts of them are entitled (CARICOM 
members in the Island for at least three years), and the role they play for the development of 
the Island. It forces policy-makers to better consider their specific needs. For instance, 
immigrants not only affect the result of the political elections, but they also influence the whole 
political campaign. While there is no quantitative data on that matter, it is often said that the 
current government has won thanks to the vote of the immigrants. Its program was more social 
than the opponent’s one, and hence was addressing more directly some of the issues faces by 
the immigrants. During the by-election campaign in January 2017, the candidates also 
emphasized in their program the need to create an inclusive society and to facilitate the 
integration of immigrants. One candidate allocated about one third of his radio campaign to 
the question of inclusion, social cohesion and equality between nationalities: 
“For those that immigrated here for a better life for their family, for those that 
immigrated to help rebuild this country, for those that came to retire. Now is 
not the time to give up. For those that had to move overseas and still yearn to 
return home. Now is not the time to give up hope. Montserrat needs help. The 
people of this country deserve better. We need a new kind of politics, a politics 
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of inclusion. Instead of creating divisions we should be breaking down 
barriers. Everybody on this island deserves to be treated equally. Do we really 
think Montserrat is going to progress if we disenfranchise half the population? 
Do we think there is a Guyanese heaven, a Jamaican heaven, a Santo 
Domingo heaven, a Montserrat heaven? If we can't live together here how will 
we live together there? We want a Government of the people, by the people, 
and for the people.” (Radio political campaign in January 2017) 
Immigrants become therefore major agents of change for leading the recovery 
processes. The change induced by the immigrants tend therefore to redefine the power 
relationships between groups and the type of decisions that are taken. In this sense, 
Montserratians perceive immigrants as a threat. They express fear of being less 
considered, of having to face a too important job and salary competition and of losing 
their cultural identities and habits. 
 
6.3.1.2.  Immigration control as reactive measure to limit change 
 The gradual recognition that immigration was going on with additional social, 
economic and cultural change, the society and the GoM gradually reacted by adapting their 
measures and policies. Some specific measures have been adopted at the local scale by 
organizations like schools, social services or churches to cope with the emerging social issues. 
Schools for instance have implemented particular programs and methods to deal with 
marginalization and language issues. The social services train their workers in order to be more 
professional and to deal better with the new social issues. However, there is no general strategy 
at the national level aiming to deal with the change in the population structure and the need of 
integration. A decision-maker explained about that:  
“We just administrate those things by themselves, but we don't have a sort of 
overarching policy that says we are multicultural or diverse nation or 
territory and this is what it means.” (Interview in May 2016) 
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To cope with the new challenges that have emerged from the massive immigration, the 
decision-makers adopt rather reactive methods aiming to better select the type of immigrants, 
even if that may prevent demographic growth.  
 
While immigration has been made easier with easy procedures during the first years of 
the volcanic crisis from 1998, it is now gradually more controlled and more defined. The 
objective is to select better the type of immigrants and their skills, depending on the specific 
needs of the island at different periods. Although the need of having a work permit has always 
been a requirement for working in Montserrat, it has been relaxed in 1998-1999, while it 
becomes now stricter. The officials working at the immigration office explain how since 2014-
2015 they control more carefully that the work permits well correspond to the job that the 
immigrants are doing and that the employer is well the one declared. Only the OECS members 
are exempted as the freedom of movement is part of the OECS treaty. The visa application and 
extension are also becoming stricter in the last years. While so far it was common to ask a 
holiday visa and try to find a job later, it is now forbidden to work with such visa. If it is done 
and found out by the Department of Immigration, the extension of the visa is refused. Instead, 
it is now required to ask a 3 months working visa and then ask an extension, which costs 
EC$100, until they can provide a work permit. The extension is also subject of the amount of 
financial resources as the immigrants have to be self-sufficient. The process is judged costly 
and tiring by the immigrants, especially for those in the most unstable situations who do not 
have constantly a work permit.  
Moreover whereas the access to the British Overseas Citizenship was used as a strategy 
by Montserrat to attract the immigrants, the procedure is gradually made more complicated 
and is still in debate. The objective is not anymore to attract as much immigrants as possible 
but rather to stabilize the immigrants living in the island and to select those who come. Until 
2003, only five years of residency on Montserrat were necessary to access to the BOT 
citizenship. It has now been extended to eight years of residency in Montserrat and there are 
still debates to know whether it is long enough or not. A senior official of the GoM explained 
during an interview in May 2016 the objective of such change: 
“What you find which earlier was a bigger challenge, when the period for 
satisfying naturalization was less was that a lot more people who have 
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migrated quicker to the UK and it affected the rebuilding process because 
skills especially [...] people would have trained up individuals in an area 
where it is skill gap and then five years [later] the person becomes naturalized 
and moves to the UK so then you have to start the whole process all over again 
and still trying to build the capacities required for work to help us move on 
on development and that has been one of the major challenges.[…] Moving to 
8 years is to slow the process a bit more.” 
This official made very explicit the link between demographic growth and naturalization 
procedure: 
“Even some people think eight years is still not enough, not enough time... it's 
something we will have to look at that as population growth is one of our 
objective […] [the turnover is] still there but it's not a big rush as it was 
previously when... at the time it was less [years of residence compulsory].” 
(Interview in May 2016) 
Policy-makers argue that the turnover has decreased with the evolution of the legal time of 
residence for naturalization. There is however no data and statistical analysis to understand if 
the change of legislation is the main motivation for a longer time of residence in Montserrat 
or if there are other reasons justifying this evolution. The information given about the 
Governor’s office, in charge of naturalization, tends to demonstrate that there is not such strong 
link. They explain that application for BOT passport are often done much later than the 
minimum eight years legally requires as immigrants generally requires more time to meet all 
the criteria, especially the financial requirements. That confirms the difficulty of integration 
commonly expressed by the immigrants. It also refutes the idea that immigrants leave the 
Island very fast and that the legislation in terms of time of residence compulsory affects their 
decision. The strategy does not address the social issues and therefore does not tackle the 
problem of immigrants leaving the island because of a lack of integration but is instead focused 
on the control of immigration as a process and a tool. 
 
In addition, the growing feeling of being threatened by the massive immigration has 
led to several protective reactions aiming to preserve the balance of power at the profit of 
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Montserratian. For instance, governmental jobs are mainly offered to Montserratians, limiting 
the immigrants to the private sector. Officially that is not legal, but it is widely practiced and 
often thought as compulsory to give the priority for jobs to the Montserratians first. The Labour 
Department specifies on the press note that: 
“All employers are reminded of Section 4.8 of the Work Permit Policy which 
requires that ‘Every job being offered to a non-belonger must have first been 
advertised extensively in the media in order to give local persons a fair 
opportunity to apply’. Proof of such advertisement must be submitted to the 
Labour Department when making application for Work Permits” (The 
Montserrat Reporter, n.d.)  
However, the Race Relations Act states in section 5 that: “No person shall, with respect to any 
employment at an establishment in Montserrat, discriminate against another— (a) in the 
arrangements made for the purpose of determining who should be offered that employment; 
or (b) in the terms in which the offer of employment is made; or (c) by refusing or deliberately 
omitting to offer that employment to a particular person. (2) No employer shall discriminate 
against an employee in relation to— (a) the terms of employment of that employee; (b) the 
employee’s access to opportunities for promotion, transfer or training, or to any other benefits, 
facilities or services; (c) acts of dismissal, or disciplinary acts or any other act of the employer 
which is to the detriment of the employee” (GoM, 2013, p.7). Therefore while legally, 
discrimination in employment is forbidden, there are practices that encourage giving priority 
to Montserratians. During the interviews, Montserratians and immigrants often claimed that 
governmental jobs were legally reserved, granting priority to Montserratians. A social worker, 
who thought themself very knowledgeable about employment legislation, was very surprised 
to discover the contrary when we looked together for the laws.  
The lack of minimum wage is often reported as a significant source of tensions between 
communities. Although it is a factor of important inequalities, the debate it raises highlights 
the difficulties that policy-makers face to deal and manage immigration. A report of the 
UNICEF (2016, p.13) states “While there is an economic justification for the lack of a 
minimum wage in the territory, the absence of this mechanism creates a situation where 
workers can be exploited. Given Montserrat’s difficult economic situation and the scarcity of 
jobs, workers are forced to accept any payment offered”. The question of a minimum wage is 
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highly debated in terms of its impact on recovery and on immigrants themselves. Some policy-
makers argue that it could decrease the number of people that employers could employ, and 
therefore increase the unemployment. For others it is a way to equalize the conditions between 
all communities, to avoid too low salary and enable everybody to pay taxes and therefore fully 
contribute to the economy. The Labour Act, drafted in 1996 with the Protection of Wages Act 
Legislation and never completed, refers to a minimum wage and potential fines if it is not 
respected. However, it does not fix any amount (GoM, 2012). The Montserrat Civil Service 
Association and Montserrat Allied Workers Union both support its establishment too but argue 
that it is not in the interest of some policy-makers who are themselves employers. Yet without 
official protection, the social dumping may continue as workers, both Montserratians and 
immigrants, have few resources to counterbalance it. Montserratians perceive that as an 
additional threat on their ability to compete economically. According to some entrepreneurs, 
it also contributes to slow down the economy as the involvement in the private sector is too 
unstable compared to the public sector. While no decision has been taken on this matter so far, 
the debate it raises illustrates the view of policy-makers on immigration management, namely 
an instrument to serve one specific purpose, which is demographic growth. It also 
demonstrates how such approach has repercussions on Montserratians also and affects the 
other dimensions of the recovery processes.  
 
6.3.2. Reinforcing local identity to cope with the rapid change 
6.3.2.1. Cultural and identity development as a response to the change 
 
Another major source of fear generated by immigration is the social and cultural changes 
that occur. The reaction to that is an increase of efforts to preserve and even develop the 
cultural identity of Montserrat. Various measures are implemented for that both by policy-
makers and civil society.  
The development of the sense of pride of being Montserratians has been officially stated 
in the Sustainable Development Plan for 2008-2020 (GoM, 2010, p.44). One strategic focus 
aims to be the “Promotion of health, well-being and national identity – The essence of this 
strategy is the promotion of health, well-being and national identity through education, 
nutrition, physical exercise, sports, healthy lifestyles and engagement in cultural events. As a 
result of this approach, it is expected that by 2020, […] that there will be a greater sense of 
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identity and national pride among Montserratians”. During an interview in April 2016, a GoM 
senior official explained that several efforts are currently done in order to develop the national 
identity of Montserrat. There was not such willingness before the volcanic crisis according to 
her. She explained that the status of British Overseas Territory could have for long prevented 
Montserrat for developing its own identity. Children now learn a national song, in addition to 
the British anthem “God saves the Queen”. She said that several national traditions are now 
resurrected:  
“So the things that we try to do is as much keep as many of those things that 
help to identify our self, our national dance, get the knowledge about our 
national birds and dishes, goat water promoted more of that and bringing to, 
infusing more in our culture to want to bring that. […] Because we have lost 
quite a bit of that, institutional memory of things because of the mass 
migration of Montserratians leaving as the result of the volcano.”  
She suggested that the fear of losing their identity and to efforts to reinforce it is due, on the 
one hand, to the emigration of Montserratians during the volcanic crisis, and on the other hand, 
to the large immigration that has followed: 
“Because there was a push to... with the whole sense of immigrants, 
perception of immigrants taking over Montserrat, you're trying now to hold 
on to something Montserratians that get the other to [fit] into that culture. So 
when you come to Montserrat, you do as a Montserratian would do.” 
A Montserratian woman also explained the link between immigration and enhancement of 
local culture by saying:  
“The more [immigration] happens, the more people get [resistant], I think it’s 
correct, no one wants to lose its culture, every island has its own unique 
culture […] we don’t want to lose that […] a lot of it is lost all over the world 
because the people who are the champions of certain things they are not here 
[…] We have some of our culture still […] But not much. And we want, we 
want to hold on.” (Interview in January 2016) 
A policy-maker confirmed: 
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“Our sense of what is being a Montserratian is lost, the traditional things like 
the way we cooked things, you know our... our cultural... you know like 
masquerade and all those kinds of things that are deeply embedded in the 
culture, people are... they have anxiety because those things are being lost 
and also they have anxiety because young people are leaving, you know, all 
generation... so I think there is this feeling that for some people they really 
don't want to come to turn to the fact that it's a completely new Montserrat. 
And that it's being defined not just by the people who've been here long long 
time but it's also being defined by the people who come here to settle and make 
their life and raise their family and go to school. That I think it's a big 
challenge for us and Montserratians...” (Interview in May 2016) 
 
Therefore, national symbols are raised to redefine the identity of Montserratians as the 
latter has been altered by the rapid and intense demographic change. There are signs of 
resistance to the recent changes. A Montserratian scholar, writing at the end of the volcanic 
crisis, identifies what constitutes “Montserratness”, in other words the Montserratian identity: 
“What constitutes Montserratness is inextricably linked to the aforementioned cultural 
element, thus Montserratness is directly related to ‘possessing’ the Montserrat culture. It 
almost seems incongruous for Montserratians to claim a culture since their shared beliefs and 
behaviours are plaited with African, Irish, British and Caribbean influences. Yet, the mix that 
has evolved is prototypically Montserratian. The essence of Montserratness is captured in 
maroons, ‘box hands’, calypsos, steelbands, masquerade and string bands. It is also manifested 
in dressing in one’s ‘Saturday and Sunday best’, the ‘strangers’ paradise’ hospitality, ‘the-
morning-neighbour-morning’ greeting, the communal joys and sorrows’ and an exciting 
‘Montserrat English’ (dialect). There is no Montserratness without these Irish legacy: the 
Shamrock, the Lady and the Harp, St Patrick’s Day, goat water, surnames such as Allen, 
Bramble, Dyer, O’Brien, O’Garro, Riley and Tuitt.” (Shotte, 2008, p.3). She therefore clearly 
associates the Montserratian culture and identity with the symbols and characteristics that 
existed prior-1995. Although she mentions a mix of influences, she does not refer to the more 
recent influences from Jamaica, Guyana and Dominican Republic. She mentions the Caribbean 
influences but rather referring to those who have shaped the pre-disaster identity. In the same 
way, during informal discussions and interviews, Montserratians often distinguish the 
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members OECS countries, considered as culturally close from Montserrat, and the immigrants 
of Jamaica, Guyana and Dominican Republic, considered at contrary as very different from 
the Montserratian culture.  
 
Interestingly the development of the national identity and of the national pride was one 
of the scenario drawn by the Montserratian participants of a scenario project of the future 
development of Montserrat after the Hurricane Hugo and at the beginning of the volcanic crisis 
in January 1997 (Possekel, 1999). The favourite scenario was called “Proud Alliouagana2”. 
Among various objectives, Montserrat’s history and culture were aiming to raise pride and 
self-esteem of the population, for a “people oriented, self-determined, cohesive and 
indigenous, environmentally sound economy” (Possekel, 1999). This scenario was developed 
before the extended demographic changes that affected the island.  
 
This approach therefore aims to develop bonds among the Montserratian community. 
However as some research has shown before, based on Putnam’s theories (Cheong et al., 2007; 
Macnab, Thomas, & Grosvenor, n.d.), a strong bonding social network can prevent the 
development of bridging social network. This approach seems to prevent social cohesion 
between all communities, yet an important support for recovery process. During an interview 
in May 2016, a senior official of the British government argued in the sense of a better 
inclusion and more efforts for making immigrants feel part of the community, saying:  
 
“Some people are feeling that [immigration to Montserrat] is an easy path [to 
move to the UK] and they think that [immigrants] are using Montserrat in a 
sense. So I think that has to be... that issue has to be addressed a little bit 
better. Either we have to... be more welcoming to people so they do feel part 
of the place and they do feel ‘oh I was gonna go for my British citizenship, 
maybe I still will but I'll still gonna stay in Montserrat’ you know. 
 
[…] We need to find a new sense of identity. There was a strong sense of 
identity in the past and there wasn't necessary for somebody they had a policy, 
they defined it for people because people just had it but now things are so 
                                                                
2 Alliouagana is the name initially given by the Amerindians to the Island of Montserrat 
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different that I would say, we probably need to think about how we will 
consciously and maybe through policy, maybe through activities help 
Montserratians redefine their identity.” 
 
The need of inclusion of different communities is increasingly acknowledged by a part of the 
society. However, according to the British Government senior official, although the creation 
of a new sense of identity through the acceptation of the diversity is judged important by many 
on the island, little is done for it:  
 
“I felt that a lot of people in the government, they get [the need of more 
inclusion] and they want that, but we don't have a policy about that, as such. 
We don't have certain practices, we don't have a... diversity coming, you know 
that kind of things. So I try to do that as much as I can in my... and surely the 
Premier you know and other officials you would hear them to talk about that 
[…] So that's something [the diversity] that we really need to promote in a 
myriad of ways and we're just beginning to do that. Yes, we do have Spanish 
speakers at the schools, we are beginning to recognize different groups here 
but it does take a while and there is some resistance.” (Interview in May 2016) 
Some policy-makers and social workers argue for strategies to reinforce social cohesion that 
acknowledge the new context. In this sense, the Red Cross is considering the idea of 
implementing some village competitions in order to create an identity based on the village 
where people live now and not based on the Island where they belong or the village where 
they used to live before 1995. Moreover, in 2016 and 2017 a few basketball games between 
opposing villages were organized, as had been done prior 1995, in order to reinforce pride 
and self-identification for the new villages. However such events are irregular and 
uncoordinated at the national level. The objective here is clearly to unify different groups 
around a common characteristic and hence decrease the importance of the country of origin 
as factor of segregation. Although this village competition had existed for several years, it 
had been abandoned since 2005 (Figure 6.4). Montserratians tend to persist in identifying 
themselves by their village of origin, very often located in what is now the exclusion zone, 
instead of referring to the neighbourhood where some have been living for twenty years. The 
sporting competition reflects the gradual recognition by community leaders and social 
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stakeholders that social cohesion needs to be reinforced and that diversity needs to be 
embraced.  
  
 
 
 
Figure 6.4: Sign in the entrance of the village of 
Lookout about the village competition (Charlotte 
Monteil, 2017) 
The Montserratian population often 
criticize efforts to include all communities. 
These efforts, like the language classes for the 
Dominican (DR) and Haitians, are perceive 
negatively because they seem to make the 
Montserratians being a minority and threaten the continuation of the pre-disaster identity and 
culture. They contribute to post-disaster change on the island and establish a different identity 
than the one that is claimed by a part of the Montserratian community. On the contrary, the 
efforts to preserve or even create a Montserratian identity based on symbols used before the 
volcanic crisis corresponds to the will to recreate a sense of return to pre-disaster normality 
and stability.  
 
6.3.2.2.  Absencing immigration in the identity creation process 
The reinforcement of Montserratian culture is a reaction to the multiple changes that 
have  occurred on the Island since 1995. It appears as a stable element, associated with what 
the Montserratians perceive to be the “pre-volcano” Montserrat. In the meantime, it seems to 
exclude the non-Montserratians, more specifically those who do not belong from this particular 
culture, from the identity of Island in post-disaster recovery. In the interviews and FGD, 
immigrants often express anger and feeling of rejection against them. For instance, a group of 
Guyanese explained that the Christmas and St Patrick periods are very difficult period to cope 
with for them. Many Montserratians from the diaspora come back, sometimes after several 
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decades living out of the island, and tell proudly to the immigrants that they are the local ones. 
The St Patrick festival, while officially addressed to all residents, tourists and members of the 
Montserratian diaspora and enjoyed by the immigrants as well, fails in several aspects to 
include the non-Montserratians. In 2017, I attended a popular event of the festival and noted 
that the presenter was frequently using the pronoun “we”, referring only to those sharing the 
history and culture of Montserrat even though he was speaking to a very diverse audience. He 
was talking about the Irish heritage and the specific history of Montserrat. All non-
Montserratians were hence reminded that they were actually not the target audience of the 
event. In the same way, participants of the Cultural Pageant Competition were asked to 
represent a village of Montserrat. Most of the participants had chosen or were given a 
destroyed village while the most recent villages (Look Out, Davy Hill, Brades or St Peters), 
comprising more than 42% of the total population in 2015, were not represented. A group of 
Guyanese, talking about the event, explained me that this single event was not a problem, 
acknowledging the unique history of Montserrat, but that the repetition of such practice and 
the lack of events targeting everybody, whatever their origin, ultimately felt excluding. The 
strong distinction between Montserratians and non-Montserratians is reinforced verbally on 
many occasions through the specific vocabulary that is used.  
 
Festivals serve as a metaphor of the efforts implemented for creating a post-disaster 
identity of Montserrat. Immigrants seem to be excluded from this identity, despite of the 
fundamental role they play in this process. Despite the widespread feeling of being 
marginalized, very few collective actions are implemented. Anger is present but is rarely 
expressed publicly. It has been necessary for me to organize anonymous and hidden focus 
group discussions to discuss the question more deeply. Different reasons are highlighted to 
justify the lack of collective action. They include the feeling of lack of legitimacy to complain 
as they migrated for economic reasons and the lack of leadership in the Jamaican and Guyanese 
community, preventing the coordination and the implementation of actions. The lack of 
representation of immigrants within institutions and government also prevent some specific 
issues being raised and to highlight the different needs between Montserratians and 
immigrants.  
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 Individual actions by the immigrants themselves, to prevent their marginalization and 
fight against the discrimination they face, are made difficult by their precarious condition, both 
in terms of employment and in terms of the naturalization process. During interviews and 
informal discussions, immigrants explain that they cannot take the risk to complain, as 
Montserratians would, because it would be more difficult for them to find another job. That 
would compromise the objectives that have led them to migrate, in other words earning money. 
A Dominican man (DR) explained:  
“[People] are afraid to talk to somebody because you know… the language. 
And then, they don’t want to loss what they have, you see.” (Interview in 
January 2016) 
Immigrants also often express the fact that they feel they are not allowed to speak and 
complain. They explain that they receive very aggressive reactions when they protest against 
some of the discriminations they face. While many immigrants feel that they are well 
integrated in daily life, there is a diffuse feeling among the immigrants of not being considered 
legitimate or allowed to speak equally to the Montserrat-born people, especially when it comes 
to political or societal issues. A Dominican explained that while he lives on the island for more 
than 20 years, more than half of his life, his opinion is never listened to or accepted by 
Montserratian. Such observations are also made when immigrants have been naturalized and 
are officially Montserratian. A Jamaican social worker explained during an interview in 
January 2016: 
“But at the end of the day, that’s said, there still have issues with the persons 
who are naturalized or non-naturalized, because they, what should I call it, 
there are the personal issues that exist in the country with the persons who 
are non-nationals [immigrants], even if you are naturalized. […] once you 
don’t have, you are not born Montserratian, there is a difference in all of that, 
so… most of time people get frustrated because of that, because they have the 
skills, occasional requirements and they still get the mediocre jobs. And 
somebody without the requirements get the job over you.” 
Because Montserratian society is originally composed of only a few large families, well-
known and well-identified through their family name (like Sweeney, Ryan or Fergus), those 
who do not belong, namely immigrants, are easily identified and excluded. According to the 
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discussions with immigrants and Montserratians, those who get naturalized continue to feel 
and to be considered as immigrants.  
The silence of immigrants and the absence of integration of their culture in the process 
of creating a national identity reflects the wider pathway of development decided by the 
Montserratian society and the role attributed to the immigrants. Immigrants are associated with 
the post-disaster period and to specific roles, namely to support the economic, physical and 
demographic recovery of Montserrat. Immigrants are not part of the narrative of post-disaster 
recovery, as they are not considered as part of the society. 
While some policy-makers and some people working with communities try to highlight 
the need to embracing the different cultures, immigrants are mainly seen through a utilitarian 
lens: they fill the empty positions and inject their money into the local economy but they may 
do no more than “fit-in” to Montserratian society. With the increasing number of immigrants, 
two contradictory trends are developed: one reinforcing the Montserratian culture and in turn 
failing to embrace the new diversity of the island, the other one recognizing the importance of 
embracing the diversity of communities and the added value of the immigrants.  
 
 
6.4. Conclusion 
If the increase in immigration clearly addresses specific needs for post-disaster 
recovery, evolving as time passes, the lack of management of the process and of a long-term 
view has generated some extended changes in the society, especially in terms of socio-cultural 
and economic structure. It has led to resistance by a part of the Montserratian population and 
policy-makers, and a gradual segregation of society by nationality or country of origin. 
 
The general marginalization of the immigrants in the post-disaster recovery is therefore 
expressed on the one hand, in their daily life because of limited access to financial, social, 
human and physical resources; and on the other hand, through the lack of recognition of their 
role in the recovery process and in the post-disaster identity of Montserrat. Considering their 
relative number, about half of the total population, that has considerable implications on the 
level of social cohesion created through the post-disaster development and on the vulnerability 
of the society to disasters.  
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In Montserrat, because it is impossible to recover the resources and the lifestyle that 
have been destroyed as a result of the volcanic crisis, the return to a sense of normality and 
stability goes mainly through the preservation, or even the reinforcement, of what is perceived 
to be the Montserratian identity. Shotte (2008, p.1) explains: “Admittedly, this is an uphill 
struggle since the Montserrat identity is being squashed, and sometimes made invisible, due 
to the pressures from the more dominant cultures in this multi-ethnic, multi-cultural 
metropolis. Despite the challenges, Montserratness is still being celebrated and the desire to 
sustain an island identity remains strong”. Although this process helps Montserratians to have 
a sense of control over their life and the place where they live after a long-period of uncertainty, 
also perhaps to psychologically recover, it hinders adaptation. Instead of a learning process 
that enables the Island to adapt to the post-disaster change, Montserrat adopts a very 
conservative approach that rejects these changes. As a consequence, it prevents adequate 
consideration of the new issues faced by the society and the emerging drivers of vulnerability. 
It hence seems to prevent the implementation of the ideal of “building-back-better” and of 
strengthening of resilience in the long term. 
 
Disaster can create significant social disruption and transform the socio-demographic 
structure of the population. The constraints of the post-disaster period and the need to support 
the psychological and social recovery of the affected social groups can hence contribute to the 
reinforcement of bonding social capital, while preventing the development of bridging and 
linking social networks. In a context of significant demographic transformation, from a 
relatively homogenous society to a socio-culturally diverse society, such a recovery trajectory 
may contribute to maintaining immigrant groups in a situation of relative marginalization, 
which is a root driver of vulnerability to disaster (Wisner et al., 2004). Yet, in Montserrat 
strengthening of bonding social capital has come as a reactive response, both formal and 
informal, to disaster and as a psychological recovery strategy. It corresponds to the desire to 
recreate a sense of normality during the post-disaster period and to recreate a sense of 
community.  
This study also highlights the conflict between short-term goals and long-term needs. 
While immigration has been used to support economic and demographic recovery in the short-
term, it requires accompanying measures to support inclusion and integration in order to 
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prevent negative repercussions in the long-term. In the absence of such measures, the resulting 
marginalisation and vulnerability of immigrant groups has consequences at the national scale. 
Such a development trajectory prevents the achievement of sustainable recovery learning from 
the past disaster and by building-back-better. It fails to integrate the communities of 
newcomers, despite the critical role for long-term recovery, and can promote a maladaptive 
development on long-term. I have demonstrated here that if social capital plays a critical role 
in supporting the recovery processes, post-disaster demographic transformations, from a 
homogenous to a heterogeneous society, require adaptation in the way that social capital is 
mobilised. In particular, even though the immediate needs of psychological recovery may 
encourage the reinforcement of bonding networks, there is a need to build bridging and linking 
social connections in order to foster resilience in a diverse society.  
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CHAPTER SEVEN 
MEMORY, RISK PERCEPTION AND DISASTER RISK REDUCTION 
DURING THE RECOVERY PROCESS 
 
One major aspect of the recovery process is to learn from the past to reduce the risk 
of disaster and promote resilience. Yet, the variety of responses to a disaster illustrates 
various levels of learning and adaptation strategies, leading to different degrees of 
sustainability (Dyer, 2009; Field et al., 2012). Reducing the risk of disaster requires not 
only knowing about the risk, but also implementing actions, either at national scale or by 
individuals themselves. These are directly linked to the way the risk is perceived (Renn, 
1990; Wachinger, Renn, Begg, & Kuhlicke, 2013). The social representation of risk derives 
from the way it is built as a social object through the influence of culture, communications, 
and collective memory (Gruev-Vintila & Rouquette, 2007).  
However, as we have seen in the previous chapter, post-disaster change, among 
others, induces great challenges for the recovery process, in particular to knowledge and 
memory of disaster. The different communities have different experience of disaster and 
hence, different forms of knowledge of risks. Moreover, rapid post-disaster change tends 
to encourage a desire for short-term stability and certainty, and in this way undermines the 
efforts for sustainable development. The willingness to reduce the risks of disaster faces 
more issues and priorities than it does in non-crisis time (Olshansky, Hopkins, & Johnson, 
2012), including a lack of resources and the need to relocate people in an emergency. It 
leads to gradual mental block when it comes to address the risk of disaster. Although this 
is necessary for psychological recovery, it can be harmful for preparedness to natural 
hazards.  
Through the experience of Montserrat, I analyse the difficulties of implementing 
actions of preparedness and more generally to communicate about risks. I examine how 
risk perception gradually evolves with the recovery process and the emergence of new 
needs and desires, and how that affects risk communication. The amount and rapidity of 
change of the society also frame the memory of the disaster and the level of trust in the 
actors of DRR. The study reveals a highly ambivalent attitude of society, including people 
and policy-makers, with the risks and with risk management, inducing a constant trade-off 
between forgetting and remembering the risk of volcanic hazards.   
Page | 226 
 
7.1. Risk perception and redevelopment of Montserrat 
Many Small Island Developing States situated in the tropics are exposed to a diverse 
range of natural hazards. This often means that an island can be impacted by different 
hazards within a narrow timeframe, which presents challenges for recovery. In Montserrat, 
two consecutive major hazards, namely Hurricane Hugo in 1989 and the successive 
volcanic eruptions from 1995 to 2010 (five phases), strongly affected the life on the island 
(see Chapter Four), but also helped to raise awareness about the level of exposure of the 
island to hydro-meteorological and volcanic hazards. However at the time of this study, 
gradual change in the level of consideration of the different risks are observed. Different 
factors affect the risk perception and the willingness to act, including the time passing, the 
level and type of memory, the type of actors and the level of trust between actors.  
 
7.1.1. How does the risk of disaster shape the redevelopment? 
The rebuilding of the north of Montserrat has been the opportunity to build new 
settlements and infrastructures while taking into consideration the existence of risks and 
the experience of previous disaster. The successive eruptions and the destruction of a large 
number of infrastructures by pyroclastic flows in the south of the island has led to the 
creation of an exclusion zone. Its borders have gradually moved as the volcanic activity 
was evolving as seen in Chapter Four. As a major constraint for the recovery of Montserrat, 
it constitutes an obvious consideration of the risks in the redevelopment of the island. The 
establishment of zones based on the level and type of volcanic activity has allowed the type 
of activity allowed in each zone to be defined.  As the volcanic activity has remained low 
since 2010, the perception of the exclusion zone and the level of fear towards the risk of 
volcanic eruption has evolved. With the recovery process going on, new priorities emerge 
and the risk of disaster linked to volcanic hazards seems to become less significant in the 
strategy of development.  
Officially the development of Montserrat is clearly focused on the northern part of 
the island, in other words an area not exposed to volcanic hazards for the most part. The 
Physical Development Plan for 2012-2022 clearly focuses on the development of the north 
and does not consider the zone C, V and F as part of it (GoM, 2012). The Sustainable 
Development Plan 2008-2020 mentions the development of “volcano-related economic 
activities”, including geothermal energy, volcano-based tourism and sand mining, all 
located around the volcano in the southern part of the island. But it does not explicitly 
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mention the south of the island as an area of future development (GoM, 2010). However, 
despite of the lack of an official plan for this area, the exclusion zone plays growing role 
in the economy and social life of Montserrat. In 2016, the Guardian synthesized the 
situation Montserrat as follows:  
“It’s still a grim sight, but 20 years after the first eruption, Montserratians are 
beginning to reconsider Soufrière Hills. The nation’s government, elected at the 
end of 2014, is now betting the country’s future, in part, on the very volcano 
that almost destroyed it. The eruption is the past, they argue; geothermal energy, 
sand mining and tourism are the future. ‘We have learned to live with the 
volcano,’ said the island’s premier, Donaldson Romeo. The ‘long, hopeless 
period’ that began with the eruptions is over. ‘Ash to cash’ he said with a grin” 
(Schuessler, 2016). 
The expression used by the Premier of Montserrat “Ash to Cash” reveals the willingness 
to use the damaged area for its economic potential instead of continually considering it as 
a prohibited and dangerous area. Therefore we observe that after an initial distancing from 
the volcano and thereby from the volcanic risk, a part of the population and of the policy-
makers express the willingness to go back to the south for conducting various economic 
activities. By doing so, they argues that the risk is not high enough and is too uncertain for 
restraining the development to the north of the island only (see also Haynes, 2006).  
 
7.1.2. Differential levels of risk perception depending on hazards 
While Montserrat is prone to several natural hazards, not all of them raise the same 
degree of concern. As shown in Chapter Five, the displacement to the north and the 
rebuilding of the infrastructures and dwellings has been an opportunity for structural 
change and for building better, in order to be better prepared for the various hazards that 
could affect the Island. The displacement has been an opportunity to largely reduce the 
exposure to volcanic hazards and to build infrastructures more resistant, especially to 
hurricane. It has enabled the building of houses generally less vulnerable to the risk of 
hurricane and the setting up of shelters for hurricane in Churches, schools and in the old 
refuge built during the volcanic crisis for displaced people (Figure 7.1). However, as we 
have seen, the level of compliance to the building code is variable depending on the 
neighbourhood, the type of hazard, the type of household, its origin and its previous 
experience of disaster. The consideration of risk in the rebuilding of the north of the island 
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therefore considerably depends on the perception of risks depending on the different actors 
and on the level of consideration expressed by the disaster managers and the policy-makers.  
 
Figure 7.1: Map of the hurricane shelters in the north of Montserrat 
Interviews and policy reports reveal a common agreement among disaster managers 
and policymakers about the need of preparedness to hazards, but with a different level of 
concern depending on the type of hazard. Overall it is recognized that the development of 
the island is highly dependent on the risk of disaster and therefore that the recovery of 
Montserrat cannot ignore the need to prepare for hazards. Decision-makers talk about the 
uncertainty of the future and the possibility that an event may considerably affect the re-
development of the island. A senior policy-maker explains that because the population lives 
now on one third of the island only, the government has to make sure that the population, 
their livelihoods and national investments are safe. However, the level of concern for the 
different hazards and for the need of preparedness largely depends on the level of certainty 
associated with each hazard.  
Noticeably during the interviews conducted for this study, policy-makers, 
community leaders and the general population naturally guided the discussion toward the 
risk of hurricane, mentioning the risk of volcanic hazards only when I asked specific 
questions about it or when talking about the development of the south. During an interview, 
a leader of the Dominican (DR) community naturally shifted from the risk of volcanic 
hazard to the risk of hurricane. When I asked him what could be done to prepare his 
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community to volcanic hazard, he mentioned the building of a shelter in the Dominican 
(DR) church, actually designed especially to accommodate people in case of hurricane. The 
risk of hurricane is a greater concern for the north of the island while the perception of risk 
of volcanic hazards tends to be limited to the exclusion zone. Contrarily, the risk of volcanic 
hazard is not a strong concern in the inhabited part of the country. It is partly explained by 
a lower exposure to volcanic hazards than in the exclusion zone. Moreover, because the 
exclusion zone is uninhabited, it has become less concerning in terms of risk, despite of the 
activities going on there.  
The degree of concern for hazards among the population does not only vary 
depending on the actual level of risk but also depending on the level of monitoring and on 
the level of trust in the institutions in charge of risk management and monitoring. Volcanic 
hazards are highly monitored and controlled scientifically by the volcano observatory. The 
exclusion zone is highly controlled with strict rules limiting its access to specific uses only 
and under strict supervision. A volcanic hazard zone has been created rapidly after the first 
volcanic eruption while no map exist for the other hazards susceptible to affect the island.  
This leads to the perception that the risk is managed and limited to the uninhabited 
exclusion zone. Therefore, inhabitants of the country, disaster managers and policy-makers 
rarely mention the need to conduct more specific disaster preparedness measures for 
volcanic risk. During interviews, residents of Montserrat commonly referred to the MVO 
as the institution in charge of managing the risk. They delegated the responsibility to this 
institution, explaining that if anything happens, the MVO would react and protect them.  
They have therefore developed a sense of safety thanks to the existence of the exclusion 
zone and of the MVO as monitoring agency.  
Contrarily, the other hazards do not benefit from such close assessment and 
preparedness measures.  There is a relatively poor identification of the vulnerable zones 
and vulnerable households to hurricane, flooding or earthquake for instance. However, 
seasonal campaigns are available for raising the level of awareness about the risk of 
hurricane and for educating to the adopted preparedness measures. Efforts are done to 
promote an effective communication and thereby make preparedness measures effective. 
Preparedness efforts are spread across the whole society, not only among the organizations 
in charge of DRR or monitoring. The Red Cross, major agency in charge of disaster 
preparedness focuses on the risk of disaster by adopting a broad perspective, not only based 
on communication about the hazard itself but by tackling factors of vulnerability such as 
poverty, lack of access and transportation or lack of skills. There is therefore a major 
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difference in the type of preparedness measures implemented to cope with the risk of 
volcanic hazards and the other hazards. While preparedness to volcanic risk is mainly based 
on scientific monitoring and on delimitation of exclusion zone, other hazards, mainly 
hurricane, are tackled through a more integrative approach and benefit from more efforts 
for raising awareness. 
Risk perception, all over the island, varies also depending on the groups of people. 
On the 15th of February 2016, after more than two months in total spent in Montserrat, I 
wrote in my field notes my surprise when a man talked spontaneously about what he would 
do in case of a new eruption. He was a Montserratian, grown up in St Thomas and went 
back to Montserrat since 1998. He explained that he was planning to stay in Montserrat 
except if the volcanic activity was to increase again, in which case he would have to 
reconsider his plans. This concern seems to be present among the population but rarely 
spontaneously mentioned as a factor deciding of the future life plan. Instead, the 
Montserratians who have remained in the country talk about the risk of volcanic hazards 
only during the interviews when I raised the subject myself. They present other factors 
susceptible to influence their life course such as job opportunity, family issues or need to 
earn more money abroad. Indeed the formal and informal interviews reveal that there is a 
very different level of concern between different groups of people. The Montserratians who 
have always remained in Montserrat commonly mention the need to move forward and the 
fact that the volcano is now inactive. A Montserratian man for instance asked on social 
media in January 2018:  
“Will Great Britain help[the Island] to get well and pay its people to return 
now the Volcano is real quiet?”  
Moreover, policy-makers tend to mention the risk only when talking about the development 
of infrastructures and economic activities in the southern part of Montserrat but not when 
talking about the north. Other citizens easily talk about the volcanic eruptions as a past 
experience and as a part of their history, they rarely mentioned it as a risk for the future. 
Contrarily, the Montserratians who have left the country (the diaspora) during the disaster 
tend to be more vigilant and concerned about the persisting risk. Informal discussions also 
reveal that it was mainly the recently returned Montserratians and the member of the 
diaspora who express concerns about the risk of volcanic hazards affecting the north. For 
instance at the beginning of 2017, a Montserratian mother and her daughter, both back on 
the Island for holidays after living for about twenty years in the UK, were asking several 
people what were the areas less exposed to volcanic hazards to buy a land and build a 
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house. They were unsure whether the Silver and Centre Hills, in the north and the centre 
of the country, were also active and susceptible to erupt. This difference of perception 
among different sections of the society is often justified by the fact that the diaspora has 
kept the image of destruction as their last image of Montserrat before leaving the country 
and therefore associate much more the country to the volcanic risk.  
 In Montserrat, it seems that risk perception, and the preparedness efforts that result 
from it, depend mainly on: 
- the level of certainty of the natural hazards,  
- on the experience of a previous disaster and  
- on the trust in the institutions in charge of monitoring and DRR.  
These strongly contribute to determination of the recovery process and the adaptation 
strategies to face future natural hazards.  
 
7.1.3. Gradual reinvestment in the exclusion zone 
While the risk of volcanic hazards is considered as mainly limited to the exclusion 
zone, the risk perception within this area seems to evolve as the volcanic activity remains 
low. The evolution of the risk perception within the exclusion zone is translated by the 
change of its use during and after the volcanic crisis. Testimonies collected for this study 
reveal that people only really understood the risk posed by the volcano after the 25th June 
1997 eruption when 19 people were killed by pyroclastic flows even though the first 
eruption started two years beforehand.  Most of the people who were killed were farmers, 
going regularly into the exclusion zone to continue to grow their crops and tend to their 
livestock. According to the emergency coordinator at that time, several alerts had been 
given to them to urge them to leave the exclusion zone. They were resistant because of 
their need for income but also because, as explained a Montserratian woman during an 
interview in January 2017:  
“[they were] doing it for months so they knew exactly what the volcano was 
doing.” 
Therefore farmers were not worried. The death of these people is commonly highlighted 
as a major trigger for fear and realization of the actual danger of the volcanic hazard. 
In the years that followed that fatal event, entry into the exclusion zone has 
remained illegal and limited. However in 2016 and 2017, informal talks with 
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Montserratians reveal that illegal entries in the exclusion zone are frequent and consider as 
normal by many, even by some very well informed about the danger. A group of fishermen 
explained that it is where there are good fishing spots. A couple of tourists told me that 
they went to visit Plymouth illegally, pretending to not know that an authorization was 
required, despite of the visible “no trespassing” signs at the entrance of exclusion zone V. 
Due to its prohibited character, there are no accurate data on the extent and on the purpose 
of the use of the exclusion zone and on the evolution of that use in parallel with the 
evolution of the volcanic activity.  
 In the meantime three major economic activities, all related to volcano, have been 
allowed since that the volcanic activity has decreased: geothermal production, including 
the initial work of drilling and setting up the infrastructure, sand mining and tourism 
(Figure 7.2). Geothermal drilling has started in 2012 with the objective to start to 
production by 2020. Its location, in an elevated point between St Georges Hill and 
Garibaldi Hill, in the zone V of the exclusion zone (see Chapter Four), takes into 
consideration the risk of volcanic hazards since it cannot be affected by pyroclastic flows 
(ATOM, 2015; EGS Inc., 2010). Sand mining also constitutes a major economic activity 
for the south of the island. While it was mainly located on the Eastern side of the island, it 
was moved in 2012 to the Belham Valley and to various beaches filled by lahars during the 
volcanic crisis. It includes work of collection in the valley and transportation by truck 
through the exclusion zone up to the jetty in Plymouth to carry the sand to the barges. While 
this activity has been going on long before 1995, the lahars constitute an essential resource 
for this activity. It has grown from 0.30% of the GDP in 2010 to 2.62% in 2015 (Eastern 
Caribbean Central Bank, 2017). Finally tourism has strongly increased since 2015. Before 
that date, the access to the zone V, mainly to Plymouth, was strictly forbidden and the 
observation of Plymouth and of the volcano was only possible from Richmond Hill in zone 
C. In 2016 the government decided to allow the access to tourist tours once a week, under 
strict supervision. Group tours are organized with a maximum of 50 people allowed each 
time in the exclusion zone plus bus drivers certified and trained to emergency evacuation.  
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Figure 7.2: Economic activities being developed in zone V of the exclusion area. (A) farming, (B) semi-
private project of restoration of the beaches for touristic infrastructure, (C) geothermal activities, (D) sand 
mining (Charlotte Monteil, 2016, 2017) 
Noticeably, pressures are growing to encourage the cleaning and rebuilding of some 
villages, particularly Cork Hill, located in zone C and totally evacuated in 1997. Those 
villages have been strongly damaged by the ash falls but have never been affected by 
pyroclastic flows due to their location (see Chapter Four). Since 2017, pressure has 
increased for even further reinvesting in these areas where people persist to identify 
themselves. Many displaced Montserratians also continue to pay mortgage for their house 
despite not living there anymore. In March 2017, for the first time since its evacuation, the 
whole area has been cleaned up in order to organize the Cork Hill reunion, a one week 
meeting of the people living there before 1997 (Figure 7.3). Since then, other meetings are 
planned several times a year, including cricket matches, barbecues and an annual reunion. 
This goes in parallel to the growing willingness to restore and reinvest in the area as a major 
objective to move forward after the volcanic crisis. The 2017 budget speech, made public 
in June 2017, formalizes for the first time the possibility to regenerate this area through 
specific incentives. From the 1st of July 2017, exemptions from Import Duty and 
Consumption Tax are applied for three years for the building materials imported in order 
to fix or build in Cork Hill, Delvin’s, Foxes Bay, Weekes’s and Richmond Hill (Romeo, 
A B 
C D 
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2017),  which are all villages located in the zone C and evacuated between 1995 and 1997. 
This decision of the government reveals the willingness to reinvest in the south for 
settlement and business development as part of the recovery process of Montserrat. 
 
Figure 7.3: Cork Hill reunion in March 2017 (Edith Duberry) 
Before the presentation of the 2017-2018 budget and the formalization of this 
objective, formal and informal interviews reveal critics and scepticism about the feasibility 
of the project. A physical planner explained that the decision would be taken only if the 
pressure from the population becomes too strong, as renovating the south of Belham Valley 
will face a large number of issues. He explains that the cleaning of Cork Hill for the reunion 
in March 2017 shows a growing pressure coming especially from the people who have 
been evacuated from the area and living now either in the north of Montserrat or abroad. 
Indeed, during the budget speech, the Premier said: 
“The work of the Cork Hill Reunion Committee in organizing the reunion, 
which took place earlier this year March 19-25, was inspiring to us all. The 
efforts and hard work paid off, it was a great success. […] I want to further 
support their efforts and therefore Cabinet has recently approved granting 
exemption.” (Romeo, 2017)    
This way, the Premier clearly expresses the willingness to pursue the reinvestment in the 
south and to encourage initiatives in this direction.  
 The gradual reinvesting in the exclusion zone, formally and informally, reveals a 
growing perception that the area is safe. It is linked both with the fact that there has not 
been volcanic activity since 2010, hence that the volcano is now not in eruption anymore, 
and to the lack of clear and efficient communication about the persisting risk.  
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7.1.4. Risk communication during the post-disaster period 
The efforts for risk communication during the recovery period reflect what has been 
learnt from the previous disaster and the importance that is given to the risk of disaster in 
the redevelopment of the country. As seen in the Chapter Two, risk communication 
emphasizes three major elements, namely the information given, the method it is 
communicated, and the way it is received and understood (Bier, 2001; Breakwell, 2000). It 
contributes to the way the risks are perceived and how accurate that the perception is. In 
the meantime, the way risks are communicated reflects how risk is perceived by the 
authorities, those in charge of the communication, and how they want the risk to be 
perceived by the society.  
In Montserrat, since the beginning of the volcanic crisis, risk communication 
remains very top-down (see Donovan & Oppenheimer, 2013). Information concerning the 
level of risk and the preparedness measures to adopt is provided by a few organizations, 
namely the GoM, DfID and the Governor’s Office, the Red Cross, DMCA and MVO. 
Schools, churches and national radio also play a role of mediator between the mentioned 
organizations and the population.  
Noticeably, the level and type of information communicated vary depending on the 
type of hazards. As mentioned above, there are major differences in communicating and 
preparing for  hurricane hazards versus volcanic hazards. Because the risk of hurricane is 
seasonal, it benefits from an annual campaign of communication and preparedness activity. 
It includes radio messages, flyers, drills and communication about what to do before, during 
and after a hurricane. In the same way, in February 2018, DMCA started to actively 
encourage measures of preparedness to earthquake after several earthquakes were recorded 
in the Caribbean region in the previous months. In a Facebook post of the DMCA addressed 
to the population (Figure 7.4), it is explicitly mentioned that the need of preparedness 
emerged from what is perceived a growing risk. The recent earthquakes in the region 
therefore play the role of reminders of the risk of earthquake and hence encourage measures 
of preparedness (Bickerstaff & Simmons, 2009; McEwen, Garde-Hansen, Holmes, Jones, 
& Krause, 2017). 
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Figure 7.4: Facebook post on the 12 February 2018 by DMCA to encourage preparedness to earthquake 
 The risk of volcanic hazard however does not benefit from a specific and well 
organized program for communication. It depends more from how the risk is perceived by 
the authorities and the time passing. Consequently, it has largely evolved during the period 
of low activity since 2010. Now, efforts of communication include mainly messages about 
the exclusion zone and what has to be done within this area (Figure 7.5). Specific programs 
and drills are addressed to the workers of the exclusion zone in order to emphasize the need 
of use radio and specific measures of precaution. However, according to an employee of 
DMCA, the respect of the exclusion zone and of the precaution measures is attained more 
by force than by individual conviction of the risk following advice. An employee explained 
during an interview that people do not go to the exclusion zone because they are scared of 
the fines if the police catch them, and not because they are convinced that the warnings are 
justified. In reaction, scientists of the MVO explain that they have to remain very strict and 
vigilant on what they allow within the exclusion zone in compensation of the decreasing 
vigilance of the society. Risk preparedness and communication are therefore still conducted 
in a very top-down way, led by scientists and authorities.   
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Figure 7.5: Signs indicating the limits of the exclusion zone and the risk of lahar (Charlotte Monteil, 2016) 
Risk communication faces several challenges identified by policy-makers and 
agencies in charge of monitoring and disaster management. A major one is the access to 
immigrant communities. When this issue is discussed with the actors in charge of 
communication, the language is mainly emphasized. To cope with that, a number of flyers 
have been translated into Spanish and Haitian Creole. The MVO also translated one of its 
documentaries about the volcanic crisis in French. A staff member explained that they were 
considering in 2016 to translate it in Spanish also but did not have the competencies yet. 
However, this documentary is mainly watched by 
tourists. In the same vein, flyers related to risks of 
disaster and preparedness measures are generally 
translated in different languages (Figure 7.6) in 
order to be accessible to all.  
 
 
 
Figure 7.6: Flyers for preparedness for hurricanes, written 
by DMCA and translated in Spanish and Haitian Creole 
 
However despite the efforts of translation, the question of access to these information, 
and efficiency of the message, has been raised by members of the diaspora more concerned 
about risks of disaster, as well as by some staff members of DMCA and MVO. They 
question the type of media actually read, seen or listened to by the immigrant communities. 
While ZJB radio is the main media for the Montserratians, non-nationals, especially non-
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English speaking communities, do not listen to it as much. Yet most information are 
communicated through ZJB. To compensate, in 2017, a Dominican (DR) woman started a 
program in Spanish on the national radio, directly addressed to her community,  in which 
she presented information related to hurricane but never related to the volcanic hazards. 
During an informal discussion, members of the diaspora who regularly travel to Montserrat 
were wondering where the flyers about natural hazards were available. They never noticed 
whether there were some at the airport and at the port, the two only entrance gates on the 
Island. A MVO employee in charge of the communication about volcanic risk explain that 
he has doubts about the efficiency of their communication strategy and hesitates to pursue 
in the same way they are currently doing. He particularly questions the efficiency of the 
MVO methods on the new communities living in Montserrat, but explains that so far, they 
have not been able to implement any other solution. So far, the MVO gives a weekly short 
report on Facebook, a monthly report on the radio, and an annual more detailed report 
developed by the SAC and addressed to the authorities of the country. Concerning the 
weekly report on social media (Figure 7.7), several Montserratians explained that they just 
read the first sentence “Activity of the Soufrière Hills volcano remains low” and do not 
continue reading. An employee of DMCA gives an analogy between volcanic hazards and 
birds. He explains that while early in their life, birds are careful and stay away from humans, 
they gradually come closer as they 
see that humans are not hurting 
them, so close that the human could 
catch them easily. He explains that 
as the volcanic activity remains 
quiet, residents of Montserrat act 
with the volcano in a similar way as 
the birds with the human.  
 
 
 
 
Figure 7.7: Example of a Weekly report of the 
MVO on the volcanic activity 
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 While communication about the risk of hurricane persists year after year due to the 
seasonality of the hazard, communication about volcanic risk has gradually evolved. It has 
stopped being a priority tackled by all types of institutions. Instead, it is considered at the 
charge of some very specific organizations in charge of a top-down communication 
strategy. A policy-maker in the Ministry of Education explains that schools tackle much 
less the risk of volcanic hazards than the risk of hurricane because it is not part of the 
general curriculum. He considers that it is not the role of schools to tackle this issue as 
there are institutions in charge of that. A head teacher explained: 
“We had persons from the MVO, we had them coming in and sharing about 
the volcano. Actually we use them, the scientists, to share on specific aspects 
of science, so where the syllabus requires information on volcanology or 
anything closely related we invite scientists to come in and share with the 
students.” (Interview in January 2016) 
In the same way, another head teacher explains that now, the school does not spend time 
talking about the volcanic hazards because  
“[we are] out of volcano now.” (Interview in January 2016) 
while they were a psychological support and had regular discussions with the students 
during the early stage of the crisis. She mentions that DMCA sometimes comes to the 
school to distribute flyers and talk to the students, but only about hurricanes. Schools 
therefore rely on other institutions to communicate about risks.  
 The efforts of communication about volcanic hazards are therefore mainly focused 
at remembering the past disaster, as an important event now rooted in the history of 
Montserrat. At school, students are encouraged through different exercises to remember 
and learn about what happened (Figure 7.8). 
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Figure 7.8: Three students’ work on the history of the volcanic crisis (from left to right: illustration and 
poem exhibited at the MVO; Volcano Stories book written by students for the Creative Writing Competition 
hosted by the MVO in 2013 (Edgecombe & Gladding, 2016); poster made by the students of a Primary School 
telling people’s story during the eruption (Charlotte Monteil, 2017) 
 
Anniversaries also are seen as an opportunity to commemorate the past disaster, more than 
to sensitize the population. A few months before the 25th of June, 2017, the 20th birthday of 
the death of 19 people in an eruption, a senior British policy-maker explained that although 
this day could have been an opportunity to really raise awareness about the risk, any 
communication for awareness raising strategies was difficult to implement. Although some 
agencies, such as DMCA, and some policy-makers aimed to take this day as an opportunity 
to talk about the risk, they explained during informal interviews that they faced opposition 
from Montserratians decision-makers who argue that they do not want to scare people or 
that it is not a priority. Instead that day has mainly been used and seen as a commemoration 
day, indicated by the speech below, given by a pastor on the 25th of June 2017, and 
published in the newspaper The Montserrat Reporter on the 7th of July, 2017: 
“First and foremost, I must give thanks to God for being with the People of 
Montserrat throughout the past 20 years.  As we look back there is no doubt 
that from the start of the crisis in 1995, through to the events of June 25th, 1997 
and since God’s hand has been with the people of Montserrat; with those who 
evacuated and live beyond our shores and those who have remained to hold the 
fort, including of course Nationals, Non-Nationals and friends of 
Montserrat.  The evidence is there for all to see that we are a blessed people and 
we know it beyond the shadow of a doubt. But let us go back twenty years. […]  
This commemoration indicates that we remember your pain and your grief and 
we will never forget each and every one of the 19 who lost their lives that day 
[…]. 
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With them also, and with each succeeding eruption, familiar landscapes 
disappeared […].Gone with them an island lifestyle […]. Families torn apart, 
father here, mother and children there, old parents and grandparents somewhere 
else […]. We are a resilient people, and that resilience grounded in a solid faith 
in God has brought us through some tough times.  Some VERY tough times. 
But I wonder if perhaps what we need today is to take a break from resilience. 
[…] 
As we think of what we have lost, and most of all of those we have lost, let us 
not be ashamed of our tears. I pray that today, God may use those tears to wash 
away some of the pain, guilt, and misunderstandings that many of us have been 
living with for twenty years. I pray that it will offer us all, wherever we are, on 
the Rock or in exile, an opportunity to draw closer to each other, give thanks, 
comfort each other, and strengthen each other with grace and truth” (The 
Montserrat Reporter, 2017). 
 Communication about volcanic hazards has become gradually focused on the 
objective of remembering, more than on the objective of raising awareness, unlike the 
communication on hurricanes. The memory of disaster is therefore seen as the main 
element for encouraging preparedness.  
 
7.2. The role of memory for social learning and DRR 
7.2.1. Direct and indirect experiences of disaster 
The level of consideration of risk of natural hazards is strongly determined by the 
experience of past hazards and the memory of these hazards (Connerton, 2009, 2010; Le 
Blanc, 2012). The reconstruction of Montserrat has been largely influenced by the memory 
of the hurricane Hugo which seriously or totally damaged about 85% of the dwellings 
(Berke & Wenger, 1991). Indeed, policy-makers, Montserratians, and some immigrants 
who arrived just after the hurricane and because of the reconstruction needs, still remember 
the level of damage. Moreover, the frequent hurricanes and storms affecting, at various 
degrees of intensity, the neighbouring countries, such as the tropical storm Erika in 
Dominica in 2015, serve as indirect experience (see Renn, 2004; Wachinger, Renn, Begg, 
& Kuhlicke, 2013). The social and spatial proximity of the other Caribbean islands helps 
to enhance the perception that the same type of event can happen in Montserrat and 
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therefore serve as a motivator to increase the level of preparedness in Montserrat at the 
governmental level. A policy-maker explained: 
“Every hurricane season we’re actively watching what is created in the coast 
of Africa […] and come across and thinking well, will that turn that way or 
that way before it gets to Montserrat or wherever in the Caribbean […] all 
we can do is being well prepared and certainly […] activate some programs 
and make sure you mitigate against that sort of risk as well you can I mean. 
You never know what scale of things you’re going to have, you know like 
Hurricane Hugo, I hope it won’t be that bad but...” (Interview in February 
2016) 
Similarly the measures of preparedness to volcanic hazards are marked by the 
experience of the volcanic crisis. Policy-makers and disaster agencies strongly rely on 
people’s memory to respect the measures of precaution. As seen previously, some 
initiatives are organized by the MVO mainly to support the transmission of the memory, 
such as writing competitions on the theme of the volcano and the publication of the book 
“Volcano Stories” (Edgecombe & Gladding, 2016) as the result of one of these competition 
among children and teenagers (Figure 7.8). Apart from that, measures for raising awareness 
and for encouraging preparedness measures have decreased. A DfID decision-maker 
underlines the difficulty to make plans for volcanic hazards considering their uniqueness 
and their low frequency. On the occasion of the 20th Anniversary of the eruption of the 
Soufrière Hills Volcano on 20th June 1997, he said  
“Nobody can have adequate plan for volcanic eruption because it’s… the last 
one in Montserrat before this one was about 300 years ago and each eruption, 
each volcano is very different.” (Radio talk in June 2017)  
Most efforts for reducing the risks are based on the presence of an exclusion zone, efficient 
if respected by the population. It is assumed that memory is the main factor encouraging 
the population to understand the actual danger and to respect the safety measures. The 
former governor Frank Savage said: 
“It’s important to record [the past experiences] and that the new generation 
learn what happened in the past, how they can protect the future families.” 
(Radio talk in June 2017) 
A policy-maker also explained: 
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“Technically it is still an active volcano and anyone who thinks it isn’t needs 
to check a few facts, but if everybody observes the rules and procedures, like 
no access to the exclusion zone and what to do in case the activity resumes, 
there should be no threat of life from it.” (Radio talk in June 2017) 
Another DfID policy-maker summarizes that by saying:  
“Anybody who has been here for more than 10, for more than 5 years, 6 years, 
knows about the ashing. So they know that, and that’s probably the most likely 
thing that can happen [for] the volcano in the next little while, we can get 
some ashing of that sort again. And I'm not saying it won't blew up neither but 
we are here, not there. […] any place that people can live and rent have been 
scientifically allocated that they can live there. There is very clear 
demarcation based on very scientific research and the experience of the last 
volcano about where it's safe to live and where it's not.” (Interview in May 
2016) 
The fact that the volcanic crisis is still recent and has constituted a strong experience for 
the Montserratian society is assumed by several policy-makers and disaster manager to be 
enough to respect the rules. A disaster manager explains that the volcanic risk is not what 
they focus in priority as people are constantly reminded the existing risk by the proximity 
with the volcano.  
 
7.2.2. Obstacles to translate memories into knowledge and social learning 
As discuss earlier in Chapter Two, while direct and indirect memory are important 
factors of risk perception, they do not determine the willingness to act and therefore the 
level of preparedness measures implemented (McEwen et al., 2017; Wachinger et al., 
2013). Memory needs to be translated into knowledge and hence accurate risk perception 
in order to allow action ultimately (McEwen et al., 2017). However the literature suggests 
that despite an accurate perception of risk, other factors may influence the willingness to 
act for preparedness and there is no direct causal pathway between the experience of a 
natural hazards and a higher level of preparedness (Haynes, Barclay, & Pidgeon, 2008b; 
Wachinger et al., 2013). Effective social learning may be strongly influenced by memory 
but also depends local socio-economic conditions, on sense of place, on types of narratives 
and on their level of transmission, among other factors (McEwen et al., 2017). Wachinger, 
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et al. (2013) highlight three variables influencing the decision-making for preparedness 
measures: the experience and motivation, the trust and responsibility and the personal 
ability.  
In Montserrat several factors seem to affect the learning processes and the creation 
of a more resilient society following the volcanic crisis and Hurricane Hugo. Despite a 
relatively recent experience of the disaster, the memory of the events gradually evolves in 
time, depending on the level of “memorialization” (Le Blanc, 2012) and differs greatly 
between groups of people depending on their experience and access to “indirect 
experience”. It therefore leads to different level of knowledge and learning. Secondly, 
despite several reminders, the uncertainty concerning future volcanic hazards combined 
with the recovery needs lead to conflicts of priority and strong pressures for reopening 
more exposed area and more generally for minimizing the preparedness measures. The 
tensions between the different dimensions of recovery leads to both processes of “active 
remembering”, that is materializing events and making efforts for transforming individual 
memories into a communal memory, and “active forgetting” (Connerton, 2009, 2010; 
McEwen et al., 2017). Finally, the perception of level of agency and trust in the decision-
makers strongly influence the willingness and capacities to act.  
 
7.2.2.1. The memory of disaster: not a fixed image 
Development of preparedness measures for volcanic risk is strongly reliant on the 
memory of the past volcanic event, assuming that the experience is recent enough for 
everybody to remember it. However memory is not a fixed image representing what exactly 
happened in the past. It evolves for individuals and groups, being shaped by new realities 
and new needs. Because individuals cannot remember everything, information and data 
naturally fade away as time passes and as they seem irrelevant or useless (Muzaini, 2015). 
But at the same time of this unconscious process of forgetting, active and conscious efforts 
are conducted either to remember or forget and contribute to the place making (Muzaini, 
2015). Halbwachs & Coser (1992, p.51) argue that “the mind reconstructs its memory 
under the pressure of the society”, forgetting the constraints of the past as they no longer 
operate, and adapting the memory to the framework of present. Memory helps to shape the 
vision of the present and the desires for the future, but is also shaped by them at the same 
time (Halbwachs & Coser, 1992; Hamer, 1994), leading to diverse and evolving memories. 
It is a social construct shaped both by the process of actively remembering and actively 
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forgetting some elements of the past (Connerton, 2009, 2010; McEwen et al., 2017; 
Muzaini, 2015). 
Interviews and informal talks with Montserratians who have remained on the island 
reveal important differences in the narratives about volcanic hazards when talking about 
the previous experience versus when talking about future risks. The ash falls which 
occurred during the volcanic crisis are generally described as very scary events where 
visibility was extremely limited. A disaster manager explains that roofs can collapse under 
the weight of the ash, and electricity can be cut. Cork Hill and Richmond Hill, two areas 
that former residents have started to clean and want to reinvest in progressively, were 
covered by 10 to 30 cm of ash between 1995 and 1999 according to the British Geological 
Survey1. In Salem, currently inhabited and considered as safe, an inhabitant explains that 
many shops including his own shop were destroyed or damaged because of the ashes. He 
said that they were reaching upwards of 30cm. When talking about ash falls people also 
remember the extreme difficulties and the tiredness they had of cleaning everything so 
often.  However when they are asked about the risks of reinvesting in the south, 
Montserratians tend to consider ash falls as something annoying more than dangerous. 
They mention the need of cleaning the ash but do not express worries about the danger of 
it. A Montserratian woman explains with irritation that there is no need to talk about ash 
falls as it is not worse than the snow falls happening in Europe. It reflects a process of 
“active forgetting”, that are efforts conducted to almost deny the event (Connerton, 2009; 
McEwen et al., 2017). The narratives evolves, gradually minimizing the hazard, and 
although people are aware it can happen, they no longer talk about it as a dangerous event. 
It does not necessarily means that they have a different risk perception but it highlights 
what they want the situation to be. We can wonder if the change of narrative people have 
for volcanic risk is conscious and in this case, is like Halbwachs & Coser (1992) say,  the 
oblivion of the constraints of the hazard as it belongs to the past, or if it is a conscious 
change of narrative. Indeed by normalizing the risk and making it controllable, it allows 
them to move on from the disaster and take action for redevelopment. It also gives them 
back a sense of control that they have lost during the disaster while they were forced to 
move from their house and unable to plan the future due to the high level of uncertainty.  
Transforming their memory, or making active efforts to forget, translates what the present 
and the future means for them. Denying the risk, consciously or unconsciously, highlights 
the willingness not to frame development around risk of disaster. The narratives of hazards 
                                                          
1 Source: http://www.bgs.ac.uk/discoveringGeology/hazards/volcanoes/montserrat/environmental.html 
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based on memory of the past and the memory of the events therefore evolve depending on 
the present and future interests.  
The memory of the disaster does not only evolve over time and depending on the 
personal and collective interests, it also strongly differs among the different groups living 
on the Island, either now or during the disaster. We observe major differences between the 
Montserratians who have experienced the volcanic eruptions and who have remained on 
the island, the Montserratians who have left the island during the volcanic crisis, the 
immigrants who arrived either during the crisis or more recently, and the young people too 
young to have experienced and remember the crisis. The Montserratians who have been 
forced to leave the island because of the volcanic crisis tend to keep a very fixed memory 
of it. Visiting the south of Montserrat with a member of the diaspora and a Montserratian 
displaced to the north, only the first was crying and speaking with a very emotional tone. 
The second explained to me later that she got used to the situation now and had had to 
accept it, otherwise it would be too hard. It is a common comment from the Montserratians 
who have remained on the island as they justify that they have to move on and that they 
are tired of thinking of the volcano. During the St Patricks Day Festivals in 2016 and 2017 
when numerous Montserratians living abroad came back for holidays, many of them 
explained that they did not recognize their island. One explained that she had never come 
back until then and had just discovered the amount of change. For many, the last image 
they had of Montserrat was an image of destruction. A disaster manager explains that when 
he goes to London, the members of the diaspora ask him a lot of questions about the safety 
of the island and the current volcanic situation. In Montserrat, among the residents, that is 
not a daily concern. Only the occurrence of some reminders, such as the sulphur smell, the 
discovery of the sinkhole, or an anniversary bring attention to the risk. In daily life 
contrarily, questions about a possible volcanic hazard in the future rather tend to raise 
irritation and denial. The two groups who have experienced the same situation have reached 
a different level of acceptance. While for the diaspora, the last memory of the island is 
associated with an image of desolation and destruction, the Montserratian residents have 
gradually built a new life on that and downplay their memory of the event, even making 
efforts to forget it.  
A part of the population living in Montserrat, namely the youths who were born 
during or after the crisis, and the immigrants have limited or no experience of the volcanic 
crisis. Those who arrived or were old enough before 2010 have experienced some ash falls 
but did not experience the displacement, destruction, pyroclastic flows and sudden 
Page | 247  
 
uncertainty about the future. Unlike the two other groups described above, they do not have 
direct experience and therefore have no memory of the disaster. They therefore depend 
mainly on what is told about the volcanic crisis and how they are informed about the risk. 
A Dominican (DR) woman living in the north of Montserrat tells that she never saw the 
volcano as she does not have a car. During the interviews, the non-national people explain 
that they know what happened on the island and that is the reason which has enabled them 
to come on the island. However, similarly as the Montserratians who have remained on the 
island, they prefer not to think about it. A Guyanese man in Montserrat since 2004 explains 
that while he was scared and worried in the first years after arriving on the island but then 
he got accustomed to it. A Dominican (DR) man also explained: 
“We have to [become] accustom[ed] to [living] with that reality. So, I don’t think 
we need to worry too much about that. Because we live in here and we depend on that you 
know. We think that God is in control and whenever happens, everybody is in the same 
situation.” (Interview in January 2017) 
The policy-makers and disaster managers struggle to assess the level of awareness 
about risks among the groups that did not experience the volcanic disaster. A policy-maker 
explained during an interview in May 2016: 
Policy-maker: “They know, they know. People absolutely know that it can 
explode any time.”  
Interviewer: “Do you think that non-national people also know?” 
Policy-maker: “Well, I hope so... but that's a very good question. That’s a very 
very good question. […] because if you have not been through it, you don't 
know what the consequences are. However they are not at risk in the same 
way than people who lived in Plymouth.”  
A disaster manager also explained in 2016 that he does not know how efficient the regular 
efforts of communication among the immigrant communities are. While it is often argued 
that people know because they are told the story, the lack of integration of the non-national 
communities and the difference of language for some prevent them to have access to these 
stories and therefore to have an indirect experience of the disaster.  
 Similarly a part of the population has never experienced hazards like hurricane, 
landslides or lahars. Guyana not being prone to hurricanes, it is assumed that Guyanese 
immigrants are less aware of the risk and of the preparedness measures to adopt. Likewise 
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the traditional ways of building houses vary depending on communities and are not to 
always adapted to the topography and the regular landslides during heavy rains. Because 
local conditions were not taken into account, a house built and owned by a Guyanese family 
had been partially damaged by a landslide in the beginning of the 2010s. According to a 
group of Montserratians, that would not have happened if it had been built by 
Montserratians as they have enough experience of landslide to respect the basic rules of 
building.  
 As the population is becoming more and more diverse, the experience and memory 
of disaster therefore largely differs among the different groups of people.. The way to deal 
with these differences also varies according to the type of hazards. While few efforts are 
done to reinforce the communication about the risk of volcanic hazards and thereby allow 
everyone to have an indirect experience and to improve their risk perception, much more 
effort is extended around the risk of hurricane. It is recognized that not everybody has the 
same knowledge of the risk and that it is necessary to regularly remind the level of risk and 
the type of preparedness measures. Such differences between preparedness to hazards are 
linked to the strategies of recovery post-disaster, to different level of uncertainty of the 
various hazards, and to the level of agency in terms of preparedness.  
 
7.2.2.2. Memory and awareness threatened by conflicting needs and 
uncertainty of risk 
The way of dealing with natural hazards and enhancing the level of preparedness is 
intimately linked with the recovery process. The difference of communication and 
preparedness strategies mainly between the risk of hurricane and the risk of volcanic 
hazards reveal major differences of relation between the population and these risks.  
The word “accustom” is often used to describe the relation that all people living on 
the island have with the volcanic risks. Montserratians who have experienced the disaster 
are willing to forget about the risk. It is commonly argued that people are tired and 
traumatized by the long period of uncertainty and the level of disturbance during the crisis. 
It is perceived that talking about the risk is perpetuating the uncertainty and the instability. 
Hence, the willingness to feel safe and to move on contributes to minimize and normalize 
the risk. Being confident in the system allows them not to feel constantly worried about the 
future (Giddens, 1990; Lewis & Weigert, 1985; Luhmann, 2000) and instead to spend their 
energy and their thought for planning economic and social development. Without totally 
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denying the risk of volcanic hazards, policy-makers and residents tend to delimit it to the 
exclusion zone and to consider that the rest of the island is safe, minimizing the risk of ash 
falls in the north of Montserrat and neglecting the fact that some activities are going on 
even in the exclusion zone. A policy-maker argued during an interview in May 2016: 
“Any place that people can live and rent have been scientifically allocated 
that they can live there. There is very clear demarcation based on very 
scientific research and the experience of the last volcano about where it's safe 
to live and where it's not. And nobody can live legally in any unsafe zone.”  
Another policy-maker said during a radio show in June 2017: 
“[Scientists] all say with reasonable certainty […] we’ve seen the worst of it 
in terms of the scale of what it can do and such are the plans in place and the 
hazard zone system that it should never again, provided everybody observe 
those procedures […] that’s the volcano again should never be a threat to life. 
Everybody is now in the safe area.”  
The containment of the risk in the exclusion zone and its high monitoring by scientists 
therefore gives a sense of safety for daily life. It takes into consideration the places where 
people live but neglects the fact that the exclusion zone is both a crossing point and an 
increasingly economic and recreational area.  
Not only is the risk considered as limited to a specific area, but its intensity also 
tends to be minimized. The evolution of the description of ash falls proves that gradually 
the risk is not considered as important as it was in the past, despite the recent experience 
of disaster.  Although people are aware it can happen, they have changed the way they talk 
about it. It does not necessarily mean that they have a different risk perception, but it 
highlights what they want the situation to be. We can wonder if the change of narrative 
people have for volcanic risk is conscious and in this case is, like Halbwachs (1992) says, 
the oblivion of the constraints of the hazard as it belongs to the past, or if it is a conscious 
change of narrative. Indeed, by normalizing the risk and making it controllable, it allows 
them to move on from the disaster and take action for redevelopment. It also gives them 
back a sense of control that they have lost during the disaster while they were forced to 
move from their house and unable to plan the future due to the high level of uncertainty.  
Transforming their memory, or at least the way they talk and perhaps perceive the past, 
translates what the present and the future means for them. Denying the risk, consciously or 
unconsciously, highlights the willingness not to frame development around risk of disaster. 
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The narratives of hazards based on memory of the past and the memory of the events 
themselves therefore evolve depending on the present and future interests.  
The same minimization of the risk is observed concerning hurricanes. While annual 
campaigns of communication and efforts of awareness raising, a disaster manager argued 
that although people are aware that the risk of hurricane comes back every year, they do 
not expect a big event. He said that people expect a lot of wind but do not think that a big 
event could happen. Less than one decade after Hurricane Hugo, Possekel (1999) who 
examined the recovery process, noticed that a hurricane was, “perceived as a rare and 
extreme event that will not repeat itself for a long time”. Having survived a previous 
disaster also contributes to make the concerned population feel they are able to cope with 
it again and do not need to worry too much about it. A Guyanese man in Montserrat since 
2005 argued in September 2017 during an informal discussion:  
“We have survived once, we will survive twice.”  
He explained that now everybody feels confident that they could survive so they do not 
feel particular fear and are quite confident in the future. It is often what makes the 
population living in Montserrat qualifying themselves as “resilient”, neglecting or even 
reinforcing the vulnerability to disaster by being too confident in the system. It refers to a 
phenomena often explored in the literature, where experience generates a false sense of 
security (Donovan & Oppenheimer, 2013; Pelling, 2011; Wachinger et al., 2013; White, 
1945). Moreover, the fact of having a high knowledge of volcanology reinforces the idea 
that they can cope with another hazard. People commonly show high pride of being all 
“little volcanologists” and being familiar with a lot of the jargon, like “pyroclastic flows” 
or “lahar”. However, lay knowledge is not always used or framed in order to promote 
resilience (McEwen et al., 2017). Indeed the feeling of confidence and safety derived from 
this high knowledge actually prevents paying attention to the preparedness measures and 
the communication about risks. It can therefore generate a greater vulnerability to disaster.  
The spatial and narrative containment of risk associated with the idea that memory 
and local knowledge are sufficient to prepare for volcanic hazards helps to give back a 
sense of control in a very uncertain context. Therefore, although it counteracts awareness 
raising and development of preparedness measures, it supports other dimensions of the 
recovery and allows people to gradually find back stability and recover psychologically. 
People often explain that they would not sleep at night if they were thinking of the risks 
and that they are tired of having to assume that there may be new disturbances in the future 
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again. There is a clear willingness to think that there is no risk anymore. The willingness 
to move forward encourages people to ignore the risk and gradually to start to plan new 
development in the south closer to the volcano. Montserratians who experienced the 
disaster frequently says things like “It can’t erupt again, we had too much”, linking their 
need of stability to the tiredness and trauma of the disaster.  
To recover psychologically, as they have benefited from very little counselling, the 
displaced Montserratians express the willingness to stop taking into consideration the risks, 
to stop thinking of it. There is therefore an active and conscious effort for forgetting, as 
remembering appears likely to trigger unwanted outcomes (Connerton, 2009; McEwen et 
al., 2017; Muzaini, 2015) . While for a part of the population, the psychological recovery 
goes through ignoring the risk and living their lives where they have been displaced. That 
goes through the conscious and wanted efforts of reinvesting in the places that they identify 
as home. There is a growing willingness to reinvest in Cork Hill especially, but also some 
other villages which are located in the exclusion zone but are considered as relatively safe 
as not directly exposed to pyroclastic flows. Despite the major difficulties for reinvesting 
in these villages, linked to the lack of basic infrastructures, the difficulties of access, and 
the uncertainty of the future in terms of volcanic activity, there is a growing pressure on 
the government to facilitate the return. The emotional attachment therefore counteracts the 
main measures for disaster risk reduction and the initial strategy of recovery, that is 
developing infrastructures only in the north, out of the exclusion zone. It leads a part of the 
displaced people who have not succeeded to create a new sense of place in the new 
settlements in the north to consider that recovering means going back to normal, or at least 
going back to where they used to live. In February 2017, a policy planner affirmed that the 
government had not decided yet what to plan for the south and whether they wanted to 
redevelop it, considering the risk of volcanic activity. He said the pressure on the 
government to return to the south was growing from the diaspora and the elderly 
Montserratians especially. In March 2017, the Cork Hill reunion was the first major social 
event in the exclusion zone since the evacuation. Five months later, in June 2017, in his 
budget speech, the Premier stated eventually that: 
“The work of the Cork Hill Reunion Committee in organizing the reunion, 
which took place earlier this year March 19th – 25th was an inspiration. The 
Office of the Premier and his team will further support these efforts. Therefore 
Cabinet has recently approved granting exemption from Import Duty and 
Consumption Tax for three years on all building materials imported 
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specifically to repair or build any structure located in those villages of Cork 
Hill, Delvin’s, Foxes Bay, Weekes’s and Richmond Hill from the 1st of July. 
This will give direct support to those people who want to rebuild their homes 
and regenerate these important areas. The initiative will encourage significant 
construction activity in the private sector.  As a business opportunity, it allows 
for the building of new homes and villas for sale as we increase housing and 
villa stock” (Romeo, 2017). 
As the volcanic activity remains quiet, the trajectory of recovery is therefore gradually 
influenced by the emotional attachment and the willingness to take back control.  
Moreover it is often argued that talking too much about the volcano and about the 
risk of disaster gives a negative or scary image of the island and therefore prevents 
investments, immigrants, and tourists, all of which contribute to the demographic and 
economic recovery of the island. The budget speech of 2014-2015 clearly states the need 
of giving a positive image of Montserrat to attract investors and people. It said:  
“the MCAP [Movement for Change and Prosperity] team has rebuilt the 
image of Montserrat abroad and brought a new sense of confidence among 
our partners and potential investors. That kind of confidence is critical in our 
efforts to attract investment (GoM, 2014). 
 Communication about the volcanic or other hazards tends to remain low in order 
not to scare potential incomers.  Therefore, there is no consensus about the necessary level 
of communication about risks, especially risks linked to volcanic hazards. Professionals of 
tourism and disaster managers say that they feel that the government intentionally tries not 
talking too much about it in order to change the image of the island and stop linking it to 
the volcano only. As tourism is one of the major economic development sectors, efforts are 
done to reinforce the idea that Montserrat is now safe. A professional of tourism explains 
that the policy-makers encourage them to not talk too much about the volcano and focus 
more on the other aspects of the island. According to this professional, the volcano is seen 
through a negative lens by the policy-makers as it gives a sense of danger while from the 
point of view of many tourists, it is what makes the island unique. Therefore encouraging 
the development in the south and not communicating too much about the volcano is 
commonly perceived by the policy-makers as a way to reassure incomers about the safety 
level. The manager of an estate agency explains that villa buyers feel reassure when they 
see some economic development in the southern area, especially the opening of a bar-
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restaurant in Isles Bay, in the south part of the Belham Valley, an area largely covered by 
lahars. She says that since the bar-restaurant has opened, potential buyers of villas in 
Garibaldi Hill think that the risk may not be so high, and that they would not be isolated in 
case of hazard. Recent returnees explain that when they were still in UK and thinking about 
going back to Montserrat, the policy-makers explained to them that the volcanic activity 
was quiet. One of them says if she knew the volcano was still active, she would not have 
come back.  
There is therefore a rational cost-benefit trade-off being conducted among the 
society to show and hide the risk (Bickerstaff & Simmons, 2009) reinforced in a period of 
recovery when it is necessary to take action quickly to rebuilding the resources and to 
recreate a sense of stability. The denial of risks is therefore a way to quickly achieve what 
are seen as main priorities.  
 
7.2.2.3. Lack of trust and lack of agency impeding the decision to act 
We previously noticed major differences in the consideration of risk of hurricanes 
and risk of volcanic hazards in the recovery process. In addition, to be influenced by the 
type of memory of the previous disaster, the level of certainty of the risk of the future and 
the motivation and needs for development in the future, the level of preparedness to natural 
hazards is also largely influenced by the level of agency of the different actors, including 
policy-makers, disaster managers, scientists and people. Their capacities to act then is 
highly dependent on the level of trust they have with each other. A number of studies have 
interpreted the silence of communities about risks as cultural response to the sense of 
powerlesness and dependency (Bickerstaff & Simmons, 2009; Giddens, 1990). Ignoring 
the risk when it is perceived that nothing can be done is a way to protect the society and 
the individuals themselves against unmanageable anxiety and preserve ontological 
security, that is preserving a sense of stability and order in people’s life (Giddens, 1990).  
Preparedness to hurricane and to volcanic hazards are managed by different actors. 
In the case of volcanic hazard, the major measure is to delimit the areas where people can 
go and cannot go. It is decided by the authorities in partnership with the scientists of the 
MVO. People commonly express the feeling of a lack of capacities to prepare, except 
staying out of the exclusion zone. A man who experienced the disaster said if it erupts again 
he would leave the island. There is the common perception that people either would survive 
a second time as they faced it once or would definitely leave because of fatigue from the 
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1995-2010 crisis. Many explained that they would not feel able, psychologically mainly, 
to face the same uncertainty as what they faced during this period. Besides emigration, very 
few other individual strategies of adaption are exposed, such as building a house not too 
close toa road and with an edge to protect from the ashes, having a greenhouse for crops. 
Some senior policy-makers clearly stated during public radio shows and interviews that 
there are no preparedness measures to adopt considering the uncertainty of the eruption 
and the existence of the exclusion zone. They stressed that respect of the rules, like not 
accessing the exclusion zone without special authorization, is the main preparedness 
measure people can adopt, and that it makes people safe. Reducing the risk of disaster 
linked to volcanic hazards appears therefore mainly dependent on the authorities’ decisions 
while it is perceived that the people have no agency on that.  
As it is perceived that all habitations are safe since they are located out of the 
exclusion zone and since people are assumed to know the risk, efforts to reinforce the 
preparedness measures are limited even in the areas that are closest to the volcano, 
especially the different neighbourhoods of Salem. Most efforts for reinforcing 
preparedness at household and community levels are conducted by the Red Cross in 
coordination with the DMCA which conducts communication efforts. A disaster manager 
of Red Cross explained  
“One of the things that we indicated […]  is that through trainings, because 
of the family emergency planning, which is household family emergency 
planning, we educate the households to get a plan that a family can carry out, 
you know, emergency action which must be… and it’s the reason that’s why 
we wanted to work on the emergency pathway and on route in Fritz and 
Flemmings community.” (Interview in January 2016) 
However, such measures are relatively limited and the efficiency of the communication 
measures is questioned by a large range of actors, including policy-makers, scientists and 
the general population. Indeed it concerns an area where demographic changes are rapid 
and massive, with few if any direct memory of the disaster, making more difficult the 
implementation of communication programs efficient in the long-term.  
While it is perceived that preparedness to volcanic hazards can mostly or only be 
handled by authorities and that individuals have low agency and low capacity of action, the 
situation is a bit different for the preparedness for hurricanes. There are more diversified 
actions implemented for reducing the risk of disaster linked to a hurricane. They depend 
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on a larger and more diversified range of actors, from individuals to local institutions and 
associations and to authorities. There is more sense of control and agency than for volcanic 
hazards. It is well acknowledged that the implementation of preparedness measures at all 
levels may be enough for reducing the risk of disaster. Spontaneously, actors give more 
practical solutions for preparing for hurricane than they give for volcanic hazard. During a 
question specifically oriented towards preparedness to volcanic hazards, a Dominican (DR) 
man spontaneously switched the question to give an example of preparedness measure for 
hurricane. He explains that his church, in construction at the time of the interview, was 
planned to have a room as shelter. He said: 
“If whatever happens, everybody is in the same situation. But that’s why I 
tried my best to build a building who can be a good shelter for people. So that 
building we have right now is strong enough if anything happens so we can 
shelter the people in it.” (Interview in January 2016) 
The frequency and regularity of hurricanes every year at the same season gives a 
better sense of agency. It gives the perception that the hazard is well known and can 
therefore be better anticipated. A disaster manager explains that the people are aware that 
hurricanes can happen every year and therefore that they have to prepare. However he 
argues, as Possekel (1999) noted some years after Hurricane Hugo, that they do not expect 
a major event to occur as “God is on their side” and major events are considered are rare. 
The expected limited intensity of hurricanes therefore seems easier to manage than the 
volcanic hazards which are too uncertain.  
 
As the risk perception decreases over time while the volcanic activity remains low, 
doubts about the necessity of these measures emerge and the trust in authorities by people 
is threatened. But trust plays a major role in the functioning of the society. Luhmann argues 
that the “only alternatives to appropriate trust are ‘chaos and paralysing fear’”(Lewis & 
Weigert, 1985, p.968). The social function of trust is to reduce the complexity to a 
manageable proportion (Luhmann, 2000) and therefore to facilitate decision-making in a 
situation of uncertainty. It inevitably involves a part of risk-taking and doubt and therefore 
remains precarious as different elements can decrease the level of trust, ultimately to the 
level of distrust (Lewis & Weigert, 1985). It requires believing that trusting will have more 
positive consequences than not doing so. Lewis and Weiger (1985, p.971) argue that “the 
behavioural content of trust is the undertaking of action of a risky course of action on the 
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confident expectation that all persons involved in the action will act competently and 
dutifully”.  
In Montserrat, the decision by the population to trust authorities and scientists, and 
hence to respect the exclusion zone and the measures of precaution, is essentially based on 
the memory of the previous disaster and on the awareness that the volcano can erupt any 
time and can be very hazardous. However, the fact that the volcanic activity is low since 
2010 jeopardizes the idea that the risk is still present and that it is better for the society to 
respect measures of precaution than to move forward without taking into consideration the 
risks. According to a disaster manager, people now respect the rules concerning the 
exclusion zone because they are forced to do so and scared of the fines if they are found to 
be breaking the law, more than they are scared of a potential volcanic eruption. He says 
that when regular activity was going on, it was easier to make people respect the safety 
rules. In the same vein, a Montserratian woman who was part of the group organizing the 
Cork Hill reunion explains that they will go back and settle in the exclusion zone depending 
on the government, when it will decide to provide the necessary facilities and 
infrastructures, such as a bridge to cross the Belham Valley and electric connection.  
Moreover, when in 2015 the MVO detected an increase of volcanic activity and stopped 
all entrance to the exclusion zone, thereby halting the mining activity for five weeks, the 
workers expressed lot of anger against the MVO. The fact that there was ultimately no 
eruption gave the perception that there was an excess of precaution from the MVO and 
therefore that the MVO was responsible of the lack of incomes of the workers for that 
period. Similar comments had been made during the crisis (Haynes, Barclay, & Pidgeon, 
2008a). Despite the need of precaution, disaster managers fear that people become less 
responsive, in other words that they trust the authorities less, if alerts are too frequent and 
not followed by an actual hazardous event. That is even more evident that Montserratians 
generally consider that they all know the volcano, having experience several eruptions 
themselves, and may be able to know by themselves what is risky and what is not.  
 
There is indeed a general feeling that the decision of reinvesting in the south 
depends on what the authorities decide only, and not on the evolution of the volcanic 
activity, as it is perceived that “the volcano is dead” now, as may people often repeat. The 
regularity of hurricanes, unlike volcanic hazard, reminds people that it is necessary to adopt 
measures of preparedness and trust the authorities, as the risk appears too high otherwise. 
The respect of measures of preparedness to volcanic hazards therefore only relies on the 
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trust that they are adequate and that authorities and scientists know that it is necessary. 
Reminders, such as the smell of sulphur or an increase of volcano-tectonic activity, play a 
major role for emphasizing the need of respecting the measures of precaution and trusting 
the authorities about risks. For instance, the MVO reports an increase of calls from the 
public, especially from the neighbouring island of Antigua, where the population has less 
access to fast information, when the smell of sulphur becomes more present. Similarly, 
they report that the discovery of a sinkhole in 2016 has been a reminder that “nothing is 
taken for granted” and that the island is prone to natural hazards, even though the sinkhole 
was not related to an increase of volcanic activity. It triggered questions from the public 
and has been the opportunity to increase, at least temporarily, the interest of the population 
for the information about the volcanic activity and to counteract the efforts for forgetting  
(Muzaini, 2015). However, similarly to the perceived excess of measures of precaution, 
reminders may eventually lose their effect on population and become ineffective.  
The maintenance or reinforcement of trust between the different stakeholders 
therefore strongly depends on the level of familiarity with these actors (Lewis & Weigert, 
1985). Trust requires some evidence of trustworthiness which can be very diverse, based 
on rationality and emotional components. The particular situation of Montserrat having a 
double government makes trust building difficult (Wilkinson, 2015), due to the ambiguous 
relation of dependency with the British government. The latter is often suspected to have 
its own interests, different or even contrary to the ones of Montserratians. Moreover it is 
perceived that consultants working with DfID are not always useful and efficient and that 
they do not know the local context. The doubts about their competencies and about their 
actual interest weakens the level of trust in British authorities, the same who are in charge 
of the disaster management. In the same vein, the immigrant population does not benefit 
from the same familiarity with the different stakeholders in charge of disaster management. 
A disaster manager explains for instance that the immigrants, who used to have less 
trustworthy decision-makers in their countries of origin, are less prone to follow the advice 
and orders of the authorities in Montserrat. He takes the example of Jamaicans who do not 
generally have trust in police because of social issues in their country of origin and says 
that if there was a need of evacuation in an emergency, Jamaicans may not immediately 
respect the orders of the police. The trust in authorities is partly threatened by their 
perceived lack of transparency. When people perceive that there are hidden interests, they 
tend not to follow the recommendations of authorities for preparedness and DRR. Hence, 
the fact that recreational and economic activities increase in the south while authorities 
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continue to claim that it is dangerous to go into the exclusion zone makes the message 
unclear and affects risk communication. During an informal discussion, two residents, both 
non-nationals, were wondering why tourists could go to Plymouth and not the residents of 
Montserrat. Saying so, they highlight their lack of understanding of the rules in place and 
suspect other interests not well known.  
The question of competency also emerges when addressing decisions made by the 
Montserratian government. A manager of a sand mining company, willing to make further 
investment in the exclusion zone and to clean a beach for settling touristic infrastructures, 
complains that the government does not fully support his company in this project and states 
that the incompetency of the current government prevents it from taking a decision good 
for the Montserratian society. He argues that the government is too “small-minded” and 
unable to take big decisions. The measures of precaution therefore seem for him not to be 
based on an actual risk and an actual knowledge of the situation but rather on a lack of 
competencies.  
Acknowledging the fact that respect of the safety measures depends on the level of 
trust people have in it, the MVO implements various measures of communication about 
the work they are doing, to reinforce their links with the population, especially through 
schools. Internships for local students are offered, and visits of the MVO are regularly 
organized for the pupils. They also organize an annual competition of creative writing for 
adults. A staff of the MVO argued that people certainly participate more for the prizes, 
especially the helicopter tour, than for contributing to the memory of the disaster, but by 
doing so it maintains the familiarity of people with the scientists and therefore potentially 
their trust. The same person suggests that they should invite the Dominican (DR) 
community to visit the observatory and by doing so, reinforce the level of trust by a group 
which is not familiar with the Montserratian system and with the various organizations, 
and  which has low or even no direct experience of the disaster. The same suggestion has 
been made during a meeting with a group of women thinking about how to promote the 
integration of non-nationals. It was argued that only by making immigrants familiar with 
the local organization, they could gradually behave in a culturally acceptable way and 
integrate into the society. If reinforcing familiarity and eventually trust into the different 
stakeholders does not directly contribute to DRR, it appears as essential to implement and 
make effective measures of preparedness, especially in a fast changing and highly 
destabilized society. The ways of building trust therefore must evolve gradually with the 
change occurring during the recovery process because the evolution of the local and global 
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context strongly affects trust. This underscores the importance of dialogue between all 
stakeholders involved, directly and indirectly, to DRR efforts, and implementation of tools 
which enable the integration of needs and knowledge of all and therefore reinforce mutual 
trust (Gaillard and Mercer, 2012).  
 
7.3. Conclusion: recovery process as the result of the negotiation between 
forgetting and remembering risks 
Risk perceptions are evolving, varying depending on the efforts for forgetting and 
remembering the past disaster. The negotiation between those two processes contributes to 
shape the “new normal” and the vision for the future. It determines how the development 
is framed on risk of disaster. The trajectory of recovery of Montserrat is influenced not 
only by the past events, the resources remaining, and the future needs and challenges, but 
also by how those are remembered and interpreted. There is therefore an important 
negotiation between “active remembering” and “active forgetting” (Connerton, 2009, 
2010) in order to create a new identity and a new vision of the future. Different strategies 
are used in Montserrat to materialize and memorialize both forgetting and remembering.  
The efforts for forgetting are evidenced by the fact of not talking about the risk in 
daily life, what Muzaini (2015, p.104) qualifies as “conspiring silence”. It is commonly 
argued that if people keep talking about the volcanic risk, it will give a negative image of 
the island. In the same way, frequent efforts are undertaken to emphasize the positive 
aspects of the disaster such the rise of artistic creation, the opportunity for the displaced 
people to further their education in the UK, or the fact the volcano represents a major 
touristic attraction. Gradually, the narratives about the volcanic hazards also change, 
normalizing and “absencing” the risk. The development of the island is therefore not 
framed around of the risk of volcanic hazard. At the same time as Hetherington (2004 in 
Bickerstaff & Simmons, 2009) demonstrated, the risk is never fully eliminated and it 
retains always the capacity to transform into presence in case of the outbreak of a reminder. 
Absencing the risk in Montserrat therefore does not mean that the risk is totally forgotten 
and denied. Several events regularly contribute to make the risk ‘present’ again, at different 
degrees and for different lengths of time.   
The implications of this active forgetting for recovery, encouraged by the tensions 
between needs and priorities for development, are important. They help to explain the 
difficulties of achieving a sustainable recovery and learn from the lessons of the past. The 
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need of disaster risk reduction during the recovery period is largely counterbalanced by the 
need of ontological security (Bickerstaff & Simmons, 2009; Giddens, 1990), in other words 
the need of perception of safety, stability and order, as the psychological effects of the 
disaster are still very present. It impedes the willingness to think and adapt the efforts for 
disaster risk reduction, especially in the case of uncertain hazards and when trust and 
agency are low. An accurate risk perception is also not sufficient to arouse the willingness 
to act. In Montserrat, the implementation of such measures therefore essentially rely on the 
memory of the past disaster, despite the fact that it varies depending on groups and 
individuals and as time passes. The trust on decision-makers is also essential for supporting 
the respect of the measures of preparedness.  
Consequently, the prevalence and gradual increase of the “active forgetting” of the 
past disaster and the absencing of the risk contributes to recreate forms of vulnerability to 
disaster among the population, especially within a rapidly changing society where groups 
have very different experiences, needs and interests. Those who have less direct or indirect 
experience of disaster and less access to communication about risks are less able to adopt 
adequate measures and attitudes for living with the risk. Those correspond essentially to 
the recent immigrants, who accumulate other factors of vulnerability as we have seen in 
chapters Five and Six. The active efforts for absencing the risk at the scale of the entire 
society counteract the limited efforts done by disaster management agencies to 
communicate about the risk. Two different messages are clashing against one another, 
affecting the trust in authorities for respecting the preparedness measures. Dialogue and 
efforts for building trust are therefore essential to facilitate adaptation to risk and efficient 
implementation of DRR measures. 
Active forgetting therefore calls into questions the learning and adaptive capacities of 
Montserrat during the post-disaster period. While learning is essential to promote 
adaptation and sustainability of the recovery process (Djalante, Holley, Thomalla, & 
Carnegie, 2013), I have shown in this chapter that it faces many obstacles and cannot 
become fully effective. Djalante et al. (2013, p.2108) emphasize the role of knowledge for 
informing better DRR practices and “the need for resilient risk-governing institutions”. 
However the recovery process in Montserrat shows that knowledge alone is not enough to 
stimulate better consideration of the risk. Memory of the past disaster strongly evolves 
under the influence of other needs, such as the psychological recovery and the need of 
stability, leading gradually to a maladaptive society (see Lebel, Grothmann, & 
Siebenhüner, 2010; UNFCCC, 2007), or in other words a society that adopts “adaptation 
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measures that do not succeed in reducing vulnerability but increase it instead” (UNFCCC, 
2007, p.30).  
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CHAPTER EIGHT  
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS 
 
This thesis has its origins in the growing recognition of the critical importance of 
the post-disaster recovery processes for making a society more resilient and for reducing 
the risk of future catastrophe. Although the recovery period is marked by major and diverse 
disruptions across society, it is also an opportunity for change and for “building back 
better”. This concept was institutionalized in the Hyogo Framework for Action 2005-2015 
(UNISDR, 2007a, 2007b, 2015) as an effective and sustainable way to decrease the risk of 
disaster and increase the resilience of communities. At the same time, this thesis also arose 
from the observation of the complexity of the post-disaster period and of the recovery 
processes (see Berke, Kartez, & Wenger, 1993; Johnson & Hayashi, 2012; Medd et al., 
2015; Olshansky, Hopkins, & Johnson, 2012; Rubin, 2009; Rubin, Saperstein, & Barbee, 
1985; Tierney & Oliver-Smith, 2012).   
This chapter draws together the findings from earlier chapters and outlines the main 
conclusions of the study. It is necessary to first place it in the wider framework of disaster 
risk reduction and post-disaster recovery.  
 
8.1. A summary of the research objectives 
 The post-disaster period receives relatively less attention from researchers, policy-
makers and practitioners compared to the other stages of the disaster cycle. Most studies 
focus on the short-term post-disaster period, including early relief, emergency response 
and physical reconstruction. The long-term recovery period is still relatively neglected 
despite evidence showing its major importance for building resilience and reducing the risk 
of disaster (Berke et al., 1993; Chang, 2010; Davis, 2007; Olshansky, 2005; Rubin, 2009; 
Rubin et al., 1985). Moreover, existing research is often inadequate in the sense that it 
tackles only specific dimensions of the process, in particular, reconstruction, displacement, 
or economic redevelopment, and fails to address the complexity of the whole process (see 
for instance DeWaard, Curtis, & Fussell, 2015; Fussell, Curtis, & DeWaard, 2014) 
(Hayashi, 2007; Hettige & Haigh, 2016; Johnson & Hayashi, 2012; Lawther, 2016; Tierney 
& Oliver-Smith, 2012).  
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 My study aimed to address this complexity of the post-disaster period, and in 
particular analyse the changes implemented during that time. Although cascading impacts 
of the disaster can impede the socio-economic and physical long-term re-development of 
the affected territory by limiting the amount of resources available for managing 
development (Birkmann et al., 2010), the changes implemented during this period are 
critical to building back better (Birkmann et al., 2010; Gawronski & Olson, 2013), and 
therefore to the future of the affected population. It offers a window of opportunity to 
reduce vulnerability to disaster and build resilience (Kammerbauer & Wamsler, 2017; 
Levine, Esnard, & Sapat, 2007; Olshansky, 2005). However most research looks at the 
impacts of the disaster and fails to analyse the changes implemented and their long-term 
impacts (Birkmann et al., 2010). According to Capoccia and Kelemen (2007, in Gawronski 
& Olson, 2013, p.134), the changes implemented have “the potential to trigger a path-
dependent process that constrains future choices” and are therefore highly determinant of 
the trajectory of the recovery process.  
A major post-disaster transformation concerns societal relationships, in particular 
the unplanned change in terms of social capital of affected communities. Although there is 
strong evidence of its importance for disaster recovery, it receives relatively less attention 
from researchers and practitioners (Aldrich, 2012; Nakagawa & Shaw, 2004). Because the 
demographic structure of the society may be highly disrupted by the disaster, social capital 
strongly evolves during the recovery period. In this thesis, I tackled in particular the roles 
and impacts of immigration, bounding and bridging social capital, and social cohesion 
throughout the recovery process and sustainable development.  
Because it is difficult to measure recovery and affirm when it ends (Johnson & 
Hayashi, 2012; Medd et al., 2015), I decided to analyse the process in relation with the 
specific objective of disaster risk reduction. Considering that recovery involves both a 
process of “restoration of pre-disaster functions” (Lindell, 2013, p.812) and a process of 
adaptation or innovation based on different  learning degrees (Djalante, Holley, Thomalla, 
& Carnegie, 2013; Lebel, Grothmann, & Siebenhüner, 2010; Pelling, 2011; Tosey, Visser, 
& Saunders, 2012) from past events, the creation of conditions for a “new normal” that will 
be less vulnerable to disaster than was the case in the past is critical. Through this research, 
I analysed how the changes implemented have reflected the types and degree of post-
disaster learnings and how they affected the vulnerability of all or a part of the society.  
 Therefore, this thesis aims to better understand, from a comprehensive perspective, 
the motives and visions that shape the post-disaster recovery process. It is intended to better 
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understand the obstacles to a sustainable re-development processes and to the 
implementation of adaptive strategies to reduce the risk of disaster. It contributes in 
particular to a better understanding of the adaptive strategies in a context of rapid 
demographic change.  
 I present here the major conclusions emerging from this study, concerning the case 
study of Montserrat itself, but more generally its contribution for the understanding of post-
disaster processes in a wider context. I also discuss the main limits of the study and how it 
could be extended and taken further.  
 
8.2. Research conclusions 
8.2.1. Recovery: a multi-scale and multi-dimensional process 
 At the beginning of this thesis, I was expecting to analyse the timeline of the 
recovery process in order to find out some key stages and “critical juncture” points 
(Gawronski & Olson, 2013) that require specific attention for improving the process. This 
was assuming that recovery was a relatively sequenced and linear process. However, the 
study has highlighted that because the post-disaster recovery occurs in a complex system, 
it includes multiple dimensions that have each their own pace and their own objectives. Of 
those, physical recovery (settlement and critical rebuilding in particular) is the most 
examined by researchers, policy-makers and practitioners, because it is easily quantifiable 
and evaluable. However, recovery also includes other dimensions like social, demographic 
or psychological recovery. In Chapter Five, I compared the development of four different 
neighbourhoods during the post-disaster period. Starting with the analysis of the rebuilding 
process, it has been possible to identify the interactions between the different dimensions 
of recovery, across different spatial and temporal scales. Rapid rebuilding, driven mainly 
by short-term objectives and without regard to the socio-economic needs of different 
communities, has prevented the creation of the conditions for sustainable redevelopment. 
The development of neighbourhoods without consideration of their interactions with other 
scales may also affect the sustainability of the development of the broader society as it can 
create negative externalities, such as spatial segregation of the population. Similar 
conclusions emerge from Chapter Six where I show that the specific focus on demographic 
recovery was prioritized over consideration of the social, economic and cultural changes 
that emerged during the post-disaster period. The complexity of the recovery process 
cannot be understood or explained in terms of the linear sequence of phases associated with 
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the conventional model of recovery (Rubin, 2009). I have demonstrated through this thesis 
the need to consider recovery as a multi-dimensional, multi-scalar and multi-temporal 
process. It cannot be assessed on the basis of a single dimension or at a specific point of 
time but requires a comprehensive approach to analysis.  
 
8.2.2. Obstacles to the adoption of a comprehensive approach to recovery 
 This study of the redevelopment of Montserrat has demonstrated the difficulties of 
considering the different dimensions of recovery, as well as the strong interactions between 
each other, and of adopting a long-term view in a context of considerable uncertainty. The 
main reasons identified by this case-study find support in the wider research literature. 
Although the recovery process plays a critical role in determining the character of long-
term development, proactive change and decision-making are made difficult by time 
compression, a notable characteristic of post-disaster recovery (Olshansky et al., 2012). 
The large increase of activities, (like reconstruction, communication, planning, decision-
making) during the response phase of the disaster, induced mainly by the need to replace 
capital services, prevents anticipating long-term needs. Chapter Five highlights how on 
Montserrat the short-term need to rebuild has been prioritized, and how that strongly affects 
long-term development, both at the scale of the neighbourhood and at the national scale. It 
also emphasizes the difficulties to implement rapid adaptation strategies in a very 
bureaucratic and hierarchical system of governance. In a post-disaster context where 
decisions and actions must be made faster than during normal times, some major actors of 
the recovery, such as governments, cannot compress on time their activities and decisions 
(Olshansky et al., 2012). Having to follow official procedures impedes their ability to 
implement long-term development plans during the recovery period, prevents the system 
from adapting easily during the post-disaster period to the new characteristics and needs of 
the post-disaster context, and even contributes to the reproduction of factors of 
vulnerability to disaster.  
 The complexities faced during the recovery process are also largely induced by the 
destruction of major infrastructure, in particular human resources like qualified  
professional staff, and the rapid post-disaster changes generated by the population 
displacement and by the relatively high level of rapid immigration. The lack of 
representation of about half of the total population illustrates the fact that the concerns and 
needs of many immigrants do not make it onto political agendas that prioritise the needs of 
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native Montserratians. In the meantime, it induces a poor understanding of the immigrants’ 
socio-economic context. The lack or the inadequacy of statistical data also prevents the 
formulation and implementation of proactive evidence-based policies, both in terms of 
adaptation to socio-demographic change (see Chapter Five and Six) and in terms of 
adaptation to risk of disaster (see Chapter Five and Seven).  In Chapter Six, I show that the 
reactive measures for immigration control were largely linked to a lack of understanding 
of the motivations, behaviours and needs of immigrants. In Chapter Seven, I also show that 
the lack of preparedness measures to reduce the risk of disaster linked to natural hazards 
was often justified by the high level of uncertainty associated with these hazards, as well 
as by the lack of data on the vulnerability of settlements, households and buildings.  
 
8.2.3. How does the past influence the present and future? 
 I have argued that the local vision of what the future of Montserrat should be is 
essentially a nostalgic vision. Although nostalgia supports the psychological recovery of 
the affected community, it proves to be maladaptive. Indeed it fails to accept and integrate 
post-disaster change. Instead, it promotes a development strategy based on pre-disaster 
socio-economic context, no longer relevant in post-disaster period. My research confirmed 
that, as other studies have found (Aijazi, 2015; Joakim, 2013; Khasalamwa, 2009; Wisner, 
Blaikie, Cannon, & Davis, 2004), pre-existing socio-economic conditions of a society, 
including the system of land division, social stratification, level of poverty and the system 
of governance, contribute to shaping people’s response to disasters.  
 I go further than this, showing that the image of the past also shapes the recovery 
process. This image is recreated through specific symbols and informs the vision of the 
future. Since in the case of Montserrat it is not possible to return to a pre-disaster state, 
collective efforts to recover a sense of normality and stability focus largely on cultural 
identity (see Chapter Six) and certainty (see Chapter Seven). For the affected community, 
the Montserratian cultural identity, as expressed in cultural narratives and practices, is seen 
as the remaining link between the pre- and post-disaster periods.  
 This link implies strong efforts to create a collective imaginary of what the society 
was before the disaster. This imagery derives from the balance of “active remembering” 
and “active forgetting” (see Chapter Seven). In this effort, the recovery process is mainly 
oriented to preserving, and even reinforcing, symbols of the pre-disaster period, such as 
the idea of ‘Montserratness’ (see Chapter Six). In the meantime, it operates through the 
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exclusion of what does not belong to this past identity. That includes on the one hand, the 
gradual absencing, or at least normalization, of disaster risks in the collective imagination, 
in particular regarding the most uncertain volcanic hazards (see Chapter Seven). It 
highlights a contradiction between the willingness to remember the story of the disaster, as 
part of the narrative of Montserratness, and at the same time, to play down the risk of 
disaster despite scientific evidence that shows the risk still exists. At the same time, it also 
involves the exclusion of the immigrants from narratives of the recovery process, as if they 
were not a major characteristic of the post-disaster period (see Chapter Six).  
 Active forgetting has major implications for long-term and sustainability of the 
recovery process. In Chapter Seven, I demonstrated how the gradual absencing of risks of 
disaster contributes to direct attention away from available risk information and limits its 
circulation, gradually affecting the way that risk is perceived. It also counteracts the efforts 
made by DRR agencies to strengthen people’s risk awareness, by developing a false sense 
of safety and hence undermining messages that aim to encourage disaster preparedness. 
This may become a driver of vulnerability for some groups, in particular those who do not 
have a personal experience of the disaster, specifically young people and immigrants, and 
those who are the most exposed physically and economically to volcanic hazards. It can 
also increase the vulnerability of the Montserratian economy if the most exposed areas 
continue to be reinvested in for economic and recreational purposes. While a central 
element of post-disaster recovery processes is to learn from the past, the case of Montserrat 
highlights that there are several obstacles to the learning process. It highlights the complex 
links between experience, knowledge of risk, and implementation of preparedness 
measures. It shows indeed that the benefits of experience of a disaster in the knowledge of 
risks can be counteracted by the need of psychological recovery through stability and 
feeling of certainty.   
 The Chapter Six demonstrated that the instrumentalization of immigration to meet 
specific needs of the post-disaster recovery process, and their exclusion from the vision of 
post-disaster Montserrat, generates social tensions and marginalization of some ethnic 
groups, which in the long-term is detrimental for the whole society. The lack of 
consideration of socio-economic change led by immigration also contributes to making the 
most marginalized more vulnerable to disaster. The persisting stigmatization of immigrant 
communities and their socio-economic and political marginalization partially prevented the 
building of trust in the disaster management agencies and the authorities, and the 
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development of knowledge of the risks and of preparedness measures. It thus prevents 
adaptation to natural hazards and learning from past disaster.  
 In this study, I have highlighted the critical role of social cohesion for sustainable 
recovery and the difficulties to fostering it on Montserrat during the post-disaster period. 
Although previous research emphasizes the role of bonding social networks for recovery, 
its role evolves through the recovery process. In the short-term, reinforcement of bonding 
social networks is an unconscious motivation to preserve a feeling of normality and resist 
the changes that have proliferated since the disaster. However, because bonding networks 
tend to exclude those who do not belong to the network, their reinforcement prevents 
cohesion-building across communities and hence prevents the integration of immigrant 
groups. In association with the efforts to reinforce the cultural identity of Montserrat, the 
push to preserve and strengthen bonding social capital therefore jeopardizes economic, 
social and demographic recovery, namely the necessary increase of the population through 
the decrease of population turn-over (see Chapter Six). I argue here that a shift from the 
reinforcement of bonding social networks to the building of bridging social capital is 
necessary to enhance the sustainability of the recovery process (Cheong, Edwards, 
Goulbourne, & Solomos, 2007; Djalante, Holley, & Thomalla, 2011; Hawkins & Maurer, 
2011; Leonard, 2004; Macnab, Thomas, & Grosvenor, n.d.). and to build social cohesion, 
essential for strengthening trust between stakeholders and collective action in the long-term 
(Aldrich & Meyer, 2014; Chamlee-Wright, 2009; Chamlee-Wright & Storr, 2011; Leroy 
et al., 2016; Nakagawa & Shaw, 2004). However, the reactive nature of redevelopment in 
Montserrat, led by the desire to re-establish the society and culture as existing before the 
disaster (see Chapter Five, Six and Seven), makes this transition from an emphasis on 
bonding social capital to a focus on bridging social capital extremely difficult.  
 This finding highlights the importance of better understanding what is needed for a 
sustainable long-term recovery process. It has significant implications for the measures 
adopted to build social recovery, in addition to the more traditional measures designed to 
support economic and physical recovery. Further research is needed to understand better 
which measures might most effectively support this shift from bonding to bridging social 
capital.  
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8.2.4. Obstacles for learning and adapting to change and risks during the post-
disaster period 
 The recovery of Montserrat to date reflects a limited learning process. It can be seen 
as maladaptive in the sense that the post-disaster recovery measures only partly succeed in 
reducing vulnerability, for instance, through the displacement of the population to an area 
less exposed to volcanic hazards, but increase and even create other vulnerabilities at the 
same time (UNFCCC, 2007). Reflecting on the different levels of  learning (Argyris and 
Schön, 1996 in Pelling, 2011) presented in Chapter Two, my research leads me to conclude 
the redevelopment of Montserrat reflects single-loop learning, that is the implementation 
of incremental improvements, in particular, in terms of preparedness for hurricanes and the 
establishment of an exclusion zone in regards to volcanic hazards. However, there is no 
evidence of double-loop learning. Because the changes implemented in Montserrat to 
adjust to post-disaster needs are mainly reactive, they do not adequately address the 
different recovery processes and therefore are not sustainable. 
 Building a resilient system presupposes the capacity to adjust to the post-disaster 
change and plan the recovery process accordingly. It therefore requires governance and 
social systems to be sufficiently adaptable. Yet the dual system of governance of 
Montserrat, because of its status as a British Overseas Territory, prevents such adaptability. 
For instance, it depends on British legislation, not adapted to the specificities of the post-
disaster context. It also strongly depends on the work of consultants, sent for short periods, 
which is not necessarily effective for long-term development. Moreover, as the population 
tends to push for the restoration of socio-economic conditions pre-exiting the volcanic 
crisis, in particular in terms of social relations and of the island’s pre-disaster cultural 
identity, it strengthens resistance to change. It prevents adaptive planning for recovery, but 
rather forces rapid reactions, without previous planning, as impacts of the post-disaster 
reactive measures gradually emerge. Hence, twenty years after the opening of the territory 
to immigration, it becomes urgent to react to the effects to the unmanaged migration. This 
perpetuates the societal instability and uncertainty in terms of future development, as the 
lack of post-disaster long-term management enables the emergence of cascading effects of 
disaster. Moreover, it perpetuates the affected community’s feeling of a lack of control of 
their life and their future generated by the disaster. 
 The recovery of Montserrat proves so far to be maladaptive as it fails to build 
resilience. While the Montserratian community encourages the reinforcement of the 
bonding social network as a way to recreate a sense of normality, that strengthens at the 
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same time boundaries between communities and exclusion of the immigrant groups. Hense, 
the community fails to adapt to the diversifying society and maintains, or even increases, 
the inherent marginalization of immigrants, a major factor of vulnerability to disasters. 
Moreover in order to enable the psychological recovery of the affected community and 
strengthen Montserratians’ feelings of safety and stability, the recovery process as it is 
conducted in Montserrat tends to absent the risk of disaster and thus prevents the 
implementation of efficient DRR measures. Therefore, in the long-term this can lead to a 
collapsing system (see Bunce, Mee, Rodwell, & Gibb, 2009), reproducing conditions that 
incubate disaster and failing to build resilience.  
 
8.3. Limits of the study 
 The study has been conducted based on the experience of Montserrat. This case is 
extreme in several aspects, in particular the duration of the volcanic crisis, the extent of 
damage and post-disaster change, and the small size of the population. The choice of this 
case derives from a purposive sampling (Patton, 1990). The selection of an extreme case is 
justified by the possibility to emphasize some processes during the recovery period. The 
small size of the population and the remoteness of the territory, typical from SIDS, have 
enabled the illumination of the major factors and tensions contributing to explain the 
recovery processes in place. It is important however to acknowledge the specificities of 
Montserrat in order to explain them and before generalizing the study.  
 The tension between trying to strengthen bonding social capital and the clear need 
of reinforcing bridging social capital is particularly relevant for places with a very or 
relatively homogenous society before the disaster. Such results indeed can be more 
disputable in more heterogeneous places as the role of cultural identity and the boundaries 
between communities are less defined. The balance between bonding and bridging social 
capital hence may be quite different in such context. Moreover, the intensity and rapidity 
of demographic change may have exaggerated the reactions, in particular the efforts for 
reinforcing the pre-disaster cultural identity of Montserrat. Such process may be less 
significant in another context.  
 Another limitation of this study is linked to the methods adopted for this research. 
The choice of methods was largely defined by ethical considerations. Because of the 
unusually small-scale of Montserratian society and because of the politically and socially 
sensitive nature of the topics tackled in this study, it has been necessary to protect the 
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anonymity of participants. Issues of safety and language have also influenced the type, 
number and diversity of people interviewed. Both the collection and the analysis of the data 
may have been influenced to some extent by my personal characteristics as researcher (see 
Chapter Three).   
 
8.4.  Further research 
 As the research progressed, the framing of the study rapidly shifted to the role of 
immigration in the period of post-disaster recovery, which became a major focus of 
attention. The resulting research contributes to the emerging body of knowledge on the role 
and consequences of immigration for recovery following a disaster. Much research has 
been conducted into population displacement and emigration as a consequence of disaster 
(Guadagno, Fuhrer, & Twigg, 2017) but much less on post-disaster immigration into 
affected areas. This study provides interesting results that could be explored in different 
contexts. Although the status of Montserrat is atypical because of its continued relationship 
as an Overseas Territory of the UK, it shares similar characteristics with many other small 
islands that are also exposed to volcanic hazards and other potentially disastrous events. 
There may be value in comparing them where there are similarities in geographical and 
population size, to better understand the influence of different systems and structures of 
governance. Moreover, it should be considered to conduct a similar study in a more 
heterogeneous society as the tension between bonding and bridging social capital may be 
less strong. That may involve different adaptation strategies following demographic 
change. This would help build a more complete picture of the post-disaster recovery 
process.  
  Demographic change, in particular immigration, during the post-disaster recovery 
period raises important questions in terms of governance and environmental justice. It can 
induce a redistribution of the resources and of the risks among the communities (Sandoval, 
Gonzalez-Muzzio, & Albornoz, 2014). I have demonstrated that the pathway of recovery 
adopted in Montserrat has at the same time created marginalization. This brings into 
questions how the recovery process can adapt to demographic change in order to sustain 
social/environmental justice. Analysing the recovery process through the perspective of 
environmental justice may provide a basis for characterizing tangible long-term goals, 
based on ethics and equity. The concept of environmental justice can also provide keys for 
assessing the long-term sustainability of the recovery process (Walker, 2012).  
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 This study has focused on a context of post-volcanic crisis. Volcanic hazards are 
quite atypical because of the length of time for which they can continue, their unpredictable 
return period of hazard, or the multiple forms that the hazards can take (like pyroclastic 
flows, lahars, ballistics, ash, lava…). The creation of an exclusion zone and the consequent 
loss of space or infrastructure for instance, also creates specific conditions for the recovery 
process, quite different than what could happen in case of flood or hurricane for instance. 
I demonstrated that in Montserrat, the uncertainty and instability induced by volcanic 
hazards have largely contributed to the strengthening of cultural identity at the cost of social 
cohesion in particular. It has more generally induced resistance to socio-economic change 
during the post-disaster period. It would be necessary to explore whether the same 
resistance to social, cultural and political change occurs in the context of other, less 
destructive hazards, with similar implications for the social and/or cultural organization of 
affected communities. This question is particularly important considering the importance 
of cultural identity and collective imaginaries in the recovery process, as demonstrated in 
this study. Investigating differences in response in relation to the type of hazard and the 
extent of disruption may also reveal more about the role of different forms of social capital 
in recovery strategies and processes in different contexts.  
 A major issue emerging from this thesis is the difficulty of measuring and 
quantifying progress across the different dimensions of recovery. Further efforts are needed 
to develop a range of adequate indicators of critical components of the recovery process 
that would enable the different stakeholders to better assess the long-term needs of the 
society and the efforts needed to meet them. This thesis primarily serves to highlight the 
importance of adopting a comprehensive and longitudinal approach for the understanding 
of post-disaster recovery.  
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APPENDIX 
EXTRACT OF INTERVIEWS 
 
To read: 
 CM: Charlotte Monteil (Interviewer) 
 I: Interviewee 
 
Extract of an interview with a government officer, conducted on 25 April 2016 
 
CM: so for you what are the main problems you have to address since you are in the 
government with the non-national people coming on the island? 
I: Okay, speaking from an educational point of view with migrants coming here to seek 
employment, some would bring along their children, and most time they will bring their 
children after they would have settled for a bit. Hum... the challenges we have, some of the 
children they come from different social background, from... instances where a child may 
not have been attending school regularly. But as the result of Montserrat's law, that every 
child must be at school. In our context, once a child comes on island, they must be engaged 
in some education institution. So you may find that, a child who may be age 14 may, 
because of absences from school, from where they're coming from, from their own country, 
they may only have limited exposure to education. So they may be operated at the lower 
level of what is required for them within the school environment.  
CM: Even at such age? even at 14? 
I: At 14 yes... So you may find that, that child may not be as literate as they should at the 
age 14, who... the person at age 14 in Montserrat should be able to operate at that level, 
they may not have had a full primary education. So they're missing up the basics, so you 
find issues of literacy and numeracy and as the result of that, the frustration comes in. and 
that can find an increasing behaviour problems as the result of that. 
CM: at school or? 
I: At school and sometimes even at home. Because it's true, some of those individuals who 
come, that may be their parents who have been travelling for work, and so now they have 
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really settled, they are now bringing their child to spend that time with them, to get to 
redevelop that connection with their child. But the child may have grown up, let's say with 
the grandmother or another relative. So you find that when they come, they're not really 
familiar with their parents […]. Because their parents have been travelling for work. And 
so you have issues in socially, among some parents and, even to the point where this 
academic year, we have seen an increase in number of mental related behaviours coming 
out among children and most of them are migrant children  
CM: Which kind of mental related problems?  
I: Sometimes a child may be very depressed, may come very depressed. You have suicide 
attempts, as serious as suicide attempts, and you also found that, just their behaviours, you 
can't explain […], and on one case in particular, where the child want to bite them... under... 
their skin… and wanted to eat grass on the ground, so... Some very odd behaviours. And 
you really can't point your hand to what it is, because they would have come into our system 
at a later age, where we would not have followed their history, to know what is the issue 
that is affecting them. And part of it too as I mentioned earlier, they may not have been 
with that, their parents growing up. So it's all the changes, of them coming from a different 
culture and now living this culture off with their parents which they're not familiar with or 
they may be other things happening, maybe abuses or other stuffs like that. But we do not 
know the history about so you have that challenge that we have to be dealing with. And 
coupled with that, is that among them you have nonspeaking, non-English speaking 
students who would come in especially at second school level where they would not have 
had English as the first language. And on top of that, some of them may not have been in 
school as regularly too so it makes very difficult for them first to grasp at the level where 
they should be educationally and secondly to grasp with the language, dealing with the 
language barrier. And you find that play out in behaviour again where there would be fights. 
There would be grouping gangs so they go among themselves because they can speak 
among themselves and not necessarily dealing with communicating effectively with their 
other English-speaking pairs. And so you find that they end up having fights, suspensions, 
not being in school as often as they should as the result of this type of behaviour, so you 
have that challenge among the youths. The other challenge is that, in our education system, 
a child enters, well should exit around age 16, so we have... Child is coming from another 
Caribbean country where their education system allows them to go beyond, their policy is 
different to our policy. Coming to the Montserrat environment they may not be allowed 
into a regular secondary school because they would have pass the age, so somebody coming 
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at 16, somebody coming at 17, would not form part of our secondary school, and have 
education here. So that's now create another social situation where they would probably 
have to find private tutors to allow them to get the requisites CXC to be able to have some 
forms of qualification to get into the job market  
CM: Is it something that the government now would try to tackle?  
I: Well we are. We... This year, which is new, this semester coming up, this academic year 
coming up, it's a... We have an access-learning program that we are going to be introducing, 
and that helps persons who have not been able to accomplish their bases in maths and 
English, at least the bases in maths and English towards that level where they can be able 
to write CXCO level 
CM: So even though they are like 16, 17 years old, they can access to the program. 
I: Yes, they have access to that program. And that would help to build up the literacy and 
numeracy level across the society, because some of these teenagers, their parents would 
now... They have gone through the naturalization process and have chosen Montserrat at 
their home, and so at the result of that they now become world of Montserrat in that sense 
that they become part of our community, and to look at the overall development of our 
community, we have those challenges. We try to build the literacy standards up. Literacy 
and numeracy standards, to build that knowledge up, to allow them to be more employable 
and end up developing other social skills as the result of not being appropriately engaged. 
So we're working on that this year coming through and... But in addition you have at the 
college, you have few more programs coming in but as I mentioned earlier, because of that 
barrier of not having completing all secondary [tuition] properly or not even having these 
O levels that would help you to get a good start, the basic entry into... To help you in your 
carrier path is to have the math, at least the mathematics and the English, to allow you to 
be able to advance in the society, and in your carrier path. So you will find that the programs 
at the college, some of them would have get to individuals who have already attend the 
mathematic and English and they excluded these ones who did not have it. So we are now 
making it open to everyone nationals and non-nationals once they're interested in building 
their…, you know in the community, they have chosen Montserrat as their home... Giving 
them the opportunity to develop these skills. So that is how we are looking at combatting 
that challenge of literacy. Most of the people who come here, now they come for domestic 
work, especially those from Caribbean countries, the more domestic, for domestic work, 
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or in the construction field. […] And most of those individuals, most of them does not have 
the late basic literacy or numeracy skills. And to offer them that opportunity… 
CM: Yeah... even among the adults 
I: Yeah, yes. In among the adults... other migrants who would come, those one... The ones 
I speak of, especially from the Caribbean, they would normally stay around for 10-20 years, 
some would stay longer. Part of the challenge with some of those who come is the 
opportunity that, Montserrat becomes an opportunity for them to get into the UK because 
we are a UK... territory. So once you have satisfied the requirements to be naturalized, it 
gives you the opportunity with the regular documentation for you to be able to move 
through to the UK.  
CM: Yeah, after 8 years  
I: Yeah, so what you find which earlier was a bigger challenge, when the period for 
satisfying naturalization was less was that a lot more people who have migrated quicker to 
the UK. And it affected the rebuilding process because skills especially, I can speak from 
a government point of view because my background is from government [...] people would 
have trained up individuals in an area where there is skill gap and then five years [later] the 
person becomes naturalized and move to the UK. So then you have to start the whole 
process all over again and still trying to build the capacities required for work to help us 
move on on development, and that has been one of the major challenges.  
CM: So by moving to eight years it… 
I: Moving to eight years slows the process a bit more. So you'll find those within the service 
who would have those who are more employable at the higher level who end up staying a 
bit longer and...and actually start settling down, build their own homes here and to live here 
so there is no longer that rush that it was when it was less. It was first three years and then 
five 
CM: Oh, it was three years? 
I: Yes. So then it became... it was so easy, three years like that. It was much quicker but 
when you... for eight years, you would have invested in certain things here then it changes 
your thinking in terms of... you weight the options more than when you are just here not... 
necessarily developed a commitment of wanting to stay. You can take off and you leave. 
But even some people think eight years is still not enough, not enough time... it's something 
we will have to look at that as population growth is one of our objective and recognizing 
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the economy of scale when you have a bigger population and in terms of how you're able 
to move […] the economy forward as a result. And it also helps to build an attractive... 
people are here longer and you're building their capacities here, the knowledge base, based 
on what they are common with. Then it helps us, it helps us with development even more 
than us always having to importing skills for short period of time and then you lose that 
skills again. Even at that time when you would have someone from another country been 
trained, and then they are gone, they leave as well... individuals. So one of our greatest 
challenge has been the turnover of […] the skills at that level as the result of the 
immigration policies that where in place at that time. It's still there but it's not a big rush as 
it was previously when... at the time it was less.  
 
Extract of an interview with a technical officer (I1) and civil servant (I2), conducted 
on the 19 January 2016 
 
CM: how do you feel working in Montserrat? About Montserrat and about the hospital? 
I1: Montserrat? How I feel? I came for a specific job description but the experience is 
completely different [...]. What I was asked to do, right. So in terms of the [...] that’s fine, 
but in reality I think it’s much more challenging than what I expected 
CM: Why is that? 
I1: The health system is in a period of redevelopment right? Because after the volcano, they 
lost 80% of the health infrastructures, so the government has decided to reconstruct the 
hospital, a new hospital, because this is a post-disaster hospital 
CM: So they will build a new one? 
I2: This one is actually a school 
[…] 
I1: I came to support the infrastructure redevelopment agenda, right? It is funded by the 
DfID, so I came as the hospital director to provide technical assistance, so the 
redevelopment of hospital infrastructures and services 
CM: And where will be this hospital? 
I1: Where will it be? The location? We’re not sure yet! It’s still looking for preferred site 
Page | 302 
 
CM: There are some ideas at least? 
I1: Yes we have ideas! But let me tell you. When I came, there was a preferred site and 
after two years, the government changed and the new government wants the hospital in 
another site 
CM: Why did they change? 
I1: Why did they change? Politicians. Not even to do with… not even to do with evidence. 
So when I came here the hospital site was this site for redevelopment. After the last 
elections, we are now looking for another site. So that’s create a little of… for me, of 
frustration. In that, after two years, I don’t think much have been achieved after two years. 
And the reason is, for that, I think one: it could be circumstances beyond the government, 
beyond my control, because the government change policy direction. That’s why. And 
second of that… I say a lot about the government, I don’t think people here on island after 
volcano, who didn’t go, left to England, I don’t think they are much accommodating for 
redevelopment…. 
CM: What do you mean? 
I1: They are not too welcoming foreign consultants to come to teach them the things 
CM: The people who left the island? 
I1: The people who have remained 
CM: Oh yes ok 
I2: So you had 2-3000 who remained and about 10-11,000 who left. And then the people 
who staid all the time, obviously most of them came from the south of the island. And then 
here they settled their own life, their own bubble if you like and they are very protective of 
Montserrat, they are very… you know, because you lost a lot, your identity and all the 
things, they are protective from foreign people coming in, and the impact they always done 
But interestingly, I’m not foreigner, I am a Caribbean 
I2: Which is funny [...] because he is a West Indian and I am a Montserratian and we are 
treated differently. You know I come from here and almost everybody knows me but I 
studied in the UK and I was off for a long time 
CM: And that’s enough for… 
I2: That’s enough for them to [..] 
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CM: And you, you don’t consider yourself as a foreigner [speaking to I1]? 
I1: I am, let me tell you I am… 
I2: He is, he is! but not in a such negative way as much who did not come from the region 
I1: I don’t care 
I2 (Addressing to I1): Yes but [...] people are accepting you because you are West Indian, 
they have a connection with you as English person [I1 disagree] 
I1: No no no, I am here from the Third World, [...] there is acceptance in my behaviour to 
not to do that 
I2: But you behave in a way that they are familiar because you are West Indian 
I1:Because I am Grenadian yes! I am much more emotionally strong but I must say… even 
though I am from Caribbean, right? Coming here, this is a shock for me. Because I am from 
Grenada which is a small island and went to Trinidad which is a multi-racial society [...] 
and I am accepted as a professional. Here they don’t accept me. They don’t accept [...] and 
I have no excuse. And the thing is that also, I came with DfiD. And some people, that are 
blaming development, the stage of development and the difficulties, the lack of 
development and DfiD 
CM: Oh they complain about DfiD? 
I1: DfiD yes. So anybody that DfID bring here and funded for working here will experience 
some sorts of resistance. So there is this issue, right?   
CM: But this resistance that you feel is from the politicians? from the… 
I1: No! The resistance is from the civil service, from the structure. The resistance is from 
the [...], the civil servants, the public servants. [...] I will tell you. Politicians resist. I don’t 
think there is a [...] from the politicians.  
I2: And politicians are… most of them are local nevertheless. They still have personal 
issues with working with outside consultants. And that influences how they work 
I1: No I think… no but I think that for strict professional point of view, it’s not how the 
politicians proceed. Civil servant bureaucracy and that resistance to change to way they do 
business. Right? And it’s rooted in culture. And what you will see is that Montserratians 
are, most of Montserratians work overseas, go to UK to do their Master and Undergrad. So 
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they [...], most of my friends here went to same University as me, we fought together, we 
computed the same exams and here now, they don’t even accepted 
I2: And this is in the 90s […] and they were friends. The difference wasn’t here. And 
professionally thought they were also resisting together. It’s our psychological, you 
know… being protective of Montserrat and being protective of the little, of what was left 
because there is not so much which was left compared to what was here before. So it’s 
partly understandable  
CM: No but I understand but…  
I2: You know it’s not right but it’s understandable.  
I1: Another thing in the resistance I see is in the disparities in [...]. 
CM: In what? 
I1: In salaries. Disparities. Because foreign consultants are paid international rates. And 
the locals are paid the local salary. And there is a big gap. And that is expected. So a 
technical person will get 5,000$, and DfiD, funded by the DfID to do the same work he 
will get 20,000$. And that is actually parallel public services that you have, and that is [...] 
animosity and resistance from the public service  
I2: And that is at every level. I heard senior, senior people to say the same thing. 
I1: I thing that is one of the problem. But my experience here as director here… if I had to 
come back here, I would not sure. 
CM: Really? 
I1: No I would not.  
CM: Because too much resistance, too much difficulties? 
I1: Well that is one and… I don’t think… I don’t think we share the same vision. There is 
the issue of capacities here. Most of people here, they don’t go anywhere. They came for 
university and they work here and that’s all. Somebody like me who work as a director in 
Trinidad [...], so I have understanding of the health sector. But people that are here [...]. So 
if you come and say that you can be more efficient they don’t support but they never 
experienced it. So there is a capacity issue here. They may have an important qualification 
but don’t have really the exposure to work with… 
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[…} So for people coming to tell them it’s very very hard. And you see that, you will notice 
that. Montserrat is considered to be one of the most researched country in the world. And 
you see you are here. There are [..] of consultants and who well work. But it’s on paper, 
nothing to do in practice. So the difficulty is how you institutionalize all of that, how you 
implement. Implement change in Montserrat, that is very complex. And this is the most 
complex place I’ve ever seen. […] 
 
Extract of an interview with a teacher (Secondary School), on the 26 January 2016 
 
CM: And which kind of changes did you observe in the school since the eruption? 
I: Changes in the staff, composition of staffs. Changes in the number of students and the 
nationality of the students. 
CM: So when you say changes in the composition of staff, what do you mean? 
I: Well, we have frequent turn over among the staffs, teachers left, you have to recruit a 
new one and then they left. So you have that change over most every years 
CM: But do you mean that they are going to another school in Montserrat or…? 
I: No, no they are going off island. This is the only secondary school of Montserrat. No so, 
off island. The recruitment has slowed just a bit now, except that we having difficulties for 
teachers in some subject areas, particularly math and English.  
CM: So the teachers, where do they come from? And the staff in general? 
I: We have from Dominica, we have from Jamaica, we have from Guyana, we have from 
St Vincent, we have locals… all across the Caribbean. At one point we had from India as 
well. 
CM:  And was it the same before the eruption? Or when you started? 
I: No, it wasn’t as bad, you had quite a large number of Montserratians, of teachers. But 
after with the eruptions, they have lost their home, some of them lost their job because most 
people migrated, the population of the school at one time was as low as 92 
CM: And now it is? 
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I: It is 340. So that’s recovery. But I haven’t really identified students based on their 
nationality in the school but I can tell you that the population of Montserratians in the 
school now is just about half. They are from all across the Caribbean.  
CM: And because you have lots of teachers and staffs from other countries, do you face 
some particular issues with that, or…? 
I: For me the biggest concern is that… is retention. Whether they are going to continue the 
next year, so they are on contract so whether they are going to continue their contract or 
not. That is really the biggest issue I have with the staffs who are not from Montserrat. 
What we have done to include some of the culture, to include some of the strengths from 
whatever they are from, in our school, in cultural aspects of the… so we had a cultural 
presentation, we did it twice. We actually featured the culture of all other territories, so 
they were able to share and everybody appreciate each other’s culture. And that was really 
really essential for the unity of the school.  
CM: Yes I guess, it’s very interesting! For how long did you do that?  
I: We have done it for Commonwealth day, we did it twice. Two separate occasions on 
Commonwealth day.  
CM: So it was the staffs and students also? 
I: Staffs and students.   
CM: And which kind of cultural aspects did they present? 
I: some they danced, some did more dramatic presentations, and displayed for… flags and 
[] items. So we had that. We have a number of students from Santo Domingo, Spanish 
speaking, and I guess they are different in term of culture from us, but they were able to 
portray their culture, they did it and dance. And the students accepted what they did, and 
actually presently surprised, the presentations, they were very welcoming.   
CM: You were not expecting that?  
I: Not expected, they didn’t expect it. I mean, they did their national dance, most of students 
had no idea on what their national dance was, so they didn’t expect indeed they will be 
quite dramatic but most of students enjoyed it. It’s different to what they would do here. 
So those, activities like those actually help to strengthen the school.  
CM: What kind of other activities do you do to integrate them? 
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I: Well basically what we do, we include anything in what we do right? And we had the 
opportunity to show case talents and culture from each of the individual island. We do so, 
and we also allow the students from each island, and allow their parents, to determine which 
aspect of the culture they want to show case. So we don’t specify, we let them decide with 
their parents what they will show case.  
CM: Yes, so according to their own personality and… So you told that the Spanish students 
are the most different culturally. So what… how to you see that? In daily life, at the school? 
I: At the school… It is just that… getting them to conform to what we have here. One of 
the things I have found out by speaking with residents here who are from Santo Domingo 
is that the children are given certain privileges earlier than ours. 
CM: What kind of privileges? 
I: So that they are free to make decisions, they are free to attend, you know, they can attend 
shows later in the evening. So that you may have a local child 16, on the 16, not be able or 
shouldn’t be able to do certain things or go certain places. In their culture, that’s not so. 
You know, they are freer, their children. We have to bring remind that it is the way, we are 
and they need to obey… That’s basically it for them. And then the other challenge now that 
the school face now and that it didn’t face pre-volcano, it’s the influx of students with a 
second language, Spanish. So we now have to find a way to help them. To learn English, 
because they need to learn English. Because all school is in English. 
CM: So how do they manage? Because it takes time to learn a new language… 
I: Actually honestly because the numbers are greater now, we have more problems than we 
used. When the number was smaller, they quickly learned the English because then they 
needed to communicate with the others. But now, we have 20, plus maybe 25 or then, so 
you find they gather in groups and they continue to speak Spanish. When we had 2 or 3, 
they learned the language quicker.  
CM: Yes, I assumed it’s because they had to. 
I: They had to. But now, that they don’t have to they can ask to friends who know some 
English, what’s the word they said, you know, it’s even more difficult to learn for them the 
English. They learn the book and they learn our dialect. But instruction isn’t in dialect. So 
they can tell you in dialect but then translate it into written form, they have problem.  
CM: And how the teachers manage that?  
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I: They try to teach them the English. Some of them actually give up to make it easier for 
them because they know they have the ability, they will translate to them sometimes in 
Spanish to let them to do the work, but it’s not really the best, because they still need to do 
it in English. And that they are some who will work in Spanish and English to try and [..], 
we are looking at make different strategies to try to teach the English.  
CM: And at the end, what is the level of the students? 
I: Some of them are quite good, but the job after is the English language. If they want to be 
examined in French, sorry in Spanish, it would be okay. But it doesn’t work because the 
exit exam from the Caribbean council, CXC, is in English.  
[…] 
CM: And about the other students, like Guyanese and Jamaican…? 
I: They, they already speaks English so, they tend to be ok. The only time we will see a 
difficulty among the students is if in our society there are some incidents. If there are some 
disagreements between the Guyanese and Jamaicans and so on, or whatever… when they 
come to school, the students will discuss, so after very quickly we say them “it’s not 
acceptable” and what they do in over there is not acceptable” you know… We have sessions 
on how to respects each other, like females, and values, and… We haven’t had to do that 
for long time. So it’s ok, it’s… understanding that students are from different backgrounds 
and then they will have different experiences and different cultures. And getting all the 
students to respect differences, to be inclusive, and… to understand the culture, and share, 
so… 
CM: I assume that the fact of having teachers from different countries may help 
I: It may help, yes absolutely. We remind them that once you enter the gate of Montserrat 
Secondary School, I’m not interesting of where you are from, you are student of Montserrat 
Secondary School and it’s all your identity here. So, they understand that as well. It 
probably helps their community as well cause, the children now understand and they have 
friends from different countries so parents now have to accept that our children have friends 
from different places. And in PTA meetings, I would have said to their parents, because 
when we have PTA,  
CM: PTA is? 
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I: Parents-teacher association. I make sure that they are our students and I don’t make a 
difference if they are Guyanese, Jamaican, Santo Domingo… they are students of the MSS 
and reports on students of the MSS and any talk about where you are from, I don’t entertain 
it. 
 
Extract of an interview with a senior office of the British government in Montserrat, 
of the 13 May 2016 
 
CM: So I am very confused whether they would be a minority or…  
I: Well, they would be statistics because the immigration department... I don't know if they 
released them to you  
CM: I asked but they said they didn't have those specific data and… 
I: Yes, they wouldn't... I don't have any idea on what the ratio would be but that would be 
really interesting to know  
[…] No, and even if they don't release to, you know, outside researchers, it's the kind of 
information that our statistic people should be having or gathering. Because statistic... we 
need evidence-based policy and our statistic so far are very, are weak here, you know. So 
people are beginning to think to gather statistics like that, they are hard pressed to even do 
the basic economic statistics and social statistics, so... but you're right, I mean that would 
be a very interesting piece of information. That would help somebody doing an analysis to 
make a judgement about how open we are, how non-open we are. […] 
Because most of what people think is based on perception here and some people, it doesn't 
matter whether data are available or not, they're not interested in that part 
CM: Of course, and in that case you cannot...  
I: But it is the responsibility of government to be making evidence-based policy. So it is an 
issue for the government. We can't tell the public to do that. Although I heard somebody 
famous, I can't remember the name of that person, but I like the saying. He said: "everybody 
has the right to their own opinion but not everyone has the right to their own... evidence" 
["Everyone is entitled to his own opinion, but not his own facts" is a quotation from the 
late U.S. Senator Daniel Patrick Moynihan]. You know, it means that evidences are 
evidences. Yes... so I think that's probably universal.  
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[…] 
CM: Considering the fact that Montserrat is very prone to several natural hazards, what 
is the view of the British government about the risks of disaster? 
I: Okay, well... maybe we can go back to your earlier question on what is the relationship 
between UK government and the government here in the UK, Okay... Montserrat is one of 
the 14 overseas territory, you must know all of this, and they are through all over the world. 
And the relationship is that the overseas territories are former colonies, they're not called 
colonies now because it's a different relationship mitigated by constitution, so it's a lot 
less... it's not like that, it's more of a partnership or at least that's the idea. Okay so, the 
government of... the UK government passed a white paper in 2012, which you should look 
at, which is about the overseas territory which states the policy toward the overseas 
territories which is basically that it has an obligation toward them. They are territory of 
Britain, okay, so... you know you have some places with tinier population than here, you 
know Pitcairn, there is a lot of British aid which goes in there because their obligation is to 
sustain the people as long as the place is habitable in the territory. And that's certainly true 
for Montserrat. Yes, there are hazards […], there are hurricanes and earthquakes, and they 
haven't had this volcano for 300 years or so. So there is no intention of the British 
government because it is a risky place, you know, to change in that policy. What we do, 
it's trying to ensure that our policies take into consideration the risks here and helps to 
mitigate them, helps Montserratians be resilient and be able to mitigate them and the 
government in such a way that... you know... Because we have a small economy, 
governance in such a way that we take advantage of whatever economic opportunities are 
there. And you have the right kind of system in place and governance and so on, that's the 
territory is able to govern itself more and more, you know, more efficiently and boost the 
economy, that's the interest of the UK government in the territories.  
CM: Yes, but I assume that even if there is that obligation, you have to take into 
consideration the risks, the different hazards 
I: Yes 
CM: So how does that affect the way, the development of Montserrat?  
I: Well, you know... part of governance here is managing, is disaster management. So we 
have a big shrunk of that, we have the MVO, which is probably the State of the art of 
volcano monitoring place of the world, everybody... we have an exclusion zone, people 
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can't go where surely the volcano could erupt again. We know... we know a lot of that 
volcano now. We don't know when it might erupt but we know a lot on what might happens 
if it does, so you know. We are all in the North now, you know, we don't, we're now in the 
South, that's one of the way of managing, we manage hum... if you can go in, if you can't, 
you know, all that kind of stuffs. So that's the volcano part. You know we have to think 
about marine safety and all those kinds of things, in that context.  
Then the other part is earthquakes and hurricanes. We have earthquakes all the time just 
because we have an active volcano, but none of them have been that serious. But that's true 
in the all Caribbean, Antigua, our neighbours and so on, are prone to earthquake, and 
perhaps tsunamis can happen in the Caribbean but we have warning systems, we have 
monitoring systems for that, to... and then we have a disaster management facility, yeah? 
And then the governor, the governor has a big responsibility for that […]. And when, and 
this particularly focuses on hurricanes you know, but it's generally on disasters.  
[…] 
CM: And what is the view of people on volcanic risk? 
I: They don't… they don't want to hear anything about it because they've been exhausted 
about  
CM: Yes that's totally normal, but at the same time… 
I: Yes, but they know, they know. People absolutely know that it can explode any time.  
CM: Do you think that non-national people also know?  
I: Well, I hope so... but that's a very good question. That’s a very very good question. But 
that's a very good question because if you have been through it, you don't know what the 
consequences are. However, they are not at risk in the same way than people who lived in 
Plymouth. They are safe in terms of the eruption of the Soufriere, right? But ashing, they 
didn't experience... I've been told in 2010 we had heavy ashing, so everybody who has been 
here before knows that ashing is not a nice thing. Ash fall, you know, that could happen 
any time, so anybody who has been here for more than 10, for more than 5 years, 6 years, 
knows about the ashing. So they know that, and that's probably the most likely thing that 
can happen vis-a-vis of the volcano in the next little while, we can get some ashing of that 
sort again. And I'm not saying it won't blew up neither but we are here, not there. 
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CM: Yes, yes that's true. But aren’t you concerned about the houses in Flemmings, 
Hope…? Because it is a lot of non-nationals living there… 
I: Yes, but any place that people can live and rent have been scientifically allocated that 
they can live there. There is very clear demarcation based on very scientific research and 
the experience of the last volcano about where it's safe to live and where it's not. And 
nobody can live legally in any unsafe zone. There is some activities carried on, some are 
in the unsafe zone, people go on and do that like in Cork hill car races and stuffs like that, 
but you cannot live, you are not allowed to live and it is monitored anyway, so you know... 
but has been scientifically designated a safe zone. 
CM: Yes, but for the ash falls? Ash falls can go... 
I: Anywhere, they would come in Brades  
CM: Yes, exactly, that's why... all those houses that are not in so good condition,  
I: Yes, but that's the problem. Housing is a problem here and the Premier has that in the 
top of his agenda. You know, housing is.... he is working very hard to trying to build the 
housing at optimal standards. Hum... so that is a concern that housing... it, it... in some 
place, it's not adequate, but it's not because of the ashing, because we're all subject to the 
ashing, doesn't matter what kind of house you live in. 
CM: Yes, some houses I guess are more resistant 
I: Some may be closer, but when it happens ... or the roofs may be fallen like that, yes of 
course, but that may happen in heavy rain. You know, they're just... the standard isn't high 
enough... People shouldn't be living but have to live in those kinds of houses and things 
have really really been done to try and build new houses for them and get people to move 
in better houses. So that is a concern but it is not one that has been ignored and the housing 
thing is not like... oh well, this is for this kind of persons but not for that kind of people 
because it's anyone who lives in substandard housing, you know... yes... okay? 
 
 
 
